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ABSTRACT
PUTTING THE WORLD ON THE COUCH:
CULTURAL AUTHORITY AS A DIMENSION OF
MID-20™ CENTURY POPULAR PSYCHIATRY AND PSYCHOANALYSIS
David Park
Dissertation Supervisor: Larry Gross
From the late 1930’s through the early 1960’s, a sizeable cohort of psychiatrists and
psychoanalysts wrote for lay audiences. Their writing merged the concerns of the professional
with the interests of the lay person, and motivated special conditions for the establishment of the
author’s authority. This situation gave rise to a variety of strategic forms of authoritative
presentations, considered here in terms of cultural authority, a term that allows for a focus on both
the terminology and the narratives that were constructed in this genre of writing. This sense of
cultural authority is applied to the popular writings of the following prominent psychiatrists and
psychoanalysts: Karl Menninger, William Menninger, Edward Strecker, Fredric Wertham,
Robert Lindner, Erich Fromm, and Thomas Szasz. It is argued that the strategies that these
experts used were shaped by their professional backgrounds, as psychiatric and psychoanalytic
standpoints reproduced their institutional alignments and oppositions through the authoritative
discourse offered by these experts. Opposing, though occasionally blended, appeals for cultural
authority included die pure professionalism offered by popular psychiatrists and the anti
professional appeals most commonly found among the lay analysts who lacked the medical
credentials of their psychiatric counterparts. Both points of view attempted to install the author’s
own point of view as the legitimate way to serve the public, and both involved ways of
highlighting the authors’ claims to expertise. The differences between the psychiatric and
psychoanalytic claims to cultural authority are considered in light of Antonio Gramsci’s notions
of traditional and grounded intellectuals, recasting these labels as stakes in the game of cultural
authority that these experts played. All of the psychological experts used narratives that
emphasized their own physical proximity to their subjects as an index of their authority to address
the issues they described, and they all merged their popular appeals with implicit claims of the
broad relevance of their respective fields. Concluding notes address the role of professionalism
in the world of public intellectuals, and suggest a broader application of the label ‘public
intellectual’.
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Introduction:
Psychiatry and Psychoanalysis
for the Public
Introduction
“One of the by-products of the post-Freudian age,” observed historian Max Lemer in
1955, “has been the emergence of a new genre of American writing—the work of the writing
psychiatrist or psychoanalyst, who applies his insights to the problems of the day or tells of some
of his adventures with his patients” (in Lindner, 1955, ix). This genre of psychological writing
was in its prime in the mid-twentieth century in the United States. Books written by psychiatrists
and psychoanalysts were frequent best-sellers, and articles penned by these same authors could be
found on the pages of newspapers and popular periodicals. At the time, it was an unparalleled
professional cross-over into popular culture.
The psychiatrists and psychoanalysts who created this “new genre of American writing”
that Lemer described could be called public professionals: professionals who used the mass
media to communicate with large, non-professional audiences. Much research has been dedicated
to the cultural formation of the profession. In particular, the sociology of profession has delved
into the issue, first by considering the professions in terms of specialized skills and formal
knowledge (the factors that separate the professions from other occupations), and from the 1960’s
on, by taking a more critical approach, identifying formal knowledge as a tool for the
monopolization of power and the protection of status and privilege (Freidson, p. 29). In both
approaches, one factor that has frequently been overlooked has been the potential for
professionals to communicate with lay audiences.
The popular psychiatric and psychoanalytic writing of the 1940’s and 1950’s did exactly
that: it put professional ideas up for popular consumption. As border-crossers between their
professions and the field of popular consumption, they sought a kind of cultural authority for
themselves and their professions, in a sense acting as emissaries of their profession. They carried

1
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out this strategic positioning in their writing and in all of the other contexts in which they
addressed those outside of their profession. The messages they offered owed their form to the
structure of these contexts, and in particular, to the professional position of the authors. This
communicative situation—in which a professional addresses lay audiences—is sometimes
thought to be lacking. Many who have addressed themes of professionalism and the situation of
the ‘public intellectual’ have posited some kind of opposition between public intellectuals—
whose ‘public-ness’ frequently rests on the fact of their putting ideas up for popular
consumption—and professionalism—which is thought to involve a necessary insulation from the
public. In this sense, the idea of a public professional collides the categories of professionals and
public intellectuals in an attempt to shed some light on how public professionalism can be.
The idea that professionals are to some degree insulated from the public is eminently
defensible; after all, can there be any denying that professions define themselves largely in terms
of what the general public and other professions are nofl Many analyses of the professions have
followed the lead of Max Weber, citing his oft-invoked concerns regarding the ‘iron cage’ of
rationalization and bureaucratization to mount a critique of the professions that takes issue with
what is thought to be their increasing disengagement from public life. Sometimes, this
disengagement is described without an assertion that the disengagement necessarily represents a
public loss. Daniel Bell, for example, has made the rise of professionalism out to be a kind of
triumph of the new “post-industrial society” (Bell, 1973).
Antonio Gramsci is also a touchstone in these debates. Gramsci’s definition of the
intellectual was quite broad, and can be easily attuned to professional issues. He identified two
types o f intellectuals, the organic and the traditional. The traditional intellectual he described as
someone “whose position in the interstices of society has a certain inter-class aura about it but
derives ultimately from past and present class relations and conceals an attachment to various
historical class formations” (1971, p. 3). He contrasted traditional intellectuals with organic
intellectuals, “the thinking and organising element of a particular fundamental social class”
2
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(1971, p. 3). Gramsci himself clearly located professionals as traditional intellectuals; their role
in the process o f hegemony was one of legitimating the status quo and the interests of the
dominant classes, a job made all the more effective by their ability to seem like they lacked (this
is the concealment he describes above) any class-based interest. This view of the professions has
been enduring; it has energized debates over the place of the professions, frequently pitting
professions against ‘intellectuals’ and ‘public intellectuals,’ who tend to be granted the ‘organic
intellectual’ role in the debate. One version of this take on professionalism can be found in
Burton Bledstein’s The Culture o f Professionalism (1976). Bledstein asserted that “the culture of
professionalism provided an orderly explanation of basic natural processes that democratic
societies, with their historical need to reject traditional authority, required” (1976, p. 90). The
‘formalized knowledge’ that characterizes the professions is thus thought to be a way of
establishing professional autonomy, and as such, a means by which the middle class can
legitimate its own social position.
Another vision of the professions’ capabilities to act with social and political force is
proffered by Michel Foucault, who suggests the role of the “ ‘specific’ intellectual” in part as a
way o f considering the impact of the professions on public life (1980, p. 126). Though there is
danger in supposing that the terms ‘specific intellectual’ and ‘professional’ are perfectly
synonymous, it is clear that Foucault includes many professionals in this new category. He
contrasts the new ‘specific’ intellectual with the “ ‘universal’ intellectual” who held sway in the
nineteenth century (1980, p. 126). In contrast to many twentieth century historians and theorists,
Foucault sees something quite productive in the move from the universal to the specific
intellectual. Because specific intellectuals take part in “real, material, everyday struggles” and
face “the same adversary as the proletariat, namely the multinational corporations, the judicial
and police apparatuses, the property speculators, etc.,” Foucault finds reason to believe that the
professions qua ‘specific intellectuals’ may in fact be more grounded than other critics. The
“figure of the ‘specific’ intellectual,” he claims, “has emerged since the Second World War,” and
3
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remarks that Robert Oppenheimer was perhaps the first exemplar of such an intellectual (1980, p.
127). Foucault was of the opinion that the specific intellectual was a break from the intellectualas-writer; it was in the area of day-to-day practice that he saw as most relevant to the struggles of
the specific intellectual (1980, p. 127). However, this emphasis seemed mostly to have been a
way of moving away from the idea of the intellectual as ‘great writer’—a role Foucault thinks has
passed its time—than a denial of the professional’s potential to communicate with a lay audience.
Seen from Foucault’s vantage point, the phenomenon of public professionalism appears as a new
kind o f intellectual expression, a shift from the intellectual who takes the standpoint of a
generalized citizen and writes about universal themes to the intellectual who assumes the position
of an expert and explores how the domain of that profession may be shown to be important to
those outside the profession.
Frequently, the opposition between public intellectuals and professionals is cast as a
narrative of decline wherein an ostensible rise of a professional class is seen as the potential ruin
for the (ostensibly more ‘grounded’) public intellectuals. Bruce Robbins, who insists that
“nothing so simple as a decline has...taken place” (1993, p. x) has charted many of these
arguments. One version of this narrative of decline can be found Russell Jacoby’s The Last
Intellectuals (1987). Jacoby argues that the would-be intellectuals of the present day have been
largely swallowed up by the academic professionals, leaving us with a professional elite where
once we had a diverse set of grounded and engaged public intellectuals. A similar point of view
has been espoused by some o f those on the right wing of the political spectrum, as well. Dinesh
D’Souza lambasted the professionalism of academics in his argument that “[tjhrough
professionalized jargon, however meaningless, critics assert their claims to special expertise and
consequently to special recognition and privilege” (as quoted in Robbins, 1993, pp. 2-3). This
focus on professional jargon and self-advancement, he argues, cuts off academe’s connection to
the very people whose interests it sometimes claims to represent, the poor and downtrodden.

4
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In opposition to this story of the professional erosion of intellectual power, Robbins
articulates a more complicated vision of the interactions of intellectuals and professionals, much
of it revolving around the notion that professionalism “need not be a sort of zero-sum game in
which professional knowledge establishes its authority only by eliminating the knowledge and
authority of someone else” (1993, p. 51). Of particular relevance in this discussion, Robbins
holds that the public has more presence in the professions than is usually assumed.
“Professions,” he claims, “are not hermetically sealed, but porous” (1993, p. 91). He stakes this
position in part by asserting that “[i]f the laity, in the form of state and/or market, is not a party
to” what it is that the profession is doing, “then [the profession] cannot achieve its desired
effects” (1993, p. 91). In this sense, no profession could attain complete autonomy over itself; it
is only in relationship to a public that a profession can be legitimated. A doctor, for instance,
could talk all he wants in whatever jargon he prefers, but without patients who need his or her
medical help, it would be quite meaningless. Robbins cites Magali Larson, who finds it
“doubtful.. .that specialties whose functions are not really understood by any significant sector of
the public” can maintain much power as a self-sustaining profession (cited in Robbins, 1993, p.
91). It is truly in a profession’s interests to keep tabs on the public’s needs and values; though
violating them is not necessarily an instant death knell, it would be unwise to suppose that they do
not matter. This is not to suggest a free-market/rational-choice model of successful professions
so much as to reiterate Gramsci’s notion that intellectuals must (by definition) be responding to
the interests of something outside of themselves.
Robbins also suggests a means by which the public plays a role within the processes
carried out by individual professionals. He asserts that ‘the public,’ as an imagined entity called
up much as George Herbert Mead’s ‘me’ or ‘generalized other’, is internalized within members
of the profession, to the extent that “the public is something like a professional unconscious”
(1993, p. 88). And this internalization “act[s] with real force upon the profession’s psychic
economy, whether or not they correspond faithfully to extra-professional collectivities” (1993, p.
5
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89). Though the driving concern here has more to do with communicative process than with
individual (or shared) ‘psychic economies’ per se, the general thrust of this does ring true for the
study of public professionals. I suggest that the idea of the public plays a significant role in the
establishment of authority within the popular psychiatry and psychoanalysis that enjoyed its
heyday in the 1940’s and 1950’s. Whether the authors in this genre were cognitively concerned
with the public or hung up on the minutiae of intra-professional squabbles is of little consequence
here; their writing displayed a consistent—and at times dramatic—concern for establishing their
relationship to the public, and for legitimating their own observations and conclusions through
their own understanding of their proximity to the authentic needs and desires of the public.
The example of popular psychiatric and psychoanalytic writing provides a clear, and
affirmative, answer to the question of whether or not professionals have ever played the role of
public intellectuals. Whether or not this is a good thing or not is another issue entirely; those who
suspect an insidious, hegemonic functioning at work in public professionalism have much to go
on. As the debate has played out, particularly in the context of the ‘culture wars’ of the last
twenty years or so, the words ‘intellectual’ and ‘professional’ have frequently taken on,
respectively, positive and negative connotations. Robbins shows this in his review of the
narrative of decline that characterizes so much of the debate over professionals in culture. But
while the question of worth should not be jettisoned entirely, it seems that many other questions
have been left unanswered. In particular, given that some professionals most certainly do reach
out to lay audiences, it would be interesting to know what this looks like, and what role ‘the
public’ plays in this kind of communication. This is not an attempt to install a concern for the
public as a yardstick for exoneration or vilification of public professionals; as Robbins and
Foucault before him have indicated, the public is implicated in even the most minute of
professional undertakings. The point here is to understand how ‘the public’ is used as a modality
through which public professionals can cast their own expertise as something that represents the
true interests of their audience. And more broadly, keeping in mind that all communication can
6
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be seen as strategic, this is an attempt to chart the contours of the authoritative voice that is
effected in the messages of a set of public professionals.
Cultural Authority: A Concern for Strategic Presentation
In this study of popular psychiatric expertise, my goal is to show how cultural authority is
manifested in the discourse created by psychiatric experts. This term ‘cultural authority’ has been
used in several divergent ways. Though authority has, in past studies, been considered in terms
of effects on audience perceptions (e.g. Hovland, 1953), authority will here be analyzed in terms
of its shaping of how communicators present themselves, owing much to Barbie Zelizer’s use of
cultural authority as a construct with which to analyze authority’s “effect on the communicators.”
(1992, p. 2). Zelizer places faith in how Hayden White locates authority not in the words but in
the narrative of the discourse. White posits that
once we note the presence of the theme of authority in the text, we also perceive the
extent to which the truth claims of the narrative and indeed the very right to narrate hinge
upon a certain relationship to authority per se (1980, p. 18).
With Zelizer and White in mind, then, I turn my attention not to the results of authority (defined
as effects on an audience), and instead to the practice of casting authority into narrative; cultural
authority will here be considered as a communicative practice of claims-making.
Applied to the context of the popular psychiatry and psychoanalysis of the mid-20111
century, this suggests that cultural authority can be found at work in the discourse itself—in the
case of the popular professionals, in the books and articles that were written for popular
audiences. This is not to assert that cultural authority cannot be found at work in the distinctly
professional writings (i.e. publications by and for professionals) by these individuals. The
interests and strategies at work in this understanding of cultural authority can be found in almost
all communication; indeed, there is scant controversy in the notion that there is a rhetorical
dimension to communicative practice. My point is that the situation in which an expert addresses
a lay audience through the mass media provides a context that, because it brings together the
professional and non-professional worlds, motivates special conditions for advancing cultural
7
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authority. It is a unique communicative context that prompts authors to use particular linguistic,
narrative, and rhetorical strategies in their writing. These strategies, then, become the means
though which any other claims can be made.
This term ‘strategy’ must be explained. By using this term, I presume that the discourse
used by popular psychiatrists and psychoanalysts is a kind of deployment. The notion of a
strategy allows for an understanding of how experts’ interests in communicating with a lay
audience shape the discourse that results. It is hardly a revelation to suggest that discourse does
not issue from a pure source, unsullied by the push and pull of the institutional, social, and
political conflicts. One of the drawbacks of the idea o f strategic communication is that it is
sometimes understood to presume that the strategies at work have been thought out in advance as
a kind of meta-discourse that is explicitly formulated in the mind of the communicator. This
analysis attempts to steer clear of such assumptions.
The strategic analysis of cultural authority offered here does not presume that the
strategies found to be at work in the discourse of experts is necessarily consciously thought out
before-hand (though, at times, it may be). Pierre Bourdieu describes the “always semi-conscious
strategies” that make up the “game in which the conquest of cultural legitimacy and of the
concomitant power of legitimate symbolic violence is at stake”, and this gets us somewhat closer
to an understanding of cultural authority (1993, p. 137). The term ‘semi-conscious’ is crucial
here, for this model of strategic communication presumes that utterances are neither the outcome
of totally conscious and rational calculation nor the result of deeply-felt unconscious rules. The
strategy, says Bourdieu, “is the product of the practical sense as the feel for the game, for a
particular, historically determined game” (1993, pp. 62-63). It is this feel for the game that
explains how communication could be strategic (as opposed to being chaotic or predetermined),
and, I argue, informed how the psychiatric and psychoanalytic experts addressed the public.
But simply to posit a ‘feel for the game’ is to say something rather vague about why
communication takes the shape that it does. A (slightly) more detailed understanding can be
8
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achieved if it is further stipulated, as Bourdieu would have it, that the game that is played is
carried out in a ‘field’. The field is a metaphor through which one can envision the different
strategies—in other words, the range of position-takings—that are taken. A field is “the site of
struggles in which individuals seek to maintain or alter” the rules of the game that is played.
Moreover, “the individuals who participate in these struggles will have differing aims—some will
seek to preserve the status quo, others to change it—and differing chances of winning or losing,
depending on where they are located in the structured space of positions” (John B. Thompson, in
Bourdieu, 1991, p. 14). These ideas of strategy, game, and field make possible an analysis of the
cultural authority of experts as it relates to the field in which it was produced. Seen in this light,
popular psychiatry and psychoanalysis can be seen as more than either a way of stating scientific
facts in a neutral manner or a totally self-interested bid for the status of ‘expert’. The theoretical
approach that Bourdieu outlines can show how the writings of the public professionals were the
product of a specific field. This field was largely delineated by the rules germane to the
profession of psychiatry (and with it, psychoanalysis) as well as by the fact that they were
addressing lay audiences. Bourdieu has asserted that
all verbal expressions.. .are marked by their conditions of reception and owe some of
their properties.. .to the fact that.. .their authors.. .try to maximize the symbolic profit
they can obtain from practices which are, inseparably, oriented towards communication
and exposed to evaluation (1991, p. 77).
The strategic practice of trying to ‘maximize profit’ (in many ways parallel to Goffman’s
description of ‘face’ as a ritual factor in conversation) can be traced to the workings of the field of
production. To find the reason cultural authority looks like it does means to come to an
understanding about the structures that shape how the stakes of the game are defined.
It can be difficult to notice the strategic dimension of discourse. As in any other game,
the stakes of this game derive much of their power from the fact that they need not be explicitly
acknowledged to be effective. Bourdieu locates authority largely in the words that are used by
the speaker. “The power of words,” he explained, “is nothing other than the delegated power of
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the spokesperson, and his speech—that is, the substance of his discourse and, inseparably, his
way of speaking—is no more than a testimony, and one among others, of the guarantee of
delegation which is vested in him” (1991, p. 107). The language itself communicates where the
speaker is coming from, and the use of specific types of language constitutes a claim to the
authority that comes from that authoritative space. So, when a psychiatrist uses terms that come
from medicine or psychiatry, these words are, in a sense, deployed as strategic guarantors of the
(considerable) authority that derives from the power that psychiatry and medicine enjoy. Words
and terminology are, then, stakes in the game of cultural authority.
Michel Foucault provided a similar appraisal of the role of discourse, and concerned
himself particularly with scientific discourse. He suggested that it was helpful to investigate
“what effects of power circulate among scientific statements, what constitutes, as it were, their
internal regime of power” (1980, p. 112). This focus on “discursive regimes” (1980, p. 113)
offers another way of regarding the job of prying open the work of authority that is carried out in
the work of public professionals. Foucault also raised the possibility of examining the “field of
strategic possibilities” (as quoted in Bourdieu, 1993, p. 33) that is itself reminiscent of the
Bourdieu-ian use of the terms ‘field’ and ‘strategy’, though Foucault disavowed any attempt to go
beyond the discourse, by attempting to explain it through comparison with the institutional
framework from which it springs, a position that Bourdieu has criticized (1993, p. 33). The path
chosen here will endeavor to interpret the strategic discourse of public professionals in terms of
how they relate to the interests of the institutions (in this case, the professions) that are so clearly
involved. Certainly, individuals do not always simply take the point o f view of the institution
with which they identify. First of all, this would be impossible, for each institution can be
understood to contain and subsume many competing interests and possibilities; there is no ‘one
position’ to take. Secondly, as we will see, when the public professional makes a clear move to
address non-professionals, there are times when it is in the author’s own interest to cast him or
herself as capable of shedding the skin of the profession; in such cases, the profession can be
10
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denounced outright, or it can be used as just one of many relevant identifications that the author
can bring to bear.
But just as words have a major role in claims to authority, so too does narrative play a
role in the construction of an authoritative vantage point. I have already (above) referred to
Hayden White’s general concerns regarding the relationship between narrative and authority, but
this notion can be made more specifically applicable to popular professionalism. Barbie Zelizer
suggests that “the ability of narrative to invoke community, its employment as a strategic act of
legitimation, and its function in constructing reality” all “imply the strategic nature of narrative
acts” (1992, p. 33). As the journalists she studied used narrative as “an effective way of
legitimating themselves as spokespersons for a story” (1992, p. 34), so too did the experts
examined here. Popular psychiatry was, indeed, a way of telling stories that frequently involved
the experts themselves as central characters. While the conclusions that these experts made—
regarding such things as war, alcoholism, and fascism, among other issues—can be (and will be
here) examined simply in terms of the way they charted bold new territory for the profession,
another dimension that will also receive attention here is the manner in which these authors, via a
reflexive positioning of themselves, located themselves and their professions as privileged
interpreters of what was.
It should not be controversial to suggest that words and narratives can be put to strategic
uses. Indeed, it can be difficult to envision strategic communication without words and narrative.
Let me further suggest, then, that the strategies (like Bourdieu’s ideas of cultural capital and
authorized language) are not distributed evenly and used by any who happen along, but are
instead closely associated with the communities from which they originate. The role of the
community occupies a central role in Bourdieu’s understanding of authority; the essence of
speech’s power, as he sees it, is its ability to cue identification with a given space on the social
topology (Bourdieu tends to avoid the word ‘community’). Stanley Fish’s notion of the
‘interpretive community’ is relevant here. Fish explains the idea of the interpretive community
11
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by describing how “[ijnterpretive communities are made up of those who share interpretive
strategies not for reading (in the conventional sense) but for writing texts, for constituting their
properties and assigning their intentions” (1980, p. 171). Though Fish is more concerned with the
issue of how readers can arrive at divergent meanings from a text, the idea of the interpretive
community is applied here as a way of approaching the means by which professional formations,
such as psychiatry and psychoanalysis, could arrive at strategies that could truly be said to be
collective. The professional fields that shaped the experts here under consideration gave those
experts a shared understanding of their professional communities that generated strategies by
which they could promote themselves and, by extension their professions (that is, their
interpretive communities).
The position of the popular professional is characterized by simultaneous conflicting
pressures. Firstly, the popular professionals find themselves in a situation where it is clearly in
their best interest to refer to whatever it is that separates them from the lay audience. Clearly, this
is something that is best accomplished tacitly, or at least implicitly. That is, they need to find a
way to say something to the effect of: ‘I know this and you do not. I am a member of my
profession, and my profession is particularly well-suited to whatever it is I am saying. Those who
do not share my professional stance (including you, the audience) could benefit from
understanding what the profession has to offer.’ It hardly needs to be pointed out that this kind of
explicit statement is rarely made by public professionals or any other public figure. If it were, the
writings of public professionals might be much shorter. One could imagine a book that featured
nothing but this kind of blunt statement of qualifications, followed by staccato descriptions of the
author’s major conclusions, to be committed to memory as the expert’s truth.
But the popular professional has to do more than simply show how they are separate from
the lay audience; another stake in the strategic presentation of expertise involves writing the
audience into the expertise by showing that the author and the audience are really part of the same
entity, or at least by showing that the two parties share the same interests, and that the author is
12
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truly acting as proxy for the audience. In this sense, it is also in the self-interest of the popular
professional to efface some of the differences between themselves and the audience. Both the
erection of the symbolic divide (establishing difference) and the effacement of that same divide
(establishing commonality) occur in the same writings, frequently at the same exact time. And,
while this is a stake in the game, we will find that these twin strategies of commonality and
difference play different roles in the discourse of experts who represent different parts of the
spectrum of professions. That is, the strategies used by the experts owe much to the location
within the professional field from which they originated, and that they are strategically impelled
to reproduce.
This ambivalence at the root of professional appeals, the need to simultaneously claim
and efface one’s identification with a profession, indicates a concern for the public that Bruce
Robbins (above) suggests is an ongoing component of all professional tasks. In terms of cultural
authority, this means that the author’s relationship to ‘the public’ becomes a stake in the game.
Bourdieu shines some light on this issue when he describes how “the ‘people’... is first of all one
of the things at stake in the struggle between intellectuals,” and how “the stances adopted towards
the ‘people’ or the ‘popular’ depend in their form and content on specific interests linked first and
foremost to belonging to a cultural field of production and, secondly, to the position occupied
within this field” (1990, p. 150). I would add that this concern for the people, which is always a
major stake in intellectual conflicts, is of particular importance when professionals address a
large, lay audience. Because they are addressing those who lack the expertise they have, and
because this impels them to highlight their differences from their audience, the need to show
some kind of solidarity via appeals to ‘the people’ becomes all the more urgent. Also, because
professional autonomy makes them suspect as representatives of the people’s interests, it
becomes all the more necessary to claim an alignment with the true interests of ‘real’ people.
Bourdieu describes a kind of “double-break” that can exist at the heart of this move to
incoiporate ‘the people’ into a public stance (1990, p. 152). The double-break might be explained
13

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m is s io n of t h e cop y rig h t o w n e r. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

in this context by saying that when an expert aligns with the people, there is simultaneously a
break with the people (in the advancement o f expertise) and a break with the profession (through
a contrast with other experts’ ostensible lack of contact with the people). This kind of double
break is itself reminiscent of a very relevant pattern described by Stanley Fish. Fish describes
what he calls “anti-professionalism” as “the assumption that questions of merit have nothing
essentially to do with the acts of description and judgment that have their source in the largely
political machinery of professional bureaucracies” (1989, p. 215). By advancing a suspicion that
professionals are, by their nature, out of touch with certain essential questions of value, the
professional aura can be turned into a stigma, marking a failure to take part in the truly important
questions. Frequently, anti-professionalism takes the form of denunciation of professional
routine or professional jargon; these can be cast as factors that merely insulate the professional
from what is presumed to be the real world. Professional success is cast as the manifestation of
ambition, not of merit (1989, p. 218). Significantly, Fish finds this anti-professional stance to be
“nothing more or less than the ideology of professionalism taking itself seriously,” and as
“professionalism itself in its purest form” (1989, p. 245). When used by professionals, such as
the popular experts here, anti-professionalism becomes something quite similar to the concern for
the people: it is a way of further guaranteeing the professional author’s adherence to community
goals, and to the ultimate consistency of the expert’s profession with the community. Again, a
double-break can be invoked: the professional is breaking with the people through the
establishment of professional credentials and authority, and breaking with the profession through
a denunciation of professional routine. For this reason, the use of ‘the people’ and anti
professionalism are inter-related means to similar ends. To be sure, the use of anti
professionalism is shaped by the position of the author; we will see that some situations lend
themselves to anti-professionalism more than others. Because psychiatry and psychoanalysis
occupied different positions in the field of professions, and possessed different types and degrees
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of symbolic and cultural capital, the members of these sub-groups used anti-professionalism
differently.
To Diagnose the World: The Diffuse Psychiatry and Psychoanalysis
In this pursuit of the understanding of the vagaries of the cultural authority of public
professionals, it must not be forgotten that these experts addressed specific topics. And their
ability to apply their professional understandings to new domains should be understood to be a
major part of why these struggles over cultural authority matter. When the psychiatric and
psychoanalytic experts took on issues such as crime, alcoholism, war, and politics—in addition to
(and, usually, in terms of) their more central concerns with psychosis, neurosis, and politics—
they were making more or less implicit claims that their profession was the rightful possessor of
the ability and power to explain these broader issues. This was, in a sense, a kind o f collective
power move. By expanding the purview of their profession centrifugally out beyond its
traditional borders, these public professionals approached their audience in terms that brought
together professional interests and the kinds of topics that would be more sure to attract an
audience than might the kinds of issues discussed in professional journals.
Magali Larson has described how professions have founded their “credibility on
a .. .monopolistic base—the claim to sole control of superior expertise” (p. 13). In Larson’s
history of professionalization, monopolies of competence are possessed by professions and
established through institutional power, as, for instance, when the American Medical Association
sets standards for who can and who cannot use the title of ‘medical doctor’. Though Larson uses
it as a way of understanding institutional power, the concept of monopoly of competence can also
be put in the service of a cultural authority perspective. Thusly warped, the monopoly of
competence is not something possessed and wielded so much as it is something asserted and
presented as warrant to claims of authority. When applied to the phenomenon of the centrifugal
extension of the profession domain that occurs in the writing of public professionals, the idea of
asserting a monopoly of competence takes on a new aspect. By merging their psychiatric point of
15
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view—expressed, of course, through psychiatric terminology and in a narrative structure that
foregrounded the explicitly psychiatric nature of the authority at work—with established social
problems, psychiatrists were asserting monopolies of competence for moving into a wide range of
new issues. This rhetorical extension of the profession was a strategic placement of the
profession, a way of situating psychiatry where the action was.
But it was not the mere fact of the extension of psychiatry that made these moves into
new areas serve the symbolic interests of psychiatry. As we shall see, it was also in the interests
of the profession (and its constituent members) to establish a place for itself outside of its usual
domain of the mental hospital. The mental hospital had, by the mid-20th century, become the
target of much criticism. Horror stories of terrible occurrences behind the walls of the mental
hospital were widely circulated, and exposes of dubious practices at mental hospitals were
enough to place a true stigma on the mental hospital, and on psychiatry more generally. The
move away from the traditional mental diseases offered a way for psychiatry to eliminate this
stigma. By addressing problems that did not involve the mental hospital, popular psychiatrists
could demonstrate their own independence from their traditional locus of power. Anything
outside of the mental hospital would have done the job; the important thing was that the author
avoid seeming like a mad doctor who was bent on committing patients to an asylum they may
never leave. The de-emphasis of the mental hospital appears to have been a major interest at
work in the move away from traditional understandings of psychiatry.
To raise the issue o f ‘moving away from the mental hospital’ is to call attention to the
importance of the location of expertise. The popular psychiatric and psychoanalytic writing here
under consideration frequently used location as a major construct in the establishment of cultural
authority. By telling a story from the psychiatrist’s point of view in a mental hospital, I argue, the
expert situates the narrative so as to maximize his own proximity to the issue at hand. Again,
parallels to this line of analysis can be found in Zelizer’s work on journalism. She finds that
“[the] link between authorship and authority emerges from some underlying sense of a
16
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journalist’s proximity to the event” (Zelizer, 1990, p. 37) and also that “American broadcast
journalists transform proximity from a value into a practice” (Zelizer, 1990, p. 46). Experts could
be understood to do the same thing. Proximity, in this sense, is deployed much as any other
cultural capital, and plays a similar strategic role. It functions as a very basic manifestation of the
author’s constructed difference from the lay audience: the author was there, while the audience
merely reads about it. Some psychiatric experts located their narratives in their popular works in
mental hospitals, providing cues to their own professional standing. However, in keeping with
the theme o f the move out of the mental hospital, we will find psychiatric and psychoanalytic
experts establishing their own proximity to issues that do not take place inside mental hospitals.
Proximity, in this sense, could serve a dual function, both cueing an author’s authoritative
location and establishing a distance from a stigmatized context (e.g. a mental hospital).
Psychiatry’s Emergence: The Contours of a Professional Field
An important assumption in this pursuit of an understanding of the cultural authority of
popular psychiatric experts is that the structure of the field of psychiatry shaped the cultural
authority that the experts claimed. In other words, it is important to have recourse to the internal
and external structural constraints on psychiatry as a practice if the rhetoric of the its professional
appeals is to be sufficiently described. It is important to get past the discourse itself (without
suggesting a deterministic approach) so that a strategic approach can be initiated. Bourdieu
warns against considering discourse in and of itself; he suggests an incorporation of all kinds of
facts that are important precisely because they are unspoken. He claims:
It is difficult to conceive of the vast amount of information which is linked to
membership of a field and which all contemporaries immediately invest in their reading
of works: information about institutions—e.g. academies, journals, magazines, galleries,
publishers, etc.—and about persons, their relationships, liaisons and quarrels, information
about the ideas and problems which are ‘in the air’ and circulate orally in gossip and
rumour (1993, p. 31).
So, though it is clearly impossible to consider all o f these unspoken factors, it is also important to
provide as much institutional history as possible so as to understand why the strategic self-
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presentations of the psychiatric experts took the forms that they did. The history of psychiatry
will shed a great deal of light on the strategies deployed by the popular psychiatrists.
American psychiatry emerged in the early nineteenth century as a medical profession that
was closely wed to the mental institution. Psychiatric private practice was almost unheard of
before the twentieth century. In its early stages, the mental hospital’s job was closely tied to the
new phenomenon of urbanization that was under way in the early 1800’s. The mental hospital
was made more workable by this grouping of the population, and its earliest job was to provide
custodial care for individuals whose inability to function would have previously have been the
responsibility of their families. At that time, insanity was in the process of being introduced to
the medical point of view, and it was a revelation when leading psychiatric minds agreed that
insanity was potentially curable. This idea, along with a general movement toward an expanded
role for the government, supported the creation of a wide network of state mental hospitals, which
were intended for all who needed them, regardless of their ability to pay for psychiatric services
(Grob, 1994, pp. 24-49).
These progressive hopes were not quickly done away with, but they were frustrated
when, in the late nineteenth century, mental illness proved to be a stubborn adversary. The
duration of a patient’s commitment to a mental hospital grew increasingly long, with nary a lag in
the rate of commitment. This meant that the number of patients housed in mental hospitals grew
precipitously. Many hopes for treating mental illness as a brief, acute problem were dashed; it
was obvious that what was then called mental illness was a chronic problem, both for the
individuals who experienced it as well as for the institutions that attempted to deal with it.
Because of this, therapeutic concerns were placed on the back burner, as custodial issues relating
to the simple logistics of how to house, feed, and maintain a large population of mental patients
became the most pressing issue. Though some suggested that a more graduated approach to the
problem of mental illness—such as the establishment of community care centers that would
relieve the pressure from the overstuffed mental hospitals—psychiatrists believed that their
18
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authority was linked to the large public institutions, and resisted attempts to create a new system.
Psychiatry’s successes were achieved through a belief in the potential of the institution-based
system, and the profession was, throughout the nineteenth century, unwilling to back away from
it(Grob, 1994, pp. 103-117).
The end of the nineteenth century found psychiatry playing up its links to medicine while
weathering criticism for its increasingly obvious failure to ‘cure’ the individuals who were
committed to mental hospitals. Psychiatrists found new (usually medical) ways of diagnosing
mental disease, and new methods of treatment. They began to make take their practices outside
of institutions, and they formulated a preventive role for themselves. As historian Gerald Grob
claims, the psychiatrists’ “goal was nothing less than the reintegration of psychiatry into
medicine, which would permit them to share in the status and prestige employed by the latter”
(1994, p. 130). Jean-Martin Charcot’s theories of hysteria offered an early means of describing
mental diseases as organic, and not merely social, problems. More enduringly, Emil Kraeplin, a
German psychiatrist, stressed nosological refinement in his approach, which involved defining
mental diseases in terms of their outcomes. This approach had, by 1899, established manicdepressive illness and schizophrenia as crucial problems for psychiatry to tackle. Kraeplin’s
ideas represented a major medicalization of diagnostic technique in psychiatry, which had
previously been stymied by a lack of professional unity (Shorter, 1997, pp. 85-107). As historian
Edward Shorter remarks, “being ‘Kraepelinian’ meant that one operated within a ‘medical model’
rather than a ‘biopsychosocial’ model, as the battle lines later became drawn” (1997, p. 108).
Psychiatry had almost always carried with it some kind of medical credentials. By responding to
a growing crisis in the treatment of mental illness by re-affirming and deepening its links to
medicine, psychiatry placed its trust in professional authority more than ever before.
New treatments, some of which produced miraculous results, emboldened psychiatry’s
efforts to be taken on equal terms with the rest of medicine. Inducing fever in patients with
neurosyphilis (an advanced form of syphilis, in which the central nervous system is affected),
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resulted in reduced psychotic symptoms when the practice was introduced in 1917, and it
provided psychiatry with stirring justification for its medical stance, though attempts to treat other
mental illnesses through inducing fever proved less fruitful. Mental illnesses that lacked the clear
infectious origin of neurosyphilis demanded different treatments. Sedatives have been used in
psychiatry since the early nineteenth century, and in the early twentieth century, new sedatives
were devised. An expansion of the use of sedative and hypnotic drugs sometimes blended with
new sleep-inducing therapies; results were not dramatic, but these new treatments did allow for a
mitigation of some of the most difficult symptoms of mental illness (Shorter, 1997, pp. 192-207).
In the early 1930’s, Austrian psychiatrist Manfred Sakel devised a technique of shock
therapy to treat schizophrenic patients. Convulsions were brought on by administering an amount
of insulin sufficient to induce a coma, frequently resulting in observations that the patients so
affected had recovered absolutely and attained new levels of stability. Because insulin shock was
a dangerous procedure, a new shock treatment involving the use of the drug Metrazol was devised
for shock therapy. But by the late 1930’s, electroconvulsive shock therapy (ECT), a method by
which the patient was administered electric shocks, was devised. It quickly became both a
psychiatric success story (with a relatively strong record in its use on psychotic illness) and a
public relations nightmare; psychiatry’s critics, already on the lookout for what appeared to be
punitive treatments, held that ECT was an egregious over-stepping of proper professional
boundaries. The removal of portions of a mental patient’s brain, the procedure known as
lobotomy, was another instance of psychiatry’s ambitious striving for equal standing with
medicine, and a way of attempting to treat some of the most stubborn and severe cases of mental
illness. Lobotomy was first devised in the late 1930’s, but by the early 1950’s, had faded away;
though it was never common and did not last long, it played a major role in the criticisms of those
who believed psychiatry had over-reached (Shorter, pp. 207-229).
These new, very medical-seeming procedures were put forth by a psychiatric profession
that collectively considered itself, and was recognized as, a part of medicine. Psychiatry’s role
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within medicine, though dating back to the early 19th century, took on a new importance in the
early 20th century. This is because the role of medicine itself had changed. Medicine, of course,
is a highly regarded profession, and could be considered the most prestigious of all the
professions. Medicine’s enhanced professional authority stems from many sources. As a
profession, it is characterized by strong control over the training and membership of its own field,
with a strong professional organization in the form of the American Medical Association. It
involves a great degree of technical expertise, and routinely boasts dramatic rates of recovery and
effectiveness. And, perhaps most importantly in terms of cultural authority, the medical
profession is perceived as acting on behalf of the interests of the public and the individuals who
seek medical treatment. Alexander Fleming’s discovery of penicillin in 1929 was a watershed
moment for medicine’s triumph as a profession. In the nineteenth century, medicine was not so
widely hailed as a professional success story; a relatively inchoate profession, it struggled to
differentiate itself from other health treatment techniques, many of which could be no more
harmful than some of the cherished treatments still practiced by doctors. Penicillin, and then
Salk’s polio vaccine, represented dramatic changes in medicine’s ability to define its own
seemingly miraculous diagnostic and therapeutic techniques. And, in terms of public image,
these new advances legitimated medicine’s increasing power, marrying its concern for the people
with its technical competence.
As a member in more-or-less good standing in the medical community, one might expect
that psychiatry would benefit from these medical advances. And indeed, this appears to have
been the case; psychiatry was able to bask in some of the authority granted to medicine. But at
the same time, medicine’s hasty advancements highlighted some of psychiatry’s shortcomings.
Gerald Grob described psychiatry’s position vis a vis medicine in the early 20th century thusly:
Aware of their declining status within medicine and cognizant of the seeming
obsolescence of their custodial hospitals, psychiatrists were receptive to the kinds of
scientific and institutional innovation that would presumably bring them closer to their
medical colleagues (1994, p. 145).
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Many of psychiatry’s medical techniques and diagnostic tools can be best understood when
considering the gap in effectiveness (and with it, a credibility gap) that psychiatrists feared had
begun to divide them from the rest of medicine. For psychiatrists, medical expertise had become
a necessary means by which to improve their own field, and to shore up their own authority as
experts.
If the early 20th century found psychiatry exploring new means by which to keep
psychiatry medical, another noticeable trend was psychiatry’s simultaneous efforts to reach out
from the mental hospital, finding new sites for the application of psychiatric practice. The mental
hospital, with its connotations of imprisonment and its large population of seemingly incurable
patients had become a very heavy weight for psychiatry. The expansion of the in-patient
population in American mental hospitals grew steadily for decades, until it reached its peak of
559,000 patients in 1955 (Grob, 1994, p. 49). And while this expansion was a professional
victory in that it represented psychiatry’s ability to procure funding and address the problems of
so many people, it was also a failure in that it made crystal clear psychiatry’s inability to cure its
patients as effectively as other branches of medicine.
So, there was initiated a move out of the mental hospitals. By moving out of the mental
hospital, psychiatry did not surrender its claims to medical authority; it only supplemented those
claims with new medical applications. The move out of the mental hospital also allowed
psychiatry to redefine its domain. Instead of sticking to the definitions of mental illness that had
given psychiatry its onus of an ever-growing, seemingly incurable population of mental patients,
psychiatry redefined itself to make a case for its own relevance to all people. Two patterns of
psychiatric adjustment characterize this redefinition: mental hygiene and social psychiatry.
Mental hygiene represented psychiatry’s attempt to formulate a preventive approach.
The mental hygiene movement was started by a former mental patient, Clifford W. Beers, whose
1908 book, A Mind That Found Itself, told the story of his own life inside a mental institution
after he was diagnosed with manic depression. In the book, Beers was critical of the treatment he
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received without rejecting the legitimacy of psychiatry. It was the most important expose of
institutional life yet published, and Beers did not rest with the publication of the book. In his
attempt to build a movement to reform institutions, he came into contact with Adolph Meyer, one
of the most prestigious psychiatrists in America, and Meyer suggested that they together form the
Society for Mental Hygiene; though the conflict between Meyer and Beers quickly sapped this
group’s power, the National Committee for Mental Hygiene was successfully founded in 1909.
Meyer’s goals differed from those of Beers. Instead of pushing for the sweeping institutional
reform that Beers had in mind, Meyer suggested instead that the goal of the Society for Mental
Hygiene be to promote ideas of mental disease prevention. The movement that Beers
spearheaded had been absorbed by psychiatry and used to justify an expansion of psychiatry’s
domain of expertise (Grob, 1994, pp. 151-155). Mental hygiene was a well-publicized campaign
as well. The journal Mental Hygiene commenced publication in 1917, and it was explicitly
framed as a journal for both psychiatrists and the lay public (Grob, 1983, p. 162).
The prevention of mental illness, as laid out by the psychiatrists who supported the idea
of mental hygiene, involved the avoidance of behaviors considered to be correlates, causes, or
results of mental illness, and the adoption of ‘healthy’ activities that were thought to foster mental
health. So, quite tacitly, the idea of mental health (in addition to the established category of
mental illness) had been added to the area of psychiatric expertise. Certainly, in the early days of
the National Committee for Mental Hygiene, psychiatrists knew precious little about the etiology
of mental illness. But the idea of mental hygiene gave them a weapon to use that would “attract
broad support from a public increasingly fearful of the seeming rise in venereal diseases,
alcoholism, and a variety of other aberrant behaviors that fostered illness, dependency, and
crime” (Grob, 1994, p. 154). Mental hygiene was both a turn away from the mental hospital (and
the stigma attached to it) and a project impelled toward highlighting psychiatry’s membership in
the medical fraternity; mental hygiene’s parallels with other medical projects were a major part of
its appeal. Instead of focusing only on individuals, like traditional psychiatry, mental hygiene
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expanded the psychiatric gaze to include groups as well; patients were considered in the
aggregate as potential mental patients. Mental hygiene was “so broad and inclusive that it
aroused little suspicion” (Grob, 1983, p. 151). By broadening the scope of psychiatry,
psychiatrists had found a way to place themselves in the public eye, and their new definition of
their (now preventive) work was defined broadly enough to be relevant to everyone.
Social psychiatry was another development that changed psychiatry, and it featured some
of the same trends that were apparent in the psychiatric embrace of mental hygiene. One of the
first to use the term ‘social psychiatry’ was the director of the Boston Psychopathic Hospital (and
pioneering popularizer) Elmer Southard, who in 1917 used the phrase to indicate a kind of
mixture of social services and social psychology. Social psychiatry really took off in America in
the 1940’s and 1950’s, as psychiatrists used it as a way of conceptualizing mental illness as a
result of unhealthy human relations tied to specific social contexts (a class element was frequently
involved in these theories), and as an inspiration for their own efforts to correct the mental illness
through the establishment of healthy human relations (Shorter, pp. 235-236). Social psychiatry
shared some characteristics with mental hygiene (they both emphasized the state of mental health
and not just disease, and both stressed the importance of environment) and also with community
psychiatry (which would prevail in the late 1950’s and 1960’s as a movement for alternatives to
the mental hospital). Again, one can notice in social psychiatry psychiatry’s interest in leaving
the mental hospital behind, defining itself into the interests of a new clientele (and not just the
chronically mentally ill who clogged the mental hospital system), and playing an enhanced public
role.
Psychoanalysis: Its Role Within and Without Psychiatry
While these developments within twentieth century psychiatry were of great importance,
a new movement that arrived as a challenge to—and potential tool of—psychiatry was beginning
to make its presence felt. The new movement was psychoanalysis. Obviously, psychoanalysis
was not developed within American psychiatry. Though there were significant precursors,
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psychoanalysis’s origins can be accurately traced to Josef Breuer and, of course, to Sigmund
Freud, the latter of whom had a background not in psychiatry, but in neurology. In the late
nineteenth century, Freud latched onto the problem of the origins of hysteria, which had proven to
be something of a mystery. Hysteria’s etiology, he proposed, could be understood with recourse
to the patient’s life history. He put aside the physiological details of brain mechanisms that he
had studied as a neurologist and instead proposed a kind of interview technique to allow the
patient to relate his or her own experiences, so that these could be analyzed from a quasi
diagnostic point of view (Schwartz, 1999, pp. 15-62).
Obviously, there is not space here to provide more than the briefest of overviews of
Freudian theories and methods. In Freud’s Vienna, psychoanalysis was not tied closely to any
particular profession; Freud made sure of that. He attracted a coterie of like-minded peers that
met frequently and generated a body of psychoanalytic theory. Freud himself authored many of
the most important works on Freudian theory. The Freudian approach located great importance
in the individual’s dreams, sexual drives, infantile and juvenile experiences, and familial
relationships. Perhaps the most radical innovation was the Freudian idea (though Freudians were
not the first to emphasize an unconscious, there is no denying the unique impact of the Freudian
version of this idea) of an expanded role for unconscious processes in the consideration of human
behavior and cognition. Freud also played up the role of conflicts within an individual; the idea
that the human mind was made up of competing factions of id, ego, and superego made explicit
this sense of the conflicted self. Instead of suggesting that human behavior could be understood
with respect to fixed, or static, properties within each person, Freud posited a psychology that
focused on dynamic processes. For that reason, ‘dynamic psychology’ has since become a code
for Freudian-style psychology.
The psychoanalytic session, Freud stipulated, was to be a relatively unstructured
conversation, preferably carried out quite frequently; numerous sessions were usually required
before the analyst was thought to be able to make any headway into the problems of the
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analysand. Though Freud began his break with neurology and psychiatry by suggesting new
ways of approaching hysteria, it was ultimately less debilitating problems (usually defmed as
neuroses) that became the staple for early analysis. To be certain, this played into certain
interests on the part of Freud’s psychoanalytic circle. Scheduling sessions with denizens of the
middle- and upper-class who suffered from some of the less debilitating mental problems was,
after all, a good way of carving out a commercial niche (Shorter, p. 182). Freud’s psychoanalytic
circle was given to intense infighting; some of his closest companions in thought, including
Alfred Adler, Sandor Ferenczi, and Carl Jung were cast out for their refusal to hew to Freud’s
own understanding of the psychoanalytic mission (Schwartz, pp. 93-129). Freud’s sense of
mission, and general refusal of the trappings of medicine (or any other profession), led him to
write profusely, and his writings were often great successes with a broad audience. By 1920,
Freud was on the mind of all of Europe, consciously or not.
In America, Freudianism took a different course. Instead of being controlled by an innercircle, and maintaining an arm’s length from professional identification, Freudianism in America
was largely absorbed by medical practice, and by psychiatry in particular. Even before the turn of
the centuiy, word of Freudianism was spreading. In 1911, a group of Americans (including some
psychiatrists) founded the American Psychoanalytic Association, which was initially intended to
include anyone interested in Freud (Shorter, p. 163). And in 1913, two psychiatrists, Smith Ely
Jeliffe and William Alanson White, formed the first American psychoanalytic journal, The
Psychoanalytic Review (Schwartz, p. 146). Border issues between psychiatry and the inchoate
psychoanalysis arose very quickly; psychiatrists began asking themselves whether they should
admit those who lacked medical training into psychoanalytic training programs. Though there
was initially a mixed reaction on this, the battle would quickly become more heated (Schwartz, p.
158). Psychiatrists viewed psychoanalysis as a potentially strong tool in their quest to find new
treatments, but many were also concerned that a psychoanalysis separate from medicine could be
a powerful nemesis.
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In 1938, psychoanalysis made a clear move in the direction of professionalism; it began
to require that its members had completed at least one year of psychiatric residency. Before long,
most members of the American Psychoanalytic Association were also members o f the American
Psychiatric Association. And psychoanalytic training became an important part of psychiatric
coursework (Shorter, pp. 164-165). Such strong institutional links between psychiatry and
psychoanalysis have been cast alternately as a medical take-over of psychoanalysis in America
(e..g., Schwartz, p. 144) or as a psychoanalytic coup within psychiatry (e.g., Shorter, 145-189).
One thing is for certain, though: psychiatry was quickly becoming a major force to be reckoned
with. Especially after World War II, psychoanalysts were emerging as major figures within
psychiatry, garnering plum positions as department heads. And the American Psychiatric
Association itself began naming psychoanalytic-leaning psychiatrists, such as William
Menninger, as president (Shorter, pp. 172-173).
Within psychiatry, a major force for the promotion of psychoanalytic ideas—the Group
for the Advancement of Psychiatry (GAP)—was formed in 1946. Collectively, the members of
GAP advocated a move away from traditional psychiatric methods such as somatic therapies
(including electroshock), surgical techniques such as lobotomy, and mental hospitals. GAP cited
problems in these established methods, and favored an expansion of psychiatry into such issues as
the family, education, social issues, civil rights, and personal liberty (Grob, 1994, pp. 197-199).
One GAP document proclaimed that this new direction, “in a true sense, carries psychiatry out of
the hospitals and clinics and into the community” (as quoted in Grob, 1994, p. 199). That is, the
‘advancement’ they called for expressed a desire within the profession to dissociate psychiatry
from the stigma of the mental hospital/asylum. The 1950’s were shaped profoundly by the
psychoanalytic influence exemplified by the GAP movement.
The debate within psychiatry effectively separated the profession into two factions.
Gerald Grob, drawing on the analysis provided by medical journalist Albert Deutsch, (who
himself was sympathetic to GAP) has observed the two sides of this debate:
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On the one side were the heirs of institutional psychiatry committed to a somatic
pathology and organic and directive therapies. On the other were those who believed that
institutional psychiatry was obsolete, favored psychodynamic and psychoanalytic
concepts, and endorsed community treatment and social activism (Grob, 1994, pp. 200201).
The new directions that GAP offered used psychoanalysis to play up the public relevance and
scope of psychiatry. On one level, they were giving psychiatry a face lift. Much of the stigma
that dogged traditional psychiatry came from the patients it treated in public institutions, who
tended to have very low socio-economic status, and who were, after all, commonly regarded as
‘crazy’. Psychoanalysis offered a new locale for the psychiatrist: the private practice. Patients
seeking psychoanalytic therapy were usually middle class (Shorter, p. 181). And, because
psychoanalysis defined its relevance so broadly, almost anyone could be convinced that they
could benefit from interacting with an analyst.
The dynamic approach led psychiatrists to deal with the neuroses (an expansive category)
and other personality disorders not thought to require institutionalization. Psychoanalysis gave
psychiatry a road out of the mental hospital. It also provided those psychiatrists who chose to go
public a better opportunity to write themselves into social problems and issues that concerned the
public at large. Newly emboldened to write about mental disease as something that played a role
in everyone’s life, (a kind of medical version of a psychoanalytic view) psychiatrists could
address the public without having to drag the public into the mental hospital, so to speak.
Combining with some of the emphases brought to the surface in the continuing crusades for
mental hygiene and social psychiatry, psychoanalysis was a huge factor in getting psychiatry out
in the light of day.
But psychoanalysis was not only practiced by psychiatrists. Those who wanted to open
psychoanalytic private practices without going through psychiatric training were deemed ‘lay
analysts’. As we have seen, these individuals were for the most part refused membership in the
American Psychoanalytic Association because they did not go through medical training. Even
within the psychiatric community, there was a decidedly mixed reaction concerning how to
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respond to the phenomenon of lay analysis. Many, and especially the New York-based
contingent of analysts led in part by Abraham Brill, believed lay analysis would only taint the
field. Others within psychiatry, such as the Chicago-based Franz Alexander, held that it was not
worth attempting to stamp out lay analysis in an effort to make analysis more medical. Freud
himself was frustrated by the degree to which psychiatry had claimed psychoanalysis as its own
in America. With the American Psychoanalytic Association firmly requiring that its members
were trained in medical methods, there was little for lay analysts to do; this APA did have an
effective monopoly.
The rise to power of the Nazi party in Germany was a crucial development in these
fights. Large numbers of psychoanalysts from central Europe, many of whom were Jewish, fled
Continental Europe in the 1930’s. Many of them emigrated to America. Because European
psychoanalytic associations did not have the medical sensibility of their American counterparts,
many of these dmigrd analysts were either refused membership in the American Psychoanalytic
Association or allowed in by a grandfather clause that seems to have been created only for the
inclusion of certain (but by no means all) illustrious analysts whose membership brought great
notoriety into the Association. But the lay analysts who soldiered on without such membership
frequently did manage to find a niche for themselves. The lay analysts who emigrated from
Europe usually possessed some kind of professional training, and sometimes had links to Freud’s
inner-circle which could be capitalized upon. Two members of the psychoanalytic splinter
faction called the Zodiac Group—Erich Fromm and Karen Homey—both found positions as
professors and/or analysts in spite of being black-balled from the APA (Schwartz, pp. 187-188).
And there was sufficient demand for analysts that less well-known figures could find steady
work, too.
The Public Professionals In Question
It is clear, then, that the period from the late 1930’s through the I950’s represented a
relatively distinct period for psychiatry. At this time, mental hygiene, social psychiatry, and—
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most importantly—psychoanalysis were changing how psychiatrists understood their own
profession. The underlying concern for much of this new direction was to move out of the mental
hospital. The genre of popular psychiatry and psychoanalysis was closely related to this move;
by taking their case to a lay audience, the popular psychiatrists established a way of capitalizing
on the new direction. Because the new directions in psychiatry defined so many social problems
as relevant to psychiatry, popular psychiatry could make psychiatry out to be a field that did
much more than deal with the severe, chronic cases of mental illness that demanded
institutionalization. By taking on issues such as alcoholism, politics, war, and popular culture,
popular psychiatry had a ‘hook’ with which to appeal to an audience.
My analysis chooses a small subset of the popular psychiatrists and popular lay analysts
who wrote books for lay audiences during the period from approximately 1938 through 1965.
Most of this analysis focuses on the 1940’s and 1950’s, and especially the period after World War
II. The assumption that drives this very selective approach is that the strategic work of cultural
capital such as popular professionalism represents can be best understood by taking a thorough
approach to the research of each expert. To attempt to deal with all popular psychiatry would
necessarily mean pushing into the background most of the crucial details relating to the individual
author’s all-important social position. By choosing a small subset of popular psychiatry, I have
attempted to take each expert’s background and interests into account.
The experts I have chosen were included because they made publishing books and
articles in popular periodicals a consistent, and frequently dominant, part o f their work. Though
they might not be the most memorable figures from today’s vantage point, their consistency as
figures acting as the public face of the profession made them stand-outs. Unlike many other
popular psychiatrists and analysts, their books were almost always intended for either a lay
audience or a mixed professional/lay audience. And when not writing books for a lay audience,
they found ways to reach the public through popular periodicals. To be certain, sometimes these
periodical articles were thought up by editors of periodicals, and delegated to the experts. But
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this is all the more reason to include these authors: they were the ‘go to’ figures when periodicals
wanted a psychiatric think-piece, a book review, or a psychological musing on a social problem.
I have chosen four psychiatrists as representatives of popular psychiatry: William
Menninger, Karl Menninger, Fredric Wertham, Edward Strecker, and Thomas Szasz. William
and Karl Menninger were brothers, and each was a famous and prestigious psychiatrist in his own
right. Karl was the older brother and one of the first truly popular psychiatrists. His psychiatric
analyses of diverse social phenomena, his insistence that psychiatry move in psychoanalytic
directions, and his controversial role as head of the American Psychiatric Association all made
him a noticeable, contentious, and esteemed spokesperson for the psychiatric profession. His
books The Human Mind (1930), Man Against H imself(1938), and Love Against Hate (1942a)
brought psychiatry into the public eye as never before. His first book, The Human Mind, quickly
became the most popular psychiatric book ever written, ushering in not only his own public
expertise, but in a sense the entire genre of popular psychiatric writing..
Karl’s younger brother William Menninger, the author of the popular books Psychiatry In
A Troubled World (1948a) and You and Psychiatry (1949), provoked less controversy within the
profession, but garnered considerable attention nonetheless. Most important, his service in World
War II as the brigadier general in charge of psychiatry would propel him to much public
attention. To include the Menninger brothers in this analysis is to aim directly at the blue-chip
experts who wrote in this genre. Simply put, no psychiatrist achieved the professional or public
heights that the Menningers did. Their clinic, the Menninger clinic in Topeka, Kansas, was
widely viewed as the most prestigious psychiatric institution in America, if not the world. It was
a kind of Mayo clinic for psychiatry, and for both William and Karl Menninger, it provided a
humanistic, authoritative background for their own work and writing.
Fredric Wertham was the department head of psychiatry at Queens General Hospital and
also the founding psychiatrist of the Lafargue Clinic, a free psychiatric clinic in Harlem. His
book, The Seduction o f the Innocent (1954a), concerning what he considered to be the devastating
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effects of comic books on children, earned him the spotlight. His writing on comic books had
generated enough concern to prompt Senate subcommittee hearings on comic books, and his
(nationally televised) testimony during those hearings fit in quite well with what he took to be one
of his most important missions: to effect social change through the application of psychiatric
expertise. His other popular books included Dark Legend (1941), The Show o f Violence (1949),
and The Circle o f Guilt (1956). He was not associated with the kind of psychoanalytic advance
that the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry offered, but he did attempt to move psychiatry
into new directions. He was perhaps the most prominent psychiatric writer who took on the
volatile issue of psychiatrists as expert witnesses in criminal trials. His own version of social
psychiatry played an important role in his work, as did his (sometimes unspoken) concern for
mental hygiene. Largely as a result of his crusading as a comic book expert, he had more entries
in the Reader’s Guide to Periodic Literature for the period 1940-1960 than any other psychiatrist.
Edward Strecker, head of psychiatry at the Pennsylvania Hospital and chair of the
psychiatry department at the medical school of the University of Pennsylvania, had a great
popular success with his book Their Mothers’ Sons (1946), which concerned what he considered
to be the emotional immaturity of American youth. He also penned such popular works as
Alcohol—One M an’s Meat (w/Francis T. Chambers, 1938), Psychiatry in Modern Warfare
(w/Kenneth E. Appel, 1945), Basic Psychiatry (1952), and Their Mothers ’ Daughters (w/Vincent
T. Lathbury, 1956). There is no doubt that Strecker’s name is less frequently remembered today
than are the Menningers or Wertham. However, as a more traditional psychiatrist, who never left
behind somatic therapies and openly challenged psychoanalytic developments in the field,
Strecker occupied an important place in the field of expertise at the time. His orthodox expertise
provides a study in contrast with the more diffuse and all-encompassing versions of psychiatry
offered by Wertham and the Menningers.
Erich Fromm, an dmigrd lay analyst whose first book in English, Escape From Freedom
(1941), launched his career as a popular writer, went on to great success with later books such as
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Man For Himself(1947), The Forgotten Language (1951), The Sane Society (1955), The Art o f
Loving (1956), and Sigmund Freud’s Mission (1959). Fromm may have achieved the most
stunning successes (in terms of book sales) of any o f the experts here under consideration.
Escape From Freedom received a great amount of critical attention, and his later works sold quite
well; The Sane Society reached number 5 on the New York Times best seller list. Fromm
provides a strong contrast with the psychiatric writers because of his status as a lay analyst. His
lack of medical credentials prevented him from obtaining membership in the American
Psychoanalytic Association, and his writing ferociously opposed the medicalization of
psychoanalysis. By including Fromm, this study gets not only a contrast between the psychiatric
and lay-analytic points of view, it also provides an understanding of how psychological
understanding can be applied to politics and religion.
Robert Lindner, a lay analyst from Baltimore, wrote Rebel Without a Cause (1944), a
book that, despite its recognizable title, was not very popular and had almost nothing to do with
the Nicolas Ray/James Dean film of the same name. His more popular books included Stone
Walls and Men (1946), Prescription fo r Rebellion (1953), Fifty-Minute Hour (1955), and Must
You Conform? (1956a). As with Fromm, (whom Lindner greatly admired) the selection of
Lindner will allow a broadened understanding of the field of psychological expertise. And
because Lindner dealt so much with crime, his writing provides an excellent example of how the
analytic context can be made relevant to some of the more concrete social problems.
The final expert I explore is a psychiatrist, Thomas Szasz. His fust three books, The
Myth o f Mental Illness (1957), Law, Liberty, and Psychoanalysis (1963), and Psychiatric Justice
(1965), launched a vociferous critique of psychiatry. He is perhaps the ultimate study in contrast.
As a psychiatrist who turned against psychiatry, challenging its most basic presuppositions, he
used his position for what he believed was a kind of creative destruction. His arguments were
intended as, and taken as, a broadside on psychiatry. And because he doubted that psychiatry
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could improve itself, he wrote for lay audiences. His arguments, as he saw them, demanded an
audience outside o f psychiatry. So he turned to those outside his profession.
Of course, this does not account for every psychiatrist and psychoanalyst who wrote for
the lay audience during the mid-20th century. But this analysis is not intended as a complete
accounting of everything that could be properly located in the genre. Instead, it is hoped that by
looking at some o f the psychiatric ad psychoanalytic experts who were most concerned with
parlaying their professional backgrounds into a place in the public eye, an understanding of some
of the strategic elements of the professional-popular cross-over can be achieved. One
presupposition did inform the selection of experts: by choosing experts from both sides of the
divide that separated the medical and lay-analytic positions of the psychological professions, it is
hoped that some light may be shed on how different positions vis a vis the professional institution
generate different rhetorical stances, or if you will, different ways of asserting cultural authority.
This allows for the elaboration of what I think is a diverse, but not exhaustive, vision of how
professionalism and professionals can interact with the public.
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Throwing Seeds:
Textbooks For a Lay Audience and the
New Diffuse Psychiatry

Though this study picks up in the late 1930’s, when psychiatry began to make its most
noticeable entrance on the stage of popular culture, this is not to deny that there were some
psychiatric books written before 1930 that were geared toward, and successfully attracted, a lay
audience. Elmer Southard and Mary Jarrett’s co-authored book The Kingdom o f Evils (1922)
found a place on many bookshelves. Also, Clifford Beers’s 1908 book A Mind That Found Itself
introduced the idea of mental hospital reform to a wide audience. Though Beers was a former
mental patient writing about his travails when confined in an institution, and not a psychiatrist
relating a strictly professional view of the field, his book nevertheless attracted attention to
psychiatry, making it a kind of meeting of the worlds of public and professional concerns. And,
of course, Freud’s writings, almost all of which aimed for a wide audience, had attracted a
significant amount of attention at least as early as the 1920’s.
In 1930, Karl Menninger published The Human Mind, his first book, and a significant
popular success. It would soon become the best-selling psychiatry book to that time (Faulkner &
Pruitt, p. 99). The Human Mind attempted to chart a complete psychiatric portrait of the
functioning and malfunctioning of the mind, as viewed by the psychiatrist. It was a survey of
psychiatry and an application of psychiatry as an omni-directional vantage point from which to
understand the human world. Menninger’s popular outreach also included regular columns in
Household Magazine and Ladies Home Journal, as well as a position as an editor of science
content for The Nation (Faulkner & Pruitt, pp. xi-xii). Revised editions of The Human Mind
appeared in 1937 and 1945. Prompted by his success with his first book, Menninger followed up
with two more books, 1938’s Man Against Himselfand 1942’s Love Against Hate, each of which
would explore what he considered to be the defining tensions in human life.
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The approach in these books, and in many of the articles that accompanied them, was to
take psychiatry itself as the point of departure. In this sense, it is accurate to consider them to be
textbooks, though they were intended for a much broader audience than just students of
psychiatry. The textbook approach to popular psychiatric writing would diminish after World
War II, but it did not disappear. Along with these popular textbooks by Karl Mennninger can be
grouped other books about psychiatry by psychiatrists, such as Edward Strecker’s Basic
Psychiatry (1952), and William Menninger’s You and Psychiatry (1949). Together they
represented one kind of strategy for considering the entire world in psychiatric terms, one that
reflected these authors’ concerns for maintaining ties to their profession while increasingly
moving away from the severely mentally ill and the asylums and mental hospitals where they
were treated. Their appeal was summed up in a New York Times review of Strecker’s Basic
Psychiatry, where the reviewer, Rollo May, deemed the book “[pjopular in the best sense of the
word,” and concluded that “this book does not pretend to do what a book cannot do—namely,
cure people by way of the printed page. But it does present an interesting, sound, abundantly
illustrated survey for lay readers in their own language” (1952, p. 6).
A Concern for the Audience
While one might presume that textbooks, by definition, exclude non-professional readers,
that was not the case with these books. These psychiatric textbooks, by Edward Strecker, Karl
Menninger, and William Menninger, successfully reached a popular audience. All of them were
reviewed in popular periodicals, and other opportunities for broad exposure were granted, as well.
The Human Mind was offered as a main selection by the Literary Guild book club in 1930, and
You and Psychiatry was made available by the Book of the Month Club. And this popular
exposure was no fluke. Or, even if it was a fluke, it is clear that the lay audience was the intended
target of these writings. The authors made it very clear that they wanted to reach out from their
profession, and that they saw such communication as beneficial to their profession.
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In the preface of the second edition of The Human Mind, Karl Menninger describes how
he has fashioned the book in response to comments made by psychiatric students and colleagues.
He explained how these colleagues asked him to enlarge the section of The Human Mind devoted
to psychiatric treatment, so that their patients could have an expanded knowledge of what kind of
treatment they were being given. He concludes that “[f]or the intelligent patients of intelligent
doctors, I have therefore, rewritten the section on treatment and made it more specific” (1945, p.
xii). So, he anticipated that psychiatric patients could get the book from their doctors.
But this was not the only form o f popular outreach that he envisioned. He also describes
how, “[i]n response to the awakening interest in psychiatry on the part of clergymen” (p. xii) and
others, he expanded the section dealing with psychiatry and religion. He also opined that the
second edition of The Human Mind
must serve the purposes o f doctors, patients, medical students, nurses, teachers,
psychologists, clergymen, and intelligent lay readers interested in science or in human
beings. These are the people who read it before, and who I hope will feel that the
revisions accurately represent the changes in fact, theory, or emphasis which the passage
of time and the further experience of seven years have made necessary (1945, p. xiii).
So, Karl Menninger made it very clear that this book was written for a lay, as well as a
professional, audience. One can notice in this last declaration, though, a kind of ambivalence
about approaching those outside his profession. Clearly, he is not comfortable with the idea of
writing ‘just’ for a lay audience. Indeed, in his correspondenceat at that time with his colleague
Harley Williams, he indicates that he “tried to make it a little less popular style [sic] and more
likely to appeal to medical men” (Faulkner & Pruitt, p. 256). By insisting on addressing both the
professional and lay audiences, and by making this insistence most explicit, I argue that Karl
Menninger was trying to establish himself as an uncompromised popularizer, willing to
communicate with the people, but nevertheless strongly attached to his profession.
Besides the straightforward statement of the imagined audience, there were many less
direct ways of indicating that these books were, in fact, an appeal to those outside of psychiatry.
One method, used frequently in these popular psychiatry textbooks, was to explain to the
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audience that the book would be a chance to eliminate the public’s confusion about what
psychiatry was. Strecker described “an iron curtain between the general public and psychiatry,”
implicitly setting up Basic Psychiatry as a chance to provide an accurate bridge between the two.
While admitting that psychiatry had managed to gain some exposure to the public eye, he
regretted that
[c]ertain aspects of psychiatry have been overemphasized and overdramatized. The
innumerable important and highly interesting facts and experiences of the everyday
practice of psychiatry have been too often slighted and even overlooked (1952, p. 3).
The public’s misunderstanding of psychiatry, he argued, “bar a considerable segment of the
public from participating in preventive efforts” (1952, pp. 6-7). Strecker is doing more than just
stating that this is a book for a lay audience. He is also casting the kind of thorough description
of the field of psychiatry offered in Basic Psychiatry as a way of correcting the commonly-held
image of the profession and even as a way of improving the lives of the public.
A similar justification for addressing the public is put in place in Will Menninger and
Munro Leafs You and Psychiatry. In the introduction, they explain how they met in the Army
and found a common cause:
One was working in the area o f public relations and the other in the professional field of
psychiatry. They found their jobs overlapped. The public wanted to know about
psychiatry and psychiatry needed public understanding. The terrific loss of manpower in
the Army and the Navy from psychiatric casualties started them to thinking that there
must be some additional approach to helping the people of our nation understand the
basic factors of mental health (certainly there have been lots of them) (1949, p. v).
The book, they explained, was an effort to redress the fact that “[mjost of us are pretty hazy about
what would happen if we went to a psychiatrist,” and to assure a lay audience that “[cjonsulting
him, however, is essentially no different from going to any other physician, except that the
psychiatrist, just as any other specialist, has his particular methods for examining and treating”
(1949, p. 139). Most popular psychiatric books, particularly those published after World War II,
would take a more topical approach, thoroughly addressing one topic, such as crime, sex, war, or
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politics. Here the topic was the profession itself. The central social problem that set these
popular textbooks in motion was the public’s lack of knowledge about psychiatry.
The anticipation of a wide audience is a recurring feature in Karl Menninger’s troika of
pre-WWII popular books. As we have seen, he was wary of appearing to be a popularizer. He
plugged this skepticism into his own stance, calling attention to his own uncompromising nature.
For instance, after a rather pointed criticism of the educational system in Love Against Hate, he
remarks that
I am fully aware o f the angry challenge that these remarks will arouse in some readers. I
have set them down at the deliberate risk of being called anything from a misanthrope to
a communist, although I believe I am far from being either one” (1942a, pp. 244-245).
In this manner, Menninger highlighted how he dared to flout the expectations and predilections of
his audience. The same sense of ‘daring’ can be found in his broaching of the topic o f suicide in
Man Against Himself, when he notes that “[s]o great is the taboo on suicide that some people will
not say the word, some newspapers will not print accounts of it, and even scientists have avoided
it as a subject for research.” (1938, p. 13). By making these kinds of statements, Menninger was
pushing away any suspicion that his efforts to reach out to a lay audience implied any kind of
compromise on his part. These remarks become kinds of guarantees of the authenticity of his
own stance, promises that he is presenting a totally professional, yet simultaneously maverick,
account of the world.
The same attempt to bridge the professional and popular worlds, and to make explicit the
very act of this bridging, can be found in the Menninger brothers’ meta-communicative
discussions of the terminology they use in their own writing. In Love Against Hate, Karl
Menninger describes the content o f the book as a combination of “accepted psychiatric
knowledge” and his own insight. He points out that
[i]n presenting the entire thesis, I had to make the choice of employing a highly technical
form available only to specialists within my field of the profession of medicine or a form
which was understandable to any intelligent person, professional or non-professional. I
have chosen the latter even at the risk of having it depreciated as mere ‘popular science.’
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The substance of the book, however, I have been teaching to my students and discussing
with my colleagues for many years” (1942a, p. vii).
Clearly concerned that the act of popularizing would taint the entire project, dragging it into the
merely ‘popular’, he makes a strong claim that, despite the familiar language, this is the bona
fide, professional perspective. Eleven years later, Karl’s brother William Menninger mulled over
the same issue in his similarly textbook-like You and Psychiatry, discussing how
[i]f you or I tried to sit in on a discussion group of electronic engineers hashing over
some improvements in radar and they started jabbering in that dialect they call technical
language, it wouldn’t take us very long to find out that the shop words they used were
confusing us even if we were capable of following the main line of their ideas (1949, p.
11).
He argues that the same problem with professional jargon applies to psychiatry, wherein
psychiatric terms sometimes become a handicap for the better understanding of
psychiatry. Laymen pick them up from popular articles—articles that use the terms but
do not adequately or correctly explain them. Then the person thinks he knows the term
and what it means, uses it incorrectly, and more people are confused.. .The confusion and
haze that hang over practically any word that has psych in it is interesting but often
downright discouraging. Derived from the Greek word Psyche, the term somehow came
to mean the soul and later the mind (1949, p. 11).
So, William Menninger distances himself from the ‘merely’ professional by admitting that
psychiatric terms lend themselves to confusion. At the same time, he distances himself from
other unnamed popularizers who warp the true meaning of psychiatric terms. Like his brother, he
distances himself from both sides, insisting that the popular language he uses is a faithful
translation of psychiatric terminology.
The popular psychiatric textbooks here under discussion could be identified by their
extremely broad application of psychiatry. Instead of examining one specific issue or problem,
they took psychiatry as their topic and sought to demonstrate how the entire social world could be
viewed through the psychiatric lens. It would be hard to find a more clear-cut example of
psychiatrists attempting to dissociate themselves from the traditional problems of the asylum and
the mental hospital. Significantly, the popular psychiatric authors linked this move out of the
hospital to their attempts to write popular psychiatric works. It was asserted that the broadening
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of the range of psychiatrically diagnosable diseases and disorders into the prosaic world outside
the mental hospital necessitated, or at least went hand in hand with, a reaching out to the non
professional audience. Simply put, the audience was defined as the subject of psychiatric
knowledge.
Aiming at the lay audience as the subject of psychiatric diagnosis could be found early in
The Human Mind, where Karl Menninger noted how
[mjany readers have said to me: ‘I was afraid I would find myself in your book,’ or ‘I
almost imagined I had some of those abnormal conditions myself.’ To such persons I
usually reply quite gravely: ‘I hope so.’ For if one has a mind at all, his mental
processes are subject to some of the faults and failing that characterize the human mind.
If someone does not find himself at all in this book, it is either that he is not human or
that some pages have been left out (or tom out) (1945, p. xii).
The Human Mind ends much as it begins, finding Menninger describing how there were no easy
paths to mental health and maturity. He intones that
[t]he vast majority o f ailing minds never see psychiatrists and never will, and many of
them never should. But the principles of psychiatry should be applied all the same.
Sometimes they can be self-administered; sometimes a friend will turn the trick. The
family doctor or clergyman often does it. And sometimes a book will do it—a book like
this, or a less technical one, like several which I could name (see bibliography), and
which I daily recommend (1945, p. 367).
In this sense, the book is retrospectively cast as a kind of tool for self-diagnosis and treatment, as
if he were actually prescribing the book.
In You and Psychiatry, Will Menninger and his co-author Munro Leaf describe how their
original intention had been to create a book that could explain to servicemen in World War II that
their (diagnosable) problems were shared by many people. The book itself had accomplished this
task, but the finished product addressed everyone, not just servicemen. They described how they
“felt it was worth their hying to put into simple words and abbreviated form some of this
information which applies to all of us in our daily lives, that are complicated at any time and
more so in this period today that we call ‘Peace’” (1949, pp. v-vi). To a large extent, the
definition of this ‘peace’ is fleshed out with comparisons borrowed from the mental hygiene
terminology. As Menninger and Leaf wrote,
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there are very few adults who have graduated from the public school system of our
country who aren’t familiar with at least some information on physical hygiene: the
necessity of keeping clean, brushing their teeth, getting the right food, fresh air, exercise
and rest. They learned it in terms that they could understand. At the same time there are
many persons who have no clear understanding of either mental hygiene or their own
personalities (1949, p. vi).
Psychiatry, then, in the guise of mental hygiene, was asserted to be as important for everyone to
know as how to brush one’s teeth. This assertion forms the motivation for the text. Though it is
“not a graduate course in psychiatry,” write Menninger and Leaf, “it ought to give you a little
better understanding of yourself and how you tick. The chances are it will help you know
yourself and other people a little better” (1949, p. vi). The enlargement of psychiatry as a catchall
is perhaps nowhere more evident than when Menninger and Leaf assert that
All o f us have eccentricities and neurotic symptoms. Periodically we all have doubts and
worries. We have trouble with our children and they have trouble with us. There are
hundreds of varieties of personality strengths and handicaps (1949, p. ix, ital. in orig.).
Because, as they said, “all of us have moments when we know that we don’t quite understand
ourselves,” (1949, pp. vii-viii) psychiatry is enlisted in the effort to fill in that knowledge. The
emphasis on ‘all o f us’ clearly indicates a profession on the move away from the established
mental illnesses and toward new problems, as well as a new audience. As Strecker noted in
similar terms in Basic Psychiatry, one problem with the existing divide between psychiatry and
the public is the persistence of the idea of the world of mental patients as
a land of dark and fearsome places, peopled by grotesque and frightening shadows. Of
course, all this is quite untrue. Every day of our lives we come into contact with, we
meet and talk with, have business and social relations with people who are in some
degree psychiatrically sick. And yet it is unlikely that we will be able to detect anything
much out of the way (1952, pp. 3-4).
Throughout these frequently meta-communicative statements justifying psychiatry’s application
and appeal to new groups of people, one can see the anticipation of a mass audience, and the
calibration of a psychiatry that could apply to that audience.
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In addition to this kind of intra- and inter-personal perspective on why psychiatry is
necessary knowledge, ‘understanding’ was located as the key to approaching all kinds of political
and social problems. William Menninger and Leaf assert that
[i]t would take a pretty hard-boiled citizen to say there isn’t any need for this
understanding after taking a quick look around him today. Broken homes, juvenile
delinquencies, crime waves, group hatreds, riots, political wranglings, suspicion and fear
on all sides are not likely to make a thoughtful man or woman very smug about the state
of our individual or collective mental health. What goes for the United States, you can
double or triple, for too much of the rest of the world (1949, p. vi).
Similar statements regarding psychiatry’s broad political and social applicability could be found
in other textbook-style popular psychiatric works, but the emphasis common to most of them was
a central concern with the individual’s (frequently understood to be the reader’s) mental health.
The popular textbooks called out the reader as patient, and provided a corresponding doctor-ly
voice to provide prescriptions. Without sacrificing any o f the medical dimensions of the
psychiatric perspective, the authors applied a new, diffuse psychiatry to almost everything.
The Old Psychiatry Preserved, To Some Degree
Though they addressed expansive new terrain for psychiatry, the popular psychiatric
textbooks nevertheless maintained a steady concern for established notions of mental illness.
That is, the ‘classic’ mental illnesses, including organic brain disorders, schizophrenia, and the
psychoses, in and of themselves received significant attention in this style of going public. These
mental illnesses were the ones most closely associated with the mental hospitals, and one can
notice how, just among the popular psychiatric textbooks (admittedly this genre is one that I have
constructed myself), they became less important over time. Karl Menninger’s The Human Mind,
originally published in 1930, put great emphasis on these problems, while his later books Man
Against Himself and Love Against Hate, found him adopting a more psychoanalytic viewpoint
and reaching out to new applications. And William Menninger’s You and Psychiatry paid
practically no heed to the classic psychoses and organic disorders. Strecker’s Basic Psychiatry,
from 1952, however, was a late holdout for the old pre-psychoanalytic psychiatry. Strecker

43

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e co p y rig h t o w n e r. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

himself was, at least in Karl Menninger’s opinion, skeptical of psychoanalysis, and this stance
comes through in the very medical, ‘doctorly’ prose of Strecker (Faulkner & Pruitt, p. 271).
When the old psychiatric problems were dealt with in popular works, it was a kind of adherence
to professionalism. The two books that did this most thoroughly, The Human Mind and Basic
Psychiatry, openly billed themselves as intended for psychiatric students as well as a lay
audience.
The description of traditional psychiatric problems, then, represents a kind of
‘centripetal’—or inward-impelled—professionalism. Instead of showing how psychiatry could
move out into new areas, this discourse established the writers and bona fide authorities of what
the profession had dealt with for years. The Human Mind, for instance, devoted significant space
to discussion of mental deficiency, including the categories of idiocy and imbecility (1945, p. 55).
Other discussion concerns the related issue of “deficient intellection” (1945, p. 175). Strecker
covers the same territory in Basic Psychiatry, lingering, like Menninger, to discuss the possible
causes of mental deficiencies, sizing up the roles of nature and nurture in such matters (1952, pp.
278-282).
The blending of the body and the mind, the concern with psychosomatic issues, also
allowed for a kind of assertion of overlap between psychiatry and more physically-oriented kinds
of medicine. Psychosomatics, the medical concern for the overlap between physical and mental
disease, frequently came up in Basic Psychiatry. Strecker boasted on behalf o f his profession that
“[i]f the union of body and mind has been consummated only recently, then for a long time
psychiatry has brazenly sanctioned an illicit relationship” (1952, p. 233). Tracing the history of
psychosomatics back to ancient Greece, Strecker places psychiatry in league with, yet slightly
ahead of, the mainstream of physical medicine. This represented a kind of insistence that
psychiatrists were doctors after all, and entitled to the same symbolic benefits that accrued to
mainstream medicine.
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Strecker was not alone in claiming such a large role for the body in psychiatry; many
psychiatrists under the sway of the biologically-oriented psychiatry of the time felt the same way.
In particular, he focused on how the brain, as an organ of the body, when physically affected,
could shape the mind. Basic Psychiatry features prominent discussions of the organic psychoses,
those psychoses caused in part by damage to the brain. Though he certainly did not ignore the
role played by the individual’s environment and personality in such illnesses, he stressed the
importance of the psychiatric impact that could be caused when the “cells, fibres, and tissues of
the brain...can be seriously and permanently damaged and even destroyed” (1952, p. 75). These
organic psychoses included the senile and ateriosclerotic psychoses, both caused by brain
deterioration in old age (1952, p. 93). He moves from the organic to the toxic psychoses, those
psychoses caused by ingestion of poisons, and his discussion leans in a similar, somatic direction,
delineating in particular how the consumption of alcohol and narcotics can dull the senses and
warp the personality (1952, pp. 114-115).
Strecker grouped many of the classic psychiatric problems under the rubric of the organic
psychoses, including conversion hysteria, neurasthenia, anxiety neuroses and obsessivecompulsive reactions. These were grouped separately from the manic-depressive and
schizophrenia psychoses. Paranoia is also discussed as a factor that can overlap with these
psychoses, and Chronic Psychopathic Inferiority also receives some attention. In each case, the
description of the psychosis involved mostly the basic diagnostic definition of how the psychoses
could be recognized. It was truly a doctor’s-eye view, with little sense of an application to
everyday problems or social issues. For instance, manic-depression and schizophrenia are
described as representing “deep penetrations into the land of unreality and phantasy-joumeys
sometimes so long and over so many uncharted paths that the traveler never finds his way back to
the land of reality” (1952, p. 183). After this designation is fleshed out somewhat more, with a
note that the Supreme Council o f Masons designated schizophrenia as “the greatest disease
menace of our time,” (1952, p. 184) Strecker moves on. In The Human Mind, Menninger covers
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some similar terrain, in particular discussing types of schizoid breaks. The ‘issue’ in the
discussion of these mental illnesses in this context is the mental disease itself; there is no
exploration of how these diseases can be seen outside of the accepted range of psychiatric
diagnosis. This made it a uniquely kind of inward-looking public psychiatry. It is of great
significance that many of these mental illnesses that were given this treatment were psychoses.
The psychoses were, at the time, the most severe problems that psychiatrists had to address; they
frequently involved hallucinations, along with violent and/or withdrawn behavior. The great
contrast here is with the later, post-World War II psychiatry, with its eventual lack of emphasis on
the psychoses and increasing emphasis on psychoanalysis and the neuroses.
The discussion of these psychiatric problems, the psychoses, involved using some truly
professional terminology. The names of the diseases themselves, such as neurasthenia or
Constitutional Psychopathic Inferiority, were explained, but they were not very thoroughly
blended into a popular lingua franca bridging the professional and lay audiences. And because
the diseases themselves were the ‘starting points’ of analysis (i.e., they were discussed as
problems in and of themselves), they occupied a central place in the textbook-style popular
discourse. This gave this style of writing a kind of purely professional, top-down sensibility. In
other words, though psychiatry was moving to become more diffuse at the time, this textbook
writing was not always so diffuse as to jettison all of its medical outlook and phraseology. For
example, when the organic psychoses are at issue, there is a necessity of giving at least a
modicum of attention to issues of brain structure. Such discussions, I assert, lent this style of
writing a kind of purely medical authority. The words themselves were recognizably medical,
and frequently involved an emphasis on the biological, as opposed to the social, side of
psychiatry, as is well-illustrated when discussions of brain structure or organic psychoses arose.
The use of such medical language represented a kind of claim to traditional medical authority as it
highlighted the author’s own links to medicine via psychiatry. But the more biological and
medical the style of writing, the more the authors were ruling out links to the ‘social’ problems
46

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e co p y rig h t o w n e r. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

(such as crime, war, and sex) that they would eventually take on with such fervor. In this sense,
the purely medical perspective had its limits. While it seemed to allow only a limited degree of
diffusion to the psychiatric gaze, it could be seen nevertheless as a kind of medical under-writing
of other discourse, be it more ‘social’ problems in the same text, or other books or articles by the
same author. It served to assert the author as the proper possessor of medical authority, and this
authority could then be applied in other discourse.
Finally, it should be pointed out that the discussion of mental illness, particularly in The
Human Mind and Basic Psychiatry, frequently took the psychoses as a point of departure. The
psychoses, usually the most severe of mental illnesses, were closely linked to the metal hospitals;
they accounted for a significant, sometimes overwhelming, portion of patients in mental hospitals
(Grob, 1983, pp. 190-192). The chronic psychoses could be considered a true specialty of
psychiatry when these books were written, in the sense that psychiatry had little competition in
treating them (Grob, 1983, p. 236). And, given the considerable difficulties they encountered in
treating the psychoses, it is easily understood why they did not encounter more competition.
When authors included discussion of the psychoses in their popular psychiatric writing, then, they
were highlighting what it was they could address that no one else could. They were centering
discussion on an issue for which they had a monopoly of competence. However, the psychoses
close links to the mental hospital, their relatively (though not completely) inflexible diagnoses,
and psychiatry’s inability to arrive at a cures for them, (Grob, 1983, pp. 190-196) would make
them a rather rare topic of popular psychiatric works, particularly after World War II. The turn
away from the classic psychoses, as we will see, constituted a major part of the popular
psychiatric move. Outside of the popular textbooks, it was hard to find any discussion of these
psychoses at all.
Psychoanalysis
The strictly medical discourse concerning the psychoses and organic mental health
concerns in and of themselves, what I have referred to as centripetal, purely professional writing,
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was only a small part of what was asserted in this loose sub-genre of popular psychiatric
textbooks. Much of the other textbook discourse, though it still revolved around the issue of
‘what psychiatry can do for us,’ took a dramatically different tack, expanding psychiatry through
the application of the ideas of Sigmund Freud and his psychoanalytic viewpoint.
The interaction between psychiatry and psychoanalysis in the United States is a hugely
important factor in the history of popular psychiatry. The arrival of psychoanalysis provided
those psychiatrists hoping to reach a new audience with an entirely new set of concepts. These
concepts bore some resemblance to the medical terminology of biological psychiatry, but also
retained a distinct literary air about them. And, indeed, Freud had always insisted that
psychoanalysis should not be practiced as a medicine. Psychoanalytic analyses stressed the
interactions between people, not the (faintly comprehended) minutiae of brain chemistry and
mental disease etiology. Freud’s writings themselves reached a relatively large audience, and
though it is impossible to know exactly how he changed the popular conceptions of psychiatry, it
is fair to say that his arrival on the intellectual and psychiatric scenes at least made clear that the
inquiry into the human mind did not have to be chained to the mental hospital.
Frustrated by their continuing inability to cure patients in their charge, psychiatrists in the
early 20th century were increasingly looking for new methods that promised better results than the
traditional methods would allow (Grob, 1983, pp. 150-151). Institutional psychiatry was, for a
long time, barely influenced by psychoanalysis; it was more of an intellectual trend than a mode
o f treatment in America (Grob, 1983, p. 120). As psychoanalytic ideas and analysts filtered
across the Atlantic, American psychoanalysts began forming their own societies. The first such
society was formed in New York by Abraham Brill in 1911. The American Psychoanalytic
Association was created in the same year. Though it had little power at first, its membership
swelled quickly. Membership would continue to grow as analysts fled from Europe in the 1930’s
and 1940’s. Increasingly, these analysts involved themselves in psychiatry; medical credentials
became a requirement for membership in the American Psychoanalytic Association in 1938. In
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America, psychoanalysis and psychiatry became closely intertwined by the end of World War II.
By the mid-1950’s, 82 percent of the members of the American Psychiatric Association were also
members of the American Psychiatric Association (Shorter, pp. 163-164).
Historian Edward Shorter casts this move on the part of psychoanalysts as an
encroachment, a parasitic power-grab in which psychoanalysis treated psychiatry as the host.
Indeed, this does seem appropriate; there is little doubt that psychoanalysts were casting about for
some means of authorizing themselves, and psychiatry seems to have come in handy for this
purpose. However, if psychiatric authority seemed like a way ‘in’ for power-hungry analysts, it
would likewise seem that psychoanalytic concepts and methods became a way ‘out’ for
psychiatrists who wanted out of the mental hospital’s dilemmas, and even more so for those
psychiatrists who wanted to turn this escape from the mental hospital into a kind of display for
the lay audience.
Karl Menninger was one of these psychiatric boosters for the psychoanalytic
methodology. After a lasting interest in psychoanalysis, he completed his training analysis with
the noted analyst Franz Alexander in 1932. The 1930’s found him pursuing a psychoanalytic
trajectory in his own psychiatric work. Though the first edition of The Human Mind evidenced
relatively slight influence of psychoanalysis on his work (this influence would increase markedly
by the time of the final and third edition, published in 1945), his next book, Man Against Himself
(1938), found him advancing a thoroughly psychoanalytic point of view.
Man Against Himselfdid not purport to be a comprehensive vision of psychoanalysis.
Instead, the focus was on the impulse to self-destruction that could be found in all people. The
reliance on Freud takes little time to materialize, as the book’s preface, which addresses how
“men destroy one another, and that our civilization has arisen from the ashes of despoiled peoples
and decimated natural resources,” credits Freud for tying this destructiveness to “an instinct, and
to correlate this instinct with the beneficent and fruitful instinct associated with love” (1938, p.
vii).
49

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m is s io n of t h e cop y rig h t o w n e r. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

Man Against Himselfconstituted an early attempt to popularize psychoanalytic theory.
But it was more than a theoretical book; it was chiefly concerned with applying psychoanalytic
theory’s insights regarding self-destruction (of course, Menninger’s interpretations varied with
those of other analysts and psychiatrists) to a bevy of issues that resided mostly outside of the
mental hospital. It was, in my terminology, a decidedly centrifugal move for a psychiatrist. It
was a dramatic break, both in terms of domain and theory, from the traditional psychiatric
approach.
Self-destruction was the hub from which Karl Menninger would radiate his
psychoanalytic perspective. The focus on self-destruction that occupied the core of the work was
introduced via Freud’s concepts of the drives of Eros and Thanatos, the life and death instincts,
respectively. From the outset, Eros and Thanatos are considered as forces that extend outside of
the individual, as
[t]hese forces, originally directed inward and related to the intimate problems of the self,
the ego, come ultimately to be directed outwardly toward other objects. This corresponds
with physical growth and personality development (1938, p. 6).
The destructive instinct, Thantos, must be directed outward in order to avoid self-destruction, and
the life instinct, Eros, must be directed outward in order to mature. This narrative of maturation
functions as a kind of fulcrum for placing the world under the leverage of psychoanalytic theory.
More or less tacitly, the move has already been made to consider almost any form of human
activity in terms of the sublimation of Eros and Thanatos, allowing for a much broader
application than the classic mental diseases had normally allowed.
At the center of the psychoanalytic drama, Menninger places the issue of suicide, the ne
plus ultra of the personal instinct toward self-destruction. He states an interest in both sides of the
issue. Not only is he concerned with how and why, in psychoanalytic/psychiatric terms, people
commit suicide, but also with the
various forms of the more successful compromises in which the impulse to destroy one’s
self seems to be diluted or diverted so that death is postponed.. .even though at an unduly
great expense in the form of suffering, failure, or deprivation (1938, p. 8).
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So, the goal here is to examine not so much suicide itself, as the entire continuum of selfdestruction that one can notice once the topic of suicide itself has been broached. Casting all of
this as an examination of suicide provides a way of examining all kinds of mundane forms of
self-destruction that had, up to that time, been generally outside of the purview of psychiatry.
Suicide, in Menninger’s popular writing, acquired a fluidity that extended the psychiatric reach,
and moved it most definitively outside of the mental hospital.
Menninger begins describing suicide per se by calling attention to “the taboo” of
addressing the topic at all, noting that it gets little attention from newspapers, is rarely spoken of,
and “even scientists have avoided it as a subject for research” (1938, p. 13). Having thusly
located himself as a maverick exploring new territory, he locates himself in the mental hospital,
describing how his own interest in suicide came to be. He explains how suicidal patients in his
care, once committed, would improve in condition to the point where their relatives began
demanding that they be discharged. After ignoring Menninger’s protestations that it was too soon
for a discharge, the families would take their relation out of the hospital’s care. Later,
“the papers would carry an announcement of our former patient’s death by hanging or
shooting or drowning. I have a large file full of such clippings and, attached, to each the
verbatim warning given the impetuous relatives (1938, p. 14).
This kind of recollection, of course, played up Menninger’s own prophetic skills in understanding
suicide, and foregrounded the difference between his expertise and the lay person’s ignorance of
the delicate subject of suicide.
Mennninger then focuses on offering a way to explain the act of suicide “dynamically”
(1938, p. 18). As is still the case today, ‘dynamic’ functioned as a code word for the
psychoanalytic approach. The dynamic approach is necessary, he argues, because we must
“recognize that from the psychological standpoint [suicide] is very complex, no matter how it
may appear” (1938, p. 20). Embarking on the psychoanalytic approach, he notes that suicide
consists of three components: it is a murder, a murder of the self, and it is carried out because of
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an individual’s desire to die (1938, pp. 24-25). The exploration of these three themes is
thoroughly executed, as Menninger takes on each thread separately, mostly by addressing how
the constructive and destructive impulses play into each one. Significantly, he finds a way of
diagnosing, or at least defining, mental health in this discussion. “Growth of the personality,
education, social capacity, and creative power” he explains, “become possible only as these
aggressions are increasingly directed outward instead of inward, focused upon the proper objects
of attack, and completely neutralized by love when those objects are desirable ones” (1938, p.
31).
Counter to this, the suicidal impulse comes from individuals whose “previously fused
bonds of love and hate are now robbed of their object, become defused, and both return to their
point of origin—the individual himself’ (1938, p. 32). Fear of others and the outside world
prevents the suicidal individual from taking things out on anyone but him or herself. And this
kind o f ‘rebounding’ tendency is particularly apparent in individuals who have an “oral”
character orientation, which involves a passive relationship to the world that leaves a person
incapable o f active engagement” (1938, pp. 40-45).
Menninger lays out the wish to be killed, the third component of the suicidal impulse, in
part by noting how it is associated with the conscience. The conscience, he explains, derives its
power from the “original aggressive instincts which, instead of being directed outward to take
destructive effect upon the environment, are converted into a sort of internal judge or king”
(1938, p. 52). Sometimes, this internal judge makes it impossible for the individual to provide
sufficient expiation, and a suicide is the only manner in which it can be pacified.
Menninger suggests many ways in which suicide can be shaped by and caused by these
intertwined instincts of life and death, and does not rule out the possibility of more kinds of
suicide. He concludes his couching of suicide by postulating, once again, that suicide involves
the inwardly-directed destructive impulse’s “gradual emergence from the state of latency to
which it is (was) temporarily confined by the activities of the life instincts” (1938, p. 79). This is
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an “exceptional” phenomenon, for normally, the erotic instinct “converts] destructive tendencies
into measures of self-defense and socially useful adaptation, or into conscience” (1938, pp. 7980). Ultimately,
death wins; but sometimes it threatens to win prematurely, aided often by incomplete or
inefficient functioning of the neutralizing devices of love. In these cases, as we shall see
in the chapters to follow, it is possible to purchase temporary immunity by sacrifice
(1938, p. 80).
With this last stroke, Menninger dovetails his psychoanalytic treatment of suicide with a much
broader discussion of what we will see will be a very large category: self-destruction in human
behavior.
The expansion of suicide into quasi-suicidal issues, considered in light of Menninger’s
analysis of the workings of the life and death instincts, begins in earnest in a section of Man
Against Himselfthat is entitled “chronic suicide”. Chronic suicide is illustrated with a discussion
of martyrdom and asceticism. Speaking alternately for “psychiatry” and in terms of
“psychoanalysis,” Menninger mostly glosses over any conflict between the two standpoints,
fashioning a view that stands at the apex of both. Putting religious asceticism under the rubric of
self-destruction, he notes how ascetics “project their guilt feelings onto a part of themselves (the
body) and, by mistreating and neglecting it, satisfy their conscience” (1938, p. 121). Such self
punishment is then linked to the individual’s life history and asserted to be, at root, structured by
a goal to propitiate the ascetic’s parents. It is in early life, Menninger states, when the ascetic
develops “the original failure to develop the softening love instincts that would neutralize the
hostile drives and result in the development of tolerance, kindness and generosity, [that] is
responsible for the severity and rigidity of the personality” evidenced in ascetics” (1938, p. 125).
Finally, he adds that ascetic impulses frequently involve an erotic component, such that the
passion for suffering can be frankly sexual at times, as in masochism, or sometimes taking the
paradoxical expression of sexual self-denial.
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But while the issue of asceticism provides a revealing glimpse at how Menninger used a
psychoanalytic understanding of suicide to couch something not so closely associated with
psychiatry, it must be admitted that this was relatively less of a power move than the subsequent
topics he would take on. For example, his discussion of self-destruction at work in criminal
behavior makes clear Menninger’s aspirations to place pertinent social problems on the couch.
Grouped under the heading of ‘anti-social behavior’, criminality receives a brief but prominent
treatment in Man Against Himself. Menninger describes how
[t]here are.. .those in whom the uncontrollable aggressive urges exceed the demand for
erotic satisfaction and break through the restraints of judgment and conscience and social
prohibitions to accomplish an immediate end regardless of the ultimate loss. This we call
criminality (1938, p. 185).
Immediately, he implies that psychoanalysis can help us deal with criminality more effectively,
noting that, at present, “society has traditional methods of treatment [of crime], more dramatic
than effective, originally designed to punish and to deter” (1938, p. 185). The contrast of
psychoanalysis’s thorough understanding of criminality with other putatively less worthwhile
approaches continues when he notes how each perspective used so far to approach crime has
failed.
Presenting psychoanalysis as the only effective means by which to understand what
criminals get out of crime, he commences to analyze crime with broad strokes. He insists that
“our whole national ideology disputes” the idea that criminality is actually self-destructive (1938,
p. 201). Our rugged individualism encourages crime, making “Americans believe that crime does
not pay if you get caught” (1938, p. 202). The drive to self-destruction can be noticed in those
criminals who are caught, many of whom, Menninger asserts “cannot., .escape the vengeance of
their own consciences. ..this leads them, then, to seek punishment, to allow themselves to be
caught, to commit provocative offenses or even to ‘break into jail’” (1938, p. 203). He reviews a
psychoanalytic study of criminals that found in criminals “a great wish to remain a dependent
child and great resentment against the social, economic, and other forces which thwarted their
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satisfactions, with the consequent combination of mixed feelings of revenge, self-assertion, and
guilt” (1938, p. 203). Finally, Menninger concludes that
[s]ome criminality is the result of overwhelming hate developed in childhood, which the
individual can express only at the price of intimidation by his own conscience to such an
extent that he unconsciously fails to carry through his aggressions and allows himself to
be detected, captured, and punished (1938, p. 204).
These were sweeping statements, imputing specific motives to broad varieties of criminal
activity. And, as we will see, this is by no means the most rigorous application of psychoanalysis
to crime in a popular work. The significance here, though, is the suggestion that the other
professions, and society in general, have something to learn from this discussion o f crime, even if
it is limited mostly to the concern for self-destruction. This constitutes a claim of a monopoly of
competence concerning crime, made on behalf of Menninger’s psychiatric psychoanalysis. The
gist here is that psychiatry, according to Menninger, was the only profession capable of delving
into the factors that lie at the root of all crime.
Menninger also placed sex on the couch with this concern for the instinct toward selfdestruction. Masturbation, for example, was asserted to create “a heavy burden of guilt, because
in the unconscious mind it always represents an aggression against someone” (1938, p. 69).
Many cases of suicide, he explains, occur after interruption of “auto-erotic activities”;
masturbation “represents a preoccupation with the self, based on aggressive feelings toward
others” (1938, p. 69).
He give a similar treatment to what he separately discusses as “perversions,” subsuming
such phenomena as homosexuality, masochism, and fetishism under that rubric. Most of the
focus in the discourse on perversions is placed on homosexuality, which is considered to be an
“infantile technique,” and a kind of “self-destruction” that “is knowingly accepted if not actually
sought” (1938, p. 208). While classifying homosexuality as a kind of perversion, however, he
also distances himself from those who express hatred of homosexuality, noting that
[t]he resentment which society feels toward overt homosexuals as expressed by violent
attacks proudly made upon them by solicited individuals expresses, to be sure, a certain
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amount of unconscious fear of and over-reaction to an unrecognized homosexual
impulses within the attacker himself’ (1938, p. 208).
While asserting a root psychoanalytic problem at work in homosexuality, he distanced himself
from those with more aggressive, and assumedly less professional, ways of approaching the issue.
Menninger also devoted his self-destruction-oriented attention to the issues of sexual
impotence and fragility, both of which he viewed as manifestations of unconscious self
destructive desires. Sometimes, impotence and fragility were brought about by the fear of
punishment that some people link to sexual activity. As a kind of hysteria, “the hysterical organ
[here the sexual organ] invites (wishes for) punishment of a lesser order to avoid punishment of a
greater order” (1938, p. 343). The rejection of sex, in other words, is accepted because sexual
behavior itself has been symbolically turned into something far more aversive, as might be the
case in “a man married to a woman who unconsciously represents to him a new edition of the
mother who successfully inhibited his sexual activities during boyhood” (1938, p. 342). He
contrasted this psychiatric standpoint with those perspectives on sexual problems that had come
before. “[P]rudishness,” he remarks, has prevented people from approaching the issue more
honestly. And many are “treated by well-meaning but, in my opinion, mistaken physicians who
ascribe all impotence and fragility to physical or chemical factors and use corresponding methods
of treatment” (1938, pp. 348-349). The only profession equipped to approach these problems,
claimed Menninger, was psychiatry, and in particular, the kind of psychiatry that could wield
psychoanalytic insights.
Finally, some of the most sweeping categories of behavior that Karl Menninger placed on
the couch with his ideas concerning self-destruction involved almost anything that could be
loosely defined as unhealthy. He described “purposive accidents” as incidents that seemed like
accidents but were in fact unconsciously brought about by the self-destructive impulse. “The
significant and differential thing about purposive accidents,” he explains, “is that the ego refuses
to accept the responsibility for the self-destruction” (1938, p. 320). With this rationale for the
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application of psychoanalytic psychiatry in place, he asserts that automobile accidents “often
occur under circumstances which are suspiciously indicative of at least unconscious intent”
(1938, p. 322). And making clear the importance of these accidents as a social problem, he noted
how “[ejvery five minutes someone is killed in the United States in an accident and while one is
being killed in an accident a hundred others are being injured” (1938, p. 335). If psychiatry were
attended to, he argued, we could understand these figures, and only then could we do anything
about them.
A related issue in self-destruction concerned what Menninger referred to as “organic
suicide.” Using a kind of psychosomatic logic regarding the unity of the body and the mind, he
claimed for psychiatry almost all organic diseases and ailments. According to this logic, any
organic disease, such as a cold or a boil, could be caused in part by unconscious factors. Arguing
that organic diseases involve self-punitive, aggressive, and erotic components, Menninger walks
the reader through the ways in which organic diseases are impacted or caused by the mind’s own
actions. Sometimes, the unconscious need for punishment leads diseases to take the form of an
“external” cross to bear (1938, p. 362). The aggressive component of organic disease/suicide is
illustrated in terms of heart disease, which Menninger considers to be largely a result of
aggressive tendencies (1938, pp. 375-377). And an erotic component of organic suicide can be
noted in cases where
the diseased organ becomes the chief object of the patient’s attention, concern, and it is
not inaccurate to say, affection. This is a local narcissism in contrast to narcissism in the
more general sense in which it is usually envisaged (1938, p. 391 [ital. in orig.]).
While these unconscious components of organic disease are not asserted to be mutually exclusive
with purely physical components, they are held to be a major underlying factor in almost all
disease. In this sense, it can be seen as a move to shore up psychiatry’s common ground with
physical medicine, even while moving in a wholly psychoanalytic direction. When considered
alongside the psychiatric claiming of accidents, another domain closely associated with non
psychiatric medicine, this strategy can be seen more clearly. Karl Menninger was painting the
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picture of a psychiatry that shared some turf with medicine, but managed to advance on the
purely physical approach that had fueled medicine’s ascent to the pinnacle of the professions.
Man Against Himselfwas just one early example of a popular psychiatrist’s application
of psychoanalytic concepts to the world at large. The other popular psychiatry books in the
textbook-style did not limit themselves to just the theme of self-destruction. With the exception
of Strecker’s Basic Psychiatry, they were even more flexible in their use of psychoanalysis to
couch human behavior. When placed in the textbook-style, as one might imagine, the topic of
these books was frequently taken to be psychoanalysis itself. And, as with Man Against Himself,
each work drew psychoanalysis thoroughly into the realm of psychiatry, drawing attention away
from the conflict between the two camps of biological and psychoanalytic psychiatry. This intra
professional conflict, which was in some ways the defining issue of psychiatry from the late
1930’s through the 1950’s, was put on the back shelf for the popular works.
Especially in the work of Karl Menninger, the name of Sigmund Freud was given a
prominent place in popular psychiatry. Upon the occasion of Freud’s death in 1939, Menninger
wrote obituary pieces for both the New Republic and the Nation. Both essays featured Menninger
at his most adulatory, though he was not completely acritical. In the obituary for the New
Republic, entitled “Death of a Prophet,” Menninger compares Freud to visionaries such as Plato
and Galileo, and complains that Freud’s last book, Moses and Monotheism, was not given more
publicity (1939a, p. 23). The Nation obituary is even more forceful in its lionizing of Freud. In
it, Menninger notes that Freud died after a long and painful fight with cancer, adding that “[i]t is
an eloquent, though incidental, testimony to the heroic qualities of the man that during all this
period his only medication was an occasional tablet of aspirin” (1939b, p. 373). Menninger
encounters difficulty finding words to fully express his admiration, describing how
Freud was not an ordinary man; he was not an ordinary scientist. He was so nearly
unique an individual that it is difficult to find anyone with whom to compare him. No
one in the field of psychology ever attained to a fraction of his stature. Among medical
scientists almost none can be said to have approached him in brilliancy, originality, or
influence upon medical science (1939b, p. 373).
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Significantly, Menninger describes how Freud surpassed and enriched the field of medicine.
Freud’s brilliance, like psychoanalysis itself, was fit into a medical point of view. Menninger was
smoothing over the clash between Freudian psychoanalysis and American psychiatry; other parts
of the obituary find him critiquing the New York Times for “declaring with pompous inaccuracy”
Freud’s lack of acceptance amongst professional psychiatry (1939b, p. 374) and noting the irony
of the fact that, though Freud did not care much for America, America was “the country in which
his theories are best known and most widely accepted” (1939b, p. 374).
Karl Menninger would repeatedly drop Freud’s name in his popular works, as when he
dedicated Love Against Hate to “the Memory of Sigmund Freud,” (1942a, p. v) or in the
introductory notes of his popular works. William Menninger also provided Freud as the
background to You and Psychiatry, with an introductory note about how “Psychiatry received its
greatest boost toward becoming a scientific method from one man, Sigmund Freud,” (1949, p. 14)
and arguing that Freud’s insights comprised the same kind of scientific revolutions as those
instigated by Copernicus and Darwin (1949, p. 15). Clearly, the Menningers were interested in
staking claim to Freud’s legacy. By placing Freud in their popular works, they were making it
seem as if their own work followed naturally from Freud’s principles. This involved playing
down certain parts of Freud’s point of view. For one thing, Freud was suspicious of the
(primarily American) medical appropriation of psychoanalysis. The inclusion o f Freudianism,
when dovetailed with medicine, allowed the Menningers to play both sides of the medical/non
medical fence.
The popular psychiatrists applied Freud’s ideas quite thoroughly. Even when discussion
of specific ‘issues’ was not presented, the grander importance of psychoanalysis to everyone’s
life was included. These functioned as grand, if distant, ways of couching all human life. Even
Strecker, who was skeptical of certain trends in psychoanalysis, found space in which to expound
on the relevance of psychoanalytic concepts. In Basic Psychiatry, he included a lengthy
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description of the interaction between the conscious and the unconscious, pausing to note that
“[wjhile psychoanalysis did not discover the unconscious, it did clarify the concept and make it
applicable to the treatment o f the patient” (1952, p. 316).
William Menninger started with the same kind of broad application of psychoanalysis,
arguing that “[a]nything we do, any move we make in life, more often than not, is started by
impulses inside us that come from somewhere other than that relatively small portion of us we
call our conscious mind” (1949, p. 10). And as Karl Menninger became more focused on
psychoanalysis in successive editions of The Human Mind, he ended up with a presentation of
psychoanalysis that covered dozens of concepts, including sections on such psychoanalytic terms
as introjection, condensation, displacement, elaboration, distortion, reversal, rationalization,
reaction-formation, symbolization, most of the Freudian complexes (including Oedipus, Elektra,
and Narcissus), fixation, and regression (1945, pp. 283-318). In such reviews of psychoanalysis,
the experts explained the terminology and asserted the grand relevance of their own terms to
explain almost everything.
But this was just the ground work for specific applications of psychoanalysis to concrete
issues and problems. Extending psychoanalysis to specific issues, the Menningers (Strecker was
reluctant to embrace psychoanalysis) argued in the specific for the relevance of psychoanalysis.
Parenthood and childhood, for instance, could be claimed for psychiatry by explaining how
psychoanalytic terms (many of which were, from their Freudian advent, intended for the familial
context) made sense o f family processes, and allowed for the creation of an evaluative posture.
Parenthood was central to the world, thought Karl Menninger, because everyone has parents. As
a profession that had an extensive theoretical mechanism for the comprehension of parenthood,
psychoanalysis provided a uniquely important understanding in a world where
[w]e forget or discount the fact that Hitler had a mother, that Chamberlain had a
childhood, that the Presidents, the Senators, the editors, the political and social leaders,
had their disappointments and frustrations, misconceptions and obsessions (1939c, p.
163-164, ital. in orig.).
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That the psychoanalytic focus on parenthood would have a normative component was implicit in
Karl Menninger’s notion that the “mistakes of the parents are important” implicit in the
description of ‘normal’ psychoanalytic maturation was the idea that parents could change their
ways by applying psychoanalytic concepts (1939c, p. 164). His consideration of parenting
largely examines parents’ aggression toward their children (a natural impulse, albeit one that must
be kept at bay, according to Menninger) and how the mother, in particular, can be located as the
source of much of eveiy child’s frustration (1939c, pp. 170-171). Menninger locates the
‘thwarting’ of the child’s natural instincts as the source of barriers to proper maturation. Because
women are given most of the responsibility of introducing children into the frustrating world,
they perform most of this thwarting. The women thwart the children, explains Menninger,
because they themselves have been ill-treated, and find themselves unable to communicate true
love. The “average mother,” he says, because she is so conditioned by the world, “is constantly
in the position of forbidding her little son to develop in precisely the directions in which his
masculine instinct impels, him, a development which, in principle, she favors” (1942a, p. 118).
In essence, all parenting is put on the couch, and then the move back to the outside world is
performed, as Menninger once again reminds the audience of the hate that still exists in the world,
and suggests that “we must consider the possibilities of so altering our social structure that
women (and therefore children) are not so much thwarted and exploited as at present” (“Parents
Against Children, p. 173). Parenting, then, was used as a way of claiming all social relations for
the psychoanalytic understanding.
The flipside of parenthood, childhood maturation, would become the centerpiece of
William Menninger’s You and Psychiatry. And the treatment that he gave to childhood was so
thoroughly Freudian as to be self-evident. The book was, in a sense, a couching of all human life
via a Freudian emphasis on psychosexual development and other maturational issues. And
Menninger takes it on chronologically, first dealing with birth and infancy, then moving on into
adolescence and beyond. One of the last popular psychiatric textbooks, You and Psychiatry was
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also the most Freudian/psychoanalytic in scope. The same concerns for early childhood shaped
Dr. Benjamin Spock’s book, The Common Sense Book o f Baby and Child Care, which was
originally published in 1946, just as the Menningers reached their apogee in the public eye. The
medical understanding of childhood maturation was a popular, and broadly contested, issue at the
time.
You and Psychiatry begins with the statement that “jbjy six or seven years of age the
personality is pretty well jelled” justified the focus on early life experiences, (p. 16) He then
reviews the oral, anal, and genital stages, what “Freud called...the psychosexual stages of
development,” going into great detail (1949, p. 18). When explaining the oral stage, he offers the
psychiatric perspective on correct mothering, asserting that “[o]f one thing psychiatrists are very
sure: abundant love and protection as expressed in physical proximity and fondling are o f prime
importance” (1949, p. 22) and indicating that breast feeding is of tremendous importance to a
baby in the oral phase (1949, p. 22). He then moves on to the anal stage of development,
explaining how the initial experiences of defecation construct how each person learns to earn
“love, praise, and approval,” (1949, p. 25) and how parents should be forgiving and patient with
their children as they get potty-trained. Finally, Menninger explains the genital stage, insisting
that discovery of genital pleasure is totally natural, and that parents should be unashamed o f such
phenomena as infantile masturbation. The same discussion touches upon the Oedipus and Electra
complexes, noting how they relate to mental diseases later in life, and stressing the need to get
through all stages of development without undue parental resistance, allowing the child to
become truly independent (pp. 32-35).
Though much of the rest of You and Psychiatry departs from childhood, maturation and
the achievement of proper psychoanalytic development with a distinctly psychoanalytic thrust,
remained as the core issues that William Menninger explored. There is a kind of hit-and-run
aspect to this writing, with quick takes on various issues, without ever turning the book into
anything less than a broad treatment of how psychoanalysis can inform us about our lives.
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Homosexuality, for instance, is mentioned as a kind of phase of sexual maturity, and Menninger
examines those who “never outgrow this phase in development” (1949, p. 50). But after briefly
explaining how a homosexual phase is normal and remaining homosexual is not, he quickly
moves on to other affairs. It frequently takes the form of a kind of Freudian handbook to one’s
own personality, explaining issues of personality structure, conversion, the psyche, and the soma.
The grand dynamic that Menninger suggests involves ‘the struggle,’ by which he means
the effort to remain mentally healthy in light of the many conflicts between personal and social
pressures. He explains how
[e]go does the best it can, but sooner or later, in this complex civilizatino it may be
overcome by troubles that result in hurt and worry. These hurts and these worries are
symptoms. They are symptoms of ill health just like fever or swelling. The fact that they
aren’t always recognized as such doesn’t change one whit the fact that they are evidences
of ill health (1949, p. 135).
The move here, toward ‘hurts’ and ‘worries,’ was largely a move away from the psychoses
(including many of the more serious mental illnesses linked securely to the mental hospitals) and
toward the neuroses. Again, one can detect the strong symbolic surge out of the mental hospital,
for “the neuroses are far more frequent than psychoses” (1949, p. 137). He describes how
neurotic symptoms “may make us uncomfortable and handicap us but usually don’t stop us,” but
can knock us out sometimes, stressing that “the chances for relief and recovery are excellent if
one gets help early” (1949, p. 137). Hence, the entire effort of You and Psychiatry culminates in
a classification of everyday life as rife with psychiatric concerns, arguing that there is a kind of
pandemic of neurosis that psychoanalytically-inclined psychiatrists are well disposed to diagnose
and treat. Relocating mental illness in terms o f stress and struggle, he insinuates psychiatry into
day to day life.
While William Menninger argued that sex was an important issue in human maturation
and mental health, it was Karl Menninger who more thoroughly applied psychoanalysis to issues
of sex and love. Much as he positioned himself through use of obituaries as the rightful
interpreter of the significance of Sigmund Freud, he commented on formative sexologist
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Havelock Ellis’s death in the same year with an obituary in The Nation, praising Ellis’s honest
and forthright way of addressing sex when it was such a taboo subject (1939d). Menninger’s
acknowledgement of the role of Havelock Ellis makes clear that Menninger himself was by no
means the first expert to take on sex in popular writing. Other authors, such as Theodore Van De
Velde, whose Ideal Marriage: Its Physiology and Technique was published in 1930, enjoyed
popular success in the 1930’s and 1940’s. And o f course, Alfred Kinsey’s Sexual Behavior in the
Human Male would see the light of day in 1948.
Not surprisingly, Love Against Hate consisted largely of descriptions of the role of love
in human life, with the by-now usual psychoanalytic thrust. Much of this discourse specifically
involved sex, and he positioned psychiatry as the only branch of medicine equipped to deal with
sex. “Sexuality,” he asserted,
is still a taboo subject in the medical schools of American universities. Psychiatrists, on
the other hand, see such dramatic examples in their daily practice that they cannot forget.
To them it is important, and this is why even those psychiatrists who do not use Freud’s
technical methods unite with the psychoanalysts in their gratitude to him for his clinical
demonstrations (1942a, p. 50).
Extending this expertise even to his anti-Freudian rivals within psychiatry, Menninger was
closing psychiatric ranks with this statement of psychiatric superiority.
He relied on Freud’s ideas to introduce his section on love, postulating that the
“expression of the life instinct... is to be seen in love... in three forms,” including “the
accomplishment of sublimation,” by which he referred to the process in which aggressive
tendencies were transformed into love, secondly, the “diffuse extensions of love to nonsexual
objects,” and finally, “the love is expended directly upon objects which must be called ‘sexual’ in
any meaning of the word” (1942a, p. 263). Love, then, was a concept that allowed the psychiatric
gaze to penetrate in many directions.
Thusly broached, the topic of love in Love Against Hate precipitated several small
discussions of issues where love can be seen at work, along with diagnostic clues regarding how
love can be warped. For example, Menninger spelled out how love can be exercised through the
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establishment of human contact, by making friends. He concluded that “Psychiatrists realize
from clinical experience what poets have proclaimed in inspired verse, that to retreat permanently
into the loneliness of one’s own soul is to surrender one’s claim upon life” (1942a, p. 271). But
the search for human contact can be problematic, Menninger intoned, if social groups become
“static,” and close themselves off to new members (1942a, p. 271).
Consideration of sex as one of the modulations of love followed from this, as Menninger
once again considered the psychiatric significance of religious and other prohibitions against sex,
finding that psychology underlies all of them, for “[psychology is more fundamental than
economics or religion; independent of but certainly not determined by economic and religious
factors, that determine our way of life” (1942a, p. 282). The insights regarding sex in Love
Against Hate were far-ranging, though usually quite specific. For example, Menninger claimed
that protecting children from sex made little sense, for children are surprisingly well-equipped to
deal with the issue (1942a, p. 284). And he argued that an “obstacle to the direct gratification of
the sexual instinct is ignorance of the technique of love-making” (1942a, p. 285). He arrives at a
kind of crescendo when he emphasizes the way in which sex can function as a support in a
mentally healthy way of life. Those who could not apply their own drive for love to a healthy
sexual functioning suffered for their way of life, and
as for those persons who have adjusted themselves to continence (I dislike the pious
hypocrisy of the word ‘chastity’), I venture to say that not even their most intimate
counselors, but only they themselves know the price they pay in silent suffering and
unseen penalties (pp. 288-289).
Sex, then, was claimed as something that could be a component of mental health at least as much
as it was a component of mental disease.
Establishing Presence and Relevance: Evidencing and Support
The support used in the popular psychiatric textbooks—the evidence used to provide an
empirical basis for the assertions—came primarily in two kinds: the case study and the historical
example. Both kinds of evidence would be used in subsequent popular psychiatric writing, if in a
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slightly modified form. I argue that the mode through which the evidence was presented was a
major component of the rhetorical strategies deployed by these experts. Though these writings
might not have relied on evidence in the same way that, say, an article in a professional medical
journal would require, one can detect a symbolic function to the presentation of evidence.
Case study evidence was the most widely used. Of course, case study evidence plays a
major role in much medical discourse, and is particularly important to psychiatry. The case
studies used to support points made in writings for lay audiences, however, was granted a certain
enhanced sense of drama. In a letter to Frances Whiting, who worked for Alfred A. Knopf, his
publisher at the time, Karl Menninger reflected on the importance of the use of case studies in
popular works, recalling how two of his mentors, E. E. Southard and Richard Cabot, influenced
his writing:
I think I learned from them the idea of the great dramatic power which the actual histories
of people in trouble contain. The further I got into medicine and the further I got into
psychiatry in particular, the more I was convinced that the tragedies and comedies of
their lives were far more fascinating than ordinary stage dramas (Faulkner & Pruitt, 1988,
p. 95).
That this note was written to a representative of his publisher is, of course, significant. One can
assume that he was trying to convince Whiting that psychiatry could indeed be sold to the public.
In this sense, the use of case studies involved some anticipation of the potential appeal to a lay
audience that such a strategy could create.
While providing a ‘dramatic’ effect was significant in itself, the case studies did
something else for psychiatry as well. When chosen and recounted carefully, they could change
the public face of psychiatry. This involved more than just making psychiatry seem interesting.
It also involved giving a kind of psychiatry from the psychiatrist’s point of view. Turning back to
Menninger’s letter to Whiting, Menninger explains to Whiting how he believes that psychiatry
has been misrepresented to the public. He opines that a prejudice against psychiatry, and
specifically psychaonalysis, has been caused in part by an over-emphasis on shock. The
prejudices against psychiatry, he argues,
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had been made more insuperable for me and for others by the unhappy way in which
psychoanalysis was and has been, and perhaps I should say still is, presented to the
medical readers and lay readers, too, of this country. It is as if a surgeon would hand out
a platter o f bloody fragments of human tissue to ignorant laymen and say—this is the
result of surgery. One can imagine how shocked the laymen would be at seeing a platter
of gore. As a matter of fact, that isn’t surgery at all but merely the end results of the
surgical operation. The psychoanalysts used to fling before the American public horrible
extracts o f this person’s or that person’s mind and call it psychoanalysis. This, they say,
is the result of psychoanalytic delving—just see what we found! No wonder people were
shocked by it (Faulkner & Pruitt, 1988, p. 96).
He continues,
It isn’t that I object to shocking people, but I object to shocking people whom I expect to
enlist in support o f the idea I am promoting, that’s all. I just think it’s poor salesmanship,
if that’s what you want to call it, although there again I think I should not like to be
quoted as using that word (Faulkner & Pruitt, 1988, p. 97).
While providing drama, case studies could, if carefully chosen, be presented in a manner that
preserves the integrity of the profession. Comparing psychoanalysis to surgery in an argument
that involves the preservation of what he calls ‘the idea of what I am promoting,’ one can see the
professional interests running through Menninger’s words here. He wants professional and
popular audiences, and he plays both sides of the space he occupies at the juncture of medical
psychiatry and psychoanalysis in order to get it.
So, the evidence used in the presentation of arguments can be said to have been a key
issue, not just in professionalism, but also in the promotion of that professional perspective to a
lay audience. In terms of case study evidence, which was ubiquitous in popular psychiatric
writing, one can see how the selection and presentation of the support comprised a major
dimension of the professional stance charted by popular psychiatric experts. In terms of
selection, there was a noticeable concern for avoiding cases of extreme, chronic mental disease.
That is, the choice of case studies was (not surprisingly) consistent with the overall move away
from the mental hospital. Frequently, the case studies involved subjects whose problems fell
more under the category o f nuisance than of crippling disease. In Love Against Hate, Karl
Menninger presents a case study of Jeffrey Mason, a failed entrepreneur who came from a
wealthy family and had a good education, whose means of socializing Menninger considered to
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be immature (1942a, pp. 62-69). Many of the case studies addressed the problems of middle or
upper class individuals who lacked something. Of course, that was largely because so many case
studies were approached from a psychoanalytic standpoint, and psychoanalysis was largely
associated with the middle and upper classes (Shorter, 1997, p. 182). If this selectivity is
considered as part of the kind of strategy for popularization of psychiatry that Menninger laid out,
however, one can see how such cases amounted to no less than a kind of refiguring of
psychoanalysis, focusing on the well-to-do as if to establish that everyone is subject to the laws of
psychiatry. Moreover, it is significant that the problems that Menninger described in this case
study of Mason were not debilitating, nor were they traced to ‘shocking’ (a la Freud) origins in
early life experience. The case studies were frequently populated with the dramatic stories from
these almost pointedly ‘normal’ people.
In addition to selection issues, the presentation of the case studies was also strategically
formulated. Another one of Karl Menninger’s case studies from Love Against Hate, that of Alan
McLore, demonstrates the kind of juxtaposition of dramatized, vivid details with psychoanalysis
that moved the arguments in popular psychiatry along. McLore, another individual who emerged
from poverty to become a business success, worked desperately hard. “Such people” as McLore,
Menninger stated,
suffer from prodigiously strong aggressive impulses which, by long-time training in selfdiscipline, by persistent application, and by meticulous compliance with the demands of
necessity, they learn to manage by means of complete absorption in work...This kind of
work, however, is not true sublimation; or perhaps we should say it is not all
sublimation—it is partly compulsion (1942a, p. 143).
The specific case study, once accoutered with bridging terms such as ‘This kind of work,’ was
established as a kind of route to the realm of broader pronouncements.
Perhaps most profoundly, the very presence of case studies foregrounded the kind of
experience that the experts had that their audience did not. That is, simply by using case studies,
these authors called attention to one of the most basic things that separate psychiatrists from
everyone else: they examine other people’s personal problems in a clinical or therapeutic
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context That is to say, the description of case studies erected a symbolic divide between
themselves and their lay audience.
It is also important to note the location of the case studies. By recalling specific case
studies, the popular psychiatrists were locating their authority, making clear, in the most literal
sense, where they were coming from. The case studies situated the authors face to face with the
psychiatric issues they described, allowing them to cast themselves as privileged interpreters of
their topics by showcasing their ostensibly direct interaction with the individuals who embodied
those issues. Significantly, the mental hospital was not a consistent part of this practice of
locating authority. Almost certainly trying to distance themselves from the mental hospital, the
authors (and here Strecker is the exception to the rule) rarely framed their case studies
specifically as tales ‘from the mental hospital’. This certainty about their direct contact with their
patients but uncertainty regarding where their patients were located would have been a snug fit
with the goal of leaving behind the mental hospital and the (mostly negative) symbolic baggage
that went with it.
Another way of providing evidence for some of the sweeping claims made for
psychiatry’s efficacy involved the use of historical examples. Such support invoked names of
famous individuals in history, usually to diagnose them. Among the authors of the textbook-style
popular psychiatry, Karl Menninger was the most apt to use such examples, as he couched such
figures as: St. Jerome, (1938, p. 112) John Brown, (1938, p. 126), Van Gogh, (1938, p. 441),
Woodrow Wilson, Napoleon, (1945, p. 76) Thomas Newton, Jeremy Bentham, (1945, p. 77)
Leon Czolgosz, Charles Guiteau, (1945, p. 99) Abraham Lincoln, (1945, p. 113) Andrew
Jackson, Ben Jonson, Richard Wagner, and Voltaire (1945, p. 154-155). These figures were
diagnosed as any other case study; their actions were considered in terms of psychiatric
symptoms. For instance, Karl Menninger classifies Harry Houdini’s escape acts as
manifestations of his own self-destructive instinct; Menninger considered them to be types of
suicide attempts (1938, p. 64). He also diagnosed Napoleon and Woodrow Wilson with
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“schizoid,” or “queer,” personalities, linking their considerable accomplishments to their
(psychiatrically diagnosable) personality types.
The psychiatric diagnosis of these figures seems a stark contrast with the presentation of
case studies that the author has presumably acquired through personal experience. Obviously,
this kind of support did not involve any claims to direct contact with these figures. However,
there is a strategic move that is being made here: by claiming these figures for psychiatry, the
authors were claiming history for their profession. Presenting psychiatric explanations for what
impelled these historical figures to act as they did, they boiled history down into psychiatric
variables, offering yet one more task that psychiatry could accomplish outside of the mental
hospital. Also, recalling Menninger’s professed concern for presenting entertaining analyses that
stopped shy of being lurid, these historical analyses fit the bill quite well. Moreover, by using
famous historical figures as case studies, the authors were able to enlist the readers in the
explanatory narrative because they already knew what became of these individuals. This allows
for a kind of prima facie demonstration of effectiveness o f the psychiatric method that benefits
from all that (and nothing more than) hindsight allows. Having experienced a certain difficulty
using psychiatry as an explanatory device, there was always a chance for psychiatrists to
retrospectively consider the past in psychiatric terms. And finally, they made it seem that the
diagnostic terms used by psychiatry were timeless, equally capable of dealing with individuals
both mundane and extraordinary, from the past and the present alike. The issue of evidence
continued to be of great importance to popular psychiatric writing through the 1960’s. As we will
see, some components of this support were maintained, while others were jettisoned, as the
contours of popular psychiatry changed with the changing times.
Treatment
Each o f the textbook-style psychiatric works featured a section on psychiatric treatment.
Describing treatment to a lay audience seems to have been motivated by a (almost certainly
justified) belief that psychiatry had not yet been well-represented. They considered the accurate
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representation of psychiatry’s methods to be the path to a rehabilitation of psychiatry’s image.
Clearly, the stigma of mental illness had rubbed off on psychiatry itself; these reviews of
treatment served as a way to deal with that stigma.
Edward Strecker fully acknowledged the stigma that had been attached to psychiatry, but
he saw progress in the profession’s future when he recounted how, “[n]ot so many years ago, an
appointment to visit a psychiatrist was something to be concealed—not exactly disgraceful, but
better not divulged” (1952, p. 44). He saw this stigma as having been in part the result of a
misunderstanding of the psychiatric examination, which, he insisted, did not involve just “the
condition of the patient’s mind,” but also involved a consideration of the body (1952, p. 45).
Strecker described the psychiatrist’s role in the examination as relatively passive, relying on the
patient to “tell.. .his life story freely,” specifically noting that “the psychiatrist will not badger
him about the details of the history” (1952, p. 46). An over-riding concern for reassurance
shaped Strecker’s view of psychiatric exams.
William Menninger provided a similar description of the psychiatric examination,
prefacing that description by remarking that “[m]ost of us are pretty hazy about what would
happen if we went to a psychiatrist,” and reassuring his audience that consulting a psychiatrist “is
essentially no different from going to any other physician,” though the psychiatrist uses some
different methods” (1949, p. 139). One of the important differences from other medical
examinations, he explained, was that the psychiatrist required “the most extensive and by far the
most time-consuming examination of any specialized field in medicine,” by which he was
referring to the psychiatrist’s need to know “a great deal about both your past and present life,
your feelings, your methods of thinking, in addition to all the data about your physical and
chemical status” (1949, p. 141). Though Strecker and William Menninger differed in their
approaches, with Menninger offering a much more psychoanalytically-oriented picture of the
profession, they both sought to rehabilitate psychiatry’s image by ostensibly lifting the veil
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surrounding the psychiatric profession, proclaiming their own openness as professionals while
continually playing up psychiatry’s alignment with medicine.
As the most traditional, and therefore, least psychoanalytically-oriented, of the popular
psychiatrists here examined, Strecker was the most concerned with establishing psychiatry’s
concern with the body. While explaining the psychiatric examination, he fended off any criticism
that the psychiatrist ignored the patient’s body, reassuring the audience that the “patient’s body is
studied from the very beginning...Many people feel reassured when they see the familiar
instruments of the doctor, the clinical thermometer, the stethoscope, the blood-pressure machine,
[and] the reflex hammer” (1952, p. 52). The psychiatrist’s gaze, he explained, was acute enough
to notice not only “signs of diseased organs, but also the possibility of covered mental conflicts,
so motivating in the production of sickness” (1952, p. 246).
Alongside his presentation of psychiatry’s commonalities with traditional medicine,
Strecker also reserved a special place for psychoanalysis, describing psychoanalytic techniques as
significant (though not central) parts of the contemporary palette of the professional psychiatrist.
Praising psychoanalysis for “[leading] the assault against the strongly entrenched citadel of selfsufficient objective psychiatry,” (1952, p. 316) Strecker identified himself as never before with
the emerging currents of psychoanalysis within psychiatry, merging his own very central place in
the profession with the new wave of technique and theory. There was a kind of progressive and
optimistic tilt to this story of psychoanalysis’s place in psychiatry. For psychoanalysis, he
argued, had enriched all psychotherapy. The “net result” of the introduction of psychoanalysis,
he claimed, made it so that “unrestricted freedom of expression is a recognized component of
every form of psychotherapy” (1952, p. 317).
But Strecker was still somewhat guarded of traditional psychiatry and unwilling to allow
psychoanalysis’s introduction to eclipse more engrained modes of treatment. He noted that:
many psychoanalysts do not make physical examinations of patients.. .A number of
analysts adhering strongly to dogma will not prescribe even a simple remedy for a patient
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being analyzed who may have only a cold. I may be wrong, but I think this is gilding the
lily a bit too heavily (1952, p. 326).
Clearly trying to knock psychoanalysis down a couple notches, Strecker distanced himself from
any self-styled mavericks who proclaimed that psychoanalysis was the future of psychiatry. His
professional stance was linked too closely to the clinic for it to have been in his interest to suggest
any radical departure from professional norms. The Menningers, of course, made no such antipsychoanalytic arguments, for they themselves offered psychoanalysis as a way out of
psychiatry’s publicity dilemma, and were thus disposed to place relatively less emphasis on the
physical side of psychiatric exams.
Two types of psychiatric treatment, shock therapy and lobotomy, are mentioned
repeatedly in popular psychiatry. However, they were not described in the kinds of rosy terms
one might associate with this oft-triumphal professional prose. Instead, they were described as
something the authors knew the public was aware of, as negative stigmas associated with
psychiatry that needed to be dealt with, but pushed away from the profession. Strecker
manifested this ambivalence in his statement that “[ejlectroshock has been given a very wide
treatment coverage, personally I think somewhat too extensive.” He acknowledged its power to
deal with certain psychoses, but doubted that the psychoneuroses (later shortened to simply
‘neuroses’) could be helped (1952, p. 311). Karl Menninger was more optimistic, but still
somewhat reluctant to grant electroshock therapy a prominent place in his picture of psychiatry.
He claimed that “[i]t is difficult to evaluate the shock treatments at the present time, because our
experience is still relatively small and still growing, and widely different opinions are held by
equally competent psychiatrists,” but acknowledged that some patients were helped by
electroshock therapy (1945, p. 411). The shock therapies that preceded electro-shock therapy,
including those that relied upon insulin- or metrazol-induced shock, both of which had a more
questionable record in treatment o f the mentally ill, were almost never mentioned.
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Lobotomy, the other physical psychiatric treatment to provoke this kind of ambivalent,
distancing stance from the popular psychiatrists was given even less enthusiastic of a description
than electro-shock therapy. Strecker gravely intoned that “[i]t is my considered opinion that these
operations [lobotomies] are being used too extensively,” and he described how, when evaluating
an article submitted to a popular magazine that took a very pro-lobotomy stance, he advised the
magazine not to publish the article. He reasoned that “the article was not factually true, and it
would have given rise to hope in the families of many chronic mental patients—false hope, which
would have ended in disillusion and cruel disappointment” (1952, p. 313). This description of a
rejected article displayed more than just Strecker’s disdain for lobotomy procedures, it also
revealed how that disdain was connected to his concern for psychiatry’s relationship with a lay
audience. Menninger communicated a similarly anti-lobotomy stance, symbolically sandbagging
the procedure out of mainstream psychiatry by describing how survivors of lobotomies were
“living rebukes” who “have rather discouraged indiscriminate surgical psychotherapy” (1945, p.
374). Explaining that lobotomy “should be mentioned because it has had wide publicity in the
lay press,” he aligned the profession against the procedure, pronouncing that “[mjost psychiatrists
are definitely opposed to this type of treatment, certainly in its present state” (1945, p. 412). Not
all psychiatrists dealt with lobotomy in this way. The practice itself survived into the 1950’s,
(Shorter, 1997, p. 228) but even before this, it was definitely not a procedure that made for a
profitable image for a professional addressing the public.
Other kinds of treatments that stemmed from psychiatry’s physical/biological side were
dealt with, but rarely received much emphasis. Confinement, for example, received very little
attention. Karl Menninger acknowledged confinement as a factor in treating suicidal individuals,
and even emphasized its necessity in such cases. “|I]t is a commonplace of psychiatric
experience,” he explained, “that such individuals [suicidal persons] are best confined and kept
under close surveillance” (1945, p. 421). Another description of confinement that Menninger
offers is introduced by the assurance that
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[b]y far the majority of the psychiatrists’ patients are seen outside the walls of the
sanitarium or hospital. But there are some who need hospitalization and do not get it.
That a melancholy man or a suspicious, deluded woman needs to enter a hospital as
urgently as does a person with acute appendicitis is not yet common knowledge (1945, p.
401).
Assuring the readers that psychiatry had established independence from the mental hospital,
Menninger justified confinement by invoking medical comparisons. That is to say, the practice of
confinement provoked some of the same kind o f deflection as lobotomy and shock therapy.
These were professional features that were not to be widely advertised. As such, they lingered on
the fringes of popular psychiatry.
It should also be pointed out that the popular psychiatry textbooks gave scant attention to
any kind of drug therapies. They were mentioned, but mostly in passing. Karl Menninger took a
defensive pose when he averred that psychiatry
isn’t faith healing, as some imagine; it doesn’t try to fool anybody, or to solve all human
problems with a single formula, or dedicate prayer to the cure of constipation. It does
effect changes in people by means of drugs when drugs can effect the changes needed
(1945, p. 373).
It seems almost as if Menninger had been confessing that drugs occupied a place in psychiatry;
the statement of drug use comes as part of a kind of de-bunking, or ‘straight talking’ that he
performs. To be certain, such defensiveness was apropos in consideration of the limited success
that psychiatry had experienced with drug treatments before the 1950’s (Shorter, 1997, pp. 246262).
While these physical techniques comprised a kind of negative essence for psychiatry,
defining popular psychiatry in the fact that the popular psychiatrists pushed them away, another
technique was given the spotlight: psychotherapy. Defined by Strecker as “any honest measure
of treatment emerging from the relationship between patient and doctor which improves the
understanding and attitude of the patient toward himself, toward his illness and toward his
environment,” (1952, p. 324) psychotherapy was the ‘talking cure’ that American psychiatrists
had widely (though certainly not unanimously) hailed as the way out of the mental hospital.
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Psychotherapy occupied a central place in the discourse regarding methodology in popular
psychiatry. It was played off in a way that allowed some significant rhetorical moves to be
advanced on the part of the profession.
The descriptions of psychotherapy as a form of treatment were frequently addressed
simultaneously to those studying psychiatry professionally as well as to the lay audience. When
considered from the point of view of the lay audience, this would have made the discussion of
psychotherapy seem like an overheard secret, as if the lay person had been granted entrde to
insider medical discussion. Strecker gave the audience some idea of how the psychiatrist had to
prepare for psychotherapy by noting that “[w]hen the doctor walks into his office, he does not
leave his own life experiences and his reactions to them on the other side of the door” (1952, p.
332). He lectured on how certain limits must be observed, and how “there is no place for threats,
intimidation, fear or the production of pain, electrically or otherwise conditioned” in “modem
psychotherapy” (1952, p. 333). Strecker’s description of the practice of psychotherapy yielded a
markedly humane portrait of the psychiatrist qua psychotherapist, reviewing how it is “mandatory
that the physician be truly non-condemning, non-critical, non-judgmental, accepting though not
necessarily condoning” (1952, p. 343). The “camouflaging veneer” of the “hidden unconscious
mental conflicts” of patients, he explained, must be stripped away “so that he and the patient
together can view them on the table of consciousness” (1952, p. 337). Strecker used such
descriptions of psychotherapy to portray the doctor-patient relationship in psychotherapy as
especially collaborative. Most psychiatric treatments were portrayed in rather rosy hues in
popular psychiatric work. And among these descriptions, psychotherapy was given the place as
the most collaborative, consensual, humane, shared experience.
Karl Menninger also cast psychotherapy as a kind of treatment that really put the doctor
on the side of the people, assigning psychiatrists the role of advocate more than the role of
authority. Starting by describing psychotherapy as “directed toward strengthening or expanding
the ego and restricting or mollifying the harshness of the super-ego,” (1938, p. 445) he noted that
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the “first step in psychotherapy is the establishing of some degree of rapport between the therapist
and the patient” (1938, p. 445). “All psychotherapyhe argued,
depends for its effectiveness on the extent to which the physician is able to give the
patient something he needs and cannot get or cannot accept—love. To be sure he (the
patient) uses a wrong technique to obtain it, but one can alter this technique only after
one has afforded the sufferer some degree of relief—not before. Then and then only is it
possible to re-educate him, emotionally and ideationally. Hence the proper management
of this dependence upon the physician is the key to successful psychotherapy (1938, p.
446).
Again, one can notice the importance that is assigned to making a positive bond with the
patient—here denoted in terms of love. In The Human Mind, he was somewhat more blatant in
the role one must play when administering psychotherapy. Playing up the selflessness of the
psychiatrist, he describe how the “first principle of psychotherapy is that it is done by some one
for someone else. It requires a saviour. This saviour may be almost anybody—many an intuitive
woman has cured a neurotic husband or lover by psychotherapy” (1945, p. 374). Significantly, he
de-mystifies the psychiatrists role by allowing that psychotherapy could be practiced by anyone.
But not long after, be retracts some of what might be implied by this, by assuring that “[o]f course
the technically trained person has enormous advantages over the naive psychotherapist. For one
thing, he knows what not to do and what not to say. The human mind, especially one in distress,
is a poor practice field for amateur explorations” (1945, p. 374). Here he slightly blurs the line
between the psychiatrist and the lay individual, but is careful to re-establish the significance of
the profession. The blurring of the line may have imputed some o f the properties of the
psychiatrist to the lay person, but just as significantly, imputed some of the properties of the
people (here the main concerns would seem to involve charity and patience) to the psychiatrist.
Karl Menninger spelled out very clearly all the things that a psychiatrist must do while
performing psychiatric counseling, a type of psychotherapy, and each rule guaranteed a
psychiatry that would truly represent those who came to it for advice. He emphasized the need to
“show the patient that you are interested in him,” insisted that the psychiatrist should never lie,
should “listen to what he has to say [and] listen a long time.” The psychiatrist was to “listen
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without censoriousness in word or expression, without rebuke, ridicule, or amusement,” and to
“give no advice, no treatment, and no opinion until you know what the patient is really unhappy
about; then tell him that such unhappiness could be (not is) the cause of such symptoms” (194S,
p. 390). Finally, he concluded that the psychiatrist assure the patient that the responsibility for
improvement resides in the patient him or herself, and not in the doctor (1945, p. 390). These
were, of course, veiy professional statements; the statement of the rules represented the
profession’s point of view. But the stress here was on what psychiatiy could do for the patient,
and when presented before a non-professional audience, the emphasis was quite clearly placed on
public service, on the humanity and dialogic nature of psychotherapy.
William Menninger’s address of the issue of psychotherapy was somewhat skewed from
his brother’s, but nonetheless retained the same kind of demystifying air. He defined
psychotherapy, and remarked that “[a]ll patients with psychological problems should have some
type or types of Psychotherapy” (1949, p. 143). While he also represented psychotherapy as a
patient-friendly method, he also stressed its links to other medical specialties by describing how
Psychotherapy is used by every physician, from the country doctor to the specialized
surgeon, sometimes intentionally, sometimes unknowingly. The simpler forms, or
perhaps one should say the less technical forms, include all communications from the
physician to his patient, which explain, reassure, suggest, give specific instructions or
counsel (1949, p. 143).
In his words, psychotherapy, seemingly the least medical of practices (since it rarely involved any
unusual tools or drugs), was linked to the medical tradition, from the country doctor to the
surgeon. Just because it did not have the outer trappings of science, he seemed to say, that did not
make it any less medical.
Karl Menninger devoted much discussion to psychoanalysis as a type of psychotherapy.
The “principle” o f psychoanalysis, as he explained it, was that a psychoanalyst “encourages the
patient to look at himself and...takes advantage of the patient’s emotional dependence upon him
to point out what the patient does not want to see” (1938, p. 455). The analyst is uniquely
disposed to preserve the independence because the goal is for the patient to ultimately “relinquish
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his grasp on the therapist because of his improved capacity for dealing with the environment”
(1938, p. 455). Making the success of psychoanalysis seem almost inevitable, he explained how,
when treated,
the patient gradually begins to complete the memory record of childhood in such a way
as to understand the apparent meaninglessness of his present dilemma. He has
discovered beyond any question of a doubt various unsuspected motives, wishes, fancies,
fears, misapprehensions; and these, together with the emotional charges associated with
them including the efforts necessary to repress them, are released, relinquished, and
revised (1945, p. 391).
And in The Human Mind, he provided a thorough review of how it feels to be psychoanalyzed,
and explained the importance of transference (wherein the analysand transfers to the
psychoanalyst their feelings toward their parents) to the psychoanalytic method. However, he
admitted that medical certainty could not be attained with psychoanalysis, noting “we do not yet
know exactly who psychoanalysis cures people” (1938, p. 449).
Edward Strecker and William Menninger were less enthusiastic about psychoanalysis.
Strecker almost totally ignored it in his popular writings, while William Menninger expressed
certain doubts regarding the efficacy of the psychoanalytic methodology, noting that it was
expensive, time-consuming, and applicable only to a small portion of psychiatric problems (1949,
p. 144). That psychotherapy was given such prominence in popular psychiatric discussions of
treatment methods is not very surprising. Psychotherapy, after all, was a major part of the
professional thrust at the time. What concerns me here, though, is how it was that psychotherapy
suited the symbolic needs of a profession attempting to assert itself in the public eye. In this
sense, it seems obvious that psychotherapy was a kind of treatment that could be discussed
without relying on weighty technical terms. In his correspondence, Karl Menninger once
described how
[ujnfortunately, the language of psychiatry is not the traditional language of doctors, and
since doctors have always been concerned with chemistry and anatomy, there is no way
to translate psychiatry into their language, so it inevitably comes about that anything a
psychiatrist writes is considered popular unless he resorts to the peculiar terminology of
one school of psychology (Faulkner & Pruitt, 1988, pp. 373-374).
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This bears directly on the emphasis, that he, his brother William, and (to a lesser extent) Edward
Strecker, placed on psychotherapy. Psychotherapy, after all, was probably the psychiatric
treatment method that was least connected with the chemistry and anatomy that acted as
(sometimes convenient, judging from the tone of Menninger’s missive) barriers to a popular
audience. It was a natural fit with a popular audience.
It should also be recalled that psychotherapy was a treatment most closely associated
(especially after World War II) with private practices, which were quite explicitly a component of
psychiatry’s (symbolic and literal) departure from the mental hospital (Grob, 1994, pp. 196-197).
Karl Menninger did not hide his loyalties; he distanced himself from the mental institutions. He
wrote the introduction to journalist Albert Deutsch’s damning portrait of life inside a mental
institution, The Shame o f the States, published in 1948 (Grob, 1994, p. 204). Privately, he wrote
to Detutsch, telling him that state hospitals “are a compromise and an insincere form of state
medicine,” criticizing them because “they do not defme their purpose clearly as being custodial,
therapeutic, or prophylactic, or all three,” while chiding Deutsch for failing to point out in The
Shame o f the States that “there is some psychiatry outside of state hospitals” (Faulkner & Pruitt,
1988, p. 250). The lines between private and public care of the mentally ill had been drawn, and
an emphasis on psychotherapy was a way for the professional to establish a break between him or
herself (almost always him, actually) and the old public facilities.
The Menninger brothers stood to benefit from this divide between public and private
institutions. Their clinic, the Menninger Clinic, had occupied a unique place in the American
understanding of psychiatry. The Menninger Clinic was run as a kind of Mayo Clinic for those
with mental illness, a place where experts were trained with the most advanced techniques and
patients were treated with unusual attention. Located in Topeka, Kansas, it seemed to be a long
ways away from the less prestigious institutions that attracted the attention of critics like Albert
Deutsch. Not only was it a private institution, it was also a family institution, founded by
William and Karl’s father Charles F. Menninger in 1925 (“The Menningers and Mental Health,”
80

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m is s io n of t h e cop y rig h t o w n e r. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

1938, p. 84). The journalistic coverage of the Menninger Clinic routinely granted the clinic the
rarefied status it positioned itself with. An article in American Magazine described how, at the
Menninger Clinic, “modem treatment, combined with love and kindness, is restoring once
‘hopeless cases’ and so-called ‘crazy people’ to healthy, happy living” (Beatty, 1953, p. 40).
Overall, the Menninger Clinic gave Karl and William Menninger a simultaneously humane and
prestigious base from which to launch their pro-psychiatric authoritative appeals.
More generally, psychotherapy allowed the authors to stake claim to a kind of alignment
with their patients. Throughout the descriptions of psychotherapy as a method of practicing
psychiatry, one can notice how the professional is positioned as an agent of the patient, as
someone whose personal contact with the suffering people grants him a kind o f moral authority.
The professional authors make themselves out to be much more than competent; they are also
casting themselves as sympathetic care-givers, truly in touch with the personal needs of their
patients. The physical location of the professional is (again) important here, as the case study
support usually located the author in face to free contact with those he treated. As psychiatry
made attempts to symbolically align itself with the formalized knowledge and practices
associated with other branches of medicine, it also strategically acted to stake claim to the moral
authority that doctors in general had been granted because of their perceived humanity and patient
advocacy. Psychiatry, as presented in these works, was a profession that acted on behalf of the
interests of its patients and potential patients, which is to say, everyone.
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Psychiatry Goes To War:
A Cinderella Story
Introduction
Addressing psychiatry’s role in the American armed forces during World War II, William
Menninger stated that “Psychiatry was on trial in the Army. It is standing before the judgment
bar in civilian life right now” (1948a, p. 537). The ‘trial’ metaphor that Menninger used was no
hyperbole. After decades of working with the mentally ill in asylums and mental hospitals,
psychiatry had found in World War II a way of stretching its professional wings like never before
and applying its professional approach to new horizons in mental health. As Menninger’s
comment would indicate, there were in fact two trials. First, during the war, psychiatry had to
appeal to the authority of the armed forces and their interests. Then, during and especially
immediately after the war, psychiatry’s role during World War II was to be judged by the public.
Claiming war as a psychiatric issue would prove to be a controversial stance. What made
psychiatry’s approach even more provocative, however, was the fact that the war was only the
beginning of what was envisioned as the proper domain for psychiatric expertise. Menninger,
continuing his insights regarding the ‘trial’ of psychiatry, noted how a prepublication reader
criticized his approach by telling him “You have stuck your neck out a long way in promising so
much from psychiatry.” The criticism applied somewhat to psychiatry’s efforts to claim World
War II as a psychiatric issue, but was almost certainly aimed at Menninger’s attempts to move out
from World War II and apply psychiatry to a multitude of domains tangential to the war.
Menninger defended himself, and the entire psychiatric effort to claim new fields:
He was trying to tell me, I think, in a polite way that I was overselling psychiatry. My
neck is not particularly important, but I have a strong belief that the wider understanding
o f the potential contributions of psychiatry is important. There has been no intention to
make exaggerated claims as to what psychiatry has done or can do. Rather, the
statements expressed represent my convictions about how psychiatric knowledge and
skill can be used. In every instance they have been re-enforced by my experience gained
during the war...Moreover, in my opinion one cannot oversell a clearer and wider
understanding of psychiatry (1948a, p. 537).
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In this understanding o f his profession, William Menninger presents the broadest definition of
psychiatry’s relevance, with no limits in applicability admitted whatsoever, and justifies this
centrifugal move away from the traditional psychiatric responsibilities and powers by asserting
that the move outward has been proven effective by psychiatry’s success in World War II.
Menninger posited that the only limits to psychiatry’s power to do all, and more, than the
public expected of it came from lack o f manpower:
There is some risk, however, that one can lead people to expect more than the present
limited personnel can deliver. At this time there are not nearly sufficient hewers of wood
and carriers of water in the field of psychiatry to do the jobs that need to be done. It is
readily understandable that persons who seek help and cannot obtain it from trained
professional persons may become discouraged. They may turn to less experienced
workers, to substitutes, to pretenders, and the job will be poorly done. The result may be
their disillusionment with all psychiatry (1948a, p. 537).
Psychiatry, in Menninger’s view, could be limited only by the shortage of qualified psychiatrists
available to do the job, implying that the only solution to psychiatry’s problems would be more
psychiatry. And defending psychiatry against the ‘less experienced,’ ‘substitutes,’ and
‘pretenders,’ Menninger insists on psychiatry’s unique ability to help the world.
The ambition for psychiatry that Menninger wore on his sleeve spoke volumes regarding
the position of psychiatry after World War II. In the decades preceding the war, psychiatry
fought hard to establish itself as a legitimate and relevant professional undertaking. This was an
extraordinarily difficult prospect. In the 1800’s, American psychiatry emerged from the treatment
of madness in asylums. The psychiatrist’s job in this institutional context was centered around
the custodial care of those housed in asylums. As asylums became an increasingly convenient,
and relied-upon, way o f dealing with the more difficult members of society, the psychiatric
profession became more visible and began to attract criticism from within and without. As the
idea of madness as an ‘illness’ gained currency in the late 19th century, psychiatrists began to
justify their profession in medical terms. The age of the asylum gave way to the modernized
mental hospital, where, instead of merely housing the mad, psychiatrists viewed their job as the
medical treatment of the mentally ill. This new medical vector to psychiatric authority was well83
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timed, for psychiatrists. Indeed, they would find themselves to be one of the earliest o f the
quickly growing field of medical specialties. Results, in the form of cures or improvement, could
not be reliably attained with the medical approach, but that did not restrain the enthusiasm of the
new scientific psychiatrists who regarded medicine as a way to lead psychiatry into the future and
counter criticisms that were made regarding the older functions of the asylum (Grob, 1983, p. 70).
Of course, it was also fortunate for psychiatry that it had hitched itself to a symbolic domain—
medicine—that was itself undergoing vast changes during the turn of the century.
At the end of the nineteenth century, psychiatry suffered from a long-lasting stigma
resulting from their association with the chronically mentally ill. Their response to this stigma
was to dissociate the psychiatric profession from its traditional subjects, in their stead offering
broad theories regarding the relevance of psychiatry to the world. Historian Gerald Grob has
observed that psychiatry’s “dreams of social redemption through progressive reform led
psychiatrists to look beyond the walls of mental hospitals” (1994, p. 141). In this sense, World
War II was a great window of opportunity for a profession in search of redemption. The
psychiatric role in the American armed forces during World War II was up for debate before
America entered the war. Representatives of the military believed that regular psychiatric
examinations would help to eliminate maladjusted soldiers, resulting in a more disciplined and
motivated military. Psychiatric involvement was regarded as tool for improvement.
To some degree, the military’s willingness to invite large-scale psychiatric involvement
into their ranks reflects the success of the lobbying efforts of psychiatrists, many of whom had
been arguing for greater psychiatric involvement since the end of the World War I. Steeled by
their limited role, while frustrated by their failures to do more in World War I, psychiatrists
pushed for an expanded role in World War II. A dominant school of thought within psychiatry,
the belief in the importance of personality as a predisposing factor in mental illness, underwrote
these claims for greater involvement. Arguing that mental illness was caused by personality
characteristics that first surface veiy early in life, psychiatrists made the point that a psychiatric
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screening o f potential inductees into the military would make it possible to find these
‘maladjusted’ or ‘immature’ individuals and prevent them from doing any damage to the other
troops (Greene, 1977, pp. 15-60). Historian Rebecca Schwartz Greene has observed that
[pjsychiatrists had a particular reason for wanting to use screening: to vindicate their
scientific, predictive expertise. Upset by the limited nature of their screening effort in
World War I and military criticism, they wanted to prove their scientific tools could
virtually eliminate mental illness from military service (1977, pp. 97-98).
For psychiatry, a profession that considered itself the Cinderella of the medical professions,
World War H was the ball they had been hoping to attend for some time.
Once involved in the war, psychiatrists did indeed take over the responsibility of
screening the draftees. From 1940 to 1946, more than fifteen million individuals were screened
by the military psychiatric corps (Greene, 1977, p. 1). Psychiatric examinations were supposed to
take fifteen to twenty minutes, but frequently lasted no more than a minute or two (Greene, 1977,
p. 168). There was considerable debate within psychiatry regarding how to classify many types
of individuals. Homosexuals, psychopaths, malingerers, former asylum inmates, and those who
had previously consulted with psychiatrists were not universally considered to be psychologically
unfit for battle (Greene, 1977, p. 156). This led to inconsistent psychiatric standards across the
screening process. Also, the stigma of being declared mentally ill, and given the label of
“neuropsychiatric 4-F,” meant that the psychiatrists’ job of classifying individuals out of the war
effort would generate criticism from the military as well as the public.
It should be remembered that psychiatry was given the power not only to screen potential
soldiers stateside, but also granted the power (or assigned the responsibility) to treat and
discharge those experiencing psychiatric problems in Europe and the Pacific, a power linking
them closely to the other medical personnel working in the military. This was a major part of
psychiatry’s increased role in the war, and physical proximity to the war allowed them to bolster
their own claims to alignment with the interests of the soldiers and the overall war effort. The
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perspective they would claim in subsequent popular writings about the war would take advantage
of their ‘dual location’, simultaneously at home and on the front.
Psychiatry’s standards for inductees were set very high, resulting in a relatively high rate
of rejection and discharge from the armed forces. By war’s end, more than two and a half million
draftees and servicemen had been rejected or discharged (Greene, 1977, p. 1). The military,
concerned with its own perceived manpower shortages, objected strongly to the loss of so many
men, and pressured the military psychiatrists to relax their psychological standards so as to stem
the flow of men out of the armed forces. Charges of racism in the psychiatric screening and
diagnostic processes became another part of the chorus of complaints that was leveled against the
psychiatrists. By 1943, criticism of psychiatry in the military had become a constant pressure.
Psychiatry defended itself by insisting, in an approach wholly consistent with their ingrained view
that psychiatric problems were caused by personality features determined early in life, that the
relatively high rate of neuropsychiatric problems they found in the soldiers was no higher than the
rate of psychiatric problems in the civilian population. Making the designation of
‘psychoneurosis’ any smaller, they believed, would only undercut their own assertion that mental
illness should not be stigmatized (Greene, 1977, pp. 321-368).
However, as the war continued, it appeared that the predictive method of screening out
the psychiatrically unstable to preserve the mental health of those on the front had failed. The
rate of psychoneurosis among active troops had not been reduced by the high standards in the
initial screening session. The Psychiatry Division’s annual report of 1944 admitted the failure of
this predictive model. As an alternative perspective, psychiatrists adopted a new stance, one that
took prevention as its central theme. Faced with the abundant evidence that it was the conditions
of combat, and not the predispositions of abnormal personalities, that correlated with diagnoses of
mental illness, psychiatrists began to elaborate on the precise dimensions of the combat
experience that could be thought to cause mental illness. Ecological factors such as food and
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weather, and social factors such as leadership and comradeship were brought in as explanatory
variables in the new psychiatric model (Greene, 1977, pp. 376-405).
As the war neared its end, then, the focus o f the psychiatric division was taken off of
screening and placed squarely on adjusting the conditions under which the soldiers fought. This
adjustment would prove to be a lasting one, and a particularly important one for popular
psychiatric writing. Instead of limiting themselves to the domain of the individual’s psyche in
terms of personality, psychiatrists and, in particular, popular psychiatry, would emphasize the
psychiatric understanding of the environment, allowing them to consider everyone as a potential
subject of psychiatry. Once factors like leadership, comradeship, family relationships, and
propaganda could be considered as psychiatric variables in the diagnosis of the mentally ill during
the war, an even wider range of factors were opened up for consideration after the war. This shift
in emphasis did not take place overnight, and did not occur in a vacuum. In a way, the move
toward environmental concerns during World War n can be seen as a galvanization of lasting
trends toward moving psychiatry centrifugally outward to new social spheres, and in particular a
confirmation of psychiatry’s move to capitalize on the conceptual vistas opened up by mental
hygiene. The popular psychiatric treatment o f World War II would find psychiatry at its most
centrifugal. The popular psychiatric experts reached out from the experiences of the war and
capitalized on their own proximity to the war. This move found the experts’ positioning
themselves and psychiatry as uniquely qualified commentators on the war, and then using this
authority to branch out to commentary concerning disparate realms of human behavior and
culture.
The Popular View of the War From the Psychiatrist’s Vantage Point
Psychiatry’s public face before, during, and after the war was largely represented by
William Menninger and Edward Strecker. Menninger’s Psychiatry in a Troubled World, a 1948
book that summed up his experiences and conclusions as the former Brigadier General in charge
of psychiatric affairs for the U.S. Army, was a kind of definitive take on psychiatry’s involvement
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in the war. The first part of the book addressed all the facets of psychiatry’s role in the war, from
the screening to the on-site diagnosis and treatment of the soldiers. The second part of Psychiatry
in a Troubled World, titled “In Peace” (1948a, p. 349), examined how these observations could
be applied in post-war America. Menninger also penned war-related articles for popular
magazines such as Atlantic Monthly and the New York Times Magazine, building on the
conclusions from Psychiatry in a Troubled World and taking longer strides in applying psychiatry
to new realms.
Meanwhile, Edward Strecker, who served as a consultant psychiatrist to the SurgeonGeneral of the Navy and as a chief medical examiner for the armed forces induction station in
Philadelphia during the war, published two books, Psychiatry in Modem Warfare (w/ Kennth E.
Appel, 1945) and Their Mothers ’ Sons (1946), that drew broad insights from psychiatry’s
experiences during the war. Like Menninger, Strecker also took his war-related insights into
popular periodicals, including The Saturday Evening Post, Every Lady’s Weekly, and the
Philadelphia Bulletin.
Both William Menninger and Strecker put the war to a similar overarching symbolic
purpose. They situated themselves in the war as advocates of the soldiers and as supporters of the
war effort. Doing this involved a kind of careful handling of the issue of mental illness in the
armed forces. Because mental illness did (as today) bear a strong stigma, they had to find some
way of assuring the audience that they were aware of the stigma, but totally opposed to the
stigmatization of mental illness. They put psychiatry to political uses, diagnosing Nazism,
fascism, and even American isolationism as psychiatric problems, a move that played up their
own alignment with mainstream American political beliefs and asserted their dedication to the
war effort. Menninger and Strecker capitalized upon the war by linking data from the war to
numerous contiguous domains of inquiry. The only thing that stood in the way of a psychiatric
solution, they argued, was the manpower shortage within psychiatry. World War II became, in
the writing o f Menninger and Strecker, a triumph of psychiatry. This kind of triumphal history of
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psychiatiy would make the oft-chaotic and contentious experience of psychiatry during the war
appear to be a classic tale of professional progress. This narrative was not merely inferred, it was
an explicit, integral component of popular psychiatric writing during and after the war. In their
writing, they argued that Cinderella had finally arrived at the ball.
Claiming War
The work of establishing psychiatry’s relevance to the war effort was accomplished
partly through statements of the huge numbers of soldiers screened out or discharged for
psychiatric reasons. By placing these numbers in the foreground, they made the war out to be a
hotbed o f mental illness, desperately in need of psychiatric involvement. Strecker asserted a
contrast between World War I and World War II, making psychiatry seem as important as ever,
by describing in Psychiatry in Modem Warfare (1945) how “[njeuropsychiatric battle casualties
in World War I were in the proportion of 1 to 7 of the total; in World War II, 1 to 3, or roughly 30
per cent” (1945, p. 12). Menninger stated that the “largest single category of evacuees from the
Pacific consisted of neuropsychiatric cases,” (1945a, p. 109) and that “[f]orty-eight per cent of the
discharges for disability between January and June 1944 were on the basis of neuropsychiatric
disorders” (1945b, p. 23). Writing in the forward to Their M others’ Sons, Eugene Meyer
described Strecker’s stance:
To [Strecker] the cold hard facts that 1,825,000 men were rejected for military service
because of psychiatric disorders, that almost another 600,000 had been discharged from
the Army alone for neuropsychiatric reasons or their equivalent, and that fully 500,000
more attempted to evade the draft were alarming statistics (1946, pp. 5-6).
That these numbers could be considered ‘alarming’ is not surprising. Indeed, the numbers,
frequently used to frame subsequent psychiatric analysis of the soldiers, set up a kind of rhetoric
o f crisis that runs through the popular psychiatric take on World War II.
If these descriptions of the numbers of mentally ill implied that psychiatry was deserving
of a major place in the handling of the war, they also threatened to cast the psychiatrists
themselves as overly-eager to keep soldiers off the front and brand them with the stigma of
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mental illness. William Menninger’s position as commander-in-chief of the psychiatric division
of the armed forces certainly made him sensitive to these criticisms, and his stance regarding the
size of the mental health problem in American servicemen manifests this concern: “Out of
4,650,000 men rejected for all causes,” he noted,
“ 1,825,000—39 per cent—were rejected for some type of personality disorder. From the
Army’s point of view the only meaning was that these men were not thought able to
withstand the greatest stress. As the war continued and manpower needs became more
acute, modifications were made in the neuropsychiatric standards so that men with ‘mild
psychoneuroses’ and ‘transitory psychoneuroses’ were inducted. Experience showed that
individuals in this category often made good soldiers (1945a, p. 109).
This statement bears the marks of a commentator who had done bureaucratic battle with the upper
echelon of the armed forces, and who understood that the public had not been fully convinced
why so many potential soldiers were being taken out of the armed forces. This kind of remark,
from Menninger, represented a kind of attempt to assure the popular audience that some mentally
ill individuals were perfectly capable of fighting, and that psychiatrists in the war were willing to
let them fight.
And the numbers of mentally ill soldiers during the war were used to do more than to
merely justify the psychiatrists’ presence in the war. The numbers could also be used to lay a
kind of authoritative foundation for their centifugal use of the data from the war, that is, their
assertion that their experiences during the war entitled them to make authoritative
pronouncements, or diagnoses, of phenomena that did not directly relate to the war. For instance,
William Menninger noted that “[tjhree hundred and eighty thousand soldiers were discharged
from the Army for neuropsychiatric reasons,” (1948a, p. 152) using this number to justify his
statement that
“[i]t is to be hoped that all physicians will prepare themselves to accept and to treat what
the Army medical officers discovered were among their biggest problems—the emotional
factors in the production of illness (1948a, p. 152).
Understanding that by “the emotional factors in the production of illness,” Menninger was
referring to the unique specialty of psychiatry, this statement can be taken as an application of
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lessons learned from the war to the broader practice of medicine in general. The attempt here is
to preserve the momentum that psychiatry had gained during the war by subtly asserting that the
war’s findings were applicable to peacetime.
A similar argument, using numbers to spread psychiatry’s role into peacetime and
civilian utility after the war, can be found in (again) Eugene Meyer’s forward to Strecker’s Their
Mothers ’Sons:
The military service screening processes gave an excellent opportunity to set up a definite
measuring stick by which to evaluate the average maturity and emotional stability of our
youth—their ability to face life, live with others, think for themselves, and stand on their
own two feet. The figures are not promising—almost 3,000,000 men either rejected or
otherwise lost to the service for neuropsychiatric reasons out of 15,000,000, just a bit
under 20 per cent! (1946, p. 6).
In this argument, the psychiatric service during the war is asserted as a chance for psychiatrists to
get a peek at something that had previously eluded them: a large cross-section of the American
populace. Before the war, psychiatry had suffered from association with its own clientele.
Because psychiatrists were assumed to specialize in the treatment of the mentally ill, their ability
to address the world in which the rest of the world lived was quite limited. By playing up the
number of soldiers and would-be soldiers who were diagnosed as mentally ill during the war,
Menninger and Strecker could highlight the fact that psychiatry in general, and the two of them in
particular, had dealt with a vast number of people who had not ‘gone crazy’ prior to any
diagnostic attention, but who were actually sized up without requiring any prior complaint as to
the subject’s psychological stability. Though this argument was assumed more than it was stated,
it can be seen as a crucial support for applying psychiatric ideas to the world in general. This
vector of authority, connecting the psychiatrists’ war experiences to their application of that
experience to the world, was a crucial component of the popular move after World War II.
Diagnosing the Soldiers
Alongside claims regarding the widespread nature of the problem of mental illness in the
war were claims regarding exactly how the screened-out and discharged soldiers were to be
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considered ill in the first place. Particularly toward the beginning of the war, before the focus of
the psychiatric forces shifted to ideas of prevention in the form of mental hygiene, the diagnostic
unit of analysis was the soldier’s personality. That is, mental illness was located in the soldiers
themselves, whose classification as ‘sick’ or ‘mentally ill’ served to justify, or at least explain, the
role of the psychiatrist in the war.
Frequently, classifying soldiers as sick was done in quite a straight-forward manner, as
when Strecker asserted that
[tjhose psychiatric battle casualties, who served splendidly and broke only after an
overload of strain was placed upon them, were sick. Those men, too, were sick who
made a feeble attempt at service, but soon after induction, sometimes only a few days,
retreated under the cloak of neurotic symptoms. So were those men sick who failed to
clear the induction hurdle because they were weighted by psychoneurotic impediments.
Finally, the men who attempted to dodge the draft were sick (1942, p. 6).
This was, of course, the very raison d’etre of psychiatrists during the war, and it is by no means
surprising to find this basic classification of ‘sickness’ used to classify those whom they treated.
Sickness was a label that served the purposes not only of the psychiatrists, who relied on it to
justify their involvement, but also the military, who needed some classification to designate why
soldiers who seemed physically acceptable were discharged, and finally the families of the
soldiers, who also demanded some explanation of why the soldier was not retained in the
fighting.
The personality-oriented psychiatry that was used to explain this sickness was present in
the popular and professional writings of both William Menninger and Edward Strecker, though
Strecker certainly favored them more than Menninger. Strecker (w/co-author John Appel) opined
that
[i]n spite of considerable opinion to the contrary, the authors believe that the main
controlling factor in the prognosis of neuropsychiatric disabilities is the same in this war
as in World War I—the previous condition of the personality. Particularly is this true of
the psychoneuroses. Unfortunately, information concerning the prewar personality—its
integration and soundness, or its imbalance—often is not available at the time when the
first neuropsychiatric symptoms appear (1945, p. 16).
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This concern for the pre-existing personality of the soldier before the beginning of the war was,
o f course, the psychiatric justification for the screening campaign that gave them such a large
amount of power in World War II in the first place. The connection with World War I is
significant. If generals are always fighting the last war, it certainly appears that, at the beginning
of World War I, psychiatrists were doing the same, using an explanatory mechanism that had
survived almost unchanged from twenty five years before. By looking at the ‘previous condition
of the personality’, Strecker, and much of the rest of psychiatry with him, avoided what would in
later years become the obvious—to consider the psychiatric meaning of war experiences—instead
looking backwards from the war to whatever kinds of diagnosable personality disorders led to the
disintegration of the soldier’s personality.
From the point of view in which the previous condition of the personality was considered
to be the most important cause of mental illness during the war, the personality of the soldier was
often held to be a kind of bulwark against the stresses of warfare. If the personality had been
working correctly, the soldier’s personality would have carried him through the combat without
symptoms of mental illness. If the personality were not working correctly, it was hoped that any
defects would be noticed during the psychiatric screening process. Whatever imperfections made
it past the screening process were revealed during warfare, when the troubled personalities were
likely to break down. The profound belief in the importance of the human personality explains
the psychiatrists’ emphasis on the screening procedures, and their inflexibility, when faced with
large numbers of soldiers breaking down in combat, to allow that the environment of war might
be o f more importance as an explanatory variable. War was taken as a proper litmus test of the
human personality. To fail to live up to its challenges indicated nothing about the war per se, but
much about the qualities of one’s personality.
Strecker and William Menninger had many classifications for these personalities that
could not withstand the challenge of the war. These personality classifications would shape how
Menninger, and especially Strecker, would subsequently move out from the war to branch out to
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contiguous explanatory concerns, such as ‘why were our soldiers ill prepared for battle?’ In this
sense, the classifications of soldiers provided diagnostic bridges between the war and the rest of
the world. Strecker, for instance, relied largely on the concept of immaturity to explain what was
wrong with the soldiers. “Why did the desire for self-preservation defeat one group of men and
not the other?,” he asked. “The answer in a large percentage of cases,” he claimed,
can be given in one word, ‘immaturity.’ The majority o f the men who failed, like the
majority of the men who fail for the same reasons in ordinary life, were immature.. .What
is maturity? It is the ability to see a job through (1942, p. 6).
The similarity to war and ‘ordinary life’ that Strecker alludes to here is a tip of the hat of what
would become his move to partly elide differences between war and general human existence, for
the differences would disqualify his war experiences as a relevant grounding for his overarching
statements regarding other domains of human life. Immaturity would be a cornerstone of
Strecker’s popular psychiatric writing in Psychiatry in Modem Warfare, Their Mothers ’ Sons,
and Their Mothers’Daughters.
Working from concerns quite similar to those of Strecker, William Menninger rarely
concerned himself with immaturity per se, instead focusing on what he called adjustment.
Menninger noted that
...in those cases where [a soldier’s] rebellion carries into refusal to obey orders instead of
later grumbling about having to do it, we have a man whose threshold of adjustment to
the situation has been crossed. If such behavior continues, he proves his inability to serve
in our Army; for, after all, obedience to group and leadership demands is fundamental to
the efficiency of our fighting forces (1945b, p. 21).
‘Adjustment’, as used here, would be a psychiatric concern throughout Menninger’s writing on
the war. The term closely mirrored Strecker’s ‘maturity’; both implied a concern for suppressing
the individual’s needs to the group’s needs. This concern for the group was largely a function of
how military concerns, such as obedience and leadership, were used to shape the psychiatric
effort that was carried out.
Strecker and Menninger would use other, more specifically psychiatric terminology to
classify the personalities of soldiers whom they considered to be bound for psychiatric problems.
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Again using the same kind of blurring of boundaries between war and normal life, William
Menninger described how
[i]n the Army as well as in civilian life, we encounter a group of persons who are social
misfits to a greater or less degree. They are individuals who, as a result of abnormal
psychological development in infancy, manifest actual or latent personality defects
characterized by a lack o f sense of responsibility, inability to learn from experience,
shallow and labile emotional expression, and a self-centered attitude in their conduct and
thinking. These cases of personality deficiency are technically referred to in the Army as
‘psychopathic personalities’ or ‘constitutional psychopathic states.’ The two types
observed most frequently are the emotionally unstable and the asocial-amoral (1945b, p.
25)
Menninger’s concern with the psychology of the deviant soldier led him to concern himself with
the malingering soldiers, those who feigned mental illness or who displayed a simple inability to
do their jobs despite the lack of any specific psychiatric symptomology. Menninger posited that
[mjost malingering, if not all, occurs in pathologic personalities. Certainly malingerers
are socially even if not medically ill. Often they have been labeled ‘psychopaths.’ If the
effect on the morale of many could be disregarded and if the man-power needs were not
great at the time of selection, the man who malingered to avoid military service should
not be taken into the armed forces. Anyone with such distorted social values and
personality characteristics is likely to make a poor soldier unless radically reoriented
(1948a, p. 215).
So, pathologic and psychopathic personalities (not the same thing, Menninger reminds us) were
grouped with the immature and the maladjusted to explain the problems that prevented soldiers
from doing a better job.
The neuroses were also used as an explanatory category regarding what was wrong with
the psychiatric casualties of World War II. Strecker suggested what the predispositions to war
neuroses were, arguing that “[ejgocentricity, self-centeredness, overconscientiousness, lack of
sociability, lack o f affection, and dependency are still factors that predispose to war neuroses”
(1945, p. 13). He also saw the neuroses as a kind of predisposing condition that led to problems
during the war, as when he concluded that
[a]ll in all, it would seem fair to conclude that in general the personality canalization and
its behavior expressions in the psychoneurotic constitution are quite vulnerable to the
demands of military life and likewise tend to influence prognosis unfavorably if the
soldier is retained in military service (1945, p. 17).
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William Menninger also relied on the neuroses as an explanatory category. He approvingly cited
another military psychiatrist, who had found that “[a] psychologically traumatic childhood and a
neurotic or unstable adjustment in later life made successful adjustment in the Army more
difficult and less probable” (1948a, p. 138).
A less obvious, but nonetheless substantial, application of psychiatry to the war consisted
of the description of what personality factors allowed a soldier to maintain mental health, a kind
of complement to the issue of what components of a personality explained the break-down of the
soldier. The issue of mental heath in effect allowed psychiatrists to expand their territory even
more than the (already flexible) categories of illness alone would allow. And here, not
surprisingly, one finds a mirror of the personality issues that provoked discussion of mental
illness. So, for example, Strecker asserts that “[t]he more satisfactory the previous personality
and the sounder its integration, the better the outlook” (1952, p. 429). More specifically,
Strecker’s view of the benefits o f a strong personality were summed up when he described how
[independence, the ability to make one’s own decisions, self-confidence, friendliness, a
sense of duty and group loyalty, the capacity for sustained aggression, good morale (a
will to fight stronger than a will to live), stick-to-itiveness—these are still safeguards to
mental health as they always have been (1945, p. 13).
William Menninger cited another psychiatrist’s study of successful soldiers, which found that
“there was a much lower incidence of childhood neurotic traits, of unsatisfactory home situations,
and of previous personality or mental disorder in his still-functioning subjects than in those with
psychiatric disabilities,” (1948a, p. 136) linking pre-war mental health to mental health during
and after the war. Strecker also offered predictions and explanations o f post-war mental health,
noting that
[ultimately the successful readjustment of the veteran will depend on that quality of his
prewar personality which we call morale or maturity—actually on his own determination
to succeed and persist through difficulties, disappointments, trials and errors, till
circumstances and his own determination and resourcefulness evolve a successful
adaptation (1945, p. 66).
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This was another way of claiming an expanded role for psychiatry, promising its usefulness after
the war, and using its experience during the war to lay claim to all that followed.
Combat Etiology
But an application of the personality as an explanatory tool was only one means by which
psychiatrists claimed the war. In addition to this approach, which was defined by a kind of
retrospective gaze, looking back to find the formative details that explained the personality
dysfunctions that surfaced during the war, psychiatrists also considered the environmental details
of the war itself as part of the psychiatric terrain. Through environmental considerations, the
psychiatric effort could be extended beyond the confines of the human psyche out into the world
itself. Significantly, this allowed the popular psychiatrists to seem less like they were blaming
the soldiers in the war. The description of environmental effects on mental health was, in this
sense, an acknowledgement that war was not an easy job, and a defense of the soldiers who were
given psychiatric discharges. Given the resistance from the military and the public during the
war, the increasing emphasis on the conditions of war can be read as a politically astute move.
The diagnosis of mental illness was, of course, a stigma, and this stigma was, in a sense, attached
as much to psychiatry as it was to those it classified as mentally ill. By emphasizing the
conditions of war as etiologically significant, psychiatrists manifested their alignment with the
soldiers’ interests, and made it seem less like they were blaming the soldiers. This was carried
off as a totally medical move, with the conditions of war considered as physical events that create
certain symptoms, comparable in a way to an epidemic of a disease.
It is important to keep in mind that personality-level explanations were not discarded in
the move to the environment as an explanatory variable. Though there was widespread debate
concerning the comparative benefits of environment and personality, this debate was widely
concerned with issues of emphasis, and it was common to find psychiatrists, such as William
Menninger and Edward Strecker, considering both personality and environment. The
justification, offered by both Menninger and Strecker, was that the personality and the
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environment exist in a kind of interaction, both sides of which were cast as relevant to their
expertise.
“War,” said Edward Strecker,
is a great leveler. It strips the soft, protective swathings of civilian life from millions of
young men and exposes them to a threat to survival. It brings out their strengths and
reveals their weaknesses both physical and mental (1946, pp. 14-15).
Similarly, William Menninger noted how there is a “constant necessity to adapt ourselves to the
demands of our complex environment” that “is sometimes referred to as the ‘personalityenvironmental struggle’” (1948a, p. 351). Thusly arguing that the understanding of the
personality of the individual can only be understood through recourse to the more complete
understanding of the environment in which that person existed, that the personality and
environment collectively comprised a distinct unit of analysis, psychiatrists were enabled to allow
broad new domains into their professional view, claiming the world much as they claimed the
war.
This view of an interaction between the individual and war, in which the individual’s
personality is pit against the onslaught of war experience, provided a bridge between the more
traditional domain of psychiatry, the human personality, and the much larger realm that they were
increasingly to move into—the world outside. That this move satisfied psychiatry’s concerns that
it not appear to be blaming the mentally ill veterans was clear, as when Menninger described
what a brutal experience war was:
No test in Army experience.. .can compare with combat in the severity of [war’s]
demands for adjustment. Hardened veterans, not infrequently Regulars, when confronted
with the danger, sounds, and sights of combat, along with the deprivation of the last
vestige of comfort and security, may become psychiatric casualties (1945b, p. 21).
Strecker agreed with the general thrust of this, averring that
[t]he authors’ observations of patients with psychoneuroses in hospitals in the United
States gave the impression that the great majority had predisposing instabilities. It is
their impression that predisposing instabilities contribute to war neurosis in the majority
of cases, but that if stresses are prolonged and intense enough, soldiers with normal,
adequate personalities can break (1945, p. 15).
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So, the idea that the conditions of war were of psychiatric import provided a way of assuring the
audience that psychiatric casualties did not deserve whatever stigma that was perceived, and that
psychiatry itself was not to blame for the stigma.
Once claims like this were made to open the door to concerns of how the war
environment shaped the psyche of the World War II soldier, the entire war was opened up to
psychiatric consideration. Strecker and Menninger classified war itself as a kind of mental
illness, and as something especially difficult for Americans to deal with. William Menninger
claimed that, during World War II,
the country went into the most pathological of all human activities—war—against its
desire and without preparation. Men who had been ill-prepared for war by peaceful life
in our democracy had to face a tough, hard, long, costly conflict. Thus, an incidence of
psychoneurosis in only 6 per cent of the men selected for military service does not
compare too unfavorably with the civilian rate. It is estimated that 50 per cent of all
patients of civilian doctors suffer from emotionally caused disorders (1948a, p. 133).
In this kind of formulation, war is simply classified into the psychiatric project. War is simply
asserted to be pathological. The rate of mental illness in wartime is compared with the normal
civilian rate. Whereas in other parts of his recounting of World War II, he describes the enormity
of the mental health problem among the troops, here he makes clear that, considering the terror of
war, the rate of mental disease during the war was not as shocking as it might be. He was
unwilling to relinquish the idea that mental illness was a major problem during the war, but here
he puts the war itself under his lens as a way to avoid appearing that he is unaware of the plight of
the soldiers.
Strecker made similar basic claims that war itself is something to be dealt with
psychiatrically. He held that
[tjhere are two fundamental differences between peace-time conditions and states of war
which the psychiatrist must bear in mind. The first is obviously that the threats of injury
and death are greater in war. Fear is more intensely and continuously mobilized. The
precipitating factors are therefore probably more important than in civilian psychiatry.
This probably accounts for the greater effectiveness of relatively simple measures of
therapy. In die second place, social pressures are more intense in war conditions.
Psychiatric therapy must consider these social factors (1945, p. 55).
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Here, the difference between war and normal life is asserted to be that which makes psychiatry
particularly relevant to war. Defining war as an issue of ‘fear’ and ‘social pressure’, he pulls war
onto grounds that psychiatry is uniquely qualified to address. This acknowledgement of the
psychiatric importance of the war environment did not weaken Strecker’s concern for the
personalities o f the soldiers. When considering the “factors which determine the size and shape
of each adjustment problem” in the war, he listed:
1. The personality of the man before he entered the military service... 2. The effect upon
the personality of the military experience...3. The environmental setting (personal,
social, and occupational) from which the soldier was removed in order to serve his
country...4. The changed personal, social, and occupational situation to which the
soldier returns and to which he is asked to adjust (1945, p. 67).
The second, third, and fourth items on this list would all involve extending the psychiatric focus
on the personality to the war itself and examining the psychiatric importance of the war itself.
This done, war could truly be understood psychiatrically without abandoning personality
concerns. And once this was accomplished, the psychiatrists had opened up a vast frontier for
psychiatric insight.
Both Strecker and Menninger examined the social situation of World War II as it
impinged upon the psychological needs of the soldiers. Menninger examined the “complications
involved in a soldier’s physical withdrawal from previous obligations and relationships,” (1945b,
p. 21) emphasizing the importance of the basic fact that fighting in a war meant leaving friends
and family behind. In particular, Menninger focused on the very moment of departure for the
war, and he contrasted the departures for World War I, when “the band and the populace saw
‘their boys’ off on the train,” and World War II, when
men reported individually to the induction center, with the public apparently indifferent
to their going. The average inductee regarded his induction with a certain degree of
fatalism—certainly with no enthusiasm. ..The absence of motivation is believed to have
contributed significantly to the high incidence of psychiatric casualties (1945a, p. 109).
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The separation of the soldier from former conditions was held to be a psychiatric concern,
something that made the war a psychiatric event. Strecker’s emphasis closely resembled those of
Menninger. Strecker held that, compared to World War I,
the fundamental factors in the etiology of war neuroses remain the same: separation from
family and home environments; regimentation, discipline, lack of freedom; fear and
threat of destruction (1945, p. 13).
Menninger described how some soldiers lost their psychological stability because they frequently
had nothing on which to focus their energies, as when they were bombarded by far-off mortars
(1948a, p. 146). Strecker encoded the situation of the soldier in war into a psychiatric
vocabulary, writing that
[w]ar forced an unconditional demand for self-sacrifice and a renunciation of narcissism.
Stresses of war produced a regression to narcissistic levels of development, i.e., a state of
infantile helplessness, a complete loss of control, a need to be cared for like children.
The diminished capacity for external interests or withdrawal of object libido leads to an
inflation of ego libido (narcissism and self-centeredness) which is expressed in abnormal
hypochondriacal sensations and a further diminution of (genital) potency and adequacy
(1945, p. 24).
In such passages, one can notice the close interaction between the personality and the conditions
of war that psychiatrists like Strecker and Menninger held to be such an important feature of the
etiology of mental disease during World War II.
The climate o f World War II was a major variable in this classification of World War II
as a psychiatric phenomenon. Menninger, for instance, considered it to be of great importance
that “World War II was a mobile war fought with the tremendously increased power of its
instruments of death. It was fought in every climate, over every sort of terrain” (1945a, p. 109).
Menninger and Strecker both analyzed the physical surroundings of World War II in terms of
their effects on the soldiers’ psyches. In particular, Strecker was particularly concerned with the
ways in which the climate in the South Pacific affected the American troops stationed there. He
noted that “[ajlcoholic psychosis follows heavy drinking perhaps only after four or five years in
temperate zones. In the tropics it can develop in a year or less” (1945, pp. 20-21). And alcohol
was only part of the only problem facing troops in warmer climates, because
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[t]he sexual system is stimulated by conditions in the tropics. Promiscuity is widespread.
Debauchery leads to exhaustion, conflicts, and guilt feelings. A picture o f neurasthenia
and depression develops, and a vicious circle is started with alcoholism (1945, p. 21).
Strecker’s concern for the interaction of psyche and soma provided grounds for positing a
relationship between the climate of the battlefield and the mental health of the soldier.
And in addition to the psychiatric importance of the climate per se, Strecker also
emphasized that there was a psychiatric meaning to the fact that American soldiers were fighting
overseas. He asserted that “loyalty, solidarity, and motivation” become
all the more important for men in the military services of the United States because of the
following important factor: Our soldiers are fighting on foreign soil, where there is no
immediate threat to their homes and loved ones. Anger and aggression are therefore not
so actively mobilized. The threat to the homeland is not so easily visualized (1945, pp.
55-56).
In this sense, Strecker made the physical locales of the war a psychiatric issue.
Menninger’s consideration of the climate of war was usually less closely tied to the
grounds of war that Strecker covered so thoroughly. Menninger’s approach was rather more
diffuse, tending to provide laundry lists of how the climate of the war experience could be
psychiatrically meaningful. At one point in Psychiatry in a Troubled World, Menninger lists
stresses that “seemed unnecessary” (1948a, p. 132) during the training of the soldiers such as how
“[competition, as it was developed on the rifle range to force qualification, was extremely
difficult for many men,” or how “[b]attle training in preparation for explosions, loud noises, and
danger” could be “improperly used so that it actually sensitized many soldiers to battle sounds.”
And, finally, “[t]o sit in a replacement depot for weeks awaiting assignment created intense
resentment” (1948a, p. 132).
For two psychiatrists so attuned to psycho-somatic functioning, it is not surprising that
Strecker and Menninger also considered physical strain and exhaustion to be major factors in
soldiers’ psychiatric problems during the war. Menninger explained the importance of this
physical strain:
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Most people are aware of the fact that to become extremely angry or emotionally
exhausted is a very fatiguing process. One may feel physically exhausted after such an
episode. The combat soldier’s emotional state was stimulated for days and weeks on end.
Keeping himself alert against death and ready to kill meant a continuous and excessive
drain on his emotional energy (1948a, p. 145).
And once this emotional energy was sapped, the soldier became more susceptible to mental and
emotional problems. This is a prime example of how psychosomatic medicine, because it
explored the conceptual regions contiguous to physicians and psychiatrists, allowed psychiatry to
reach out and consider something that was once thought to be purely physical (exhaustion) and
define its importance in psychiatric terms.
As we have seen, Strecker placed great importance on the ways in which the climate of
World War II placed specific psychiatric demands on American soldiers. From Strecker’s
perspective, World War II was an occurrence of particular psychiatric import. World War II, he
claimed, was a new kind of war, and a qualitatively different war from World War I. Among the
“striking contrasts between the two world wars which have psychological and psychiatric
significance,” he pointed to:
1. The environmental extent of World War II. This war is global on the earth’s surface
and expands, as far as science can contribute, to the reaches o f the universe.. .2. The
nature of modem warfare, its new engines of war and hitherto-undreamed-of methods of
destruction...3. Increased speed o f action. Robot bombs travel with the speed of sound.
Communication is effected with the speed of electromagnetic waves sent from and
received by portable apparatus...4. Quantitative increase in stimulation, therefore, to
which the individual soldier is subject (1945, p. 3).
Boiling down these features of World War II into something relevant to psychiatry, the ‘increase
in stimulation’ to which the soldiers were subjected, Strecker made a case for psychiatiy’s major
involvement in the war. Whereas “World War I was static,” World War II
has obliterated front lines and rear lines. Civilian populations are part of the combat zone
in the present conflict. They are inevitably involved in strains, tensions, anxieties, threats
of destruction and actual destruction, as never before in the world’s history. No one is
safe, no place is secure. Constant vigilance is demanded of all zones, both physically and
psychologically. Front lines are fluid, operations are mobile, physical demands on
conduct are without limit (1945, p. 4).
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Strecker viewed the experiences of military aviators as characteristic of this kind of fluid,
omnipresent danger that made World War II unique. Strecker claimed that “the pressure of
training and the special stresses of flying tend to induce latent neurotic tendencies.. .The
commonest symptoms are: anxiety reactions, mild phobias, psychosomatic disorders,
hypochondriacal preoccupations, and conversion hysteria” (1945, p. 21). This kind of move,
from the conditions o f the war generally to the psychological symptoms of soldiers in the war,
was an explicit argument that the war was to be properly envisioned as a psychiatric event.
This kind of boiling-down of the war into its psychological significance is nowhere more
evident than when Strecker asserts that “The psychological consequences o f’ the “new
conditions” of World War II were:
1, increased stimulation, alertness, or vigilance of the / individual, resulting in a constant
mobilization and tension of the organism; 2, constant threat to the individual,
unrelievable anticipation, lessened security, increased fear...These aspects of World War
II probably account for the greater frequency of anxiety reactions as compared with
World War I. The individual is more hopeless. He is more in need of individual and
group morale and more dependent for his security on the group—strong, well-organized,
collective action (1945, pp. 4-5).
One can see here how Strecker was, at least in part, attempting to justify psychiatry’s expanded
role in World War II. Explaining the larger numbers of anxiety reactions in the war in terms of
the specific demands of World War II, Strecker was defending psychiatry’s role, insisting that his
profession was not over-extended, as its critics in the military and the general public had argued,
but was doing no more or less than responding to the horrors of war. That is to say, this view of
the war was not only psychiatric in the sense that it encoded the war in a psychiatric phraseology,
it was also constructed in accordance with the symbolic needs of the psychiatric profession.
Mental Hygiene in The War
While World War II could be claimed as a stronghold of psychiatric terrain through
claims that the war drove soldiers to mental disease, that is not to say that this was the only way
in which the war could be planned. Indeed, by describing the mirror-image of this mental
disease, that is, the cases of mental health that stood up to the most horrific tests that the war
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could provide, psychiatry could again be made out to be the proper possessor of the truth of the
war. Explanations of how soldiers could maintain mental health were offered as success stories
that highlighted how psychiatry could go beyond diagnosing those who could not fight, and drove
home the profession’s alignment with the goals of the army.
Descriptions o f how mental health could be maintained in the armed forces commonly
relied on an implicit appeal to the goals of mental hygiene. Though mental hygiene had
originally stressed both the reform of psychiatric institutions and the idea of a preventive
psychiatry, by the time of World War II, the latter of the two goals, the push for prevention, had
become mental hygiene’s primary thrust (Grob, 1994, pp. 151-162). The significance of mental
hygiene, in the context of a popular psychiatry, cannot be overstated. While traditional diagnostic
tools allowed psychiatry to classify certain kinds of human behavior as mentally ill or healthy,
mental hygiene enabled psychiatry to project its diagnoses into the future, appraising the entire
field of human experience and social interaction according to the yardstick of what kind of
behavior, if engaged in, will eventually yield mental disease in a person. When applied to the
mentally ill in World War II, the mental hygiene approach provided opportunities for grand
psychiatric insights regarding what bolstered and/or eroded the soldier’s mental health. Again,
this allowed a great number of factors to be considered as psychiatric in nature. Also, the mental
hygiene move satisfied psychiatry’s interest in getting away from the asylum. This is particularly
relevant in psychiatry’s efforts during World War II, which can overall be considered as one of
psychiatry’s ways out of the asylum.
This move to incorporate the environment marked a kind of turning point in psychiatric
reasoning. The increasing consideration of the environment, carried out as never before during
the war, would open the entire world to psychiatry. The mental hygiene concerns cut both ways,
opening up vistas for addressing simultaneously why soldiers became mentally unstable and why
they managed to stay healthy. Strecker indicated his opinions regarding mental hygiene in the
war by suggesting that if his understanding of how mental health were adopted “unquestionably
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there would result considerable lowering of the incidence of war psychiatric disabilities” (1952,
p. 438). William Menninger tended toward a more optimistic approach, observing that
[o]ur huge war machine was made up of Joe’s and Mary’s from Brooklyn and Kokomo—
each an individual personality. Most of them were ‘normal’ persons, and, although the
war changed them, they remained ‘normal.’ Despite all of the stresses inherent in being
in an army, going overseas, and being in combat, the great majority never had a severe
enough personality problem to require medical attention. What were the factors that
made them able to stay healthy? (1948a, p. 351)
Mental hygiene could thus be applied to questions regarding the healthy and the unhealthy.
A major theme running through the mental hygiene-style arguments of Strecker and
Menninger was the importance o f effective leadership, often considered in terms of the ability of
a leader to insure his soldiers’ ‘morale.’ “Inspired leadership in a unit is the most potent factor in
maintaining a functioning, fighting unit,” (1945b, p. 21) claimed Menninger. Strecker concurred
whole-heartedly, opining that “[ejvery soldier needs confidence in the personality and quality of
his leadership” (1952, p. 438). More exactingly, Strecker returned to a trusted metaphor to
explain that
[ajgain the test tube provided for psychiatry in this laboratory of war showed up the
understanding and capable leader as the all-important implement for increasing the
soldier’s determination to stay in the fight. His was the task of interpreting to his men the
information which special sections of the Army sent him; his was the most potent
example of attitude and behavior, his approval was essential for the release o f aggressive
urges which had previously had to remain under tight control; the individual with obvious
neurotic tendencies or a heavily laden disposition to mental illness derived strength from
emotional dependence upon the leader who accepted the obligations of his role (1948a, p.
89).
Strecker’s definition of the leader’s importance highlighted the psychological importance of
leadership; to be a good leader was, in this sense, to accomplish specific psychiatric objectives.
The job of efficiently carrying out military objectives was, in this sense, cast as something that
could be defined in psychiatric terms. The term ‘morale’ was of great importance here. A pre
existing military term, it became one of the major terms claimed by psychiatrists who attempted
to draw psychiatric insight from the war.
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Menninger and Strecker also touched upon the importance of other details of the war
environment in their discussion of how mental health could be maintained. Arguing from the
standpoint of ‘morale’ that the home front played a major role in a soldier’s mental stability,
Strecker argued that
[military morale of the future must be able to provide.. .faith... [tjhat the civilians at
home are backing him, not only by buying war bonds, but by token of their attitudes and
daily behavior. The morale barometer of troops in the field dropped appreciably with the
news of the coal strike and other strikes (1952, p. 438).
Menninger took a broad approach, nothing that, among other things,
factors that aided directly in proportion to their quality were relief and recreation; the
physical supports of food, clothing, and medical attention in at least a minimal form;
training; prewar ties; and experience (1948a, p. 101).
And later, in a discussion of how “[tjhe capacity to adjust... is the number-one factor in
maintaining mental health,” Menninger explains that
[tjhe soldier had to do it and many sought and found various compensations for doing it.
He didn’t have much chance to change the environment as the civilian often can and,
therefore, he had to change himself, his behavior, his relationships. Letters from home,
occasional good meals, a few hours on leave acquired very special value as
compensations. Many a ijian demonstrated that, even with the odds against him, he could
adjust. Even the unstable individual or the neurotic soldier could do so, if given
sufficient compensatory support. We were repeatedly surprised at the number of men
with a long-standing neurotic adjustment who carried on splendidly under ‘good’
leadership when convinced of the importance of the job (1948a, p. 352).
By creating a definition of mental illness that merged concerns regarding personality with those
involving the environment, Strecker and Menninger broadened the purview of psychiatry’s
relevance to the war, and to the world.
Still more environmental factors were thought to influence the success of maintaining the
soldiers’ mental health, such as training. Menninger explained how “[tjhe extent to which [the
soldierj learned the ‘how,’ the degree of his confidence in his own ability and in his own
weapons, served as a very important environmental support in the accomplishment of his
mission” (1948a, p. 98). Strecker focused on the importance of how the psychiatric corps did its
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job, noting that maintenance o f mental health could be improved if psychiatrists could observe
these rules:
The shorter the time elapsing between the occurrence of the casualty and the initial
psychiatric treatment, the better the outlook... Within reasonable limits, the closer to the
battle line psychiatric patient are treated, the better the chances for recovery.. .The more
severe the external factors, deprivation, exhaustion, acute and severe emotional shocks,
the better the outlook (1952, pp. 429-431).
And, finally, it was considered significant whether or not the soldier had successfully identified
with his combat unit. Identification was considered to be a major support for the mental health of
the soldier. “The successful soldier,” observed Menninger,
particularly if he saw combat, had a rare experience in life. His success depended
partially upon the fact that he became a part of a unit which became a part of him. It
successes and failures were his successes and failures; its gripes and opinions were his, as
were its laurels and its hardships. In the sacrifice of some of his individuality, he found
the compensation of comradeship that rarely develops in civilian life. The resulting
security and satisfaction were an important component of his mental health. In the
experience he found a new kind of unselfishness. He discovered a rare unity in human
relationships that erased differences in creed and color and in social, economic, and
educational backgrounds. No one stopped to ask the color of the stretcher bearer; no one
cared about the religion of the blood donors; if a buddy saved a life his prewar status did
not matter. One of the rich rewards of the Army experience for many, many soldiers was
the formation o f not only new but very warm friendships. Both the identification with his
unit and the close, even though new, friendships with his buddies were major factors in
aiding him to maintain his mental health (1948a, p. 353).
This way o f casting the war experience of the soldier as something that was potentially healthy
highlights the full reach of the psychiatric paradigm. Reaching beyond specific mental illnesses
via mental hygiene, and then using a mental hygiene approach to address the successes in
addition to the failures, Strecker and Menninger extended psychiatry to its outer reaches. Such a
centrifugal extension of the psychiatric approach allowed these public psychiatrists to approach
the war as more than just something that created outsize numbers of the classic psychiatric
disorders (neuroses, psychoses, schizophrenia), but instead as an extremely complex matrix of
psychiatrically-relevant variables of human interaction.
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The Stigma of Mental Illness in the War
Describing the large numbers and wide variety of mental illness among soldiers during
World War II was, in some ways, a dangerous course for psychiatry to take. Though the
profession was becoming more noticeable because of the war, not all of this attention was
beneficial to psychiatry. If World War II was one way for psychiatrists to demonstrate their
distance from the asylum and the stigma of mental illness, this move was not entirely successful.
The stigma of mental illness was still quite powerful in the postwar years, and because so many
veterans, 4F’s, and discharged soldiers had been deemed mentally unhealthy by the psychiatric
corps during the war, there was a popular conception that psychiatrists were somehow interfering
with the war effort. The fact that those deemed mentally unhealthy during the war faced
subsequent difficulty finding employment after the war exacerbated psychiatry’s predicament.
And the stigma suffered by those so diagnosed was shared by the profession that judged them.
The psychiatric attempt to reach out to vast new domains of human dysfunction, while
maintaining the traditional diagnostic tools, was often pictured as more of an extension o f than a
turning away from, the asylum and the ‘old’ psychiatry. The response from popular psychiatry,
and particularly from William Menninger, was an attempt to counter this stigma by
acknowledging the stigma and dealing with it in a way that attempted to assure readers that
psychiatry was truly operating in the best interests of the soldiers and the armed forces.
Perhaps the most elementary way of addressing the stigma of mental illness was by
asserting that the mental health problem in the armed forces really was not so dramatic after all.
Menninger attempted to assure Americans that their military consisted mostly of courageous,
responsible individuals, following up a description of the extent o f the mental illness problem
with the conclusion that
[tjhese remarks might imply that every man serving in the military would sooner or later
become mentally or emotionally disabled. Such will certainly not be the case; a minority
will be affected. It is the writer’s intention to point out that any soldier, rather than every
soldier, may find himself in such a stressful set of circumstances that, great though his
endurance may be, it may not be great enough* There are those who have indicated that
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this is evidence of a decadent culture; consequently it may be profitable to review some
factors in our way of life which contribute to the present situation (1945b, p. 23).
This move accomplishes at least two things. First, it asserts that the mental health problem was
not so big after all, affecting only a ‘minority’ of soldiers. Secondly, using a subtle mental
hygiene-oriented focus on the soldier’s surroundings, it locates the cause of mental illness in the
war on the ‘stressful set of circumstances’ that the soldier may encounter, sparing the individual
from blame for his mental illness. Immediately after this point, Menninger collides the seeming
anomaly of the large numbers of mentally ill with another consideration of why so many were
diagnosed with psychiatric problems:
[a]dded together, the percentage of United States male citizens who are unable to serve
their country in combat is quite startling at first glance. However, it becomes less so
when we consider that our heritage has included certain conceptions... 1. We do not all
have the same ability.. .2. Each American has had the privilege of using his ability in
whatever way he thinks will bring him the life he wishes. Only a small group had chosen
military service as their mode of living, and consequently when the need arose,
11,000,000 men had to be found, evaluated, and trained into a citizen military
organization (1945b, p. 23).
Here, he admits again that the number of mentally is large ‘at first glance.’ But he explains the
large numbers by linking them to ‘our heritage,’ making the case that our American concern for
freedom of choice made compulsory military service a radically disruptive event in soldier’s
lives. Deploying this argument, Menninger is implicitly identifying with the soldiers themselves,
and American cultures and values. The mental health problems experienced during the war are
considered as a kind of price we pay for living in such a free nation. One can detect a distinct
tension at work here: the mental health problem during the war was always big enough to
demand a larger and more diverse psychiatry, but never so big as to indicate anything damning
about the soldiers themselves or American culture. Of course, this is not to imply any dishonesty
at work so much as to indicate the professional interests that operate at the foundation of such
formulations.
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Another way of confronting the stigma that was attached to psychiatry was to assert that
there was no need for a stigma, that psychiatric diagnoses were just like any other medical
diagnosis. “Through perhaps unfortunate publicity,” explained Menninger,
the diagnostic term ‘psychoneurosis’ (‘neurosis’ and ‘psychoneurosis’ are used
interchangeably) came into some ill-repute. Even by many intelligent persons, the prefix
‘psych-4 on any word was interpreted to mean psychotic—‘insane.’ Every psychiatrist
has patients who can and do recover from a neurosis by making only minor changes in
their environment or by quickly gaining an understanding of their conflicts and adjusting
to them. Others may need prolonged treatment, but they too, in a majority of instances,
can become well (1945a, p. 110).
Menninger insisted that psychiatric diagnoses during the war were nothing to be ashamed of.
Applying this to the army, he stated that
[f]ew people recognize that many superior individuals are highly neurotic and that some
of them adjust very well as contributing members of society. Army personnel, as well as
civilians, too often interpreted this diagnosis as meaning a non-effective individual who
could not be salvaged. The result of this misconception was the abuse of medical
channels for the quick disposal of men by giving patients this label as a convenient
method of getting them out of the Army. They might have been non-effective for many
reasons—because of attitude, ineptness, inadaptability, lack of physical stamina. But
with patience many of them might have been salvaged (1945a, p. 110).
Menninger defended the veterans with psychiatric problems, too, describing how,
[ojutside the Army a certain number of employers and even some government agencies
would not employ a man if they knew that he had been discharged with a psychoneurotic
diagnosis. There was never any logical basis for such a refusal except the employer’s
lack of understanding, for in most instances, the veteran was perfectly capable of making
a civilian adjustment (1945a, p. 110).
He also defended psychiatry against the argument that it was enabling the weak-willed to avoid
active duty in the armed forces by giving them a way out. Acknowledging that “psychiatrists are
occasionally asked whether or not these cases [of mental illness in the war] were genuine,”
Menninger replied,
“[t]he answer is that they were. The psychiatric casualties in the Army could roughly be
divided into two large groups: those soldiers who had previously made a good
adjustment in their civilian lives but broke down in the Army because of the emotional
stress of the new life; and those who at best had never maintained more than a marginal
mental health when they were civilians (1945a, p. 111).
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Psychiatry was in need of a change of image, and as the highest ranking psychiatrist in the armed
forces, William Menninger was well-positioned to stress the consonance of the goals of
psychiatry and the military.
But Menninger and Strecker did more than just acknowledge the presence of the stigma
of mental illness. They also acknowledged the stigma that was suffered by psychiatry itself, and
asserted that the stigma on mental illness interfered with their work, aligning themselves
symbolically with their patients, and casting those who would question psychiatric goals as
ignorant o f what psychiatry really was, beholden to outdated stereotypes from the age of the
asylum. Strecker explained how “[pjsychiatry must still suffer the burden of its conception and
infancy in an environment of gross ignorance and superstition, error and prejudice.” He
continued, “for instance, the unpleasant word ‘insanity’ still persists even though modem
psychiatrists find decreasingly little use for it, excepting perhaps in medico-legal practice, in
which it is part of the somewhat archaic language of the law” (1952, p. 36). This prejudice
against psychiatry, Menninger claimed, hindered the successful application of psychiatry during
the war. That he resented the lingering redolence of the asylum is clear, as when he notes that
[i]f the average individual considers psychiatry at all, it is likely to be in terms of state
hospitals, all too recently evolved from ‘insane asylums’! He thinks of it in terms of
queer or crazy people, insanity, bars, padded cells. The more sophisticated may talk of
complexes or inferiorities, usually without any real understanding of their words. It is the
familiar experience o f every psychiatrist to have some friend facetiously remark, ‘If this
pressure does not let up, I will soon be under your care,’ as if to imply that ‘I’ll soon be
cra2y and will then see you professionally.’ In the Army, prior to the war, the traditional
name for the psychiatrist was ‘the nutpicker,’ a combination jibe and uncultured
colloquialism (1948a, p. 15).
And the way in which this prejudice against psychiatry played out during World War II is of great
importance. “The average man,” Menninger recalled,
both in and out of the Army, was afraid of or suspicious of psychiatry because of his
inaccurate information about it or prejudice against it. The psychiatric patient was all too
apt to be regarded as a total loss or was judged in terms of failure, sin, cowardice, or
perversity (1948a, pp. 7-8).
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The problem of mental illness during the war, and the stigma that was placed on the soldiers who
were screened out or discharged because of mental illness, is blamed on the military, deflecting
the stigma from the psychiatric profession.
Menninger devoted much attention in Psychiatry in a Troubled World to describing the
broader problem here, the widespread ignorance of what psychiatry truly was. Menninger held
that the field of medicine itself was out of step with the new psychiatry, that psychiatry suffered a
stigma in the world of medicine. He asserted that
[tjhe prevailing attitude and understanding of the many practitioners of medicine
everywhere is that psychiatry is a specialty which is preoccupied with the care of ‘insane’
people. The minor personality deviations, whether they occur in dispensaries or law
courts, in a schoolroom or in a training camp, usually are not considered medical
problems. It was not and still is not generally appreciated that these minor personality
disturbances—the psychopathology o f everyday life—are matters of psychiatric interest
and concern and are, therefore, medical (1948a, p. 23).
The medical standing of psychiatry, so important to Menninger and to psychiatry generally, is
what he uses to counter the popular misunderstanding of the profession.
The frequent misunderstanding of psychiatry’s terminology was also cast as an obstacle
in psychiatry’s path. In this sense, the popularization of psychiatry, its increasingly public nature,
is seen as a part of the stigma that psychiatry had suffered. “[A]s a result o f the war,” said
Menninger,
some technical psychiatric terms have become part of the everyday vocabulary of the
soldier and his civilian relatives. Many people who use them do not know their meaning
or comprehend their medical significance. This incomplete understanding has led to
confused thinking about emotional reactions. It has also stimulated the popular use of
inaccurately descriptive labels for psychiatric patients and illnesses—‘psychos,’ ‘combat
nerves,’ and many others (1948a, p. 43).
And it was not just the laity that was blamed for these misunderstandings, as “[mjany physicians
and laymen have considered as both strange and confusing the terms o f description and diagnosis
which psychiatrists use.” Menninger continues, to point out that the
technical language [of psychiatry] is probably no more complicated than that of any other
medical specialty.. .Few people know that metatarsalgia is a callus on the ball of the foot;
nor do they know that angioneurotic edema is a special variation of hives. However, in
psychiatry even the common disorders do not have a layman’s term unless one uses such
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vagaries as ‘nervous breakdown,’ or ‘nervous’ or ‘crazy.’ At the same time, a greater
interest in and the extensive applicability of psychiatric principles have exposed more
people to its terminology. ‘Paranoia,’ ‘rationalization,’ ‘complex,’ ‘neurotic’ have
become a part of the everyday language of many laymen. Unfortunately, these terms are
too often used without a realization of their scientific significance (1948a, p. 256).
The inability to understand psychiatry is linked to its professional, medical standing. Menninger
insists that the terms most closely linked with the stigma attached to psychiatry are either totally
wrong-headed ‘vagaries,’ or are misapplications of true scientific terms. The stigma is, in this
sense, a fault of psychiatry being so thoroughly professional.
This problem with professional discourse is just one of the problems that psychiatry had
in getting its point across to the public that Menninger describes. Again deflecting blame to the
Army, Menninger sides with “incensed relatives and the justifiably critical veteran” who, alas,
were unaware of the strenuousness of our struggle to initiate psychiatric treatment in the
Army. They did not know about the many, many obstacles to it, in addition to a
previously established Army policy. They did know, what we also knew, that psychiatric
patients received minimal or no treatment in the early years of the war (1948a, p. 293).
Psychiatry’s image, Menninger pointed out, suffered from the fact that statistical figures on
psychiatric casualties during the war could not be released to the public, “lest it ‘give comfort to
the enemy’” (1948a, p. 40). This resulted in a lack o f una -standing of the psychiatrist’s position
by the public. The communication with a wider audience was blocked by this blackout of
psychiatric information.
That Menninger felt vulnerable as the highest-ranking psychiatrist in the armed forces
can be gleaned from his frustration that there had not been an organized campaign for public
education about psychiatry immediately after the war. Describing the rationale “From the
Neuropsychiatry Consultants Division’s point of view,” Menninger describes the importance of
World War II to psychiatry’s public face, and the difficulties in maintaining a satisfactory image
for his profession:
[tjhe large number of veterans returning to civilian life with psychiatric diagnoses made
the nation more conscious of the field of psychiatry than at any previous time in our
history. It seemed to be an appropriate and most propitious time to educate the public in
regard to mental health and mental hygiene precepts. Unfortunately, the War Department
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never undertook this task, nor could the American Psychiatric Association be persuaded
to accept the responsibility. The lack of lay understanding was one of the most pressing
problems confronting every psychiatrist. The period from 1944 to 1946 still appears to
have been the golden opportunity for a well-planned, extensive program of news releases,
articles in papers and magazines, and features over the radio and on the screen. What
publicity was given was, however, lamentably unplanned and undirected and was often
erroneous (1948a, p. 40).
In this sense, Menninger’s Psychiatry in a Troubled World, and Strecker’s Their Mothers ’Sons,
published in 1948 and 1946 respectively, along with the numerous articles both published that
related their war experience to audiences of popular periodicals, can be seen as a breakthrough
moment in imparting the psychiatric take on World War II. In a sense, their prominence in the
field was enhanced by the fact that there was a kind of imposed vacuum of public psychiatric
literature concerning the war in the last two years of the war. And this story that Menninger
relates about psychiaby’s inability to reach a larger audience so as to represent itself is a key part
of how he handles the stigma that faced psychiatry after the war. The stigma existed at this point,
he asserted, because psychiatry had been given no choice but to represent itself with one hand
tied behind its back.
Another way of deflecting the stigma of mental illness that had been attached to
psychiatry, and one that Menninger only briefly used, was to describe the unusual difficulties that
wartime psychiatry presented. First of all, Menninger claimed,
[bjlame upon the inadequacy of wartime psychiatric selection techniques should be
tempered with a wider recognition of the fact that the psychiatrist in the induction center
had no possible way of evaluating the four most important factors of influence upon the
soldier: the nature o f the leadership that would be provided for him; the degree of
motivation that he had to do his job or that could be instilled into him; the type of job to
which he might be assigned; and the degree of stress that might confront him. If any or
all of these were sources of sufficient psychological stress, even a well-integrated person
might be unable to adjust (1948a, p. 289).
In addition to this obstacle to psychiatric investigation, there were also numerous obstacles to
treatment, such as the fact that there were advantages to being sick, “the fact that the doctor was
an officer and the patient usually an enlisted man,” (1948a, p. 300) and finally, “the specific
Army orientation of the doctor,” which forced the hand of the Army psychatrist such that, “[i]n

115

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m is s io n of t h e cop y rig h t o w n e r. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

many situations, most vividly in combat, the aim of medical treatment was to return the soldier to
duty which was often not synonymous with his return to complete health” (1948a, p. 301). By
describing these very real problems with psychiatiy’s application to warfare, Menninger again
attempted to deflect the criticism that had tarred his profession as a group of ‘nutpickers’.
Both Menninger and Strecker leveled the argument that the military did not learn from
World War I how to handle psychiatric casualties. “[A]t the outset of World War II,” Menninger
recounted,
the status of psychiatry limited the immediate contribution that it could make. The rich
knowledge gained from the experience of World War I had either been forgotten or
neglected. The various medical specialties still held their traditional antagonistic or
indifferent attitude toward psychiatry, which was colored by a mixture of prejudice and
ignorance (1948a, pp. 7-8).
“It is an enigma,” he thought, “that despite the terrific loss from psychiatric causes which we
suffered in World War I, the Army was essentially unaware of psychiatry at the beginning of
World War II” (1948a, p. 535). Strecker was in complete agreement with this line of reasoning,
asserting that “[cjertain lessons were not learned from World War I,” specifically pointing to the
fact that there was no “skeleton neuropsychiatric organization” retained and no “real contact”
with civilian psychiatrists between the wars, and that there was a general ignorance o f‘the lesson
of General Pershing’s famous cablegram,” which called for a healthy maintenance of the
psychiatric presence in the military (1945, p. 5).
The armed forces were blamed not only for forgetting the lessons of World War I, but
also for making diagnoses of some of the lesser psychiatric problems grounds for discharge.
Menninger expressed his regret that the army made a diagnosis of psychoneurosis “tantamount to
discharge (1948a, p. 15). In these accounts, psychiatrists only discharged soldiers to the extent
that the armed forces forced them to. So, the stigma of diagnosis of mental illness, and the
accompanying stigma of discharge from the armed forces (it was not an honorable discharge),
was pushed back onto the military. Menninger describes how “[t]he attitude prevailed generally
that man power was plentiful. This led to the adoption of the easiest policy, both at the induction
116

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e co p y rig h t o w n e r. F u r th e r re p r o d u c tio n proh ibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

center and in the field: elimination” (1948a, p. 272). “When men were obviously ill,” he
remarked, “the neuropsychiatrists in hospitals were ordered to ‘give them a name and get rid of
them’” (“Minds and War,” p. 48). He also described how, early in the war,
the function of psychiatrists was merely to diagnose and dispose of patients according to
existing regulations. Usually the more prompt they were in the ‘disposition’ of soldiers
on their wards, the better was their standing with their commanding officer. In spite of
specific instructions to the contrary and the conspicuous absence o f official
encouragement, psychiatrists did attempt to treat as many patients as they could with
what time and facilities were available. However, they were continuously under pressure
by hospital commanders to get rid of all psychiatric patients. They were given little or no
help in obtaining personnel or equipment to provide even minimal treatment (1948a, p.
294).
It was the military’s interests, not psychiatry’s agenda, claimed Menninger, that caused the high
level of diagnosis and discharge of psychiatric problems. Menninger also defended psychiatry
against charges, frequently leveled by the military brass, that it was going easy on the soldiers,
rewarding those who were too cowardly to fight with an easy discharge. “[BJefore giving a
medical diagnosis,” he assured, “the psychiatrist had to be very sure that he was not excusing
from military service an individual with defective attitudes; that he was not rewarding him with
an escape from duty” (1948a, p. 36).
The basic line of reasoning here held that it was the armed forces, not psychiatrists, who
were to blame for the high level of psychiatric discharge. And this military disregard for
psychiatry was more than just the cause of the stigmatization of the soldiers, it was also
deleterious to the soldiers’ mental health as the military’s policies forced soldiers who had
psychiatric problems into a kind of bureaucratic limbo, between the battlefield and a discharge.
There is a kind of assurance in many of Menninger’s descriptions of the war that many of the
soldiers given psychiatric discharges were not particularly disturbed in the first place, that these
discharges occurred because the military did not allow for treatment, preferring instead to
discharge any diagnosed soldier. Also, the case was made that psychiatrists, to the extent that
they were allowed* attempted to act as the advocates for the soldiers against an over
bureaucratized military that cared little for psychiatric nuance. There is a kind of alignment here
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with the soldiers and against the higher-ups, giving a bottom-up view of the psychiatric
experience of the war. It is ironic that such a view could come from William Menninger, who
was, after all, a Brigadier General by the time the war ended. But this view of the conflict, in
which the psychiatrists are located in the same camp as the soldiers, together attempting to resist
the short-sighted bureaucratic requirements of the top military brass, was in the best interest of
the image of psychiatry, a discipline that had been maligned as counter to the interests of the
soldiers.
The entire psychiatric casualty issue during World War II could have been dealt with
much more effectively, Menninger claimed, if there had only been more psychiatric personnel
during the war. This kind o f ‘manpower’ argument would soon become a perennial staple of
popular psychiatric rhetoric, applied to all areas of potential psychiatric influence. As far as the
war was concerned, though, Menninger insisted that the psychiatric side of the war could have
been more efficiently, that “[s]uch waste,” as was represented by the high rejection and discharge
rate, “could have been reduced by adopting constructive policies, by supplying additional
psychiatric personnel, and by obtaining adequate official support” (1948a, p. 15). “The
inauguration of a program of psychiatry for the Army,” he remarked,
took place against heavy odds. Psychiatry had neither the man power nor the knowledge
to deal with the mental health problems presented by such large groups of people. Nor
were the war agencies prepared to utilize psychiatry (1948a, p. 9).
Again, the usual formulation o f the problem, in which psychiatry was doing all it could, while the
military dragged its feet, is in full effect.
Menninger made the case that the very fact of a stigma attached to mental illness was
itself largely the fault of the military, and in particular, the military brass. “Obstacles” to
“effective functioning” were “in part the result of problems inherent in Army organization and
policy” (1948a, p. 9). The combination of the Army’s attitude and organizational structure
prevented psychiatry from operating more efficiently. He claimed that “an attitude seemed to
prevail among many o f those in authority that psychiatry was a sort of necessary evil. Very often
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all psychiatric patients except for the psychotic were suspected of being malingerers” (1948a, p.
15). “When the cause [of illness] was not physical,” he noted,
then the individual was variously regarded as perverse, subversive, unwilling, weak,
dumb. He was likely to be labeled a ‘quitter,’ ‘an eight-ball,’ ‘gold brick,’ or any of
numerous other vernacular disparaging terms. The fact that many such individuals had a
valid personality sickness often went entirely unrecognized (1948a, p. 20).
The stigma of psychiatry affected every facet of how the military treated psychiatrists. “The
uninformed person,” Menninger explained,
expects psychiatric patients to be wild and dangerous, even homicidal. This naiVe
attitude is held by otherwise intelligent people. This is more evidence of the extent of the
misconception that psychiatry is concerned only with severe psychotic reactions. It was
perhaps in part because of this fact that the psychiatric sections of Army hospitals were
usually placed on the distal end of the farthest ramp to the rear (1948a, p. 19).
The military’s disregard for psychiatry was carried over against all medicine. A medical officer
in the war, claimed Menninger,
had little voice in recommending the reassignment of a patient to a different type of job.
He could make such recommendations, but in the early part o f the war he was, in most
instances, very much like a coyote howling at the moon—those in authority did not seem
to hear (1948a, p. 16).
And even other medical officers were unwilling to give psychiatry its due, as “[m]ost
psychiatrists had to battle constantly against many odds in order to be given a fair hearing by line
and medical officers” (1948a, p. 19).
It was only toward the end of the war that things would get any better for the psychiatrists
in the armed forces. As Menninger explained, “[i]t is to the credit of general medical men and of
the Army that, before the war ended, there was abundant evidence that many of the earlier
prejudices and misconceptions had been overcome” (1948a, p. 20). Indeed, it was only until the
last year of the war that anything would improve markedly: “The fact was that until the spring of
1944, the official point of view of the Army toward psychiatric illnesses was a mixture of
fatalism and disinterest; treatment was discouraged” (1948a, p. 293).
Problems with labeling and classification were a major part of Menninger’s objections to
the military’s handling of psychiatric casualties during World War II. He located this as a major
119

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e co p y rig h t o w n er. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

source of the stigma that haunted the soldiers diagnosed with mental illness and hindered
psychiatry’s efforts to control its own self-image. He took issue with the label for soldiers who
were screened out of the armed forces, insisting that “[u]se of the term ‘rejectee’ was unfortunate,
since the average American resents and is offended by any form of rejection” (1948a, p. 285).
Because so many soldiers were handed over to psychiatry for treatment, he said, the psychiatric
labels for those soldiers were warped by the needs of the military, to the extent that
the medical channels for discharge became abused. They were used as an exit from the
Army for men who incapacitated themselves by their defective attitudes.
‘Psychoneurosis’ became the diagnosis commonly used for that purpose. It was
undoubtedly not warranted when applied to many such cases, as first seen. However,
after the soldier had been used as a football between the company and hospital, he might
readily develop a neurotic reaction” (1948a, p. 33).
So, this kind of misuse of psychiatric terminology could actually turn into a cause of psychiatric
disabilities after all. Similarly, “in the Army the widely used term ‘constitutional psychopath’
was applied as a catchall description for misbehavior of numerous types with various causes”
(1948a, p. 192). The nuances of psychiatric insight were trampled when combined with the
military’s need for an efficient means of sorting soldiers into categories. The overarching
categorical imperative was the need to determine which soldiers to put back into active duty, and
which to send back home. The problem was that
War Department regulations directing the induction process caused the initial difficulty.
They required the psychiatrist to give a rejectee a diagnosis which would indicate not
merely maladjustment but a definite illness...The ultraconservative attitude, based on
good but mistaken intention, that prevailed in the early years of the war caused the
rejection of all questionable prospects, often with the diagnosis of psychoneurosis. In
many, many instances this diagnosis was unwarranted. Not only did we reject many men
from the Army who undoubtedly could have given good service, but at the same time we
did them a great injustice in labeling so many 4F’s with the diagnosis of a condition they
did not have (1948a, p. 125).
He continues to note that “[o]ne might justifiably ask why the psychiatrists, if they knew better,
did not protest,” responding that
they did—as soon as they obtained sufficient standing to be heard. Great credit should go
to die War Department for its effort to alter the situation. The powers-that-be did listen,
and radical changes were made—but very late (1948a, pp. 126-127).
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In this sense, the military was responsible for both major components of the stigma o f mental
illness, the very process of labeling soldiers with particular mental illnesses, and the rejection or
discharge of a soldier on account o f this presumed mental illness. Psychiatry, according to
Menninger, and to a lesser extent, Strecker, was simply powerless to prevent the military’s
insensitivity to this problem, and tried to do all it could to minimize the damage. Again, one can
notice how the defense offered by the psychiatrists involves an alignment with the soldiers and
the families of those soldiers against the (as a rule, unnamed) members of the military upper
echelon. The deflection of the stigma o f mental illness was one of Menninger’s major goals in
his writing about World War II.
A Narrative of Triumph
In the retrospective gazes of Menninger and Strecker, World War II was described as a
moment of true professional triumph. Their arguments concerning the war were frequently
accompanied by descriptions of their own profession’s actions during the war that established a
kind of break between psychiatry before and after the war. In this retrospection, they used a
variety of means by which to demonstrate psychiatry’s ostensibly newfound importance,
applicability, and success. The vision o f psychiatry they presented was triumphal in many ways,
stressing the seemingly inexorable progress of the profession, with a particular emphasis on how
the expansion of the field was allowing it to break many of its associations with the asylum or the
mental hospital.
One recurrent idea that they touched upon was that psychiatry, after World War II, was
well-positioned to make a stab outward from the traditional psychiatric issues. Describing this
“evolution of psychiatric practice in the Army,” William Menninger asserted that it was during
World War II that “[pjsychiatry struggled from the rear seat in the third balcony to finally arrive
in the front row at the show.” (1948a, p. vii) It was during the war that “[gjreat strides were made
during the war in the prevention and cure of mental illnesses” (1946, p. 10) Also, the post-war
years were looked forward to as a time when psychiatry would finally get what it had deserved
121

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e co p y rig h t o w n e r. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

after its many contributions to modem life. Noting that “[pjsychiatry is at another and important
crossroads,” Menninger asked: “Will society accept its verities? Will psychiatry and medicine
make them available? The immediate future will give the answer” (1945b, p. 114).
Menninger’s recollections of psychiatry’s struggle during the war stressed the dramatic
differences in psychiatry’s place in the armed forces between the beginning and end of the war.
He extended the success story of psychiatry all the way back to World War I, noting that
“[pjsychiatry made progress, remarkable progress, between 1918 and 1941, but it did not reach
the heights that Dr. [Thomas] Salmon envisioned and hoped for as a result of the impetus of the
World War I experience” (1948a, p. 5). During the war, Strecker noted in Psychiatry in Modem
Warfare that psychiatry was taking on a considerably larger job than it ever had before, and that
[tjaking into consideration the magnitude of the task, the personnel available, and the
lateness of the start, it is the general belief that the present organization of psychiatry in
the Army, under Colonel William C. Menninger, is carrying out a well-planned and
efficient job with foresight and skill (1945, p. 8).
Even with the leadership of Menninger, though, psychiatry had a long way to go before the
triumph could be accomplished. As we have seen, at the beginning of the war, the armed forces
were much less cooperative than the psychiatrists would have preferred, and this lack of
cooperation was more than just a way of symbolically aligning psychiatry with the soldiers; it
was also a way to set up the progress of psychiatry during the war. The early part of the war was
the ‘difficult’ time for psychiatry. In Menninger’s words,
[ejssentially, only emergency psychiatric treatment was permitted prior to 1944. In that
year major steps were taken to reverse this policy—not only to permit but to require that
treatment should be given to every patient who could benefit from it (1948a, p. 318).
Once psychiatry was more able to chart its own path during the war, though, everything was
improved. “Only later was it possible,” said Menninger,
through careful selection and assignment of the available men, to place superior
individuals in strategic positions as consultants, as division psychiatrists, and as chiefs of
services in hospitals.. .It was the scientific ability, the sincerity, and the very strenuous
effort displayed by these men in military psychiatric practice which won the whole
hearted support and co-operation of the medical officers in other specialties and which in
turn made psychiatry a truly integrated part of Army medicine (1948a, pp. 23-24).
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“[A]s soon as they obtained sufficient standing to be heard,” Menninger reminisced, psychiatrists
stood up to the military brass and initiated the changes that were so badly needed (1948a, pp.
126). A watershed moment in the progress of psychiatry in the war was the creation of the
neuropsychiatric division on January 1,1944. With psychiatry in charge of its own division (and
with William Menninger at the helm of that division), the sky was the limit (1948a, p. 241).
Once the military had been won over by the psychiatrists’ ways of doing things,
Menninger explained, the treatment of the soldiers improved radically and psychiatry’s true value
to the armed forces, and to society in general, had finally become visible. The mental health of
the soldiers was markedly improved with the unimpeded psychiatry. Menninger described how it
was “gratifying to know that the majority, probably the great majority, of combat psychiatric
casualties responded sufficiently under appropriate treatment to permit them to carry on” (1948a,
p. 151). The dramatic change came as a result of “the provision of prompt treatment, when this
was finally permitted and provided.” Again focusing on recovery statistics, Menninger noted the
(again) “gratifying recovery rate, an average of about 60 per cent of all psychotic patients
recovered within a period of 2 to 3 months from the time of onset of the illness” (1948a, p. 174).
Increasing autonomy for the psychiatrists in the employ of the armed forces allowed for
an independently devised lexicon for diagnosing the troops. “The new nomenclature greatly
enlarged the categories of the neurotic syndromes,” claimed Menninger (1948a, p. 264). These
changes in the classificatory system involved an enlarged role for psychodynamic terms; new
terms, applicable to the war, like ‘combat exhaustion,’ were introduced. Also, a more thorough
integration of psychiatric terms with organic terms was effected (1948a, p. 264). These changes,
spurred on by war, fed back into the overarching concerns of stateside psychiatry, as “[t]he
American Psychiatric Assocation was stimulated into appointing a new nomenclature committee
in 1946, which has a great challenge and responsibility” (1948a, p. 265).
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The sense of a triumphant, come-from-behind story as the backdrop of the World War II
narrative becomes quite clear when Menninger describes how
[t]he record of the results of psychiatric treatment o f combat casualties was exceptional.
It is all the more so in view of the fact that, as mentioned before, there were neither
prewar preparation as to how this treatment should be done, plans as to where it should
be done, nor much thought about who would do it (1948a, p. 305).
Against tough odds, with only weak support from the armed forces bureaucracy, psychiatry had
managed to improve its lot and lend assistance to the soldiers. Even non-psychiatric doctors in
the medical corps during the war had been changed by the impact of psychiatry, as
many doctors are much more keenly aware o f emotinoal problems as the result of their
Army experience. Moreover, many of our medical schools have improved their teaching
of psychiatry. In many psychiatry is now taught in the medical wards and the surgical
wards and in outpatient clinics of general hospitals rather than in the State hospital or in
the ‘psychopathic ward’” (1946, p. 53).
Again, one can notice here the concern for assuring the audience that psychiatry has moved out of
its stigmatized, traditional locus, the mental hospital. As told by William Menninger, World War
II was a professional triumph that yielded significant improvements in psychiatry’s institutional
standing. And when something went wrong, it was mostly forces outside of psychiatry that could
be blamed for whatever delays or disappointments prevented more dramatically successful
results.
World War II was not merely a success, though. Just as importantly, it was a success that
was achieved using new methods in a new context. If psychiatry stood to benefit from
symbolically distancing itself from its old sites of operation, the asylum and the mental hospital,
this kind o f distancing was accomplished by situating psychiatry in the context of World War II.
Simply associating psychiatry with such a dramatically new context allowed popular psychiatrists
to at least establish that they were physically distant from the old asylums and public institutions.
It was a new context, free of the residue of the asylum with which psychiatry’s traditional
domains were saddled. Before the war, Strecker described how
in spite o f all its errors, of omission and commission, psychiatry continues to improve its
techniques, psychological and pharmacological. By the labors of many workers in its
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several disciplines, it has gained a firm foothold. Nothing can prevent the climb to higher
levels, from which it will be possible to see clearer vistas of understanding and
treatment.” (1940, pp. 129-130)
The war would be cast as a dramatic advance from even this ‘firm foothold,’ with a double
emphasis on the ‘psychological and pharmacological’ that Strecker describes here. The
‘psychological’ would prove to be a way for psychiatry to move into less distinctly medical, more
‘social’ treatments, and the ‘pharmacological’ consisted of the kind of rear-guard finning up of
what psychiatry had already claimed as its rightful domain, the use of medical methodologies to
treat the mentally ill.
Also, through triumphant stories about the wealth of new, less traditional techniques that
were developed during the war, it was possible to cast World War II as an occasion for a break
with the methodology of psychiatry’s past, much o f which was held in disrepute by the public.
Menninger did this through descriptions of how group psychotherapy was carried out during the
war, especially after psychiatry was given more power to determine the fate of its own patients.
Additionally, he pointed to “psychotherapy under sedation” as a significant advance that was
given greater use as the war continued, along with electro- and insulin shock therapies,
ergotamines, and hydrotherapy as evidence of psychiatry’s advance (1945b, p. 113).
Advances in mental hygiene, considered in terms of findings regarding how to maintain
the troops’ morale, were also touted as developments during the war that contributed to
psychiatry’s advance. In Strecker’s words, during the war:
Efforts at the building of morale have been more systematic and extensive. Mental
hygiene units and counseling services have been established; lectures have been given to
nonmilitaiy personnel and line officers on psychiatric problems of the soldier and their
early detection, prevention, and treatment, the mechanism or function of fear and
aggression and wholesome attitudes toward them. Morale is one of the most important
and vital protections against war neuroses (1945, p. 49).
So, the advances in psychiatric methodology that Strecker and Menninger claimed to be parts of
psychiatry’s triumph during World War II involved everything from the more invasive, somatic
techniques such as shock therapy to the less traditionally medical techniques of mental hygiene
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and group psychotherapy. In this sense, the triumphant tale of professional advance was
simultaneously centripetal, maintaining touch with the medical center of the profession through
mention of classic somatic psychiatry (itself not terribly old at the time), and centrifugal, moving
outward to the less traditional, more ‘social’ terrain of human interaction with the idea of a
preventive psychiatry and psychotherapy.
These discussions of advances in methodology were paired with advances in the
expansion of psychiatry’s descriptions of its own proper domain. World War II, claimed
Menninger and Strecker, was a proving ground for the relevance of psychiatry to the world
outside of the mental hospital. And this expansion was not something to be taken in half
measures. The entire world of intra- and inter-personal relations and problems was thought to be
the next step for psychiatry. Grounding this expansion with psychiatry’s experiences during the
war allowed psychiatry to justify the move outward with what was at the time their most
extensive experience with a population o f individuals who had not been sent to a mental hospital.
The new and immense empirical base of soldiers and screenees was a good fit for the goal of
distancing the profession from the asylum and the mental hospital. During the war, claimed
Menninger,
[pjsychiatry made definite gains in the realm of prevention and treatment of mental illhealth. Society has an opportunity to take advantage o f this experience—in industry,
education, recreation, criminal and penal work, community life. If it does s o ,
psychiatrists must expand their work far beyond their hospitals and offices. They must
pass on to every physician a more adequate understanding of personality deviations,
through a major revision of medical education. They must attract to their field more men
and women and continue their study of human behavior and ways of enabling people to
adjust more easily to life (1945b, p. 114).
Casting the expansion of their own profession’s domain as a selfless performance of duty to the
populace that psychiatry owed the world after its experiences during World War II, Menninger
played down the degree to which this expansion of psychiatry’s purview served his own
profession’s interests. The attempt was to parlay the profession’s experiences during World War
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II into a relevance to almost everything, simultaneously inventing a usefulness for psychiatry
while moving away from the ‘hospitals and offices’ that had dogged the profession’s image.
The expansion outward was accomplished through explicit links between the war
experiences of psychiatrists and the future domains of the profession. Many of the aspects of this
move out from the psychiatrist’s traditional role can be seen in one of Menninger’s considerations
of the future contribution of psychiatry in the wake of the war. First he stresses the number of
soldiers psychiatry dealt with during the war, and how this necessitated a broad understanding of
psychiatry’s potential:
When one stops to consider the job which confronted our nation in revolutionizing
business and industry, in raising an Army of 8,000,000 men and a Navy of 4,000,000
men, it is understandable that there was a countless number of personnel problems,
personal problems and personality problems. These latter were the chief concern of the
psychiatrists, both in the Army and in civilian life. There was the displaced family, the
lonesome wife, the fatherless child, the recruit removed from his home, and the
doughfoot who had to slug his way along on the muddy ground with his rifle and his gear
(1946, p. 10).
Establishing this extensive, broad range of problems that psychiatrists were charged with solving
during the war, he continues, staking claim to new domains for the postwar world:
All of these and many others had their personality problems in trying to change their
lives, in trying to accept new and sometimes extremely difficult situations. Many of
these problems of Army men were passed on to the psychiatrist, whose particular job
was, like that of all the medical department, to select those citizens who could perform
the difficult task inherent in war, then to maintain the number selected as an effective
fighting force. In so doing we discovered or rediscovered, learned or relearned, many
points that have a direct application for this post-war world (1946, p. 10).
These problems were ‘passed on’ to the psychiatrist during the war. It is as if psychiatry itself
had been forced, by the necessities of war, to open itself to the wide net approach to mental
health, and, with the war successfully completed, was free, or even compelled, to address the
wealth of issues that could be brought under psychiatric consideration with this war experience
under the profession’s belt.
One of the most important things accomplished by this move out from the experience of
World War II was the reconfiguration of psychiatry as a science that could be used to deal with
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more than illness. “The war,” said Menninger, “increased our understanding of ways in which its
present body of knowledge can be helpfully applied to most, if not all, human activities” (1948a,
p. xiii). The opposite of mental illness, normalcy, was posited to be a major component of what
psychiatry could address in the post-war years as a result of psychiatry’s role during the war.
Menninger described how
[experience in the war has tremendously increased the usefulness of psychiatry. Its
social applications were tried in the Army and proved helpful in prevention of ill-health,
in influencing motivation, in guiding orientation, as an aid to training and to the
rehabilitation of social offenders. Psychiatric principles were applied generally to
‘normal’ men to keep them ‘normal’ in a very abnormal situation (1945b, p. 114).
The new, more ‘useful’ psychiatry that Menninger here suggests relies on extremely inclusive
concepts like ‘ill-health,’ ‘motivation,’ ‘orientation,’ and ‘rehabilitation of social offenders,’ and
the potential success of these concepts is hinted at by their success during the war. This
phraseology was well removed from the strictly diagnostic terms, including psychoneurosis,
schizophrenia, and psychosis, that carried with them associations with the mental hospital.
Other postwar declarations of the applicability of psychiatry stood alongside these
statements of how the war had spread psychiatry out into new fields. This could in part be
accomplished through use of psychoanalytic insights, as when Menninger described how
[t]he theories and findings in psychoanalytic psychiatry have contributed a dynamic
concept of the personality structure and physiology. TTie concept of the unconscious as a
major portion of every personality, from which the powerful primitive energy drives
spring, has become a fundamental consideration in understanding and interpreting all
types of behavior (1948b, p. 65).
The transformative potential that Menninger assigned to the psychoanalytic approach, as wielded
by psychiatry, was made clear, as he concluded that
[fjrom concern with the individual as a biological unit psychiatry has progressed to a
consideration of him as a social unit. More than any other branch of medicine, psychiatry
has to be interested in the environment in which a person functions, as well as in the
person himself. It has to accept as basic the fact that the emotional difficulties of any one
person always involve other people. Consequently, it is not merely a matter of studying
the blood or the X-ray or the physical pathology of the person. It involves investigation
into the environment in which he lives, his family, his friends, his job. Psychiatry has
become a social science as well as a medical science (1948b, p. 65).
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The move into the ‘social’ was not something that was entirely new to psychiatry; as we have
seen, the move away from the asylum had been under way for some time. However, the use of
World War II as a symbolic device with which to punctuate the break from traditional psychiatry
was nevertheless significant. By associating the break into the new domains with the psychiatric
experience during World War II, there was a kind of assurance, particularly in Menninger’s work,
that the change in emphasis was in fact motivated by factors exterior to the profession itself, that
psychiatry was broadening its purview because it had been forced to do so. Of course, it was also
beneficial for psychiatry to associate the broadening o f its own borders with the Allied victory in
World War II, implicitly making the psychiatric expansion appear to be a kind of outcome o f that
victory.
Menninger and Strecker both made World War II out to be a time when psychiatry, with
its forays into new areas, was enjoying unprecedented popular approval. Menninger described
how “[o]ne of the most important gains in psychiatry” that resulted from World War II, “was the
by-product of its wider acceptance and better understanding.” (Menninger, “The Promise of
Psychiatry,” p. 10) The “public interest in the problems of mental health and ill health and the
challenge o f that interest to professional psychiatry is at an all-time high, as a result of the war,”
(1948a, p. vii) wrote Menninger in the introduction to Psychiatry in a Troubled World. He
attributed great importance to this public acceptance, noting that
“[gjreat, though not as spectacular, strides were made in the prevention and cure of
mental illness. Basic to these were the wider acceptance and better understanding of
psychiatry. Millions of people became really aware, for the first time, of the effect of
environmental stresses on the personality. They learned that such stresses could interfere
with or partially wreck an individual’s efficiency and his satisfaction with life. The
universality of neurotic reactions became evident to the layman. Many discovered that
failure in adjustment was not a disgrace and often could be avoided when an individual,
finding himself in a blind alley, sought well-qualified help.” (1948a, p. xiii)
Strecker made a similar link between the popular acceptance and the move to mental hygiene,
opining that “[tjhere is an increased interest on the part of the general public in mental hygiene
and more people are going to psychiatrists and hospitals for psychiatric conditions than
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formerly.” (1945, p. 53) The triumphal narrative of psychiatric progress incorporated public
acceptance as one dimension that indicated psychiatry’s improvements as compared to the period
before the war.
Along with this triumphal narrative of professional ascendance, there was also a certain
amount of acknowledgement of psychiatry’s limits. These limits, however, were consistently
described in terms that preserved, and even enhanced, the promise of psychiatry. Menninger
asserted that
“in my opinion one cannot oversell a clearer and wider understanding of psychiatry.
There is some risk, however, that one can lead people to expect more than the present
limited personnel can deliver. At this time there are not nearly sufficient hewers of wood
and carriers of water in the field of psychiatry to do the jobs that need to be done. It is
readily understandable that persons who seek help and cannot obtain it from trained
professional persons may become discouraged. They may turn to less experienced
workers, to substitutes, to pretenders, and the job will be poorly done. The result may be
their disillusionment with all psychiatry.” (1948a, p. 537)
In this view, it was perfectly reasonable to expect the world from psychiatry, but the lack of
manpower prevented it from more fully living up to such expectations. He listed other factors
that made psychiatry “woefully deficient,” and noted that psychiatry “needs a wider public
understanding and acceptance of its potential contributions and limitations; and.. .it needs to
increase greatly its general fund of knowledge.” (1948a, p. 537) Keeping in mind that an increase
in psychiatry’s fund of knowledge probably indicated Menninger’s desire to extend psychiatry
out o f the asylum and state hospital, it can be appreciated that these ostensible limits to psychiatry
were voiced in a way that called more attention to the potential contributions of psychiatry if it
were to extend itself even further into the realm of the ‘social’ and the everyday.
Moving Out from World War II
But Menninger and Strecker did much more than just allude to the possibility of applying
their World War II experiences to far-flung realms of inquiry. They used their positions as warrelated experts to grant them entry into popular discourse regarding issues with direct and indirect
relevance to the war itself. Moving out centrifugally from the war into disparate concerns
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allowed them to convert their objective positions on the social topology that inhered from their
status as high-ranking appointees in the military who had served during the war, into cultural
capital, in the form of discourse that foregrounded their positions as experts who were
participants in the war. A symbolic divide was implicitly erected in this writing, between the
authors, who had the authority to address the war because they had taken part in the military’s
efforts at screening and treating the mentally ill, and those who lacked the war psychiatrist’s point
of view, in other words, almost everyone else.
Though the point has already been dealt with, one cannot help but notice the continual
moving away from what had formerly been the prime foci of psychiatric work. While Strecker
and Menninger had already attempted to move the profession out of the mental hospital and the
asylum through discussion of the war, they were now using the war experience to go one more
step, placing them in effect two large steps away from psychiatry’s traditional site. In this sense,
World War II was more than a destination for escaping from the sullied walls of the mental
hospital. It was also a symbolic conduit, connecting psychiatry to a wealth of conceptually
contiguous issues. At the same time, because the war itself was an event weighted with
unparalleled significance, positioning oneself as someone in possession of direct access to the war
was crucial. In this sense, Menninger and Strecker could do more than just proclaim themselves
to be representatives of lofty institutions like the Menninger Foundation or the University of
Pennsylvania. Association with the war granted a unique dimension to their authority, one that
indicated their patriotism and alignment with national interests.
Civilian Psychiatry
There were many intermediate steps between addressing the war itself and addressing the
world in general. For instance, moving out from the war itself, away from the mental health of
the troops and recruits, Strecker’s psychiatric perspective on the issue of the mental health of
civilians during the war was the focus of several articles during the war in the Philadelphia
Bulletin. Though Strecker did not author these pieces himself, it was his commentary that formed
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the bulk of the copy; he was important enough, at least in Philadelphia, for his opinions to be
considered as news. In the first Bulletin story, six days after Pearl Harbor, Strecker’s claiming of
civilian mental health is quoted. He explains how
[ajctual declaration of war has done away with uncertainties. ..Every individual now
realizes that we are in this thing and that it has to be fought through to victory. Here in
America, we’ve been the victims of ‘war jitters’ for the past two years. Now that we
know it’s our own war, the jitters should disappear (Woollcctt, 1941, p. 10).
The author of the article then explains that “[t]his isn’t just wishful thinking on Dr. Strecker’s
part. His prediction of a ‘mentally well American public’ is based on what he terms ‘sound mass
psychology’” (Woollcott, 1941, p. 10). So, grounded in what he himself terms ‘sound’
psychological principles, Strecker classifies the psychological condition of the America as a
whole as ‘war jitters’, diagnosing not just the soldiers, but all American citizens. In Psychiatry in
Modern Warfare, Strecker described how, before Pearl Harbor,
[pjsychiatrists were as unaware as a great part o f the public of the threat from the fascist
nations. There was no leadership in social psychiatry. Complacency and isolationism
were rife. Individualism, freedom, criticism, and ‘crabbing’ were handicaps to great,
united, socialized efforts. There was lack of discipline and social conscience”
(Woollcott, 1941, p. 10)
Elsewhere, Strecker contrasted the American civilians’ experience during the war with that of the
British, whose fear “mobilized their aggression and will to survive” (1945, p. 9). “The people” in
England, he claimed “had unifying and constructive outlets for their tensions. They were not
bottled up” (1945, p. 9). Strecker believed the situation o f the American civilians during World
War II called for better slogans and propaganda. He regretted that, during World War II,
[tjhere has been no good, terse, dynamic slogan developed in this war, vitalized and
energized by the tongue and idealism of a Wilson...There has been more cynicism and
sophistication in World War II (1945, p. 54).
In arguments like this, it can be seen how the war had become more than a way to expand the turf
of psychiatry. It also allowed Strecker and William Menninger a way to align psychiatry with a
patriotic cause so that they could bask in the reflected symbolic meaning of that cause.

132

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e co p y rig h t o w n er. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

Another Bulletin article on Strecker finds him addressing the mental health of civilians as
they try to stay in touch with the war through the mass media. Strecker prescribes that
[i]f you’re the nervous suggestible type it’s not a bad idea to limit your listening and
reading of war news to a few well chosen articles and programs a day.. .Turn to
something cheerful instead. And in your period o f relaxation drop the subject altogether.
You can’t shut out pessimism, but you can teach your mind to behave in spite of it by
deliberately concerning yourself with other interests (Barnes, 1942).
And in 1944, a Bulletin article found Strecker commenting on what he considered to be the
psychological significance of isolationism amongst civilians. Attributing to Strecker the point
that “National isolationism is as destructive to a country as mental isolationism is to certain
individuals,” the story went on to quote Strecker’s view that “Isolationism is the antithesis of
democracy. It could end only in national stagnation, paresis, deterioration and destruction. The
gospel of extreme nationalism is difficult to comprehend” (“Isolationism Hit by Psychiatrist”,
1944).
The Veteran’s Plight
While the concern for the mental health of the citizens demonstrates that the psychiatric
perspective could be transferred in space, from the front to the homeland, during the war, Strecker
and Menninger also stretched out their authority along the continuum of time by showing how
psychiatry could address the problems of the veterans of the war, and their families. Strecker and
Menninger used considerations regarding the mental health and sickness of veterans as a way of
bridging the authority they enjoyed in the military to something that, while clearly related to the
war, was not a war issue per se. Already occupying the position as experts on psychiatry in the
military, they moved into the contiguous domain o f the veterans’ mental health. Menninger
wrote that casualties of the war included not just those who suffered bodily injuries, but also
those who are injured in mind or emotions. It is also being discovered by friends and
relatives that these types of injury are often incurred far from combat, but those involved
are nonetheless deserving and in need of treatment and understanding (1945b, p. 20).
But it was not only the soldiers who had been diagnosed with mental illness during the war that
Menninger and Strecker were concerned about. Every veteran had to deal with a set of major
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psychological issues when returning from the war. In particular, the readjustment to family life
could be difficult, as the war often prompted idealized illusions of family life that proved
problematic upon the veteran’s return: “It was to the family with its illusions about him that the
veteran first returned with his own dream images more clear than accurate. He also brought back
the urge to run his own life and be his own boss” (1948a, p. 369). The veteran, claimed
Menninger, would have grown up during the war, so that his relationship to his father’s authority
and his mother’s affection would be disrupted by his new maturity. “The boy who went off to
war,” he claimed, “several years before had had experiences that had matured him perhaps far
beyond his years. He came home a man” (1948a, p. 369). Menninger also addressed how the
veteran’s separation from his wife and children during the war would have disrupted those
relationships.
Strecker subscribed to a very similar understanding of how the veteran’s psychology
should be understood, with much of the same concern for family relationships. During the war,
claimed Strecker, the soldier develops aggressive habits, and these aggressive habits had to be
slowly adjusted after the return stateside:
Time is required for readjustment and change in biological and psychological
processes...Normal, healthy men are bound to show marked reactions to these sudden
and revolutionary changes and demands. Reactions vary all the way from apathy and
indifference, guilt and depression, fear and uncommon sensitivity to noises, to
restlessness, impatience, irritability, pugnacity, and erratic or extreme conduct (1945, p.
63).
In this view, psychiatry is relevant to the conditions of all of the veterans, not just those who had
been diagnosed as mentally ill during the war. Strecker aligned himself with the plight of the
returning veteran in his description of how, with the war over,
[tjhey are expected suddenly to be independent, self-directing, respnsibility-assuming,
poised, relaxed, calm, co-operative, good-humored, patient, and grateful for the home and
uncertain economic environment to which they are allowed to return! This is often
impossible in even the best-adjusted, healthy soldier. Civilians are expecting the
impossible. Is it any wonder that the soldier is confused, appalled, restless, discouraged,
apprehensive, depressed, indifferent, bitter, and aggressive on occasion? (1945, p. 64).
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Again, Strecker carried out the psychiatric consideration of the soldier in a manner that allowed
him to identify himself as an advocate of the soldiers.
Some of the consideration of the veterans’ plight was done in an almost pointedly
reassuring manner. The major thrust of one article on Strecker’s view of the psychiatry of the
veteran was that the veterans would mostly be stable and healthy, given the time. Strecker
responded to questions submitted by wives and families of veterans, answering these questions
with such easygoing proclamations as, “[i]f he is naturally gentle, I do not believe the necessity of
killing Nazis and Japs will change his basic nature.. .A soldier sees many things, such as the
suffering and distress of civilians and children, which awaken in him pity and kindness” (Barnes,
1944). He tells a wife who was worried about her husband’s jitteriness that “[ajfter the war,
when it will be possible for your husband to live a normal danger-free life, it is likely his ‘jittery’
nerves will disappear. If not, satisfactory treatment will be available” (Barnes, 1944). And he
also insists that the exotic locales of the war will not have spoiled his love for where he came
from, for “[wjhile there are many historic and beautiful things to be seen in foreign lands, for the
soldier there is also mud and discomfort. Home and this country and everything in it will look
very good to the average man” (Barnes, 1944).
Menninger and Strecker applied their psychiatric take on the situation of the veterans to
recommendations for how the veterans should be treated by their families and their communities.
These recommendations concerned the mentally ill and mentally healthy veterans, indicating that,
as usual, well-being and dysfunction could both be grounds for application of the psychiatric
frame. In an article on “The Mentally or Emotionally Handicapped Veteran,” Menninger advised
that “[fjirst must come the realization on the part of the family that there is no reason to feel pity
or shame for the soldier who is discharged for emotional or mental disability” (1945b, p. 27).
The veteran, he argued, should be able to “resume the same way of life” that he had established
before the war, and that
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[t]he family may need to support and encourage, but must not nag; it should aid in
increasing the number of family-shared experiences; it should make the present rich with
understanding and unquestioning companionship. If necessary, the family should seek
help from any or all of the agencies designated to assist the veteran (1945b, p. 27).
So, Menninger used his psychiatric authority to advance specific kinds of concrete actions that
the mentally ill veterans’ families should incorporate.
Menninger also had specific recommendations for how all veterans, mentally ill or not,
should be treated. And, for the most part, the advice is quite familiar, as when he states that
[u]nderstanding affection in the home, social and economic security, and satisfaction in
work and play are the best medicine to supplement his assets gained from his war
experience—greater maturity, pride in having contributed to a vital mission, the
acquisition of new skills and abilities and of lasting friendships (1945a, p. 114).
He also had advice for the veterans themselves, admonishing the veteran to “take steps toward his
reconversion to civilian activities and pursuits,” and suggesting that “[wjith the obtaining of a
new job should go a renewal, or in some instances the initiation, of civilian contacts and
activities” (1948a, p. 384).
Strecker made some of these same suggestions, but his most concrete ideas regarded what
the community should do to help the veteran. He cited the “unbelievable accomplishments”
achieved by the civilians “in this war emergency,” and asked the audience to “keep the same
spirit of enterprise, resourcefulness, and achievement energized for the challenging problems of
the returned service men and the responsibilities of peace. Each can do his share” (1945, p. 81).
The challenge o f the returning veteran and his psychological needs was transformed, in passages
like this, into a call for more responsible living in the psychological sense. In this sense, one can
notice in Strecker’s writing a persistent effort to extend outward into broader domains.
Strecker and Mom
One of the most elaborate examples o f centrifugal extension of the psychiatric purview
came from Edward Strecker’s analysis of why mental illness was such a problem during World
War II in the first place. Instead of just reaching out geographically away from the war, as was
done with the psychiatric consideration of the civilians during the war, or reaching out to the time
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after the war, as was done with the psychiatric concern for the veterans, Strecker extended his
analysis retrospectively to the time when the soldiers and draftees were children to critique the
ways in which they were raised. A major reason for die mental health problems in the war, he
claimed, was that they were raised by ‘moms,’ women who coddled them and did not encourage
the emotional maturity that fighting a war requires.
The term, ‘mom,’ was originally used by critic Philip Wylie in his book, Generation o f
Vipers (1942). Strecker’s use of the term did not usually share Wylie’s overt sense of disdain
toward American mothers. Indeed, Strecker repeatedly distanced himself from Wylie, noting in
Their Mother’s Sons that “Mr. Wylie’s mom is described in too vindictive terms to satisfy a
trained psychiatrist” (1946, p. 13). Having used his professional stance to hold Wylie at arms
length, he thoroughly applied the ‘mom’ idea to American motherhood. He defined ‘mom’ as “a
convenient verbal hook upon which to hang an indictment o f the woman who has failed in the
elementary mother function of weaning her offspring emotionally as well as physically” (1946, p.
13). He contrasted these moms with proper ‘mothers’, who were fully up to the job of weaning
their children.
World War II took on a central importance in Their Mothers ’ Sons, which was originally
published in 1946, just after Strecker finished up his service for the American armed forces.
Strecker defined the contrast between immature and mature young men largely through
descriptions o f how the war sorted them into categories of mental health and disease. He
attributed American soldiers’ heroism and responsibility to the mothers who raised them, noting
that those mothers “are mothers of mature men—men who can and who are willing to meet life
whether it be a civilian or a military life” (1946, p. 18). But this maturity, Strecker claimed,
could not be found in the “500,000 men who tried to evade service to their country,” nor in “the
majority of the 1,825,000 men who were rejected at induction for various neuropsychiatric
causes,” nor “with a large proportion of the 600,000 more that had to be discharged from the
service for similar reasons.” 'These men, he insisted, “were all sick” (1946, p. 18).
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The sickness with which they were inflicted, Strecker claimed, “can be given in one
word, IMMATURITY” (1946, p. 21 [caps in orig.]). Moving back from the neuropsychiatric
casualties in World War II to what he believed was the cause of those casualties, moms, Strecker
made ‘momism’ out to be a kind of pandemic striking American culture, constantly eroding
whatever progress the nation might make. His understanding of mature mothering centered
around the dictum that “[w]eaning is as much a part of motherhood as is nursing” (1946, p. 24).
The child’s maturity relied upon a mother mature enough to create a mature child. Strecker did
allow that, “sometimes pop is a mom,” (1946, p. 75) devoting a chapter of Their Mothers ’Sons to
the idea, as well as writing an article (largely based on that chapter) for Parents ’Magazine that
explored that idea. But, almost without exception, Strecker was concerned with moms.
Strecker’s writing in Their Mothers ’Sons and the related articles for popular periodicals
made use of some very grand claims. Frequently, these claims regarding mothering did not rely
on any specific evidence at all. That is, the problem with moms was largely asserted without
explicit empirical support.. But when evidence was deployed, it was frequently in the form of
specific case studies and other data culled from Strecker’s World War II experiences. Such
evidence included baseline numbers of World War II neuropsychiatric casualties, frequently
listed in the prologue of articles or books to demonstrate the widespread nature of psychiatric
problems. Case histories provided more colorful support for his arguments, and World War II
was the source of many of these cases. In Strecker’s words, “[m]y work in the Army and the
Navy, because it gave me the chance to study over a short period thousands of psychoneurotics,
served to add to my case histories of moms” (1946, p. 30). These cases came from sources like
“a Philadelphia Naval Hospital,” (1946, p. 105) or the “many rehabilitation centers of the Army,
Navy, and Air Forces” (1946, p. 218). The case studies typically involved the inability of the
mom-raised son to cope with the stresses and strains of wartime service in the military.
A classic example of Strecker’s sense of being an eyewitness testifying to the existence
of momism in the mothers of recruits can be found Their M others’Sons, when he recalls
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observing parents bidding farewell to their sons at embarkation points. Starting with the remark
that “[djuring the war I witnessed many leave-takings,” Strecker calls up one particular such
good-bye:
“Once on a station platform in Hartford I saw a woman shrieking in hysterical grief and
anguish, clinging to her son as the train was about to leave. The husband with the tears
streaming down his face had to separate forcibly mother and son. Two younger children
screamed in terror. As the boy boarded the train, I heard him repeating—‘Please, mom”’
(1946, p. 67).
As the young recruit’s pleading for his ‘mom’ makes clear, this was an immature family, shaped
by momism and characterized by an inability to adjust to the demands o f the war, an inability that
is here considered as a defining trait of a mentally ill situation.
This immature family’s reaction to their son’s departure is contrasted with a mature
family’s way of seeing their son off:
Often I have seen real mothers take leave of their sons. No hilarious laughter, but a few
little joking remarks keenly appreciated by the family party...Father feeling very proud
but serious, trying to smile but not making a very good job of it. After a hasty kiss from
his sister, a solid handshake from his father, and a huge and a big kiss from a bravely
smiling mother with a jaunty ‘Be seeing you,’ the soldier marched into the car, straightbacked and strong. Surely that mother was entitled to a few quiet tears when the train
was out of sight” (1946, p. 67).
This contrast between this restrained, ‘mature’ family and the other immature family’s send-off is
redolent of some ethnic and class issues that were certainly salient at the time. That is, the
immature family described here accords to some o f the stereotypes of more ‘emotional’ Italian
and Jewish working-class families. And his approval of the relatively staid response of the
mature family holds up for his audience a model of behavior that is almost unquestionably white,
Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, and middle-class. In this subtle manner, ethnic and class issues dwell at
the penumbra of some of his discussion of the problem of immaturity within the family.
By using this data from his World War II-related experiences—what he referred to as
“my military experiences” (1946, p. 118)—Strecker was providing more than just providing data.
He was underwriting his own assertions with the authority that came from his association with the
war effort. Much as William Menninger benefited symbolically from his association with the
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war, Strecker was able, through use of war-related case studies, to position himself as invested
with the war-related capital that asserted his distance from the confines of the asylum while
associating him with the highly popular (and symbolically efficacious) war effort. Significantly,
this was largely accomplished through the type of support that he used. Instead of making
explicit assertions of his own authority to address the issue of momism, the grounds for his
arguments carried with them the guarantee of delegation that Bourdieu has located in words.
‘Mom’ as Grand Narrative
Locating momism as a major problem o f our time, Strecker moved out centrifugally to
numerous other issues, asserting that they all essentially boiled down to momism. Probably the
most simple transference of momism to non-mothers per se can be noticed in Strecker’s
discussion o f how “sometimes pop is a mom” (1946, p. 75). By simply allowing that fathers were
capable of nurturing immature attitudes in their sons, Strecker enlarged the scope of his argument.
A similar move was performed in a discussion of “moms by proxy” or “mom surrogates”—other
women capable of nurturing immaturity in a child. Here Strecker lumped together grandmothers,
governesses, nurses, and school teachers as capable wielders o f “the silver cord” that tethered
children’s emotional development to immature standards. As the pool of social roles capable of
taking on the ‘mom’ role increased, Strecker’s argument became an increasingly grandiose
indictment of American cultural trends. It should also be pointed out that after some time,
Strecker published Their Mothers ’Daughters (1956), a follow-up to Their Mothers ’ Sons that,
predictably, applied momism to the issue of emotional maturity in young girls. Like these other
moves out from the classic momistic dyad of mother and son, the argument in that book pushed
the mom argument out one increment, but still involved familial and other purely interpersonal
factors in the development of emotional maturity.
But these expansions on the Strecker’s mom homestead were only part of the story.
Much of what Strecker considered to be crucial about momism involved the way less personal
phenomena could mimic momism. He inveighed that “[n]ot all substitute moms are flesh and
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blood,” (1946, p. 104) turning the concept of ‘mom’ into a metaphor through which his
psychiatric perspective could be made relevant to a plethora of social problems. Reverting to a
more properly psychiatric tone, Strecker noted that “[d]ecidedly, psychoneuroses may be mom
surrogates, used by many who have not been able to achieve maturity” (1946, p. 109). Moreover,
he claimed that another psychiatric problem, schizophrenia, “is an unfailingly kind and lavish
mom” (1946, p. 111). Both psychiatric problems were considered as parallels to momism and as
results of immaturity that would result from being raised by a mom. The consideration of
psychiatric problems as moms was at least partly a metaphorical move away from what Strecker
had set up as momism per se. But as an invocation of traditional psychiatric terminology, it also
tied Strecker back to his own explicit field of expertise, psychiatry. He was operating in his own
backyard, re-establishing momism’s psychiatric import.
A more dramatic widening of the domain of phenomena that could be subsumed under
the heading of ‘mom’ was carried out in Strecker’s consideration of metaphoric parallels to his
central theme. For instance, “[rjeligion,” if practiced in a manner in which “we ask for
everything and give nothing” can act as a mom surrogate, “in which something fine is distorted
from its noble purpose” (1946, pp. 112-113). Significantly, Strecker was careful to communicate
his respect for religion here. This hints at the perceived rivalry between psychiatry and religion,
and Strecker’s insistence on the purity of a religion correctly practiced located him, as he
certainly desired, on the side of traditional religion, unwilling to challenge the authority of the
church.
Strecker also took on mom surrogates like “movements,” which could act as nothing but
“dignified front[s] for emotional sprees” (1946, p. 114). And of particular importance were the
ways in which ‘mobs’ could act like moms. Using an approach quite parallel to the mass culture
argument that still possessed great intellectual currency in the 1940’s, Strecker argued that, in
mob behavior, “There is an instantaneous and close identification with the mob leaders or leader”
(1946, p. 115). This identification, not surprisingly, allowed the follower to absolve himself of
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responsibility for his own actions, fostering emotional immaturity in the follower, and making the
leader act much like a mom. Similarly, the stance of national isolationism, as asserted before
World War II, is written off as yet another momistic political stance, in which “the emphasis is on
the peace and happiness of the home and the danger of entangling alliances” (1946, p. 116).
But it was not just American nationalism that could be examined via the mechanism of
mom. Indeed, Strecker found momism to be the active evil behind the fascist and nationalist
movements of the 1930’s that led to World War II. Terming these political movements
“momarchies,” he described Nazism as “a mom surrogate with a swastika for a heart” (1946, p.
133). In this system, Hitler served as the comforting mother. Strecker asserted that, in effect,
Hitler said to his people:
‘Don’t fret children, Mom Fuehrer will fix it. He knows his children have been grossly
discriminated against. He knows the others hate and abuse you, have stolen what belongs
to you, and are plotting to destroy you. Mom won’t permit that’ (1946, p. 135).
In this sense, the metaphor of momism was offered to explain how something like the Third
Reich could appeal to its people. The only culture more firmly held in thrall to a momarchy,
claimed Strecker, was Japan. “Nipponese momism,” he observed, “was more personalized than
the Nazi brand” (1946, p. 138). He argued that this extreme momism prevented the Japanese
from more effectively fighting the war, and that:
I doubt if even the atomic bomb had sufficient explosive force to dis-womb the Japanese
people. After Japan yielded, thousands of Japanese bowed to the ground before the walls
of the palace [of the emperor], abjectly begging the Emperor-Mom to forgive them for
not having tried harder to win the war! (1946, p. 139).
This view of Japan shows some remarkable parallels to anthropologist Ruth Benedict’s view of
Japanese characterology, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword (1946). And the effort to
characterize nations according to the psychological types that they nurture was a major trend of
academic work in the 1930’s and 1940’s, much of this work following in the footsteps of the
work of Geoffrey Gorer’s analyses of Russian characterology. Strecker fit this characterological
project into his view of ‘mom’, again relying on metaphorical similarities between a broad social

142

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e co p y rig h t o w n er. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

phenomenon (like nationalism) and his mom concept to forge avenues into new domains while
seemingly standing still, always focusing on how the relevance o f ‘mom’.
Alcoholism was the final form o f social activity that Strecker metaphorically brought into
the fold of mom. Alcohol was not a new topic for Strecker; before World War II, he wrote the
book Alcohol: One Man’s Meat (1938), a popular book that was intended for a lay audience. In
that text, Strecker presented a thorough psychiatric analysis of the workings of alcoholism on the
human psyche; the tone of the book was somewhat more medical than his later writings. After
World War II, Strecker had arrived at a way of applying his ‘mom’ concept to alcoholism, again
in a metaphorical sense, comparing the effects of alcohol to the emotionally stifling effects of
moms. “To the heavy drinker,” he proclaimed, alcohol “provides all the protection, all the escape
from life’s hard knocks, and all the synthetic feeling o well-being that mom provides” (1946, p.
122). The proclivity toward alcoholism, he claimed, was largely caused by moms. “In about 80
percent of the alcholic cases I have studied,” said Strecker, “momism in childhood was the basic,
underlying cause” (1946, p. 122). Most of his analysis of alcoholism after the war consisted of
explorations of the appeal of alcohol to the ‘immature’ psyche, diagnosing alcoholism by
explaining its seduction. At all times, immaturity and momism provided the background of the
appeal, as: “[ejmotional immaturity is the seed, introversion is the soil, and alcoholism is the
final growth” (1946, p. 124).
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In addition to establishing how mothers could be moms, exploring how other people (e.g.
teachers, fathers, grandparents) could act as moms, and asserting that many social problems (e.g.
mobs, political isolationism, Nazism, alcoholism) could be metaphorically understood in terms of
momism, Strecker also situated mom as a crucial point of analysis by asserting that mom could
cause at least one kind of problem. Specifically, he wrote that homosexuality could be
understood as a result of momism. Though he was assured that many “cases of homosexuality
are...deeply rooted in biological deviations,” (1946, p. 128) he argued that many other cases were
caused by immaturity that resulted from being raised by a mom. Thus,
[a] mom who gets too much personal satisfaction from her son’s deep attachment to her
as his ‘love object’ and prefers to continue as his ‘light of love,’ instead of freeing him
gently but firmly and guiding him along the path o f normal sexual development which
ends in mature heterosexuality, often sows the seeds of latent or even overt
homosexuality in her son (1946, p. 131).
And, likewise, the “pop who mentally seduces his daughter may implant a tendency toward
lesbianism (1946, p. 131). Though there are places where Strecker refers to homosexuality as a
kind o f ‘surrogate mom’, the emphasis throughout his writing on homosexuality understands
momism to be no more or less than a cause of homosexuality. This is not a metaphorical
extension o f momism, but is instead an application that is almost solely concerned with causality.
The other issue where Strecker focuses on causality as an application of momism is when he
looks at the causes of momism itself. Again, the expansion of momism allows Strecker to
establish a wider importance for the term, in this case granting him an avenue through which to
critique American society as a whole.
This society-level critique, leveled in a chapter from Their Mothers' Sons entitled
“J’Accuse,” found Strecker shifting the blame from moms to their environment. “If I have been
hard on mom and her surrogates, she can find solace in the unending hymn of praise that the
system provides. Actually, the system deserves the more severe indictment” (1946, p. 160). The
system’s problem was that it made such a comfortable place for moms. “The community,”
Strecker claimed “applauds and admiringly smiles upon them” (1946, p. 160). Moms, he
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continued, were thought to ‘give their lives’ for their children, when in fact they were ruining the
lives of those children. Strecker singled out what he saw as a pattern of political candidates who,
because the quest for popularity demanded it, loudly praised the moms of our world. This gave
moms the political power to shape our world, for “if this kind of mom continues to increase and
multiply, then we might face defeat should there be the catastrophe of another war or even now
should we fail to achieve the goal of a democratic peace” (1946, p. 161). So, through tracing the
problem with mom back through its social support network, Strecker incorporated a kind of
rhetoric of crisis, clearly stating that the continued machinations of mom could well spell the
undoing of the American way of life. “The answer” to the problem of momism, claimed
Strecker, “lies, not in revamping the moms, but in revamping the system” (1946, p. 171). He
continued, positing that,
[tjhere is no reasons why the institution of motherhood should not be investigated and
evaluated just as any other institution, the Republican and Democratic parties, the
medical profession, labor, or major league baseball—indeed any occupation or
institution. The nation has a far greater stake in the occupation of motherhood than in
any other (1946, p. 171).
And, moving back to a medical metaphor that placed the application of psychiatry at the end of a
long list of medical triumphs, he noted that
[w]e have gone a long way toward cutting down the yearly toll due to cancer,
tuberculosis, and venereal diseases by a three-fold program—talking about them freely,
presenting the cold hard facts for all to see, and continuous unrelenting public education.
The same program could be applied to the threat of moms (1946, p. 177).
If traced back to its roots, momism could be defeated. Momism is built up as an overarching
problem of grave potential danger while Strecker’s psychiatry is cast as momism’s only rival.
As we have seen, Strecker placed mom at the center of a broad range of social problems,
starting by naming some other humans in the child’s life (e.g. fathers, teachers, nannies) who
could take on the mom role, and then expanding the relevance of mom by listing many social
issues that could be understand through the metaphor of mom (e.g. Nazism/fascism, alcoholism,
mobs). And finally, the relevance o f mom could be asserted by exploring the problems that could
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be causally connected to momism (e.g. homosexuality as result of momism, our culture as cause
of momism). So, though Strecker might have been limited by his use of one master term to
approach the problems of the world, he in fact had arrived at a very convenient hook for
numerous social problems. At many times, he plainly stated that American culture was controlled
by mothers, often invoking the aphorism that ‘the hand that rocks the cradle rules the world.’
These kinds of statements played a fundamental role in setting mom into motion as an
explanatory factor. However, at least as important was his flexibility with bridging devices such
as causality and metaphor, that allowed him to explore broad new vistas, boiling them all down to
family dynamics, understood psychiatrically.
Also important was the fact that the term ‘mom’ was not a complicated professional term.
In a move that is perhaps characteristic of efforts by professionals to reach out to lay audiences,
Strecker did not rely heavily on such terms as ‘schizophrenia,’ ‘psychosis,’ or ‘neurosis’ to
explore his thesis, and he was certainly capable of generating a far more complicated professional
jargon. Instead, the key words in Strecker’s books and articles were: ‘mom’, ‘immature’, and
‘the silver cord’ (this last term referring figuratively to the tool with which the mother tethers her
children to her side). To say the least, it did not require a background in psychiatry to understand
these terms. But, while audience comprehension is not irrelevant, what is at least as important, I
argue, is that by using these terms, Strecker was locating himself on the social terrain. That is, by
placing the everyday terminology at the center of his popular writing, he was identifying himself
as something other than ‘just a professional.’ The less professional terms, to some extent,
allowed him to present himself as an expert identifying with his lay audience, and not just as an
authority talking down to his audience. The everyday lingo allowed him to rely on a set of
(sometimes borrowed) neologisms (‘mom,’ ‘immaturirty,’ ‘the silver cord’) that funneled his
professionalism through a popular tone, in a sense concealing the manner in which he was telling
his audience something he presumed they did not know already. O f course, some psychiatric
terms did find their way into Strecker’s writing, and, when used, they located Strecker as a
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professional expert after all. His neologisms, then, can be thought of as allowing the authority in
his work to play both sides of the professional/popular fence.
When not found in the terminology, the professionalism in Strecker’s ‘mom’ writings can
be found in his narrative. While using everyday, and even colloquial language to convey his
point, he regularly situated his arguments in narratives that foregrounded his professional stance.
As we have already seen, this would frequently involve narratives from World War II, in which
the telling of the story, the provision of evidence for the ‘mom’ thesis, would come from his
(prominent) role in the efforts to screen the recruits for the armed forces. When support did not
come from the war, he would refer to patients with whom he consulted in his practice. Stories
from both the war and the mental hospital involved locating himself as the relevant expert in the
situation, and served as strategies through his role as a professional psychiatrist could structure
the way in which the support was presented.
William Menninger Moving Out From the War
William Menninger’s centrifugal move out from the war into new territory was every bit
as broad as Strecker’s, but Menninger made this outward move without using a master narrative
like ‘mom’. This was a move away from the clinic, toward concern with ‘normal’ people, and
Menninger was very clear about this fact. He insisted that
[w]e need to know much more about the ‘normal man,’ his personality make-up; we must
know more of the inter-actions of the emotions with the body in the production of
physical disease and the residuals of physical disease and injuries. We must learn much
more about the causation and the most effective treatment of the many types of emotional
illnesses. It is essential that we learn much more of cultural influences and social forces
(1946, p. 54).
Written one year after the end of World War II, this statement can be taken as the background for
much psychiatric effort after the war. In particular, the concern with ‘normal’ people and the
cultural and social environment signaled a departure from the more strictly biological psychiatry
before the war. It marked an effort to radically expand the scope of psychiatry.
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For example, Will Menninger (like his brother) showed interest in applying psychiatric
insight to the world of business and industry. Describing the psychiatric screening of recruits
during the war in an article for the New York Times Magazine, Menninger described how the
“same preventive factors” used in psychiatric screening and placement “might be more widely
used by business and industry,” for “[w]e learned much in the Army as to the importance of
selection and of placement, of putting the right man in the right job” (1946, p. 53). In the same
article, he asserts that similar benefits could be achieved through applying psychiatry to the
education.
Another, and perhaps more far-reaching, issue that Will Menninger broached via his war
experiences was human relations and the importance of companionship. He flatly stated in
Psychiatry in a Troubled World that
[t]he second part of the book was written with the hope that it might be helpful to any
person who has to get along with other people. For those who wish to use them, there
were many lessons, learned painfully and at great cost, which can be applied in a postwar
peaceful world (1948a, p. vii).
The lessons about getting along with others were quite directly linked to the battle experiences of
soldiers during the war, as when Menninger described how “[ljife in the Army illustrated clearly
the basic principle that the man who made an identification with the unit benefited himself by his
increased effectiveness and satisfaction because he benefited the unit of which he was a part.”
This insight from the war was used to support the conclusion that
[i]t is our responsibility to participate, to be a part of the community, to back up the
constructive efforts of various types of community activity. How fortunate that satisfying
the needs of others also benefits our own mental health! (1948a, p. 354).
Following this line of reasoning, Menninger explored the psychiatric components of healthy and
unhealthy friendships, noting that some people have no friends, and how that predicament
“indicate[s] a mentally unhealthy state,” while it “eliminates one of the strongest factors of
support to mental health, namely the rewards of friendship” (1948a, p. 355). Further ‘diagnosing’
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the issue of friendship, he described how “the greatest value is achieved from those relationships
in which there is mutual investment and return” (1948a, p. 355).
Closely related to friendship was another foundation for psychiatric well-being:
leadership. Again, the support for his assertions was drawn from the war, as he noted how
leadership, so crucial to a functioning armed services, was also crucial in civilian affairs. The
bridging between World War II and civilian life is clearly evidenced when Menninger claims that
[i]t was not a new fact but a vividly reviewed one that leadership was one of the chief
factors contributing to mental health and ill health. In civilian life one has a chance to
choose that leadership. Similarly, one has the obligation to give leadership whether in the
family or the group or in an elected office.. .One needs only to ask any thoughtful soldier
or officer to learn of the importance of the role that his immediate commanding officer
played in making or breaking his life in the Army (1948a, p. 355).
The concerns for leadership, largely stemming from a preventive, mental hygiene perspective,
were held to be applicable to all kinds of civilian groups. In particular, however, Menninger
compared the fighting unit in the war to the civilian family. He described how
[w]hen the crusty old soldier bragged that his was the ‘best damned outfit in the Army,’
he expressed in a few words his deep pride in belonging to it. This was evidence of good
leadership. That unit had a cohesion which each member shared and which made
possible an acceptance of assignment to disagreeable as well as to pleasurable tasks.. .The
same principles are applicable to the family. When there is good leadership, members of
the family develop a mutual respect for the opinions of others, for their property and for
their feelings. Then, also, do they feel that they have ‘the best family in town’ (1948a, p.
402).
The parents’ roles are discussed as a kind of metaphorical extension of the place of the leader of
the fighting unit in World War II. Menninger further explored this comparison by asserting that,
like fighting units in the war, the best families shared their mutual interests as well as their
problems.(1948a, pp. 402-403). And the best parents, like the best leaders in the armed forces,
knew that their children/soldiers wanted a close emotional bond with them, and counseled them
when they needed help (1948a, p. 396).
From these comparisons of the family to the fighting unit, Menninger went on to address
the family on its own, in terms o f its psychiatric importance. Here he cast a wider net, relying
less on war experience than on sweeping assertions. “The family and the home,” he claimed, in a
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tone closely resembling that of Edward Strecker’s statements concerning the importance of
parents,
are the essential foundation stones of our culture and our system o f life. Every other
factor in the development of mental health fades into relative insignificance in
comparison to the importance of the home. The foundation for good or poor mental
health is laid in childhood, and therefore the effect of the failure to maintain healthy,
happy home life is beyond calculation (1948a, pp. 393-394).
The “main puipose and the reason for [the family’s] survival through the ages,” he argued, “has
been to foster the development of independent individuals.” Like Strecker, Menninger asserted
that good families fostered “maturity.” Menninger’s belief in the centrality of the individual’s
capacity to adjust to his or her environment also bore a remarkable similarity to Strecker. “Life
within a family unit,” he claimed, “tests the capacity of the child to adjust his personality to the
demands of the environment” (1948a, p. 395). By considering the family in terms of its impact
on mental health, Menninger claimed the family as a psychiatric issue much as Strecker did,
though without the hook of Strecker’s ‘mom’ thesis.
During the war, many soldiers and potential soldiers were screened out of the armed
services after being drafted or rejected from the armed services during their service because they
were homosexuals. Whereas in the past, homosexuals had been punished with the crime of
‘sodomy,’ a legal term, during World War II, they were diagnosed as ‘homosexuals,’ a clinical
term (Berube, 1990, pp. 138-147). Historian Allan Berube has found that from “1941 to 1945,
more than four thousand sailors and five thousand soldiers—mostly men—were hospitalized,
diagnosed as sexual psychopaths, and discharged from the service with the label of
homosexuality appearing on their medical records” (1990, p. 147). Given that it was an issue that
was recently claimed by psychiatry, perhaps it was not surprising that William Menninger
addressed the issue in terms of the war. In Psychiatry in a Troubled World, he began by noting
the great “emotional charge” associated with homosexuality, and how, in America,
“homosexuality is considered a crime” (1948a, p. 222) Substituting a more neutral, psychiatric
point of view for this issue, he insisted that homosexuality was a component of much social
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behavior, including many activities that were considered normal. The Freudianism he had
adopted was quite clear in this discussion, as he discussed the way in which some normal samesex activities can represent “a form of sublimated homosexual gratification,” (1948a, p. 223) or
noted that “those who denounce adult homosexual individuals with feelings of great hostility may
very possibly be overreacting to their own unconscious wishes in that direction” (1948a, p. 223).
But, for exclusive homosexuals, those who had no interest in the opposite sex
whatsoever, Menninger saw immaturity in action. “Instead of the normal progress from one stage
to another,” he claimed, “a personality may stop at the homosexual level or regress back to it so
that a preference for members of the same sex to the exclusion of interest in the opposite sex
persists into adult life” (1948a, p. 225). As with Strecker, then, Menninger considered
homosexuality in terms of immaturity. However, Menninger’s clear debt to Freud led him to
complicate the picture by exploring homosexuality as a normal dimension to much healthy life.
Menninger dealt at length to the issue o f how psychiatrists handled ‘cases’ of homosexuality
during the war. Tellingly, he quotes Edward Strecker’s comments on the issue, agreeing with
Strecker that, though they experienced friction from those who did not believe homosexuals
deserved a medical discharge (on the grounds that it was too ‘friendly’ of a treatment for
homosexuals), they believed a ‘blue’ (i.e. disciplinary) discharge was totally inappropriate, in that
many homosexual soldiers served well in the armed forces. Menninger arrived at the broad
conclusion that “[s]ome [homosexuals] have unusual talent and may make important
contributions to society. At the other end of the scale is the homosexual who is a menace, and
society has a right to be protected from him” (1948a, p. 231). Moving from the Army’s treatment
of homosexuals to the general issue of homosexuals in the general public, Menninger explicitly
distanced himself from a moral take on the issue, offering instead a thoroughly professional take,
one that for the most part preserved the stigma attached to homosexuality while offering
understanding at the same time.

151

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e cop y rig h t o w n e r. F u r th e r r e p ro d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e rm is s io n .

Menninger’s treatment of alcoholism, again similar to Strecker’s, involved use of the
term ‘dependent’ instead of the more common ‘immature.’ As with most of these other issues,
Menninger started with his experiences to World War II, and then moved to a general definition
of the problem in psychiatric terms, concluding that “psychologically, [alcoholics] are
fundamentally passive, dependent persons in whom the alcoholism symbolically represents a
craving for the original nursing bottle” (1948a, p. 187). One senses here a blend of Strecker’s
concern for momism as metaphorically manifested in alcoholism along with a distinct Freudian
emphasis on early-life experiences.
In one of his broadest assertions of the relevance of psychiatry to the world, William
Menninger located psychiatry as the answer to all kinds of peace-time issues, including the need
for democracy, community and the fight against discrimination. Proposing that “[djespite our
periodic feeling of helplessness [regarding democracy] we must remember that antidemocratic
leadership is the result of discouraged apathy on the part of the electorate,” Menninger resolved,
“we must concern ourselves about procuring and supporting wise leaders” (1948a, p. 356).
Having established leadership as a major psychiatric variable in war and, therefore, in peace, he
concluded that the political leaders we choose can have a major impact on our entire nation’s
mental health
While other arguments involving leadership drew metaphors between the fighting unit
and the family, this one involved a comparison of the fighting unit and the nation. And
leadership was not the only watchword here. The “chance for advancement,” (1948a, p. 357) so
important to maintaining troop morale, was also held to be a major support for the entire nation’s
mental health. If the members of a nation do not believe they have a fair chance to advance,
argued Menninger, then mental disease will result. Similarly, if our leaders do not provide
“motivation for our communities,” reasoned Menninger, we would lack a sufficient number of
individuals ready to work for the good o f the community, and our culture would fall apart (1948a,
p. 414). He applied these arguments to the context of the nation, as well as to clubs, churches,
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schools, families, and individuals. Mental health was, simply put, the key to community well
being.
A major obstacle to community well-being, was what William Menninger considered to
be the psychiatric problem of prejudice and discrimination. In his words, “[prejudice is correctly
regarded as a kind of neurosis” (1948a, p. 422). More than this, “America’s number-one social
neurosis at the moment is prejudice and its resultant discrimination” (1948a, p. 422). Supporting
his stance that prejudice is a neurosis, Menninger tinned to two psychiatrists, “one a white and
one a Negro,” both of whom described how an individual’s prejudice is driven by personal
insecurity, “warp[ing] the personalities of both the prejudiced people and their victims” (1948a, p.
423). Taking his usual stance of using the Army as a lens for the greater social scene in America,
he regretted that “Army life reflected the widespread prejudices and discriminations of civilian
life,” (1948a, p. 424) expressing hope that Americans could improve on their neurotic past and
present.
Crime, by definition always a ‘social problem’, also played a prominent role in William
Menninger’s post-war writing. Significantly, the worlds of criminal justice and psychiatrists were
in the midst of a collision after the war, as psychiatrists had become fixtures in the criminal
justice system, serving as witnesses who advised courts regarding the mental illness or soundness
of the accused and of witnesses. Popular psychiatrists of the 1950’s would use their role in the
courts as a way of foregrounding their legitimacy. William Menninger spent relatively little time
as a psychiatric witness for the courts, but still managed to deal with crime by highlighting the
issue of crime during World War II.
Menninger’s recounting o f the psychiatric methods used in the correction program for
criminals in the Army began by stressing the focus that psychiatrists shared with the Army:
rehabilitation. Psychiatry held the promise that a criminal justice system could be made to do
more than just punish the criminal. Rehabilitation, Menninger explained, was the goal that
psychiatrists were asked to achieve in the Army. Responding to charges that this psychiatric
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focus implied a ‘coddling’ of the prisoners, Menninger responded that “a psychiatric approach in
no sense implies coddling, but it likewise is totally incompatible with sadistic punition” (1948a,
p. 508) It was, he assured, a kind of professional, scientific approach totally separate from
tendencies to be ‘too hard’ or ‘too easy’ on criminals.
Explaining the methods used by the psychiatric corps during the war, Menninger was
quick to point out that each military prisoner was evaluated by a psychiatrist, a clinical
psychologist, and a psychiatric social worker, emphasizing how thorough such evaluation was.
(1948, p. 510) He defended the psychiatric profession from the accusation that it had been
“trying to make it appear that mental illness is the cause of crime” (1948a, p. 511). Distancing
himself from such an approach, he noted that, in actuality, only about 2 per cent o f criminals were
psychotic, while “perhaps 15 to 20 per cent...could be given some other psychiatric diagnosis;
but in 100 per cent of cases he is out of step with society” (1948a, p. 511). Menninger asserted
that these people out of step with society were not necessarily mentally ill, but were definitely in
need of psychiatric assistance. As a specimen example, he described how many individuals who
became military prisoners had problems with authority, and how these individuals
nearly always show disturbed relations with the original authority—the father. Unless
helped (sometimes one is beyond change) such individuals go through life with
resentment toward any authority, defying it, fighting it, subtly or openly sabotaging it”
(1948a, p. 511).
This approach found Menninger diagnosing crime by virtue of a rather Freudian explanatory
mechanism that stresses the impact of formative experiences with parental units. Significantly,
he does not classify these individuals as mentally ill. But, in this case, all that means is that he is,
once again, stretching psychiatry’s area of expertise outside of the domain o f the mentally ill,
effectively placing all criminals (anyone ‘out of step with society’, at least) within the reach of his
dynamic psychiatric approach. A new classification was created for criminals. “Offenders,”
Menninger posited, “be they military or civilian, are regarded by psychiatrists as maladjusted
individuals. They are socially sick” (1948a, p. 513). Such individuals could be rehabilitated by
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gaining understanding of themselves, “what the psychiatrists calls ‘insight’” (1948a, p. 513)
Returning to a contextualized discussion of how offenders were handled during the war,
Menninger described the promising results o f group psychotherapy sessions, where offenders
discussed their problems with each other, concluding such sessions “should be widely used in
civilian penal institutions” (1948, p. 514). Tacking from the war to the outside world, and
retaining a particularly psychodynamic, Freudian approach throughout, Menninger viewed crime
as fertile ground for the expansion of psychiatry, while frankly acknowledging that crime was not
a mental illness per se. Crime itself, without any necessary connection to World War II, would be
a crucial part of popular psychiatric writing after the war.
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Expertise, the Criminal Mind, and the Cracks in Society:
The Popular Writing of Fredric Wertham and Robert Lindner
Psychiatry continued to triumph after World War II. If, as the familiar metaphor had it,
psychiatry had played the role of Cinderella during the war, its carriage had still not yet reverted
to pumpkin form in the 1950’s. However, the maintenance of this place in the public eye found
psychiatry (as perhaps it had to) moving into new domains. The war itself had involved a
fortuitous set of circumstances for psychiatrists hoping to bring their profession to a wider public.
It was given unparalleled mass media attention, and involved deeply-held beliefs relating to
politics, patriotism, and national sacrifice; these factors made the war worth ‘latching onto’ for a
professional. Just as importantly, psychiatry had been given (by the government) a front seat to
the conflict, in the form of screening and treatment positions. This privileged place in the war
jettisoned psychiatry into the public eye like never before, and gave the profession a long-desired
way out of the mental hospital. But by the early fifties, psychiatric perspectives on the war had
mostly played out, and the search for new turf for popular discourse was on. In this postwar
period, psychiatrists and psychoanalysts made crime a focal point of their public writings.
After the war, psychiatry was approaching a high point of professional accomplishment.
By 1955, the total inpatient population in America reached a peak of 559,000 patients (Grob,
1994, p. 49). In particular, psychotherapy had allowed psychiatry to emerge from World War II
with widespread (though by no means universal) approval. Psychotherapy quickly became
popular with a large number of psychiatrists in private practice, most of whom dealt not with the
psychoses or chronic, debilitating mental problems, but with “noninstitutionalized psychoneurotic
individuals capable of functioning independently” (Grob, 1994, p. 224). Psychotherapy was
mostly unproven as a means of treating less well-off (mentally and financially) patients. The
success of psychotherapy occurred despite, or perhaps because of, the indeterminacy surrounding
the practice (Grob, 1994, pp. 224-225). Psychotherapy granted to psychiatry the way out of the
mental hospital that the profession had sought. It allowed psychiatry to distance itself from its

156

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e co p y rig h t o w n e r. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

failures and to make it appear it had arrived at more successful means of dealing with the severely
mentally ill. The symbolic victory of psychotherapy was largely scored by means of a
redefinition of who could be considered mentally ill. But the vagueness regarding what
psychotherapy definitively accomplished made it unclear why psychiatry should be entitled to a
monopoly over the practice. Other professionals, including social workers, clinical psychologists,
parole officers and clergymen began to use psychotherapy (Grob, 1994, p. 224). Though some
more biologically-oriented psychiatrists were less approving of this, many psychiatrists embraced
psychotherapy’s spread; they held that it represented a realization of the psychiatric dimensions
of many other professional tasks.
The introduction of psychotherapy was inextricably linked with the advance of
psychoanalysis within psychiatry. By World War II, psychoanalysis had been in the air for some
time, and it had come very far by the end of the war. Even before the war, a convergence of
psychiatry and psychoanalysis had commenced. Beginning in 1924, the American Psychiatric
Association and American Psychoanalytic Association began holding their conventions at the
same time in the same city. And as of 1938, the American Psychoanalytic Association required
its members to have completed one year (eventually to become two years) of psychiatric
residency. By 1953, 82 percent of the members of the American Psychoanalytic Association also
claimed membership in the American Psychiatric Association (Shorter, 1997, pp. 164-165). The
psychoanalyically-tinged views o f Karl Menninger, William Menninger and others within the
psychiatric profession had shifted psychiatry’s definition o f itself.
Historian Edward Shorter describes the convergence of psychiatry and psychoanalysis as
a kind of psychoanalytic coup from within psychiatry (1997, p. 164). Joseph Schwartz, in his
history of psychoanalysis, presents the same convergence in different terms; he views the
conjoining of psychiatry and psychoanalysis during the mid-20th century as a misguided attempt
to apply psychoanalysis to the needs of psychiatry (Schwartz, 1999, p. 278). The marriage of
psychiatry and psychoanalysis always had its discontents. Certainly, there were mid-twentieth
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century psychiatrists who resented their field’s adoption of psychoanalysis. And there were also
psychoanalysts who did not blend their approach with the medicine of psychiatry. This latter
group, the non-medical analysts, or ‘lay’ analysts, are more relevant here, for they were better
represented in the popular psychology of the 1950’s, by, among others, Robert Lindner and Erich
Fromm.
Operating out of Baltimore as an analyst with a private practice, Robert Lindner would
become a steady, if not the best-known, author of literature for a lay audience. Lacking the
medical background that would have allowed him a place in the most prestigious psychiatric and
psychoanalytic organizations, he nonetheless possessed a Ph.D. in psychology and a master’s
degree in criminology; these credentials were frequently noted in the introductory notes to his
books and articles. He published his first book, Rebel Without A Cause, in 1944. Though that
book’s title has since become famous because of the mostly unrelated Nicolas Ray/James Dean
film of the same name, it was a thoroughly professional book, explicitly intended for a
professional audience as a demonstration of the effectiveness of hypno-analysis, which consisted
of a mixture of hypnotic examination and psychoanalytic interpretation. His next book, Stone
Walls and Men (1946), was based on his service as a consulting psychologist at a prison in
Pennsylvania. Ensuing books and articles drew chiefly on his experiences as an analyst. This
professional background gave him an outsider’s perspective on the world of psychology; his was
decidedly heterodox brand of expertise.
Fredric Wertham was a well-established psychiatrist, with strong ties to the biological
side of psychiatry and an emerging concern for the social side of psychiatry. His first book, The
Brain as an Organ (1934), was a significant publication within the psychiatric profession,
solidifying his sterling reputation in psychiatry after his immigration from Germany. But there
was little confusing Wertham with such towering figures as William and Karl Menninger.
Wertham was, in many ways, an outsider. He was not as taken with the psychoanalytic
movement as the Menningers, and never sought the kind o f major administrative positions that
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they had fought for. But Wertham did share with psychoanalysis the impetus to apply psychiatry
to new areas outside the mental hospital. It is just that he chose a different path; Wertham can be
typified as a professional despite himself, a professional at odds with the profession, a
professional discontent who went public.
Wertham and Lindner were among the most prolific of the popular psychological writers.
Both Wertham and Lindner began writing for popular audiences before 1950, and crime was a
perennial concern for both of them. O f course, crime had been treated from a psychiatric
perspective before in popular writing, as both William and Karl Menninger as well as Edward
Strecker had dealt with the issue at least tangentially. But Wertham and Lindner located crime at
the center of their differing psychological approaches to the world; it was largely through crime
that they appealed to a public and attempted to install their expertise as relevant to public
concerns.
Inside the Mind of the Murderer
As a senior psychiatrist for the department of hospitals for New York City and director of
the mental hygiene clinic at Queens General Hospital, Wertham’s psychiatric practice put him
face to face with distinctly urban problems in psychiatry, and though his popular work drew
conclusions for the wider society, he nevertheless situated much of his own work in the city.
Murder was the first issue to bring Wertham to prominence. His first book intended for a lay
audience, Dark Legend: A Study o f Murder (1941), manifested this focus. Dark Legend
examined the case of the pseudonymous Gino, an Italian immigrant who killed his mother out of
what appeared to be a simple desire for revenge.
Wertham considered crime from a psychiatric perspective in Dark Legend. Placing
himself as Gino’s advocate in the murder case brought against him, Wertham declared in court
that “Gino was legally insane at the time of committing the crime, according to the definition of
insanity the law provides” (1941, p. 20). The story in Dark Legend mirrors the narrative of a
mystery novel. But unlike a mystery novel, Dark Legend plainly states who had committed the
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crime (Gino), and the outcome of the court case (Gino’s commitment to an asylum), at the outset.
The mystery that remained was psychiatric; Wertham sought to explain what possessed Gino to
kill his mother.
Starting with the presumption that a “madman’s logic may not be ours, but that is not to
say there is no logic in him,” (1941, p. 21) Wertham provided Gino’s story in full, in an attempt
to explain the murder in psychiatric terms. Tracing Gino’s life history, Wertham examined how
he related to his parents, finding that Gino strongly identified with his father, who died when
Gino was still quite young. Gino had a rigid belief in family honor, and resented his mother,
whom he believed had offended that honor when she accepted Gino’s uncle as her new sexual
partner. Wertham equated Gino’s situation to that of Orestes, where one could find “the death of
the father, the remarriage of the mother, the ‘casting out’ of Orestes into ‘misery’” (1941, pp.
158-159) He also stressed the similarity between Gino’s dilemma and that of Hamlet.
The psychiatric explanation that Wertham proposed was that Gino had developed an
“Orestes complex,” (1941, p. 223) and that this explained his crime. This diagnosis comes only
at the end of the book, after Wertham thoroughly explains the workings of such psychiatric
concerns as the “mother-image” (1941, p. 190) and “father-image” (1941, p. 188). He also made
clear that this was not a case of the well-known Oedipus complex of psychoanalytic theory,
because, even after modification, Wertham could not fit that complex with Gino’s hostility
toward his mother (1941, p. 161).
Wertham took care not to avoid the ‘outer’—the effect of the environment on the mind of
Gino, noting that, unlike Hamlet, he “had no England, no pirates; no diversions with strolling
players; no books to read, no time to read them,” and explaining that, because the family’s well
being depended on him, Gino worked long hours at menial jobs (1941, p. 206). This concern for
the social side of psychiatry would become a hallmark dimension of Wertham’s popular work.
But that did not mean that the psychiatric concern for the unconscious had been swept
away. Though the inner and outer forces were both seen as important factors in understanding
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Gino’s crime, there is little doubt that, in the end, Wertham’s ultimate concern in Dark Legend
was with the unconscious. In the end, he “had become convinced that Gino’s matricidal impulse
stemmed from a deeply submerged, unconscious conflict” (1941, p. 217). The final chapters read
with the certainty of a medical diagnosis, finding Wertham describing how Gino’s murder of his
mother “was like a self-operation. Gino acted like a man who cuts off his arm to escape blood
poisoning. By the cruel deed he eradicated his own mother-complex” (1941, p. 219). Wertham
establishes the characteristics that make up the Orestes complex, including: excessive attachment
to the mother-image, hostility against the mother-image, a general hatred of women, indications
of homosexual potentialities, ideas of suicide, and an emotional disorder based on profound
feelings of guilt (1941, p. 223). He then links this diagnosis to a previously established
psychiatric diagnosis, that of catathymic crisis. The “central manifestation” of catathymic crisis,
he explains,
consists in the development of the idea that a violent act—against another person or
against oneself—is the only solution to a profound emotional conflict whose real nature
remains below the threshold of the consciousness of the patient (1941, p. 226).
The enigma at the core of this mystery novel of the inner life is thereby solved; Gino is given a
psychiatric diagnosis, one that explains how the murder he committed came to be.
Summing up his own involvement in Gino’s case, Wertham justifies his application of
psychiatry. “Had this evolution of a psychiatric theory, this definition of a mental disorder, done
anything for Gino?,” he asked. Answering his own question, he stated:
Very definitely it had. For with the formulation of the theory, and the new insight it gave
me into similar cases I had encountered in the past, I could say with assurance that Gino
after his ‘realization’ had recovered fully, that he would never again constitute a menace
to society or himself (1941, p. 231).
In this manner, psychiatry is poised as a discipline that could not only explain murder, but as one
that could actually heal the murderous impulses by granting individual’s insight into their own
(oft-irresistible) unconscious impulses.
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The concern for murder as a psychiatric construct could be found, though often in the
penumbra, in almost all of of Wertham’s subsequent popular work. His next book, The Show o f
Violence (1949a), was similar in form to Dark Legend', the focus was on the psychiatricallyconsidered stories of murder. But instead of presenting the story of just one murder, it reviewed
several. The emphasis on ‘being there’ in the presence o f the murders was preserved, but there
was a greater emphasis on prevention of murder. As a blurb on the front of the book-jacket reads:
“You are taken behind the scenes in some famous murder cases—the case of Robert Irwin, the
‘mad sculptor,’ the case of Martin Lavin, a professional gunman, and many others—which prove
that murder is preventable” (1949a, front jacket).
Wertham introduces the topic of the psychiatric understanding of murder into context by
explaining the role of the psychiatrist as witnesses in American courts. He insisted that the
“psychiatrist is used in murder cases not only to give his opinion, but to substantiate it. He can do
this only by facts—facts which by virtue of his special scientific techniques he alone can obtain”
(1949a, p. 18). But Wertham wanted psychiatrists in the courtroom to be able to account for
more than the unconscious factors at work in the accused. He insisted that “the psychiatrist
should not shirk his duty to determine the point where individual guilt resolves itself into social
responsibility,” (1949a, p. 18) clearly charting a course for psychiatry to explore the broader
sociological issues he saw at work in murder.
The chapters o f The Show o f Violence consist mostly of studies of murderers that make
good on Wertham’s promise to concern himself with social responsibility; he repeatedly finds
each murder to have been preventable. One chapter examines the case of Robert Irwin, who
killed three people. Wertham argued that Irwin was innocent, noting that, when the murders were
carried out, he was not capable of acting rationally. Irwin, claimed Wertham, was suffering from
“delusional thinking” (1949a, p. 169) and a disengaged super-ego (1949a, p. 156). Wertham then
traced Irwin’s psychiatric problems to his youth, when an unstable family life led to “a largely
unconscious emotional conflict, with strong drives pitted against each other,” (1949a, p. 172)
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ultimately leaving Irwin suicidal and delusional, resulting in a catathymic crisis that led him to
kill. He concludes Irwin’s story by noting how, in captivity, Irwin wrote to him about how he
nurtured a sick sparrow. Wertham concludes on a pathetic note, asking: “Did society, before the
triple murder, ever show as much concern for sick Robert Irwin as he showed for a sick
sparrow?” (1949a, p. 182).
The other chapters on murder in The Show o f Violence take a similar tack. An
impoverished woman of below-average intelligence who killed her children is shown to have
experienced an unstable family life, and a disastrous marriage. This situation placed her at the
brink of mental illness, and when she looked for assistance of any kind, she could not find it,
resulting in her developing what Wertham deemed an “emotionally unintegrated” personality
(1949a, p. 229). Another chapter addresses the story of Albert Fish, who had killed a young
woman and sexually assaulted many young people. Wertham defended Fish’s innocence,
insisting that he was legally insane when he committed these acts. He links Fish’s crimes to his
overpowering sexual impulses, for which he was unable to receive any psychiatric assistance.
Wertham’s defense falls short in court; the chapter ends with Fish’s execution (1949a, pp. 65-94).
Throughout all of this, the importance of preventing murder is described in wholly psychiatric
terms. The overall thrust of The Show o f Violence is that, if psychiatry were more available to
people before crimes were committed, murder could be largely eliminated. The concern for
mental hygiene is apparent throughout the book (and all of his subsequent writings on murder).
Finally, there is a kind of indictment to be found here. Because we have not given psychiatry
enough power to do its job to prevent murder, he claims, we are to blame for the murders that are
committed.
Wertham found success in getting his ideas regarding murder published in popular
periodicals, sometimes boiling down chapters from his books for articles, sometimes writing fresh
material, and at other times, simply making himself available to journalists who wrote about him.
He published an abridged version of a chapter of The Show o f Violence in Scientific American in
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1949. Again stressing his mental hygiene-oriented outlook, the article was entitled “The
Prevention of Murder” and the subtitle read: “It might have been possible in the case of Robert
Irwin. Society did not accept the responsibility, but it insisted that the murderer accept the
blame” (1949b, p. 50). He wrote an article for The Nation that used the same basic narrative used
in The Show o f Violence, in which an accused criminal’s psychiatric and social background are
reviewed and the legal system is shown to be unconcerned with these details (in this story, the
accused is ultimately exonerated) (1954b, pp. 12-13). He even applied his outlook to the Leopold
and Loeb case in a 1958 book review of Life Plus 99 Years, by Nathan Leopold, in the Saturday
Review, explaining how “[i]t is only in the dynamic interplay between deeply individual and
social factors that they key to such cases can be found” (1958a, p. 18). Murder remained a major
concern for Wertham all the way through his 1966 book A Sign fo r Cain, in which he considered
lynchings, administrative mass killings, and the murder of mental patients in Nazi Germany
(1966, pp. 135-157). His hybrid concern for the individual and the society together was still in
lull effect in A Signfo r Cain, where he stated that “a combination of what may be called dynamic
clinical psychiatry and sociology is the most fruitful approach” (1966, p. 22).
Like the earlier popular psychiatry, Wertham’s consideration of murder took a pre
existing social problem and placed it in a psychiatric context, claiming for psychiatry a monopoly
of competence for dealing with the issue. But there are some distinct differences between
Wertham’s work and that of the Menningers and Strecker. Most markedly, almost from the
outset, he never used the textbook-style approach to popularizing his work. Instead of giving an
omnibus of psychiatry’s uses, he provided very focused, detailed accounts of single psychiatric
issues. This resulted in what could be called a more precisely situated psychiatric outlook. Dark
Legend did more than just limit itself to murder as an issue; it also limited itself to one story of
one murderer. Later books and articles used a slightly larger number of cases, but still found
Wertham pursuing issues one at a time. Whereas earlier popular psychiatry, even that involving
World War II (which, as we have seen, involved numerous extended explorations of far-flung
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issues), had taken a kind of omnivorous approach, pulling everything into its maw, Wertham
worked hard to pursue a handful o f related issues throughout his career.
Also, because they were so detailed, the setting of Wertham’s writing often took on an
enhanced importance. His writing on murder frequently placed psychiatry in the courtroom;
details of his arguments in court took front stage. The move is familiar; it showed psychiatry
taking action outside o f the stigmatized walls of the mental hospital. Additionally, it allowed him
to construct what was an exceptionally humane kind o f psychiatry, as he identified himself
always on the side of the accused and the downtrodden.
Finally, Wertham’s approach to murder inaugurated a kind of hybrid of psychiatry and
other social sciences. To be sure, he gave psychiatry a privileged place in his books; his own
field was made out to be a necessary, though not sufficient, part of the understanding o f murder.
The other social sciences (sociology in particular) allowed for what he considered to be the
correct tempering of psychiatric insight, not the other way around. This dynamic of Wertham’s
placement of himself can be seen emerging as Wertham took on other topics.
The Root of all Crime
Robert Lindner’s move to engage the public with a psychological perspective was, in
many respects, similar to that of Fredric Wertham. To be sure, there were important differences
between the two; most importantly, Lindner was a ‘lay’ analyst, while Wertham was a fullfledged psychiatrist with an M.D. Like Wertham, however, Lindner applied psychological
discourse to crime, hoping to install his brand of psychology as an answer to the problem of
crime. Both asserted that if the inner lives of those who break the law could be understood, crime
could ultimately be reduced, through adjustments in social conditions, the justice system, and the
means of dealing with crime after it is committed.
Lindner’s first book written for a lay audience was Stone Walls and Men (1946), in which
he provided a psychological profile not only of the imprisonment that is alluded to in the title, but
of numerous kinds of criminal activity. These observations, he assured, were “the result of some
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years of observation and experience among criminals and with crime” (1946, p. ix). He set up his
own point of view in opposition to other experts, arguing that “the trouble” with previous studies
of criminals was
that writers about crime have approached it from an academic and theoretical standpoint
and have rarely, if ever, plunged into the deeps of the offender’s very being with him.
This I have done, many times (1946, p. ix).
As an experienced prison psychologist, Lindner made the most of his direct contact with
prisoners. It allowed him a way to establish a certain difference from—and superiority to—those
experts who had gone before.
Crime, of course, is an expansive topic. Wertham had established himself in the public
eye simply by taking on murder from a psychiatric perspective. Perhaps brazenly, Lindner
considered all crime through a definition of crime that was entirely psychological, relying largely
on psychoanalytic terminology. After reviewing and rejecting legal and religious definitions of
crime, Lindner provides his own definition, arguing that
[t]he only feasible way in which crime can be defined is by considering it as a
symptomatic type of behavior which is specially and specifically motivated, and which
happens, under certain conditions, to conflict with the law. In other words, crime is a
symptom, actionally expressed, of internal maladjustment and conflict (1946, p. 38).
The performance o f crime, he claimed, was
at the time and for the individual, the best (and sometimes the only) solution to the
inwardly raging strife, in the same way as insanity provides a solution which makes it
possible for the one so afflicted to continue his existence (1946, p. 39).
This was a wholesale psychologizing of crime, defining almost everything previously defined as
‘crime’ as a psychological issue, and even enlarging the concept of crime to include some
behaviors not previously considered as crime. “[Wjith such a definition,” he explained, “it is
possible to call certain behavior forms ‘criminal,’ even though they are not enjoined by the law”
(1946, p. 39). Lindner’s concern for the ‘inwardly raging strife’ located crime in the mind of the
individual—which was, of course, the expertise of psychologists. This may have seemed like a
psychiatric proclamation, but it should be remembered that Lindner was no psychiatrist He had
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trained in and studied both psychology and criminology, and proposed this study of crime in the
name of criminology, though almost all of his discussion was carried out in psychological (and
especially psychoanalytic) terms. In his writing, he maintained a pugnacious relationship with
criminology; he cited few criminologists, and gave every indication of trying to refigure
criminology as a colony of psychology, as when he stated that “[t]he kind of crime which is the
main—and should be almost the exclusive—concern of the criminologist is that which involves
the deeper, less accessible levels of the personality” (1946, p. 55). Like Wertham, he tried to
stake an inter-disciplinary task, integrating psychological studies with social sciences, but took
the inner life (and therefore, the psychological gaze) as the essential task, essentially dismissing
all other disciplines as ancillary to his own.
The discussion of crime in Stone Walls and Men hinged around new words that Lindner
used to specify the kind of crime he was describing and the people who committed these crimes.
Instead of using the word ‘crime,’ he posited the existence of ‘criminosis,’ a kind of crime
syndrome. And, instead of ‘criminals,’ he used the term ‘criminotics.’ These substitutions,
impelled toward making the issue of crime one of psychological diagnostics, were not total; he
had not eliminated ‘crime’ and ‘criminal’ from his vocabulary. But he did consistently use these
new terms.
Lindner performed a thorough psychological consideration of crime, or criminosis; he left
few stones unturned. He devoted several chapters just to the motivation of crime, starting with
the familiar Freudian notion of the origin of the personality in early-life conflicts. He provides a
review of the conflict of the baby’s id and the societal constraints that ultimately conflict with it,
linking the unconscious desires to “criminal impulses” (1946, p. 63). Claiming that “the actual
driving force behind each criminal act is a responsibility of the ego,” (1946, p. 79) Lindner
charges forward through the hypothetical individual’s life history, linking crime to what he calls
“a permeated” or “compromising” ego, unable to stand up to the criminal dictates of the id (1946,
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p. 80). Crime, here, becomes no more or less than a precipitate of psychological conflict. It is
located as a perfectly psychological issue.
As we have seen with other moves to claim expansive domains of human behavior,
Lindner’s consideration of crime, considered in terms of an individual’s ‘inwardly raging strife,’
was used as a central hub from which to extend the psychological treatment to far-reaching social
issues. The effects of capitalism and socialism on the mind, and how they bring about their own
kinds of crime, receive a certain amount of attention (1946, pp. 238-240). He also considered
“culture...the grand total of the attitudes, governing ideas, group motivations, and common goals
of all the elements contained in a society,” (1946, p. 252) as a factor in how certain kinds of
criminal orientations are brought into existence; this concern for social systems would eventually
become major topics for Lindner’s popular writings.
The constancy with which Lindner invoked psychoanalytic principles in his explication
of the roots of crime cannot be understated. In a section on criminal careers, he locates the cause
for their existence “in the pitiless dynamics of the unconscious, against which nothing avails but
the satisfaction of elementary wants, real therapy, or organic debilitation” (1946, p. 336). At
every turn, he stressed the underlying unconscious factors in criminosis.
Eventually, after providing substantial remarks concerning how crime results from a
concatenation of unconscious factors, he turns this psychoanalytic focus on the justice system,
with a particular concern for life inside a prison. Starting with the judicial system, he finds what
he considers to be a system that “encourage[s] crime” and “interferefs] with the treatment of
criminotics,” (1946, p. 374) because it is ill-equipped (read: lacking in sufficient psychological
personnel and insight) to deal with each criminal according to his or her individual psychological
needs and constraints.
Addressing the issue of punishment, Lindner finds that “[d]own to this day, the
unconscious, hidden, unacknowledged—and, by some, bitterly resented and therefore scorned—
primary reason for punishment remains” (1946, p. 384). Punishment, he claimed, functioned as
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an ally o f the ego in the fight against the id in all of us, so that “the offender... is punished for the
forbidden ‘criminal’ impulses of all of us” (1946, p. 385). The move here is significant; by
addressing the general issue of crime, Lindner found in punishment a way of psychoanalyzing not
just criminals, but the entirety of society. His diagnosis is that punishment fails because “its
instruments and methods do not affect the predisposing conditions in criminosis” (1946, p. 386).
Extending a similar analysis to the psychology of prison punishment, Lindner found that, when
successful rehabilitation did occur in individuals who had been sent to prison, the rehabilitation
was the result not of prison, but “because the recent offense has met and satisfied unconscious
needs, which therefore no longer predispose toward criminosis” (1946, p. 415).
Lindner’s examination of prison life extends to such topics as sex in prison and life after
release from prison. He called sex in prison “perhaps the most important [problem] of all for
inmates and officials alike” (1946, p. 454). For it was in prison that “previously unrecognized
sexual propensities” (1946, p. 456) were likely to crop up. Most notable among these
propensities, explained Lindner, was
homoeroticism, the transient sexual exchange among members of the same sex who are
confined together under a situation of heterosexual starvation, and who are more readily
brought to such behavior because of their basically ambivalent sexual natures, and
overstimulated by omnipresent aphrodisiacs (1946, p. 459).
This problem, he opined, could be eliminated if prisons took a more sensible view of the
immutable, normal (as in, hetero-) sexual needs of the prisoners; homoeroticism, that is, is linked
quite directly to American culture’s inability to come to grips with the sexuality of its citizens.
So, taking an issue like sex in prison, Lindner again finds a way o f psychoanalyzing not just the
prisoners, but also the mainstream o f American culture, extending his perspective centrifugally
outward.
Regarding life after release from prison, Lindner expressed concern that it was at least as
psychologically-trying of an experience as was life in prison. Our “puritan heritage,” (1946, p.
476) he explains, with its focus on work at all times, crushes inmates upon release, when they
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find that work is hard to come by, and that they suddenly lack the protective structure of prison
life. Again, the move is made from the psychological needs of the prisoner to an indictment of
American culture. Having established himself as an expert of the ‘inner’ life of people, he shows
how the intra-personal is constrained by the cultural, and locates psychoanalysis as the essential
discipline for proper understanding.
As an experienced psychological worker in a prison, he concludes that the rehabilitation
of prisoners required a substantially greater rehabilitative effort in prisons. He decries what he
considers to be a lackadaisical effort to hire more rehabilitative personnel in prisons. Ultimately,
he finds that the justice system could only work if changed in accordance with the dictates of
psychology. His conclusion notes that the
treatment of the individual criminotic can be accomplished by depth psychology. By
utilizing the dynamic concepts which form the very marrow of the new orientation in
psychological science it is possible, in many cases, to penetrate behind the veil of
criminosis and to reach into the dank substrata of the unconscious, to probe forth for
examination and appraisal the secrets of the criminal deed, actually to reconstruct the
personality. This is an arduous task, but a rewarding one, and with the passage of every
day we are gathering new knowledge on how to go about it with more ease and surety of
success (1946, p. 485).
The ‘dynamic’ psychology he refers to is, of course, psychoanalysis. His claims for professional
involvement in crime are buttressed here with a notion of what he describes as psychology’s
inexorable progress. Later admitting some of problems involved in “the curing of individual
criminosis,” he protests, “in spite of this, it is the one productive and hopeful fact of the present”
(1946, p. 486). Suggesting that the justice system be totally overhauled for greater psychological
involvement, Lindner echoes some of the claims of Fredric Wertham, who in his writing on
murder, came to some similar conclusions regarding the need for greater psychiatric involvement
in how society deals with crime.
Experts Riding the Crest of a Moral Panic: Juvenile Delinquency
In postwar America, one crime issue had been granted a unique importance: juvenile
delinquency. As the war came to a close, fears began to spread that American society was going
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through a period of change that would undermine such cherished institutions as the family,
church, and school. The youth of America was thought to be a generation out of touch with
traditional values, participating in their own shared culture to the neglect of the rest of society.
Historian James Gilbert has observed that “[w]hat happened” in the fifteen years or so after the
war “was not so much the ironic fulfillment of predictions as genuine confusion about what
changes in the behavior of youth really meant. Prepared for the worst o f new worlds, many
observers feared they had discovered its ominous silhouette in rapidly changing teenage culture”
(1986, p. 41). In the mid-1950’s, the social problem of juvenile delinquency peaked in terms of
mass media attention; films such as The Wild One (1954) and Rebel Without a Cause (1955)
dramatized the issue, while magazines and newspapers gave juvenile delinquency its most intense
coverage from roughly 1953 through 1957. And Senate hearings on juvenile delinquency were
commenced in 1953, peaking in visibility in 1955 (Gilbert, 1986, pp. 63-66).
To be sure, psychiatrists did not create the juvenile delinquency issue, though they did
play a major role in shaping how it played out in the mass media. Like World War II, juvenile
delinquency can be seen to have been a kind of opportunity for the popular experts to piggy-back
their authority onto an issue that was at the forefront of the nation’s collective attention. Though
it was not originally intended for a lay audience, Lindner’s 1944 book Rebel Without a Cause
indicated his early involvement with the issue of juvenile delinquency. The term ‘juvenile
delinquency’ serves only an ancillary function in the book; it was as much concerned with
Lindner’s demonstrations of his methodology of hypnoanalysis as it was with broader social
issues. However, when the 1955 movie of the same title, which was much more closely
associated with juvenile delinquency, was released, Lindner’s book seemed in retrospect to be a
kind of early statement on delinquency.
Rebel Without a Cause was based entirely on the case of one young recidivist criminal,
named Harold. The book was divided into 46 chapters, one for each hour of analysis that Lindner
administered to Harold. The hopes for a wider application of psychology can be noted; Lindner
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stated that he hoped the book could “present the findings of research with a type of personality
disorder that is responsible for much of crime and has broad social and even political
implications” (1944, p. xiii). He argued that Harold was a psychopath, a personality incapable of
delaying gratification, and given to aggressive reactions when gratification is blocked by others or
by the environment (1944, pp. 2-4). Lindner did offer some insights into what Harold’s situation
indicated about American civilization, indicating the “thoroughly unoriginal contention” that
“modem society provides amply for those conditions” that lead to psychopathy (1944, p. 12).
This contention was ‘unoriginal’ because it shared so much with the mass culture critique.
Lindner’s common ground with the mass culture critique can be seen even more clearly in his
concern that the “last few years have witnessed the triumphal heavy-booted march of
psychopathy not only over an entire continent but over every painfully won tenet of what we call
our civilization.” If the allusion to Nazi Germany and fascist uprisings was not clear enough
already, he added that “the psychopath is not only a criminal; he is the embryonic StormTrooper” (1944, p. 14). Lindner’s attempt to fuse a psychoanalytic outlook with a diagnosis of
mass culture would continue in his more popular work.
These themes would return again in Lindner’s Stone Walls and Men, where he mentioned
it by name and devoted a chapter to the issue. In keeping with that book’s strong animus against
jails, he argued that juvenile reformatories only fight the healthy, creative impulses that American
society has already thwarted to an unhealthy extent. To solve the problem of juvenile
delinquency, he suggested, “there must come about a general repatteming of our entire culture
which will affect the individual moral and ethical codes of all citizens” (1946, p. 369). The cause
of delinquency is located in the culture at large; this use of delinquency as a conduit through
which to critique American culture would be even more prominent in Lindner’s subsequent
writing.
As the media coverage of juvenile delinquency peaked in the mid-1950’s, so did
Lindner’s attention to delinquency. Though he published articles in popular periodicals much
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less than the other experts here under consideration, he received noticeable exposure in the
periodicals when juvenile delinquency was the tag issue. He was profiled as an expert in juvenile
delinquency expert in Time on two occasions, and wrote an extensive piece on delinquency for
McCalls. And juvenile delinquency would receive prominent attention in his later work,
especially in his last book, Must You Conform? (1956a).
Lindner fit juvenile delinquency in with an over-arching worldview that took
nonconformity as its keystone. He justified this outlook through explication of the
psychoanalytic concern for instinct and the need to get in touch with one’s inner self. In a Time
profile o f Lindner and his take on juvenile delinquency, he describes how youth had always had
problems, but the youth of the fifties differed from those who had come before because of their
proclivity “to act out, to display, [their] inner turmoil” (“Rebels or Psychopaths?,” p. 64).
Another difference in contemporary youth, he explained was “the abandonment of that solitude
which was at once the trademark of adolescence and the source of its deepest despairs as o f its
dubious ecstasies” (“Rebels or Psychpaths?,” p. 64). The real problem, he opined, was not that
youths were violating norms of behavior and flouting conformist needs for a stable society, but
that they were conforming rigidly to their own codes of behavior. They had formed into groups:
Into these mindless associations the young flock like cattle. The fee they pay for
initiation is abandonment of self and immersion in the herd.. .In the crowd, herd, or gang,
it is a mass mind that operates—a mind without subtlety, without compassion, uncivilized
(“Rebels or Psychopaths?,” p. 64).
The similarities between this point of view and the mass culture argument were by no means very
subtle.
The shading that Lindner lent to the mass culture argument was, in a sense, quite
psychoanalytic. He imputed to the human character an “instinct of rebellion” that makes each
individual seek for uniqueness and creativity in his or her life. “There is no conceivable force or
combination of forces powerful enough to root out—or even submerge—the instinct of
rebellion,” he claimed (1956b, p. 102). But if individuals are “forced into conformity,” the
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instinct of rebellion will attempt to find a modality through which to express itself. “These
pathways,” wrote Lindner, “are likely to be the negative, the reverse of those that lead toward
personal and social fulfillment” (1956b, p. 102). The psychoanalytic tone here was decidedly
played down. However, his explanatory mechanism was certainly imported from psychoanalysis,
with its emphasis on how the id and erotic drives for creativity clashed with society’s
requirements that the individual remain in line, resulting in a kind of return of the repressed as
unconscious drives create negative, unforeseen results for the individual.
A more explicitly psychoanalytic diagnosis of juvenile delinquency was offered in Must
You Conform?, where Lindner suggested that the youth of the time were so similar to
psychopaths as to “enable us to state, without equivocation, that the youth of the world today is
touched with madness, literally sick with an aberrant condition of mind formerly confined to a
few distressed souls but now epidemic over the earth” (1956b, p. 19). Reserving for the term
‘rebellion’ a positive role, he insisted that the youth were not truly rebelling, but were instead “in
a condition of downright and hostile mutiny” (1956b, p. 5). Lindner suggests different ways in
which a psychopath can come to be, noting that “the state of psychopathy is brought about by
damage to the ego, which is the keystone in the arch of personality” (1956b, p. 21). When
something harms the ego, it “exposes the latent infantilism never far below the surface in any
case, producing regression to an earlier pattern of behavior marked by the disappearance of the
attributes of maturation” (1956b, p. 21). As his instinct pushes him to rebel, and societal forces
insist on conformity, the youth “makes a compromise: he rebels within the confines of
conformity, he discharges his protest within the limits set by the social order he has by now
permitted to be erected against him” (1956b, p. 27). Again evoking images of encroaching
fascism, he states that it is that conflict that leads the youth to “become transformed into stormtrooper, blackshirt, NKVD inquisitor, guard on the long march from Corregidor, or burner of the
fiery cross” (1956b, p. 27). Having claimed juvenile delinquency for psychoanalysis in this
manner, he extends this analysis to American culture as a whole, noting that “it is not youth alone
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that has succumbed to the form of insanity we clinicians label psychopathy, but nations,
populations—indeed, the whole of mankind” (1956b, p. 19). In this manner, Lindner used
juvenile delinquency as a stepping-off point for the psychoanalysis of the entire world.
As a clinician who frequently dealt with troubled youths, Fredric Wertham did his best to
make his voice heard above the din of other experts, lawyers, and legislators in the debate over
juvenile delinquency and its causes. His strong presence in the popular periodicals of the fifties
helped him to accomplish this. Much of what he had to say was critical of the institutions that
were supposed to be preventing and combating juvenile delinquency, an anti-establishment stance
that underscored almost all of his previous and subsequent writing. For example, he called the
New York children’s court “the weakest link in the alleged fight against delinquency,” (1958b, p.
28) castigating that court in a book review in the Saturday Review for not allowing juvenile
delinquents to be sent to the kind of mental hygiene clinic that he operated. The curbing of
delinquency, he insisted, could not be carried out simply by dumping adolescents and children
into “authoritative setting[s]” (1958b, p. 28) like military schools and jails; juvenile delinquents,
he argued should be treated in a manner that befits their psychiatric problems.
In The Circle o f Guilt (1956), Wertham applied the kind of single-case-study formula he
used in Dark Legend to juvenile delinquency, attempting to reveal, thought that one case, the
societal causes of juvenile delinquency. The case he chose to examine involved one Frank
Santana, a Puerto Rican youth from New York City who stood accused of murdering Billy
Blankenship, a white juvenile. Wertham’s analysis of Santana’s actions came in the form of
advocacy for the accused boy. He diagnosed Santana as a “schizoid personality,” with a powerful
sense of inferiority and an overall “emotional detachment” (1956, pp. 53-54). So, Wertham’s
consideration of juvenile delinquency was largely psychiatric, which is, o f course, not surprising.
But Santana’s psychiatric designation as a schizoid personality was not the endpoint of the
analysis; Wertham made clear that, while personalities may arise from intra-psychological details,
Santana’s temperament “may also derive from the fact that he was starved for attention not only
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in childhood but later in adolescence as well. He may have become shut in because he was shut
out” (1956, p. 55). In this sense, Wertham is, as usual, acutely concerned with the relationship
between personality and extra-personal (sociological and political) issues; psychiatry again is
used as the home base for an unraveling of broad social issues. These social issues are made out
to be important because of their implications for the mental health of the individual.
Wertham shied away from a purely psychological consideration of juvenile delinquency.
“Delinquency is a social phenomenon which cannot be forced into a psychological definition,
however ingenious,” (1956, p. 61) he averred. To blame juvenile delinquency on psychological
quirks of the delinquent let society off easy, he argued, and insisted that “[w]e have so much
violent juvenile delinquency today not because the children are hostile but because we have failed
to give them guidance, example, protection and help” (1956, p. 62). He proceeded to analyze the
Santana case with an eye out for the factors that precipitated the formation of his schizoid
personality and led him to shoot Billy Blankenship.
To this end, Wertham demonstrated how a mental hygiene clinic could have helped
Santana, and how the inefficiency of the clinic system would have prevented his getting any help
from one (1956, p. 194). He assigns to the atomic bomb a kind of “psychological fallout” that
affects all of society, and children in particular (1956, p. 156). He faults the education system for
not doing more to teach children the immorality of violence (1956, p. 156-157). He examines
how the “adult community’s attitude against Puerto Ricans was the most potent, the most
traumatic factor in Santana’s dislocation,” affecting “all the common relationships of his life”
(1956, p. 199). At times, Wertham’s analysis closely resembles Lindner’s take on juvenile
delinquency, as when Wertham notes that Santana’s psychological impulses that led him to kill
Blankenship made it clear that “he was trying to conform.” “Essentially,” claimed Wertham,
“[Santana] is not a rebel but a conformist—a confused conformist.. .He belongs to that large
group of people who do not have the opportunity or capacity to place themselves” (1956, p. 191).
The idea of the ‘circle of guilt’ that the title of his book refers to is explained as Wertham points
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out how the community, which was largely responsible for the crime, (and, by extension, all
juvenile delinquency) applied a “lynch spirit” (1956, p. 198) to the trial of Santana, resulting in a
vicious circle of violence. And when Santana was given a lesser charge, “this lynch spirit had
been frustrated,” so that Billy Blankenship, the victim of the crime, was posthumously vilified.
Concluded Wertham: “this vicious circle is typical of the community’s attitude in general to the
current violence in juvenile delinquency” (1956, p. 198).
Though The Circle o f Guilt found Wertham making some statements that seemed, at
most, obliquely related to psychiatry, it must be reiterated that he still placed psychiatry at the
center of his analysis. While admitting that psychiatry “is not and cannot be the whole answer to
delinquency,” he insisted that “it has important contributions to make.” If this necessitated a new
psychiatry, one that was flexible enough to handle the social part of the equation, Wertham was
happy to oblige, noting that “[w]e [psychiatrists] no longer proceed only from a patient’s
symptoms or single acts; we study the whole general evolution of the case” (1956, p. 81). While
using the word ‘we’ to establish himself as a part of psychiatry, he simultaneously changes what
this ‘we’ refers to, painting a picture of his profession that portrays this foray into the social realm
as something coterminous with professional dictates and, just as importantly, as the responsible
thing for psychiatry to do.
Wertham Takes on the Comic Books
Wertham’s psychiatric writings on juvenile delinquency frequently involved criticism of
the mass media. This was, by no means, unique to him. Many of the lay and expert
commentators on juvenile delinquency in the forties and fifties blamed the problem on the mass
media, including comic books, film, pulp novels, and television (Gilbert, 1986). Wertham was
outspoken on the issue of how the mass media related to juvenile delinquency. Specifically, he
emphasized the effect of comic books on juvenile delinquency; he unleashed an all-out media
blitz in the name of this issue. As was the case with juvenile delinquency, comic books were an
issue of public discussion and mass media coverage before Wertham addressed them. In the early
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1940’s, commentators began to criticize comics for their vulgarity; it was thought that comic
books were undermining a young generation’s sense of aesthetic beauty. For several years, the
issue of the comic books played out mostly in terms of taste and literacy.
Most of these relatively unconnected criticisms of the comics lacked the expertise that
Wertham was to bring to the issue, and they rarely made the kinds of explicit links between
comics and juvenile delinquency that Wertham would assert. And, significantly, it was not until
Wertham engaged the comic book debate that the issue came to the forefront of the American
scene. A profile piece in Time showcased Wertham’s concern for the comics, making clear his
concern that they caused juvenile delinquency. Wertham was quoted as saying “[y]ou cannot
understand present-day juvenile delinquency if you do not take into account the pathogenic and
pathoplastic influence of the comic books” (“Puddles of Blood,” p. 68).
But the first Wertham-penned essay written for a lay audience was to appear just after the
Time profile, in The Saturday Review o f Literature in May of 1948. Credited as “Fredric
Wertham, M.D.” for an essay entitled “The Comics...Very Funny!,” Wertham began the piece
with the stoiy of a mother whose four-year-old daughter had been repeatedly assaulted by
neighborhood boys. He then provides a list of other such incidents involving juvenile
delinquency, finding comics responsible for all of them. “The common denominator” to explain
such violence, claimed Wertham, “is comic books” (1948a, p. 6). He continues, and provides a
kind of repartee between arguments used to defend the comics and his own point of view,
purporting to refute the comic book apologists at every turn, and presenting a psychiatric case for
the causal connection between comic book-reading and juvenile delinquency. He concluded by
noting his own extensive research into the comics, pointing out that
[m]y own clinical studies and those of my associates of the Lafargue Clinic, the first
carried out independently from the comic-book industry, and the first leading to their
condemnation, have convinced me that comic books represent systematic poisoning of
the well of childhood spontaneity. Many children themselves feel guilty about reading
them (1948a, p. 29).
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Throughout the article, Wertham emphasizes specific cases of juvenile delinquency and examples
of comic book violence, eschewing the professional language of psychiatry. The article
crystallized a set of suspicions about comic books. As a professionally-authored piece by a
psychiatrist who emphasized his direct contact with cases of comic books’ effects on children and
explicitly linked comic books to the juvenile delinquency problem that had been like a gathering
storm, it was an important spur to further interest in the connection between comics and juvenile
delinquency in many quarters.
A subsequent Wertham article, again for the Saturday Review o f Literature, on comic
books, was prefaced with a comment from the Review editors, who pointed out that “The
Comics. ..Very Funny!” had
set off a chain-reaction that is still in motion. Today, eight months later, letters offering
help in combatting [sic] the comic-book menace continue to pour into the offices of SRL
and Dr. Wertham. Extracts of the article have been reprinted in scores of newspapers in
the U.S. and Canada. Condensations were printed by The Reader’s Digest in its domestic
and five of its foreign editions. ‘The Comics... Very Funny! ’ was the first magazine
article to be discussed on ‘The Author Meets the Critic,’ an NBC radio and television
show ordinarily devoted to books (1949c, p. 7).
The note then goes on to point out that, after the article was published, “measures were taken” by
law enforcement organizations and police departments across America, and various parentteacher organizations “staged drives” (1949c, p. 7).
The increased attention that was given to the comic books and their alleged connection to
juvenile delinquency led comic book publishers to organize and create a kind of self-regulatory
code for comic book content in late 1948. This code, it was hoped, would assuage the concerns
about the shocking comics. Though it is an exaggeration to state that Wertham’s writings directly
led to the comic book industry’s first code, Wertham was the most prominent of the experts
writing on comic books, and his publicly stated opinions became the focal point of a growing
movement to change the comics.
But Wertham found the 1948 code to be totally inadequate, and he continued to write
about the comics for lay audiences. He used the same emphasis on juvenile delinquency as a
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psychiatric effect of the comics as could be found in his essays before the code. The magnum
opus o f Wertham’s take on the comic books, the book Seduction o f the Innocent, was published in
1954. Seduction o f the Innocent involved an extensive psychiatric exposition of the comic book
issue, finding Wertham reiterating arguments he had used in earlier essays (including one chapter
that had previously appeared in Ladies ’ Home Journal), reformulating prior positions, and
offering new insights regarding the effects of comic books on children.
Wertham’s critique of comic books in Seduction o f the Innocent begins with his
description o f how,
[s]lowly, and at first reluctantly, I have come to the conclusion that this chronic
stimulation, temptation and seduction by comic books, both their content and their
alluring advertisements of knives and guns, are contributing factors to many children’s
maladjustment (1954a, p. 10).
Beginning with a focused description of the different kinds of crime comic books and the kinds of
violent entertainment they offer, he finds that few comics (if any) fail to harm their juvenile
readership. Not surprisingly, he finds effects that he defines largely from a psychiatric outlook.
A central feature in Wertham’s list of comic books’ effects includes what he called “comic-book
syndrome” (1954a, p. 114). This syndrome involves certain distinct features, including:
1) The child feels spontaneously guilty about reading the violent, sadistic and criminal
stories, and about fantasies stimulated by them. 2) He is made to feel guilty about them
by others. 3) He reads them surreptitiously. 4) He lies and says he does not read crime
comics, but only [funny animal comic books]...5) He buys comic books with money
which he is supposed to use for something else, or he steals to get comic-book money
(1954a, p. 114).
This kind of cycle of guilt is stipulated as a cognitive effect on the child.
But the “most subtle and pervading effect of crime comics on children,” he explained,
was “moral disarmament,” or a
blunting of the finer feelings of conscience, of mercy, o f sympathy for other people’s
suffering and of respect for women as women and not merely as sex objects to be bandied
around or as luxury prizes to be fought over (1954a, pp. 90-91).
This effect results from children’s desire to find “a figure to emulate and follow,” (1954a, p. 94)
and finding it in comic books. Dipping lightly into professional terminology, he notes that “the
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development of the superego, of conscience or, more simply, the sense of decency” (1954a, p.
100) involves more than just exposure to parental attitudes; the surrounding culture also provides
figures of identification. When children read comic books, he reasons, they are given characters
who are terrible objects of identification. When they identify with Superman and other
superheroes, for instance, they are fed a kind of quasi-fascist ideology in which might makes
right, giving them the idea that “ruthless go-getting based on physical strength or the power o f
weapons or machines is the desirable way to behave” (1954a, p. 97) In a converse formulation,
the child audience is given very negative stereotypes of non-white races, leading them not to
identify with these groups and perpetuating negative attitudes toward these groups (1954a, p.
101).

Wertham spells out the identification at work when children read comic books through
recourse to the psychiatric divide between conscious and unconscious, stipulating that “conscious
imitation is only a small part of the psychological process initialed by comics reading” (1954a, p.
116). More important, he claimed, was “a kind of subconscious imitation called identification”
(1954a, p. 116). Explaining this identification, he notes that the child reader enjoys reading about
what superheroes do, and in so doing, gets
emotionally stirred and identifies himself with the figure that is active, successful,
dominates a situation and satisfies an instinct.. .He looks for the same sensation again and
becomes conditioned to identify himself with the same type that stimulates him to seek
and satisfy the same pleasure again (1954a, p. 116).
And, because the objects of identification in the comics “invariably commit violent acts,” (1954a,
p. 117) these acts are eventually carried out in some way by the child audience. Wertham
emphasizes the importance of the fact that comics were so widespread and popular, stating that
“[w]hen we level a constant barrage of crime and violence at young children, it leads them
inevitably to preoccupation with these subjects” (1954a, p. 117). And the more hostility exists in
the child’s environment, he argued, the more likely the child would be to “show identifications
with people who fight each other as they do in comic books” (1954a, p. 117). That the
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identifications that comics provided could be linked to juvenile delinquency, Wertham had no
doubt. He proclaimed that “[i]f one were to set out to show children how to steal, rob, lie, cheat,
assault and break into houses, no better method could be devised” (1954a, p. 157). “Our
researchers,” concluded Wertham, “have proved that there is a significant correlation between
crime-comics reading and the more serious forms of juvenile delinquency” (1954a, p. 164). And
to support this, he produced a laundry list of shocking crime comics.
In what might seem, prima facie, to be a non-psychiatric assertion, Wertham imputed to
comics a kind of power of anti-literacy. “Comic books are death on reading,” he claimed (1954a,
p. 121). But this power of comic books to destroy reading is located in their effects on the brain,
and the power to address this problem is located largely in psychiatry. Wertham insists that
scientific understanding of reading disorders requires a knowledge of the research done
on reading during the last few decades, of brain pathology, of the modem psychological
tests—general, projective and special reading tests—a psychiatric understanding of
children, and a concrete acquaintance with the social conditions of children and the
educational process that affects them (1954a, p. 123).
After a review of his own experience in applying these points of view to the children he has seen
in clinics, he discuses how the comics relate to reading problems. Much of the effect, he relates,
can be found in the way that comic books disrupt the acquisition of “left-to-right eye movements”
that he holds to be crucial to the maintenance of reading habits (1954a, p. 127). Other ways in
which comics undermine reading habits are blamed on the poor layouts of comics (1954a, p.
139). And Wertham resented the fact that parents and teachers believed that comic book reading
could lead to book reading; the real effect, he argued, was the exact opposite. Even the comic
books that allegedly reproduce the classics of literature, he argued, provided nothing more than a
thin veil of literate appeal to hide their violent core (1954a, pp. 141-143). “Shakespeare and the
child are corrupted at the same time,” he laments (1954a, p. 143). Finally, it should be noted that
Wertham tied the argument that comics caused and enhanced illiteracy to the over-riding concern
for juvenile delinquency, calling attention to the “high correlation between delinquency and
reading disorders” (1954a, p. 136).
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Violence and crime in comic books were not Wertham’s only concern in Seduction o f the
Innocent-, he also voiced criticism of what he considered to be the “morbid” and “crude”
portrayals that sexuality received in the comics, (1954a, p. 174) noting that comic books often
dealt at least obliquely with sexual themes, and consistently represented women’s bodies in
particular in sexually suggestive ways (1954a, p. 178). This was the wrong way to introduce
children to sex, Wertham argued, deeming it “fetichism” and asserting that it would lead to
fetishism in the audience, even as they matured into adulthood. Another effect of the comics
Wertham alluded to was homosexuality, which he considered to be a likely result of exposure to
comic books such as Batman (with its focus on the relationship of Batman and Robin) and
Wonder Woman (with her all-female entourage). “[Stimulation and reinforcement” of
homosexuality was the suggested result of such content (1954a, p. 191).
But “the keynote of the comic books’ sexual message,” Wertham maintained, “drummed
into children from a tender age on, is the admixture of sensuality with cruelty. The illustrations
are, as the Art Digest called them, ‘perverted’” (1954a, p. 178). Wertham provided an
exploration of how sex and violence were blended in the comics, finding a whole range of
putatively sadistic imagery, and concluding that “the sensualized brutality of crime comic books
leads not infrequently to a connection between the thrill of suspense and that of sexual arousal—a
kind of anxiety stimulation” (1954a, p. 184). “[S]ex fears of all kinds,” he claimed, were the
result of comic books (1954a, p. 185). Moreover, comic books “do their share in laying the
psychological groundwork” for prostitution (1954a, p. 186).
Wertham also analyzed the advertisements in comic books. He argued that the ads in the
comics, for products such as breast enlargers and acne creams, undermined youths’ confidence in
themselves. Wertham again took as a starting point the idea that adolescents suffer from
considerable self-consciousness. The ads were alleged to have exacerbated these already
overpitched concerns to the point where they could cause serious emotional trauma. Wertham
mused, “No better method could be evolved to cause such worries or to aggravate them than the
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advertising in childrens’ comic books” (1954a, p. 197). Other ads, he was quick to note,
promoted knives, guns, and other weapons to the point where they practically invited juvenile
delinquency.
As Wertham’s earliest writings on the comic books had spurred the comic book industry
to ‘come clean,’ his continued publication of articles and leadership in the movement against
comic books (culminating in Seduction o f the Innocent) no doubt played a large part in prompting
the U.S. Senate subcommittee that investigated juvenile delinquency to consider the impact of
comic books. This Senate subcommittee was commonly called the Kefauver subcommittee, after
Senator Estes Kefauver, though Robert Hendrickson was the subcommittee’s chairman.1
Wertham played a prominent role in the hearings. Most importantly, it was Wertham’s thesis that
juvenile delinquency could be understood largely as a result of the influence of comic books, that
led to the investigation in the first place. Additionally, Wertham assisted Kefauver as he drew up
plans for how to execute the hearings (Nyberg, 1994, p. 355).
The Kevauver comic book hearings were a major opportunity for Wertham. Not only did
he have an inroad to change as a prominent witness, but because the hearings were televised and
watched around the country, he also had a chance to take his message to his largest audience yet.
From the outset, the hearings were framed in terms that owed a clear debt to Wertham’s writings.
In his opening remarks, Hendrickson claimed as the goal of the subcommittee “to find out what
damage, if any, is being done to our children’s minds by certain types of publications which
contain a substantial degree o f sadism, crime, and horror” (U.S. Congress, 1954, p. 1). The
concern, claimed Hendrickson, was to find out “why more and more of our youngsters steal
automobiles, turn to vandalism, commit holdups, or become narcotic addicts” (U.S. Congress,

1 Kefavuer, a Democrat from Tennessee, was the prime mover behind the Congressional investigation of
juvenile delinqency (Gorman, 1971, pp. 196-197). No doubt, he would have chaired the subcommittee had
his party controlled the Senate in 1954. Because the Republicans controlled the Senate, Robert
Hendrickson, a Republican from New Jersey, was named as chairman. Kevauver did chair the
subcommittee to investigate juvenile delinquency in 1955, after Democrats won control of the Senate in the
1954 Election (Gilbert, 1986, p. 149).
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1954, p. 2). Clearly, Wertham’s idea of a link between comic books and juvenile delinquency
played a large role in motivating these hearings.
Wertham’s testimony as a witness at the hearings contained few surprises. He walked the
subcommittee through most o f his main points, frequently using the same wordings and
phraseology as he had in Seduction o f the Innocent and in previous periodical articles. He
maintained his emphasis on crime comics, positing that “if it were my task.. .to teach children
delinquency.. .1 would have to enlist the crime comic books industry” (U.S. Congress, 1954, p.
87). And he used the same idea of “ethical confusion” to flesh out the kind of effect he had found
in youths who read comic books (U.S. Congress, 1954, p. 86). He also dedicated some of his
testimony to explain the “Superman effect,” (U.S. Congres, 1954, p. 86) in which comics that
portray super-human characters impress on children the value of power over the value of ethics or
democracy, resulting in a kind of quasi-fascist ideology of might makes right. Additionally,
Wertham explained to the subcommittee his arguments that the comics’ racist stereotypes
engendered racist attitudes in children, that the layout of comic books was anathema to good
reading skills, and that the ads in comic books made weapons available to children and
exacerbated the juvenile audience’s insecurities (U.S. Congress, 1954, pp. 87-89).
The findings of the Kefauver comic book hearings could, in a way, be seen as a partial
vindication of Wertham’s efforts to convince others of comics’ effects on children. A summary
report penned by Kefauver stated these findings in definitive terms, and Wertham’s testimony can
be detected as a major influence on them. Most of the conclusions regarding the relationship
between comic book reading and juvenile delinquency were taken straight from Wertham’s
testimony, making it clear that Wertham was the accepted authority on the comic books. One of
the conclusions, that “techniques of crime are taught by crime and horror comics,” quotes
Wertham’s testimony, and refers to him as “the first psychiatrist to call attention of the American
people to crime and horror comics” (U.S. Congress, 1955, p. 14). The next conclusion, that
“criminal careers are glamorized in crime and horror comic books,” rigidly follows Wertham’s
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logic regarding the issue, wherein comic books are seen as seducing a child with pleasurable
images of crime. Moreover, Kefauver incorporated Wertham’s critique of the comics’
‘superman’-ideology, and quoted him extensively in so doing. Wertham’s concern for the
unhealthy effects of advertisements is also absorbed in the interim report. Kefauver even uses the
Wertham-derived label of “hired apologists” to apply to the academics who maintained any
official affiliation with the comic book industry and defended the comics during the
subcommittee hearings (U.S. Congress, 1955, p. 15).
Clearly, Wertham spoke with authority at the Kefauver comic book hearings. But he was
not the only one to influence the conclusions of the Kefauver hearings. The comic book
industry’s interests were also taken into account. Kefauver concluded that
[t]he subcommittee believe that the American people have a right to expect that the
comic-book industry should shoulder the major responsibility for seeing to it that the
comic books placed so temptingly before our Nation’s children at every comer newsstand
are clean, decent, and fit to be read by children. This grave responsibility rests squarely
on every segment of the comic-book industry. No one engaged in any phase of this vast
operation—from the artists and authors to the newsstand dealers, from the pubilsher to
printer to distributor to the wholesaler—can escape some measure of responsibility (U.S.
Congress, 1955, p. 27).
Here a subtle transformation can be seen at work. Moving away from academic notions of media
effects of the kind Wertham had offered, and instead relying on a belief in “clean, decent”
material to guide him, Kefauver puts the “burden” of self-regulation on the shoulders of the
comic book industry, and in particular, on the comic book distributors. Though this “grave
responsibility” was made to appear weighty and cumbersome, there is little doubt that this was
exactly what many industry representatives were gunning for all along.
The resulting self-regulatory code, the CMAA (the Comics Magazine Association of
America) comic book code, was first put into effect in the fall o f 1954. It was particularly hard
on crime comics and horror comics, but was more lenient with the comics that hewed more
closely to the “clean, decent” line that Kefauver had drawn. Certainly, some of Wertham’s ideas
inspired various requirements of the self-regulatory code. His concern that crime was being
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portrayed in a glamorous light, in a manner that detailed the methods of crime while showing
disrespect for existing authorities such as policemen and government institutions, was mirrored
by Comic Code provisions. Specifically, provisions required that comic books “shall never be
presented in such a way as to create sympathy for the criminal,” that “no comics shall explicitly
present the unique details and methods of a crime,” and that proper respect for “established
authority” be maintained (as quoted in U.S. Congress, 1955, p. 36). Other provisions regarding
the use of advertisements in comic books prohibited the use of ads for certain weapons and
‘health’ products; of course, Wertham had been fighting exactly those ads for years.
But by no means does this indicate that Wertham was the only influence on the format of
the Comic Book Code. As Amy Kiste Nyberg (1994, 1998) has pointed out, the Code bears a
striking resemblance to earlier codes for mass media content. When taking both Wertham’s ideas
and the other codes into consideration, the CMAA Comic Book Code looks like a way for the
comic book industry to have modeled its code on earlier codes that had successfully staved off
outside regulation, while still appearing to react to current concerns, through its use of Wertham’s
concerns. That a kind of industry-friendly self regulation, the action that Wertham wanted to
avoid, was the pre-ordained method of solving the problem can be surmised from the fact that, of
the witnesses who testified at the Kefauver hearings, the majority of them represented the comic
book industry.
Wertham felt strongly that all comics were bad for children, but, as he made clear in his
criticism of the earlier comic book code in 1948 and in his testimony at the Kefavuer hearings, he
did not support censorship of the comics. He was dismayed by the CMAA Comic Book Code
that emerged from the hearings, proclaiming that “all promises of self-regulation on the part of
the publisher o f comic books have been empty, with the latest publicity stunt of a ‘czar’ [the title
for the Code’s chief administrator] and a new ‘code’ no exception” (1955, p. 613). In a much
later interview, after his name had become indelibly linked with the Comic Book code, Wertham
explained, “[c]ensorship is not the answer, it is not even the question...I wasn’t censoring comic
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books; I was merely suggesting control of what is directly and suggestively exposed and offered
to children who are young” (Hewetson & Wertham, 1989, p. 84).
What Wertham did not seem to anticipate was his part in the drama. Though he may
have been recognized as an authority (even perhaps as the authority) on the topic of comic books
and their effects on children, that did not empower him to dictate policy to the government or the
comic book industry. As Bourdieu remarks, intellectuals, such as Wertham, are “a dominated
fraction of the dominant class,” possessing the “power and privileges” that come with their
cultural capital, but “dominated in their relations with those who hold political and economic
power” (1990, p. 145). Wertham’s professional expertise was enough to get him a seat at the
Kefauver hearings, but he was still a long ways off from being able to dictate policy. His ideas
were hitched to a script that contradicted his own assumptions regarding the workings of comic
books. His ire at the Comic Book Code and at those who had been involved in creating it sheds a
light on many of his earlier writings, in which he criticized the law’s regard for the mentally ill or
the government’s ineptitude in enacting a more thorough program of mental hygiene for children.
In the case of the comic books, his expertise had gained him entrde to a debate he could not
control, just as his role as a consulting psychiatrist had allowed him in to courtrooms, but
muzzled his powers to truly affect the outcome of a case. Though his lack of dominance in these
arenas is not necessarily surprising, it does help to explain Wertham’s reformist zeal. In many
ways, his reach as a popular expert was always beyond his grasp as a reformer.
“The World Has Run Amuck”: Crisis Rhetoric at Work
Reformist zeal was not unique to Wertham; it can also be detected (though it is perhaps
less focused) in Robert Lindner’s popular writings. Indeed, as we have seen, popular psychiatry
and psychoanalysis in general had expressed differentially-inflected programs of change.
However, Wertham and Lindner’s writing exemplified a specific kind of rhetorical move that
positioned their own authority as the only bulwark against certain doom. If progress could not be
achieved, their arguments implied, at least disaster could be averted, if only the world could adopt
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their understanding of a given social problem. This crisis rhetoric, as I am referring to it, acted as
a way of framing the psychological consideration of the world By stressing the notion that there
was a grave social problem that was quickly reaching terrible proportions, Lindner and Wertham
made their psychoanalytic and psychiatric expertise out to be the only ways to stave off a true
disaster. 1 should emphasize that I am not suggesting that Wertham and Lindner were the only
experts to deal with social problems, or to offer professional routes of escape from those
problems. As we have seen, that angle had been played by other experts as well; it can be hard to
imagine popular professional writing lacking this dynamic of writing a profession into the drama
of a social problem. Wertham and Lindner, however, used this strategy more clearly and
consistently than the other professionals examined here; they were almost always in crisis mode.
The first component of the crisis rhetoric, the claim that there was a problem of colossal
proportions, perhaps capable of wiping out the world as humankind has known it, can be found
throughout Lindner’s writing. Frequently, the crisis was made out to be a sudden kind of
blossoming of doom, as when Lindner declared that
[ujntil quite recently.. .the rebellion of youth could be viewed with the detachment
usually accorded anything so common and neutral. The brute fact today is that our youth
is no longer in rebellion, but in a condition of downright active and hostile mutiny.
Within the memory of every living adult, a profound and terrifying change has overtaken
adolescence (“Rebels or Psychopaths?,” p. 64).
Though he was a lay analyst and lacked any medical expertise, Lindner used medical metaphors
of contagion to explain the spread of juvenile delinquency. The youth of the time, he proclaims,
was “sick with an aberrant condition of mind formerly confined to a few distressed souls but now
epidemic over the earth” (“Rebels or Psychopaths?,” p. 64). The magnitude of the problem, the
idea that this was a crisis, was driven home as he made the juvenile delinquency problem out to
be just a part of the dilemma, claiming that “it is not youth alone that has succumbed to
psychopathy, but nations, populations—indeed, the whole of mankind. The world, in short, has
run amuck” (“Rebels or Psychopaths?,” p. 64). Elsewhere, he notes how “.. .the supra-individual
we call society, has grown so huge and so terrible in its might that the mind of man is staggered
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before it” (1956a, p. 157). Accusing other professionals and social sciences of neglecting the
needs of man, he deems their collective effort to be
an error which, if allowed to run its course, will one day send the species into the
evolutionary shadows. There it will not matter if it expires with the bang and boom of
farewell in an atomic or H-bomb holocaust, or with the whimper of exhaustion and decay
(1953, p. 4).
Elsewhere, Lindner intones that the “way we are traveling is down, down like a falling leaf on a
windless day, a spiral of history dictated by the invariable physics of our nature” (1953, p. 144).
At every turn, Lindner was made clear what the results of ignoring his perspective would be:
total chaos and even the end of the world. The reader was presented with a choice: heed his
concerns, or sit idly by while Armageddon arrived.
The emphasis here was intensely present-oriented; the problems were held to be
something new and out of control. “[T]hese are the days of pack-running, of predatory assembly,
of organization into great collectivities that bury, if they do not destroy, individuality,” (1956a, p.
11) explained Lindner, in another claim that no such thing had ever been seen. He notes that “[i]f
anything can be said to characterize the time we are living in, it is the extreme tension that exists
between the individual and his society. The pitch to which this tension has risen is something
new in history” (1956a, p. 149).
Wertham’s assertions of crisis were less impassioned than Lindner’s. However, they did
occupy a privileged space in his writing. A crisis would act as the motivating exigency in most of
his popular writings. In Seduction o f the Innocent, for example, he creates the sense that America
was moving into a new era when he notes that “[u]p to the beginning of the comic-book era there
were hardly any serious crimes such as murder by children under twelve” (1954a, p. 155). The
Show o f Violence and Dark Legend both addressed murder. While the importance of murder may
be largely self-evident, Wertham nevertheless found ways to nuance his message to grant it a kind
of novelty and sense of urgency. He took unsolved murders as a special case, something that
psychiatry could help explain, proffering that
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[u]nsolved—at any rate, officially unsolved—murders may be as significant historically
as solved cases. Sometimes they are even more significant. They are just like the dog in
the Sherlock Holmes story who became a clue just because he did not bark (1949a, p.
254).
He also asserted that juvenile delinquency was on the rise, and was becoming more vicious.
“[Njowadays,” he wrote,
(although many people writing and talking about child guidance do not seem to know it)
children get viciously beaten by other children. They even are tortured or killed. Such
violence (although it is convenient to say it was ‘always so’) is something entirely new
(1956, p. 147)
And in A Sign fo r Cain, after years of writing as a psychiatric expert on juvenile delinquency,
Wertham described how
[ajlmost two decades ago, observing the trend during my clinical work, I predicted that
more and more brutal violence would be committed by younger and younger age groups.
This was met with disbelief. Today it is common knowledge among those dealing
professionally with these problems (1966, p. 270).
So, Wertham did engage in some of the kind of crisis rhetoric as Lindner. More specifically,
what one can see here is how Wertham distanced himself from other unnamed experts in his
proclamations of doom. A kind of Cassandra-like image is invoked, as he describes how others
have ignored his warnings in the past and continue to do so. The ability to foretell the crisis is
itself played off as a part of his authority.
But of greater importance in Wertham’s writing was a kind of crisis of morality that he
found everywhere he looked. “One can, of course, close one’s eyes to the trend of increasing and
ever more brutal youthful violence,” he wrote, giving his audience the option of either agreeing
with him or of buying into the “clichd that juvenile violence has always been with us...” (1966, p.
270). The act of realizing that there was a crisis was suggested as a kind of moral choice between
willful ignorance and enlightened expertise. Elsewhere, Wertham invites the audience to take
‘society’ to task for its ignorance, to reverse the crisis of an ignorance that afflicts the entire
society. Concerning the issue of unsolved murder, he asks, “What about society’s sense of guilt?
One has only to look over the uncounted number of unsolved murders to realize how lightly they
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are taken” (1956, p. 252). He laments society’s inability to care for its members, recalling how
“[w]hen a poor bookseller in my neighborhood had his head bashed in a few years ago, there was
much less ado about it than there would have been if a first edition had been stolen” (1956, p.
253). The sense of crisis here, again, pairs a blossoming social problem, like murder, with
widespread apathy.
Wertham was positioning his authority in his descriptions of crises. By writing himself
into a narrative in which he was taking on society’s ignorance and immorality, he was asserting
his own expertise and morality. By taking society as a kind of negative essence, an opposite from
which he could push himself away, he was casting himself again as a kind of Cassandra, knowing
the truth but doomed to live in a world where few would heed his call. Of course, this narrative
invited the audience to join him in his expertise, to strike out against society. Lindner’s crisis
rhetoric lacked the same directness that Wertham used when posing these oppositions, but
nevertheless implied the same opposition between authority and society. In this sense, both
Wertham and Lindner hinged their crisis rhetoric around their claimed status as outsiders.
But perhaps more central to the phenomenon of crisis rhetoric was the idea, implicitly or
explicitly stated, that the expert’s advice was to be ignored only at great cost. By stating that a
given social problem, such as murder or juvenile delinquency, had arrived abruptly and was of
grave import, Wertham and Lindner justified their involvement in such affairs. They cast their
own psychiatric and psychoanalytic perspectives as bulwarks against society’s almost certain
doom. This allowed them to defuse (in the name o f ‘emergency’) any concerns that they were
over-stepping their (professionally-defined) bounds as they applied their professional
backgrounds to almost everything in sight. There was no time for quibbling, they seemed to say,
for any delay in addressing these problems with their own modes of expertise would mean death
to individuals, and perhaps to society as well.
Against the World
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The assertion of professional authority did not occur in a vacuum. Psychiatry and
psychoanalysis were not the only disciplines staking claim to social problems in the 1950’s, nor
were the experts that I am analyzing the only representatives of their professions to do so. It was
a crowded field. In part because of this, Wertham and Lindner both set aside great amounts of
their popular writing for attacks and criticisms of other experts, other professions, and even their
own professions. As with crisis rhetoric, the criticism o f other experts and professions could be
detected in the work of the Menningers and of Strecker. However, the emphasis on criticism that
can be found in Wertham and Lindner’s work is dramatically greater than that of the others. It
was a major factor in how Wertham and Lindner established what I refer to as a heterodox
professional appeal. To be sure, there were reasons that Wertham and Lindner blanketed their
prose with a thick layer of criticism of others; the strategy can be related to their positions in the
fields of their professions, and to the position of psychiatry and psychoanalysis in the professional
field generally. But first, let me turn to the discourse itself.
Wertham took on a wide array of professions in his popular writings. In his early
writings, many of them concerning murder and how mental illness is handled by the law, perhaps
the most frequent recipient of his criticism was the legal profession and the legal system. In The
Show o f Violence, he explains how insanity is “a purely legal term,” lacking any medical logic
and that “[tjhere is no disease called insanity” (1949a, p. 15). A conflict between legal and
medical perspectives and interests defines much of Wertham’s standpoint; his criticism of the
legal profession was made on medical grounds. The perspective was maintained when he
discussed how a defense lawyer in a murder trial wanted Wertham to promise that he would not
find the defendant sane. Holding aloft his scientific orientation, Wertham noted how he
“explained to him as best I could that I had to examine the man first and give my opinion
afterward,” (1949a, p. 97) a purely professional explanation that dumbfounded the lawyer.
Elsewhere he mocked a judge whose rather vapid statement that a defendant should be dealt with
harshly because his “personality is permeated with psychosexual habits of thought and conduct.”
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Wertham’s retort asked, “What would the judge think if he learned that he also (and all other
human beings) is ‘permeated with psycho-sexual’ thought” (1949c, p. 8). An article about
Wertham from 1949 explained that,
[although Dr. Wertham always exhibits commendable compassion and deep
understanding for the under-privileged murderer and his innocent victim, he has only
scorn and ridicule for the experts of the law and the mind who sit in judgment on their
less fortunate men (Hitzig, 1949, p. 9).
This was an accurate assessment of the anti-expert dynamic that could be found in Wertham’s
writing about the legal system.
Lunacy commissions—groups of experts called together to advise a court of law
regarding the sanity or insanity of a defendant—took a particularly prominent place in Wertham’s
criticism. Lunacy commissions were often agglomerations of professionals from psychiatric,
medical, and legal backgrounds. So, by taking them on, Wertham could distance himself from
his own profession while castigating the legal system. One of his lengthier descriptions of a
lunacy commission mocked the way the proceedings were marred by a bizarre juxtaposition of
informal chit-chat and professional jargon. “If human lives had not been at stake,” recalled
Wertham, “it would have been an amusing caricature” (1949a, p. 140). Elsewhere, Wertham
contrasted his own deep concern with the case at hand with the way other members of the
commission went on vacation or took a cruise (1949a, p. 141).
The inadequacy of the lunacy commission to perform even the most basic task relevant to
psychiatry or the law is repeatedly stressed, as when Wertham notes that the commission’s final
report states that their inability to interrogate the defendant himself should be noted “in passing.”
He mocked this as a “a classic” example of what lunacy commissions were all about (1949a, p.
142). The chairman o f the lunacy commission, Wertham related, wrote an article about the case
for a law review, that article, “dry as dust, old-fashioned and unprogressive, copiously quoting
from legal authorities, indicated that [the defendant] was legally sane,” though Wertham found
him to be unequivocally insane from the legal standpoint (1949a, p. 144). Musing on a separate
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incidence of what he found to be the diffidence and ineptitude o f the commission, Wertham
concluded that “[m]aybe instead of spending so much of the taxpayers’ money on the medico
legal responsibility of individual culprits, it would be better to study the sense of responsibility of
the experts” (1949a, p. 158). This barbed statement about ‘experts’ was aimed at lawyers,
psychiatrists, and doctors on lunacy commissions, and, more broadly, at the legal system that
created such commissions. Wertham retained this critical perspective on lawyers and (especially)
the legal system through A Sign fo r Cain, where he remarked on the handling of cases involving
putatively insane defendants that, “[i]n no other area of the administration of justice is there so
much injustice, so much confusion, and so much flouting of scientific and moral principles on a
large scale” (1966, p. 231).
But it was not just legal experts such as lawyers and judges whom Wertham had chosen
as targets for his indignation. He aimed, more broadly, at the government and America’s system
of dealing with the mentally ill, using his psychiatric expertise as a cudgel, as when he complains
that “legislators...and child-care agencies have taken up the question [of alcoholism] belatedly”
(1966, p. 49). Many of his writings on the prevention of murder take the overall system to task,
like when he tells the story of Mary, a woman who attempted to kill her children, in The Show o f
Violence. Reviewing thoroughly the problems Mary had encountered in holding onto some kind
of stability and mental health, he concludes that “Mary’s type and personality should been spotted
somewhere along the way,” a statement he aims at the state welfare system and the mental
hygiene agencies, (as quoted in “Wertham on Murder,” 1949, p. 52). A similar murder case ends
with Wertham noting that he has “had occasions to talk about such cases and problems to high
officials who had the power to decide and act. I have looked for faces and found only masks.
And masks have no ears” (1949a, p. 94). Another case finds Wertham deploring the authorities,
opining that the “ ‘highest levels’ (as the Army puts it) who decide such cases communicate with
one another only by telephone, if at all,” alleging that these authorities rarely see fit to care about
the crucial details of individual cases, and reserving the greatest blame for the police (1949a, p.
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204). And in The Circle o f Guilt, he describes how difficult it is for a consulting psychiatrist to
see a prisoner in jail, finding the rules for such consultations—created by the “triarchy” o f the
court, the district attorney, and the correction authorities—to be negligent of the needs of the
prisoners (1956, p. 19). The Circle o f Guilt provides ample demonstrations of Wertham’s
struggles with the public agencies, whom he claimed dodged all responsibility of the case of
murder under examination, insisting that the problem was too complicated to blame any one
agency, an “over-simplification” that Wertham would not accept (1956, p. 67). And, finally, in
Seduction o f the Innocent, he takes aim at reformatories, prisons, and even the U.S. Congress,
which he blamed for ignoring the needs of children before and during the Kefauver hearings.
Asserting that the legislators involved in the comic book hearings had been manipulated by the
comic book industry, Wertham remarked that the hearings “demonstrated not only the link
between politics and crime, but also the link between politics and crime investigation” (1954a, p.
346).
Wertham also made clear his disapproval for sociology, distancing himself from that
profession’s often quantitative findings, many of which were used during the debates over the
comic books to indicate that comic books were not much of a threat. In Seduction o f the
Innocent, he derided the work of the sociologists and education experts who published articles
that defended comics in a professional journal, remarking that “[tjheir special pleading in the
guise of ‘dispassionate scrutiny’ represented an all time low in American science. But as
publicity for comic books these issues [of the journals] were well-timed and immensely
successful” (1954a, p. 220). Elsewhere, he mocked the methods of sociologists, asserting that
their results only created a smokescreen that prevented getting to the real causes o f delinquency,
averring that with the desire to single out exact causes of delinquency (as sociologists attempted)
results in “scientific-sounding writings, speeches and pronouncements [that] have fundamentally
the purpose not of finding causes but of denying them” (1956, p. 77). This stance continued
through the sixties, when he rejected quantitative sociological inquiry as a “form of evasion” and
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a “superscientific attitude which tries to reduce everything to a quantitative level” (1966, p. 43).
Significantly, this was done in the name of sociology itself, a field that (as we will see) Wertham
attempted to absorb. He insisted that “in sociological problems, this [quantitative] method can
advance us only part of the way” (1966, p. 43).
So, Wertham took on the professions that offered opposing views o f the problems he had
encountered in his practice and in his role as popular expert. Much of his ire, however, was
directed at professions contiguous to psychiatry itself, including psychoanalysis and psychology.
And he took on other psychiatrists with a particular zeal. This more intra-professional criticism,
carried out in public, found Wertham distancing himself from his own profession as he
simultaneously offered a professional perspective on social problems.
A critique of psychoanalytic viewpoints was a constant thread through Wertham’s
popular work. In an article for New Republic, he stated, “I fully agree with Dr. Karl Menninger
when he calls psychiatrists who are still opposed to psychoanalysis ‘reactionaries.’” But, his
tolerance for psychoanalysis was tested by his concern that “some psychoanalysts are apt to stress
personal facts at the expense of social facts” (1944, p. 773). This concern for the social
dimension led Wertham to carry out a political critique of psychoanalysis, charging, in the same
article, that one of the contentions of prestigious psychoanalyst Abraham Brill—that the
restlessness of the working classes was due to personal, not social causes—illustrated the danger
that “a reactionary philosophy can develop and has developed out of misapplied psychoanalytic
theories” (1944, p. 774). The word ‘misapplied’ played a major role here; it indicated that
Wertham was attempting to make it seem that psychoanalysts had strayed from the path Freud
had charted. This position is elucidated when Wertham notes Brill’s stance that Freud’s
arguments in The Future o f an Illusion can be attributed to Freud’s upbringing. The difference
between Freud and Brill, asserted Wertham, was that Freud was one of the “great rebels in the
realm o f the spirit,” so that “Freud’s mature opinion about religion is like that of Marx,... and not,
as Dr. Brill would have it, an ambiguous belief that ‘the average man’ may not get along without
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it” (1944, p. 774). In this passage, one can sense that Wertham is marshalling Freud behind his
own (putatively revolutionary and certainly social) psychiatric take, while disavowing the
psychoanalytic stance. Elsewhere, Wertham took issue with the psychoanalytic perspective on
religion, charging that “[i]t is not quite clear whether [the psychoanalytic authors] smuggle
psychoanalysis into religion or religion into psychoanalysis. The parallel between psychoanalysis
and religion is, as Freud pointed out, a false one” (1949c, p. 27). Again, he aligns himself with
Freud and against a putatively overdrawn psychoanalysis. And Wertham also claimed Freud on
his when arguing that Freud himself deemed psychoanalysis necessary for only a small number of
his analysands, making psychoanalysts who insist on full analysis out to be pretenders to any
truly Freudian heritage (1950, p. 207).
Wertham dismissed other psychoanalysts as woefully over-attuned to surface details.
“The trouble with this ‘deep psychology,’” he explained, “is that it is so superficial,” taking the
psychoanalytic focus on the oral, anal, and genital stages as evidence of an outlook that was
necessarily blinded to social reality (1945, p. 540). And when a psychoanalyst provided a view
of psychiatry, Wertham proposed that “[vjiewing psychiatry (and indeed all of life) from the
standpoint of orthodox analysis is like looking at it in one of those sideshow mirrors seen in
carnivals, which distort some details and blur the whole picture” (1948b, p. 23). Fie attempted to
show that psychiatry’s emphasis on the social context gave it an unmediated connection with
truth that psychoanalysis lacked.
When applied to the context of the criminal cases that Wertham so frequently described
for his audience, the psychoanalytic perspective’s de-emphasis on social context was cast as a
tragic shortcoming. Describing the case of Santana, the boy accused of murder in The Circle o f
Guilt, Wertham notes how a psychoanalyst acquaintance of his dismissed the case as an instance
of the “typical aggressive delinquent” (1956, p. 14). The analyst explains that the answer lies in
Santana’s hostility, and yearns for “more research on the basic structure and the intricate
psychodynamics o f the aggressive hostile personality” before explaining that he has never
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personally encountered such a case in his practice, that “ ‘I only confer with the social workers
when they present their reports to me’” (1956, p. 14). Obviously, the point here was that the
psychoanalyst was hopelessly out of touch with the social context, lost in his own terminology,
and probably more concerned with his bottom line than with the social problems that he should be
attempting to fight. Wertham positions himself as more professional and more ethical than this
stand-in for psychoanalysis. The “disease-is-a-deep-emotional-disorder school” of inquiry, by
which Wertham meant psychoanalytic understandings of juvenile delinquency, results in a
“neglect o f the social causes of delinquency” (1956, p. 75). Not only did he blame
psychoanalysts for focusing on the wrong part of the world, he asserted that this focus was a part
of a larger problem in society—the ignorance of social context.
What Wertham considered the individual-oriented emphasis of psychoanalysis to be a
negligent turning away from actual social problems, an escapist philosophy. In his opinion,
[fjocusing the minds of people on their own individual problems and seeking solutions
only there, is a modem version of the uplift, New Thought type of literature. What it
really represents is an evasion of the adult problems of social life, an escape from
responsibility to reminiscence, from the immediate to the remote, from social action to
individual therapy (1948b, p. 25).
And this individual therapy, Wertham charged, too frequently blamed the analysand or patient for
their own problems. In article for The Nation, he reviewed the case of a woman who was
experiencing problems with her marriage. Advised by a psychoanalyst that an eighteen-month
analysis was the best way to deal with such problems, she pursued a course of analysis, only to
find herself plunged further into doubt when doing so (1950, pp. 206-207). “Despite the analysis,
or rather because of it,” concluded Wertham, “everybody in [this woman’s] family suffered from
anxiety” (1950, p. 207).
Another component of Wertham’s critique o f psychoanalysis was his contention that it
was a profession of greedy entrepreneurs, taking advantage of a wealthy clientele. Reviewing a
popular psychoanalytic book, he was appalled at what he considered to be the moral of the book:
“go to the nearest dollar-a-minute psychoanalyst right off—or else” (1945, p. 24). One book, he
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claimed was “typical of the you-can’t-get-cured-if-you-don’t-pay school” that he associated with
psychoanalysis (1945, p. 24). If a Willy Loman in Death of a Salesman had “saved enough
money to go through an old-fashioned two- or three-year psychoanalysis,” he joked, the play
would have been called “Divorce of a Salesman” (1950, p. 205). Again, humorously impugning
the effectiveness of psychoanalysts, he notes that “[tjhere are manuals telling us what to do till
the doctor comes. But what are we supposed to do while waiting from year to year till the
psychoanalyst goes?” (1950, p. 206).
Other popularizers of psychological standpoints, be they psychoanalytic or psychiatric,
found themselves on the business end o f Wertham’s anti-expert campaign. Clearly, Wertham
saw these other professional psychological writers as competition for his own point of view. And
he was outspoken in taking them on. Sometimes, the point of this criticism was that other
popular writers who had been taken as psychiatric experts did not deserve their imputed
association with his profession, as when he pointed out to his readers that “[pjopular writers who
do not know the psychiatric facts” described a certain murder case incorrectly, and that “one
widely read account [was] announced as ‘one of the most complete case studies of a crime on
record,’” though it concludes that the murder was the result of “ ‘compulsions’” (1966, p. 31).
He claimed that the “bulk of the adult peace-of-mind books,” a term he used to indicate the
popular psychology literature, “is written by laymen, professional writers, psychologists, and
clergymen” (1949c, p. 6). In such instances, Wertham was attempting to set up a professional
divide between those who knew the psychiatric facts of the case, including honest psychiatrists
like himself, and pretenders who passed themselves off as professionals, such as this writer.
In other cases where Wertham denounced professional popularizers, he conceded that
they possessed psychiatric or psychoanalytic credentials, but spared them little in the way of
vitriol. Because psychoanalytic experts had been such mainstays of the popular literature of the
time, much of this criticism overlapped with his critiques of psychoanalysis. The very act of
popularizing was something that Wertham took to task, suggesting that the popular
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psychoanalysis and psychiatry was written for the wrong reasons. He denounced psychoanalyst
Eric Berne’s book The Mind In Action for being “a book on psychoanalysis that anybody could
have written—and often has,” and “a plea for the most orthodox psychoanalysis for everybody, in
the guise of ‘A Layman’s Guide to Psychiatry’” (1948b, p. 24). He also mocks Berne’s definition
of schizophrenia as “ ‘a splitting of the mind into little pieces which seem to act independently
from one another” as an idea that “comes from Hollywood, not Vienna” (1948b, p. 25). Wertham
asserted that Berne’s efforts to popularize had corrupted his psychoanalytic ideas.
An article in the Saturday Review o f Literature, entitled “The Air-Conditioned
Conscience” found Wertham at high dudgeon, taking on popular psychology. He described how
“[t]he existence and wide popularity of these [psychological books] raises a number of
problems.” He made the point that “the vogue of self-improvement books” demonstrates that
many people feel troubled. They were reaching out to popular psychology because
“psychotherapy is restricted mostly to the well-to-do, the upper classes, and those who need it
least” (1949c, p. 7). But the content of these books, he insisted, could not be trusted. Wary of the
patina of science that covered the genre, he argued that “[t]hey have influence because they seem
to be disinterested and objective, and because they carry the authority of the printed word plus the
authority of the scientific foundations they claim to have” (1949c, p. 7). This authority was, of
course, what Wertham himself attempted to establish in his own work; the work of criticism here
was implicitly aimed at demonstrating how he stood above this mess of ostensibly illusory
authority.
The first substantive criticism Wertham makes of the popular psychology is that it gives
the reader a ‘good’ feeling. Because they frequently involved case studies that began with
problems and ended with cures, they made psychological inquiry and applications appear to be
authoritative, but functioned as little more than feel-good stories. The readers of such books, he
claimed “don’t like the rules by which their ordinary life must be lived, so they enjoy reading
about the rules which they wold like to live by but don’t have to.” They “find their fears about
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the present, and the future particularly, relieved” by the notion that everything can be explained
through application of a largely psychoanalytic point of view that stresses early life experiences
over against the political and social issues of the time. Wertham concluded: “The only question
is, as Napoleon said, what did you do the next day?” (1949c, p. 7). Such stories, Wertham
averred, did not help people to change themselves or their society.
By making this critique, Wertham was alluding to his own case studies that he placed in
his books and articles, which usually lacked the happy ending, and maintained a thorough
concern for social context and institutional critique. A feature he found in popular psychology
books was “that they seem to be addressed to individuals who live mostly in a social vacuum.
The influence of the environment is producing worry, tension, or anxiety is either completely
disregarded or accepted as inevitable” (1949c, p. 27). Such an ignorance of the factors that
Wertham himself placed on the center stage of his own popular writings, he wrote, led to an
inability to account for “society’s responsibility” to its members (1949c, p. 27).
Wertham highlighted the financial interests at work in popular psychology, suspecting
that it basically functioned as a way of selling psychotherapy and psychoanalysis, noting that “[i]f
advertising ever existed, this literature is it” (1949c, p. 7). This would not be so terrible, he
considered, if popular psychology had not been riddled with inaccuracies and half-truths.
Wertham lists a number of these inaccuracies, including the “shocking misinformation that
electric-shock therapy is a good test to determine whether you are mentally disturbed or not!”
(1949c, p. 8). He also takes on popular psychology’s terminology, which he dismisses as “new
glib words, which are especially useful in social conversation if the other person doesn’t know
them yet” (1949c, p. 8). He expressed his regret that “a whole barbaric vocabulary has crept not
only into conversation but also into literary writing: ‘ego strength,’ ‘return to the womb,’ and
many other such expressions” (1949c, p. 8). The problem, he claimed, was that these words were
used “not as a tool but as a substitute for thinking” (1949c, p. 8).
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Wertham’s peroration in this article suggested that the popular psychology of the time did
have a feature that made them new in some respects: “One can extract from these books a new
concept, never before so fully elaborated—the concept of an air-conditioned conscience” (1949c,
p. 27). Showcasing his own morality and linking it to his methodology through critiques of other
popularizers, Wertham pushed these popularizers away from him. What made them bad, made
his own work good. He made very clear his own view of the borders that defined the field of
popular psychology, and clearly these borders were drawn in accordance with his own interests as
a popularizer himself.
As we have seen, Wertham was most disdainful of psychoanalysts, and took on
psychologists of all stripes in his criticism of popular psychology. But this is not to say that he
shied away from offering criticism aimed at psychiatry. Wertham contrasted his own brand of
psychiatry with psychiatry in general, and defined himself against specific contemporary thrusts
in psychiatry, identifying himself as a uniquely qualified representative of his own profession, as
an expert who has successfully avoided the pitfalls of his own profession.
The difference between Wertham and his psychiatric colleagues was frequently expressed
in terms of the people whose interests they were thought to represent. A review of one of
Wertham’s books explained that, when he represented defendants in court, Wertham “always
exhibits commendable compassion and deep understanding for the under-privileged murderer and
his innocent victim” and “has only scorn and ridicule for the experts of the law and the mind who
sit in judgment on their less fortunate fellow men” (Hitzig, 1949, p. 9). And this view of how
Wertham’s humanity set him aside from others in his profession was something that Wertham
himself promoted. In a Newsweek story concerning the case of Ezra Pound’s aborted trial on
charges of traitorous actions during World War II,2 Wertham is at center stage, opposing the four
psychiatrists involved in the case who had found Pound to be mentally incompetent to stand trial.

2 Pound had actively participated in anti-American propaganda efforts carried out in Italy during World
Warn.
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Wertham noted that the “meaning in which the word ‘insane’ is used in this psychiatric report is
unspecified and particularly unclear,” clearly hinting that the decision had been gerrymandered to
conform to the government’s interest in bypassing a full trial (“ ‘I Will Not Go Mad,” 1949, p.
35).
The point of view from which Wertham could claim this more humane position was,
figuratively, the trenches. His criticisms of psychiatry frequently contrasted what he saw as other
psychiatrists’ distance from their clientele. This opposition was used in a book review of a text
on mental disorders in later life, where Wertham notes that a “psychiatrist like myself who is
confronted with the almost daily task” of finding adequate care for his patients “finds little help or
recognition of his difficulties—or rather, the difficulties of his patients” in the text (1945, p. 540).
Elsewhere, in relation to a book on the psychiatric needs of soldiers that takes a very grouporiented view, he argues that the “magic wand of the self-important psychiatrist, which may
sometimes influence individuals, does not work with groups. Meanwhile our own veterans in
search of psychiatric treatment run from pillar to post” (1945, p. 540).
The more humane version of psychiatry that Wertham offered was vividly portrayed in
his books that centered around specific criminal cases. In The Circle o f Guilt, for example, he
expounds on many psychiatrists’ tendency to fit their psychiatric testimony to the needs of the
system. Many psychiatrists, he explains “consider it their duty to side with him and in murder
cases, in the final analysis, they function like undertakers” (1956, p. 20). Psychiatrists frequently
encountered problems understanding and communicating the reality of crime, asserted Wertham,
because they allowed their professional jargon to interfere with their diagnoses; “[sjimple social
facts may be obscured under high-sounding words,” he noted (1956, p. 64). Other criminal cases
that Wertham related found him describing similarly problematic psychiatrists, who offered “self
contradictory” diagnoses (1949a, p. 47), were constrained by conflicts of interest resulting from
their association with district attorneys, (1949a, p. 87) and made prima facie “extraordinary
statements” that could not be believed by layman or professional, including remarks such as: “
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‘These are cases that are obvious. If you look at them, you know they are insane,’” and “
‘Coprophagia is a common sort of thing [sic!]. We don’t call people who do that mentally sick’
[sic!]” (1949a, p. 88 [‘sic’ in orig.]).
When addressing the issue o f comic books, Wertham found that many psychiatrists
disputed his findings of comic books’ direct effects on children’s minds. To distance himself
from these opponents, he chose to critique psychiatry rather broadly. For example, in Seduction
o f the Innocent, he argued that
[m]odem child psychiatry, mental hygiene and educational psychology are in a crisis.
Far from being leaders, they are behind the times. Some of their literature is filled with
vagaries and generalities. When confronted with a new phenomenon like comic books,
they do everything except study the book. They make pronouncements without first
learning the objective facts and, without bad intent repeat the same old arguments which
the crime-comic-book industry—aided by its experts—had culled from the psychological
verbiage of the day (1954a, p. 278).
Wertham also chided other psychiatrists for maintaining an “over-individualistic” outlook, as well
as for taking “a defensive attitude about crime and sadism in the various media” (1954a, p. 368).
The psychiatrist, he opined, “despite his formal training, still remains a member o f the society in
which he moves and, as the whole crime comics issue has shown, is not so immune from the
social pattern as he may think” (1954a, p. 368). As far as Wertham was concerned, the comic
book issue had shown the psychiatrists to be simultaneously unprofessional in their inability to
retain Wertham’s own methodological scrutiny and over-professional in their association with
their own (upper) social class and their insulation from the real world, itself evidenced by
confusing jargon and by a reticent inability to engage the public or its problems.
As psychiatry and psychoanalysis collided in the mid^O* century, so was Wertham’s
critique of psychoanalysis blended with his critique of psychiatiy. Concluding a critique of what
he considered to be the overuse of psychoanalysis within psychiatry, he joked, “If this be treason,
send me to St. Elizabeths’,” casting himself as an unorthodox critic of the profession from within
the profession (“The Couch Cult,” 1950, p. 87). Consistent in his guise as agitator, Wertham was
unafraid of taking on some of the most prominent psychiatrists o f the time. Even Harry Stack
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Sullivan, a legend in the field, was given a raking over. Reviewing Sullivan’s Conceptions o f
Modem Psychiatry for New Republic, Wertham called the book “a discursive dissertation
composed of affected platitudes and pseudo-erudite pronouncements” (1948b, p. 24). He thought
it was a specimen example of what was wrong with contemporary psychiatry “because it shows
the unparalleled lack of criticism and responsibility that permits a book of this sort to be
published, read and highly endorsed” (1948b, p. 24). The idea that psychiatrists might be even
worse than the other writers, including lay analysts and psychologists, who wrote popular
psychology was one that Wertham pondered in print, noting that they are “sometimes even
worse” than the putatively less professional peers and that they merely fill their pages with
confusing technical jargon (1949c, p. 6). He regarded the popular and the presitigious alike with
an unforgiving critical edge.
Robert Lindner Takes on the World
Robert Lindner’s popular writing was almost as rooted in criticism of other individuals
and professions as was Wertham’s. And again, the criticism was often directed at those
professions with which Lindner’s activities as a professional had placed him into competition or
conflict. As Wertham’s excursions in courtroom psychiatry had pitted him against lawyers, so
did Lindner’s work in prisons put him in opposition to criminologists and the legal system. This
was particularly apparent in Stone Walls and Men, the book where he offered his psychoanalytic
understanding of how prisons fail to work, largely based on his experience as an analyst working
in a prison.
In the beginning of Stone Walls and Men, Lindner makes it clear that he does not let
criminology off easily, claiming a certain standing as a criminologist himself while rejecting what
he sees as the dominant trends of the field. He considers criminology to be held in thrall by
passing fashions: “Depending on the moment, [criminologists] will ride the vitamin limited, the
glandular express, the Freudian flyer, or the Lenin local” (1946, p. 2). And contrasting what his
own hands-on experience of prisons and prisoners with a kind of over-professional distance on
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the part of the criminologists, he asserts that the “ivory-tower criminologists[’]...main contacts
with crime and criminals are limited to a hasty tour o f the local jail and an assiduous perusal
(properly armed with shears for clipping items pertaining however remotely to the field) of the
daily newspaper” (1946, p. 42). Such a distance from the crime itself, he claims, results in the
adoption of “infertile categories” of analysis that fail to capture the reality of the issue, and
manifest criminology’s “servile attachment to the apron-strings of the law” by taking the law’s
categories as given (1946, p. 42). Lindner concludes that the
mind of the philosopher in crime is hidebound. He lacks the experience of actual day-today living with the problem; therefore the neat and arbitrary but lifeless distinctions
broadcast from the lecture platform have until now sufficed for him (1946, pp. 42-43).
Criminology’s evasion of psychological truth, Lindner argued, had prevented it from getting to
the roots of crime:
With but a passing and usually somewhat forced bow to the intimate psychology of the
offender, the discussion is diverted from the really important and significant determinants
of an act to a laborious setting forth of the manifest purposes of the trespass (1946, p.
316).
As this last point makes clear, criminology’s shortcomings were made in contrast to Lindner’s
psychology and his own asserted proximity to the subject at hand.
But Lindner’s critique of criminology did not stop there. He asserted that “[wjriters of
textbooks on criminology have presented the most amusing spectacle of all,” noting that their
reliance on economic explanations has led them to borrow
enough statistics from the Marxist-Leninist camp on the one side and the National
Association of Manufacturers on the other hand to assure the kind of double-talk that
encourages students to consign them and their books to that limbo where they cannot
interfere either with the students’ preconceived notions or with their plans for the next
week-end house-party (1946, pp. 229-230).
This kind of writing he regarded as “a perfect technique for the prevention of thinking and the
preservation of the status quo” (1946, p. 230). Thusly, Lindner distanced himself from the
presumed ideological shadings and interests at work in criminology, writing himself into a
putatively less corrupted way of explaining crime.
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As Wertham took on lawyers and the legal system when explaining his own
understanding of crime, Lindner did much the same thing. His take on lawyers took a by now
familiar critical look at the language that lawyers used, calling it a “ritualistic mumbo jumbo” and
“almost a game” (1946, p. 376). Legal terminology and procedure, he claimed, had ossified to
the point where the “individuality of the people who come before it, their problems, their needs,
are lost, sacrificed to a devious and punctilious routine” (1946, p. 376). This isolation from the
real world resulted in a situation wherein “the lawbreaker, the casual violator, and the inadequate
in endowment, prestige, or finances are prejudicially handled” (1946, p. 376). As with his
critique of criminology, the greed of the opposing profession is seen as playing a destructive role
in the legal profession. The lawyers’ “tradition of honor and dignity has been lost in a hectic
scuffle for money and influence” (1946, p. 380). The barrier to improvement, he said, was
apparent in the limited role ascribed to psychology in the courtroom. “The legal profession must
somehow obtain a new and more healthful orientation to recapture its high purpose,” claimed
Lindner, clearly indicating his own outlook as the ‘healthful orientation’ that the law requires
1946, p. 382).
A major problem that Lindner cited was that the courts could not take account for the
personalities of the accused. “In spite of their medieval garb, their ornate chambers, and the
veneration in which they have been used to basking,” he surmised, judges “are in dire need of
help” (1946, p. 377). This help, he explained, should come from psychological experts; “[a]
thoroughgoing study of an accused person is the sine qua non of justice” (1946, p. 377). Going
so far as to suggest that trial-by-juiy be displaced by psychiatric judgment, Lindner remarks that
“[ajlthough it was well-intended by the English barons” who created the jury system,
“[apparently the facts of psychology were unknown to these august gentry, and for their
enthusiastic error the public has been paying ever since” (1946, p. 378). The same psychological
expertise, he insisted, was sorely needed in prisons, where prisoners’ problems could not be dealt
with without the resource of psychological expertise on hand (1946, p. 378). In Lindner’s view,
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every component of the legal system had been tainted by professional interests and a divergence
from the needs of the public, a situation that could only be made right through an expansion of
psychology’s role in the process.
But Lindner’s criticisms of the professions were aimed all over the professional field. He
sculpted a consistent message of antipathy toward all professions. Usually, the anti-professional
animus sprouts from Lindner’s defense of unorthodox, ‘rebellious’ life. Calling popular
professionalism mere ‘science’ in a defense of his own approach to homosexuality, he argues that
the refusal of experts to accept homosexuality in any way represents a kind of professional
tendency to lend credence to pre-existing common sense opinions, making professionals coconspirators in the maintenance of a norm (1956a, p. 64). Elsewhere, he dismisses most
professions’ dismissal of human instinct’s role in behavior by explaining that professionals were
worried that it would seem “unfashionable” to buy into such a notion (1956a, p. 124).
Lindner notes the accomplishments of the social sciences and how he believes they are
tainted by their misuse. Describing how man has been searching for knowledge about himself
ever since his beginnings, he regrets that “[n]ow, with this knowledge [in the form of the social
science] in his grasp, he finds it being misunderstood, or conscientiously misapplied” (1953, p.
3). Anthropologists, he opined, were to be rejected because they carried out “a ‘reading-into’
behavior from a remote, superior, and sophisticated point of view,” and the social sciences in
general were corrupted by their desire to “ape” the physical sciences, which led them away from
important social truths (1953, p. 190).
The borders in this dispute regarding the professions as a kind of unified front are made
patently clear when Lindner suggests that a
bill of indictment.. .has to be drawn against those who participate in the plot against us,
particularly against those in whom we have placed faith to protect our interests but who,
all unaware it may be, have lent their voices, their influence, and the authority of their
works to the campaign to disarm us (1953, p. 24).
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The theme of ‘us against them’ is equally clear when Lindner asserts that the “proud wearers of
cap and gown are no different from the rest of us” (1953, p. 28). Academics and professionals
shun the idea of instinct, he claimed, because they fear that they may share anything with “the
unschooled and uninitiated” (1953, p. 30). Most dramatically, Lindner declares that the
professions “have elevated what they call science and the scientific method to a kind of
Pharisaical godhood, just as fetish-ridden and compulsive in its ritual of obedience and sacrifice
as any totemistic religion” (1953, p. 190).
Speaking of religion, religions and philosophies catch some of Lindner’s spite, as he
aligns them with the professions as part of the power elite of society, ruining the prospect for
constructive modes of life. “Every religion.. .and most philosophies,” he claims, “have tried to
deny the animal nature of man by techniques too familiar to repeat here; while custom, language,
education—indeed, every other agency of human expression—have assisted them in propagating
the deception” (1956a, p. 125). The philosophies and religions are portrayed as interested
observers, cowed by the power of the status quo; they reject human instinct “to range themselves
and their ideas foursquare with regnant morality” (1956a, p. 129). Philosophers he accused of
playing “word-games” (1956a, p. 4). Taken collectively, these barbs directed at other professions
were strategically impelled to be ways for Lindner to claim difference from other competing
explanations; they functioned much like Wertham’s critical takes on non-psychiatric professions.
But, again, like Wertham, Lindner heaped critical attention on the psychological professions.
Much of this criticism targeted psychiatry and other psychological professions outside of
Lindner’s own specialty of psychoanalysis.
The criticism of the psychological professions closely resembled the angle by which he
approached other professions. Lindner was unwavering in his contention that psychiatry was
aligned with the powerful and against the true interests of the people. The “psychological
fraternity,” he surmised, were mostly “the product o f intensive effort made to deny the
fundamental nature of human nature by institutions in which they have been reared” (1956a, p.
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125). This notion of a ‘psychological fraternity’ itself seems carefully chosen; the term allowed
Lindner to take on psychology, psychiatry, clinical psychology, and psychoanalysis all at once.
He continues, advancing the idea that this fraternity suffers from an “intellectual schizophrenia”
that leads them to see instinct in man when using “meaningless circumlocutions” such as “
‘intrinsic needs, ‘man’s nature,’ ‘genital lust dynamisms,”’ and other terms, while denying man’s
instinct with concepts like “ ‘learning’” or “ ‘imitation.” These terms, in Lindner’s view, make
clear that the ‘psychological fraternity’ relies more on its own sense of fashion than on any
external reality (1956a, p. 125).
His emphasis on psychology’s denial of instinct continues when he takes on the
contemporary psychologists who attempted to move the field toward the social sciences.
Expressing his disdain for “[t]he Field Theory of Lewin, the Sociometry of Moreno, and the
Interpersonal Relations psychology of Sullivan,” vectors within psychology that shared a
“contempt for biology” (1956a, p. 127). He explains psychology’s turn away from instinct as an
avoidance of the “necessity its adoption places them under to raise and solve the problems they
have inherited” (1956a, p. 129).
Lindner singles out Harry Stack Sullivan for particularly egregious crimes against
language; he is referred to as “the obscurantist of modem psychiatry whose tongue-twisting
incoherencies so desperately strive to make appear profound a na'ive descriptive psychology of
the ego and its relationshps” (1953, p. 34). The Sullivan-slamming continues at a later point,
where he dismisses Sullivan for being redolent of “the odor of the clinic,” (1953, p. 43) a
dismissal clearly aimed at psychiatry, and impelled to remind readers of the psychiatry’s
association with the mental hospital. Then, Lindner questions what he sees as Sullivan’s over
extended power over psychology and especially psychiatry, noting that “the mantle of
shamanhood drapes easily over the shoulders of Sullivan, who has set himself up as the high
priest of interpersonal relations and who rejects individuality wholesale” (1953, p. 45). Taking
Sullivan, with his position at the top of the most powerful part of the psychological field,
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psychiatry, as his opponent, Lindner made his own position as a lay analyst appear relatively
benign. Calling attention to his lack of any ‘mantle of shamanhood,’ Lindner positioned himself
as the opposite of Sullivan, as someone who was capable of fighting for the little guy, the
individual.
Lindner held that all the avoidance and fashionable positioning that he imputed to the
psychological professions was counter to the public interest. Judging the psychological
professions as a whole, he found them to be “reactionary” and asserted that “they oppose
themselves in this day to progress and freedom” from man’s limitations (1953, p. 6). It was the
psychological professions, whom he mocked as “the physicians of the ‘soul,’” and “the doctors of
the mind” that were “the most to be deplored” as well as “the most influential” (1953, p. 27).
Rarely using the term ‘psychiatry,’ but always implying that it was the branch of psychological
inquiry he was attacking, he claimed that “mental specialists” were “aided by the desire to
preserve and petrify the status quo, and especially maintain the stake they have acquired (or hope
to acquire) in it” (1953, p. 27).
As popular psychiatry attempted to play down its waning connection to the mental
hospital, Lindner’s own bid for cultural authority, which ran counter to psychiatry, re-established
psychiatry’s links to the mental hospital, capitalizing on the popular image of the psychiatrist as a
kind of mad scientist. This became a key part o f Lindner’s overall narrative that placed
psychiatry on the side of conformity to the needs of the powerful. He claimed that the mental
patient in a mental hospital
has been pulverized into submission, thrashed and smashed into adjustment, granulized
into cowed domesticity. If he can now meet the criteria of the ‘shockiatrist’ who has
attended him—if he can be polite, keep himself tidy, respond with heartiness to his
physician’s cheery morning greeting, refrain from annoying people with his complaining
and, above all, make no noise, everything will be well. If not—Quick, nurse, the little
black box! (1953, p. 54).
Using these kinds of critical jabs at the more widely suspected psychiatric methods, such as
electro-shock therapy here, and the much-criticized lobotomy and other brain surgeries in other
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places (e.g., Prescription, pp. 55*65), Lindner placed these methods in his own narrative of
psychiatry as a profession that had become an enemy of the people. He also portrayed
psychiatry’s calls to action as ineffectual, dissenting from the idea that “social-service soporifics”
or “mental-hygiene maxims” could help anything (“Rebels or Psychopaths?,” p. 64). Finally, in
one of the most dramatic of these statements of psychiatry’s difference from the people, Lindner
remarked that “[ljike the Roman aristocrats who picked their teeth, transacted business, and made
love openly while whole populaces were slaughtered in the arena below, these gulls of a scientific
shell game have been gelded of the organs of human fellowship” (1953, p. 113).
Lindner resented psychiatry’s incorporation o f psychoanalytic ideas and techniques. He
vilified psychiatry on the basis of its attempt to monopolize psychotherapy for itself. Answering
his own concerns about how psychotherapy has been misapplied, he finds part of the answer “in
the fact that the field o f psychotherapy has been pre-empted by medicine and made almost
exclusively the province of medicos” (1953, p. 138). Clearly, the attempt was to turn medicine
into a bad word, in this context; ‘medico’ was used as an insult. The education and training that
created doctors, he argued, made doctors ignorant of the “ethical, moral, sociological, historical,
and psychological questions” (1953, p. 139). Because of this, “physicians are really those who
can be least trusted with the mentally perplexed and conflicted...” (1953, p. 139). Expounding on
his position regarding medicine and psychotherapy, he wrote,
[i]n my opinion, the requirement that only those trained for the medical profession be
permitted to practice the art of psychotherapy is responsible for the stagnation of that
field, and for the fact that it has become but one more—and most potent—tool for the
enslavement of the species (1953 p. 138).
On this basis, Lindner called for a “rejuvenation of psychology,” in which the psychologists will
realize that “the modernity they claim is a hollow sham to hide the truth from themselves and
others and to maintain a naive illusion which enable them to keep the place in the human
hierarchy that they have won...” (1953, p. 210). Lacking an M.D., and dismissed as a ‘lay
analyst’ by psychiatrists, whose membership in the medical community gave them the most
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power in the psychological sciences, Lindner attempted to turn his own lack of credentials into a
sign of his loyalty to the people, and of his skepticism of the powerful.
A Time article about Lindner describes Lindner’s disdain for (mostly) popularized
psychiatric expertise. Lindner mocked the psychiatric experts’ by reducing their advice to
suggestions that we “Throw away the comic books,” (a clear jab at Wertham) “Close down the
TV stations,” “Return to breast-feeding,” (aimed at Dr. Benjamin Spock) and “Get tough with
them” (probably a swipe at Strecker) (“Rebels or Psychopaths?,” p. 64). His disdain for
psychological popularizers was voiced most directly in Must You Conform?, where he states:
“This is the day of the psychological mountebank. Everyone with access to print apparently
conceives of himself as a psychologist, and few hesitate to pontificate about man, his nature, his
mind, and his future” (1956a, p. 183). Significantly, this declaration is not so much an attack on
psychologists as against those who act as psychologists, though this certainly included some
credentialed psychologists as well. This categorization lumped the popular psychologists with
whom he disagreed in with those who merely posed as psychologists.
One effect of the popular psychology, he claimed, was a “loss of precision in many of the
key concepts important for the study of human behavior” (1956a, p. 183). He took a rather
professional tack here, stressing the difference between scientific and popular discourse,
explaining that “[sjomewhere in the process of verbal mauling, words and ideas that have been
arrived at laboriously in science or philosophy become vague and essentially meaningless”
(1956a, p. 183). He chose ‘maturity,’ a term of great importance to popular psychiatrists, and in
particular (as we have seen) to Edward Strecker and William Menninger, as an example of this
kind of linguistic corruption. Lindner’s position was to tar the term as a misleading result of
popularization. “Depending upon which pseudo-psychological book heads the non-fiction best
seller lists,” he claimed, “the popular meaning of maturity changes” (1956a, p. 183). Despite the
many misunderstandings that circulate around the term maturity, though, Lindner argued that they
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had one thing in common: a neglect of individuality and positive individual rebellion (1956a, p.
184).
Unlike Wertham, Lindner did not aim much criticism at his own part of the psychological
field. Nor is this surprising. Lay analysis (a term Lindner never used) was a kind of difficult
target. It was not an organized group, so it was hard to sum up what the central tendencies of lay
analysis were. However, certain tendencies of other lay analysts and theorists were given some
kind of a raking-over, usually by linking their tendencies to those of the despised dominant
figures of psychiatry. So, for instance, Erich Fromm “and his group” are called to task for their
opposition to the idea of instinct (1956a, p. 126). Lindner chides Karen Homey for what he
considered to be her failure to more fully oppose psychology’s call for the individual’s
adjustment to society’s needs (1953, p. 41).
Lindner’s other critical remarks regarding psychoanalysis mostly find him expressing
regret that it had been largely subsumed by psychiatry in America. Not surprisingly, he sees
psychiatiy’s use of psychoanalysis in a very critical light. He found that “ a bast new body of
knowledge is being misused and misapplied hour by hour by the bulk of the psychotherapeutic
fraternity, and especially by the psychoanalysts,” and that “the tacit ‘therapeutic’ hypothesis of
most practitioners o f the arts of psychotherapy” is really just aimed at adjusting the individual to
society’s needs (1953, p. 112). And he considers the language of analysis, asking the reader to
listen closely to the analysts, and
to the psychoanalese which characterizes their conversation—and then tell me if they
have profited from their experience of psychoanalysis much beyond the acquisition of a
new vocabulary, of the dubious social distinction of having lain for some hundreds of
hours on a couch talking about themselves, the invention of better rationalizations for
following the paths of least resistance, and a modicum o f surcease from the original
symptom which sent them to the analyst in the first place (1953, p. 114).
Because psychiatry had so completely merged with psychoanalysis by the mid-1950’s, it can
hardly be said that this kind of commentary was aimed only at non-medical or ‘lay’ analysts. To
the extent that he was critiquing the tendencies of non-medical psychoanalysis, he was asserting
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that it had become overly professional, in the sense that it had adopted a professional vocabulary
and turned its back on the needs of the people.
Wertham and Lindner on the Side of the People
By generating this voluminous criticism of competing professional and popular views,
Wertham and Lindner defined themselves in terms of whom they opposed; they made themselves
out to be unique, self-sufficient experts in their own right. But both of them also put a great deal
of emphasis demonstrating whom they were for. As very public experts, who wrote for diverse
lay audiences, they developed a strategic approach for presenting their expertise by which they
located themselves squarely on the side of the people. Of course, ‘the people’ is a very general
term. It is used here to describe the pattern wherein the experts cast themselves as advocates of
broad types of lay persons, usually victims of whatever psychologically-defined trend is under
analysis. The alignment with the people was carried out through descriptions of physical
proximity with these victims, as well as through statements made on behalf o f the plight of the
people. A similar pattern, as we have seen, was a factor in the popular writings on World War II,
when William Menninger and Edward Strecker aligned themselves with the soldiers. For
Wertham and Lindner, however, the alignment with the people played a far more prominent role
in the establishment of their positions as experts, merging with their anti-professional rhetoric to
place themselves in a thoroughly heterodox stance that stressed their commonality with the lay
audience and constructed a divide between them and other experts. They sculpted a drama that,
in its rudimentary aspects, pit them against other experts on behalf of the people.
Wertham’s alignment o f himself with the people was a consistent feature in his writings
about crime. Because so many o f these writings took the form of extended case studies of
accused criminals, he had the opportunity to stress his interactions with the accused, showing his
own sympathy for their plight. The pattern began with 1941 ’s Dark Legend, in which Wertham
examined the case of Gino, who had killed his mother. The book begins with the verdict of the
case, when Gino was found guilty in spite of Wertham’s opinion that he was legally insane at the
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time of crime had been committed. Because of Wertham’s involvement, Gino had been spared
execution. Wertham concluded, “I had saved his life,” foregrounding his own role as Gino’s
advocate (1941, p. 20). The rest of the book takes the form of a biography, tracing Gino’s life
from childhood, focusing on his family relationships, and leading right up through the act of
murder. In what would become a common feature of his popular writing, Wertham used
numerous direct quotes of Gino, allowing the audience to read Gino’s story in his own words. In
this sense, Wertham was hitching his own expertise to Gino’s cause, allowing the case to
seemingly speak for itself while positioning himself as Gino’s advocate.
Wertham stressed his own sympathy for the accused criminals he dealt with, attempting
to show their human side. Describing the mentally ill murderer Albert Fish in The Show o f
Violence, Wertham related his first meeting with Fish, noting that he was the kind of person you
would “entrust your children to” (1949a, p. 69). “To execute a sick man,” he claimed, “is like
burning witches,” driving this point home with the less sympathetic hearing that Fish received in
court before his execution. A parallel treatment of another mentally ill criminal, Robert Irwin,
finds Wertham struggling to get the proceedings to understand “Robert Irwin as a person,”
(1949a, p. 159) and quotes Irwin’s consideration of his own predicament, painting a very
sympathetic portrait of the man.
The plight of Santana, as presented in The Circle o f Guilt, is a good example. Wertham
described “how young and sensitive [Santana] looked,” reminding himself that Freud stated that
children of his age “were still in the formative state of their development” (1956, p. 23). Sitting
down to talk with Santana, Wertham tells him that he “wanted to help him” (1956, p. 23). “I
wanted to start with the boy” and deal with the crime later, explained Wertham (1956, p. 26).
Wertham defended Santana by placing the blame for his criminal act on society. “Nearly always”
with such cases, he explains, youths such as Santana “are confronted with such an enormous
psychological and social reality that they cannot digest it” (1956, p. 25). Underneath the
seemingly senseless crime, he averred, were perfectly understandable, common emotions.
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Repeatedly, Wertham reminds his audience of how much time he spent face to face with Santana.
In considering a diagnosis, he notes how he is prompted to “think back over the many hours I
spent with the boy” (1956, p. 26). The full extent of Wertham’s contact with Santana is made
clear in Wertham’s comprehensive review of Santana’s life story (e.g., 1956, pp. 30-36). And the
outcome of this biographical perspective leads Wertham to point to the treatment of Puerto
Ricans, such as Santana, in America.
He balanced his identification with accused criminals alongside an identification with the
victims of crime. Because he spent so much time on the issue of murder, this frequently meant
demonstrating his alignment with murder victims and their families. Wertham related the case of
Forlino, who had committed an infanticide. Wertham took Forlino to be a future threat to his
family, one whom the authorities seemed unwilling or unable to keep locked up. He noted his
own contact with the family and showed himself as someone acting on their behalf, arriving at the
conclusion that when the baby that Forlino killed “cried out with its ‘extra-loud scream’ it did not
only cry in its own pain asking for help; it was a human being crying to us, its fellow human
beings, to think a little more in terms of the victims” (1949a, p. 209). Another case from The
Show o f Violence finds Wertham scolding his audience (and certainly, other experts), calling
them to account for the victims, for the “murder victim is the forgotten man. What with
sensational discussions on the abnormal psychology of the murderer, we have failed to emphasize
the unprotectedness of the victim and the complacency of the authorities” (1949a, p. 259).
Wertham also championed the plight of psychiatric and psychoanalytic patients,
presenting the flip-side of the anti-professional argument that the psychological professions had
lost their way. From this point o f view, the article he wrote for the Nation, “What to Do Till the
Doctor Goes” can be taken as more than just a critique of the professions. It was simultaneously
Wertham’s bid to align himself with patients who have felt frustrated with psychiatric or
psychoanalytic treatment, taking one patient, Mrs. Ferman, as a case study of the negative effects
of psychoanalysis. In the article, he focuses Mrs. Ferman’s feelings and concerns as she and her
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husband turned to psychoanalysis to help their marriage. Wertham notes how “relatives of
patients often feel, as evidently Mrs. Ferman felt, that they are regarded as either poison or
therapy for no reason that they can accept” (1950, p. 206). He endorses Mrs. Ferman’s opinion
“when she implies that old-style psychoanalysis has not yet learned to let people rely on their own
resources or helped to mobilize their responses” (1950, p. 207).
A more political alignment was effected in Wertham’s alignment with the psychiatric
needs of the African-American community. Again, the this kind of positioning located Wertham
as an advocate of a certain group, someone looking out for the interests of the people. The
Lafargue clinic, a free psychiatric clinic that Wertham founded in Harlem, figured prominently in
this kind of alignment. A New Republic story about Wertham and the Lafargue clinic tells the
story, related by Wertham himself, of his interaction with the New York State Department, and
how he had to struggle to get them to understand that it was a free clinic. The gist was that the
existing health administration, rigidly connected to the status quo, was unable to comprehend
Wertham’s selflessness. Wertham remarks on the clinic, explaining that “We’re here in Harlem
because this is where the need is the greatest,” and “We’re simply here to treat [the Harlem
residents] like any other human beings” (Martin, 1946, p. 798). The story then goes on to
establish Wertham’s personal connections to Richard Wright, Ralph Ellison, and the rest o f the
African-American community, with a particular emphasis on the feelings of Wertham’s co
workers, one of whom is quoted as saying “one of the wonderful things about the clinic is that
these people come here without fear on their faces, without suspicion” (Martin, 1946, p. 800).
Another profile of Lafargue, in Time, notes Wertham’s friendly interactions with his patients,
young and old, and quotes his consideration of the special situation of psychiatry for AfricanAmericans. “The only difference,” Wertham claimed, “...is that here in Harlem the trouble is
much more naked and obvious... What the Negro needs and what psychiatry must help him find is
the will to survive in a hostile world” (“Psychiatry in Harlem,” 1947, pp. 50-51).
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Throughout his popular work, Wertham identified himself with parents. At all turns he
claimed that parents had been left unfit to defend their children from the buffeting social forces of
the modem world. This alignment was plainly stated as a kind of defense of parents, as when he
pointed out that the “suggestion is often made that parents should be severely punished for the
vandalism and violent behavior or delinquencies of their children,” a suggestion to which he
responds by asserting that “these parents are already punished by what has happened; they need
help, not retribution.” (1966, p. 294). Regarding juvenile crime, he finds that
[i]t is a question not only of pressure in the family but of pressures on the family. To
accuse individual parents and to threaten them with punishment is easy. It shifts attention
from social to individual influences and creates the illusion that except for these parents
there are no delinquency-producing circumstances (1956, p. 65).
And, in Seduction o f the Innocent, he appeals to parents who have been “paralyzed” by the comic
books, positing that the “vast majority of mothers” dislike comic books and their influence, but
“the moment they raise their voices they are knocked out by the experts for the defense and by an
avalanche of pseudo-Freudian lore” (1954a, p. 270). Wertham made himself out to be an expert
uniquely attuned to the interests of and constraints on parents.
Wertham showcased his personal contact with concerned parents in Seduction o f the
Innocent. He recounts how, after writing about the comics, he “received letters and inquiries
from all over the country. Many had the refrain expressed by one mother: ‘We who care about
such things feel so helpless’” (1954a, p. 300). And he concludes with a story that places him in
physical contact with a parent, lending his support. A mother of a boy treated at the Lafargue
clinic is inconsolable, devastated by the delinquency of her son. In the final passage of the book,
Wertham recalls their interaction:
‘Doctor,’ she said in a low voice. ‘I’m sorry to take your time. But please—tell me
again.’ I looked at her questioningly. ‘Tell me again,’ she said slowly and hesitatingly.
‘Tell me again that it isn’t my fault.’ And I did” (1954a, p. 397).
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Here he positions himself not only as someone who is supportive of parents, but just as
importantly as an expert who talks to parents one on one, willing to give his time, to sacrifice
himself for parents.
Nor did Wertham stop at the parents in the family; he also focused on, and placed himself
on the side of, children. This was particularly apparent in Seduction o f the Innocent, in which he
tied his point o f view to a very child-centered methodology, noting that he had “let children draw,
write and make up stories” and had “studied their dreams and asked them directly or in playroom
observation what they got out of these stories [i.e., the comic books], what they dislike, how they
thought the stories would affect other children—especially younger ones” (1954a, p. 188). The
emphasis here was on Wertham’s direct contact with the children, and the underlying point was
that his methods had given him the knowledge of what really was best for children. He was,
ostensibly, allowing the children to dictate to him. The same kind of device can be seen at work
when he describes how the “locust plague” of comic books had “settled on a group of nice
children whom I knew well” (1954a, p. 301). Highlighting his own personal contact with
children placed Wertham on a specific side, and with a certain moral advantage, in the crisis he
described.
One prominent instance o f Wertham’s alignment with children can be found in The
Circle o f Guilt, where he devotes an entire chapter (entitled “Strike, A Fantasy”) to wondering
“what would happen” if the children “took things into their own hands,” and stood up to the
adults who corrupted them, by going on a strike (1956, p. 161). In this strike, Wertham imagines
that the children boycotted comic books and violent entertainment, “and just stopped giving
adults money for them” (1956, p. 164). The children “knew that violence was bad,” so they
stopped taking any part of it, and juvenile delinquency was wiped out. By refusing to succumb to
what Wertham believed to be the fallacious beliefs and behaviors that the adults foisted on them,
they created a Utopia. “Although they did not use the term,” explained Wertham, “what they
were doing was really mental hygiene. That was again the opposite of what is done by the
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grownups, who talk so much about mental hygiene but do not practice it for children” (1956, pp.
165-166). By making true mental hygiene appear to be that which was really in the children’s
interests, and counter to the interests of many adults, (he vilifies experts, comic book publishers,
and the existing economy) Wertham wrote his own point of view onto the children, claiming
proximity to what children really wanted. He uses a similar fantasy in Seduction o f the Innocent,
calling his readers to “Set the children free!,” and imagining what would happen if adults stopped
blocking children’s healthy mental development (1954a, p. 390).
Robert Lindner did not emphasize these kinds of popular alignments to the extent that
Wertham did. But some comparisons can be noted. For instance, as Wertham put himself on the
side of accused criminals, Lindner’s writings on prisoners found him acting as a proximal
advocate of their needs. Boldly stating that “it is presumption for anyone who is himself not a
prison inmate to write about prisons, and in this sense the present account is as erroneous and
blind as any other,” Lindner forged ahead and offered his own account (1946, p. 400). But
though he had never been an inmate, he benefited symbolically from the fact that his writing
came, quite explicitly, from his experience as a prison psychologist. In a move that maximized
his alignment with the prisoners, Lindner included a chapter in Stone Walls and Men that quoted,
in full, lengthy prisoners’ statements (one occupies 15 pages of text, another takes up 12)
regarding life in prison. Each of these letters was used to back up Lindner’s claim that what
really needs to be examined is not the structure of the prison, but, “rather the self-delusion of
modem penology, its sham, and its complete failure” (1946, p. 401). Taking the role of an
authoritative conduit between the prisoners and his readers, Lindner claimed to be placing his
authority at the service of the prisoners, identifying with them against the other experts.
Evidence
A more implicit and widespread way of establishing that they were on the side of the
people was carried out in the specific ways that Wertham and Lindner supported their arguments
with evidence culled from clinical studies or analysis. We have already seen the rhetorical role of
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providing evidence in action in other experts, particularly in the support that came from ‘on the
front’-style evidence in popular psychiatric writing on World War II. Wertham and Lindner
provided evidence in a manner that differed markedly from that which was found in the works by
the Menningers and Strecker. While both Wertham and Lindner made broad claims about the
world and generalized from their data, the evidence that they provided was, as a rule, more
focused on the interaction between themselves and their analysands or patients. This kind of
emphasis on the interactions granted a personal dimension to their authority. By avoiding
diagnostic discussions, summaries of baseline statistics of mental illness, and involved
discussions of how psychodynamic terms fit into everyday life, they sculpted an authoritative
voice that seemed to come from the mouths of those they were trying to help than from the ivory
tower of psychiatry that both so thoroughly lambasted.
Much of Wertham’s evidence was drawn from his interactions with patients in the clinics
where he worked. He stated exactly where his evidence came from, prefacing one set of findings
with an extensive reminder of where he had done his work:
In the Lafargue Clinic, in the psychiatric service and the mental hygiene clinic of Queens
General Hospital, in the Quaker Emergency Service Readjustment Center, in practice and
in consultation, some five hundred children a year came to my attention. In the clinics I
built upon intimate relationship with the community so that I had frequent contact with
practically every public and private agency in New York that deals with mental-hygiene
problems of children and young people (1954a, pp. 296-297).
But this was the more impersonal side of his explicitly clinic-originated presentation of his
support for his conclusions.
More frequently, he would simply refer to clinic interactions, as when he describes how
“[a] number of times, young gang chiefs have conferred with me in the clinic,” and how those
gang chiefs had been unable to fmd any help from other adults (1966, p. 280). Or, when
addressing the effects of comic books, he notes how an “anxious mother consulted me some time
ago,” and describes the plight of the woman’s daughter, who had been assaulted numerous times
by comic-book reading delinquents (1948a, p. 6). He did not have to explicitly remind the
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audience that he had talked with his patients at length; this could be demonstrated quite simply by
quoting conversations from his clinical experience, as he did at length in Seduction o f the
Innocent, where children’s comments about the comic books and the messages they received
from them were foregrounded. A good example o f this comes when Wertham supports his
argument that children deny reading crime comic books: “Typical is the remark of an eight-yearold child at the end of our interview: ‘Please don’t tell my mother that I read Crime Does Not
Pay and Superman! I keep them always on the bottom of the heap’” (1954a, p. 114). Another
example finds Wertham quoting a “small boy,” a comic book reader who was “asked what he
wanted to be when he grew up.” “His instant reply was enthusiastic: ‘I want to be a sex
maniac!” (1954a, p. 174). By allowing the children to do the speaking, Wertham could make it
seem more like he was following their lead instead of dictating to them. And, certainly, by
quoting children, Wertham was able to capitalize on his access to them. He cast himself as an
expert who had experienced prolonged, involved, and personal discussions with the children.
This dovetailed with his denunciation of other professionals, whom (as we have seen) Wertham
made out to be distant from the actual needs of children and mental patients.
The real wealth of Wertham’s use o f ‘personal’ data found Wertham dealing with his
subjects as case studies in jails and mental institutions. This kind of support almost filled Dark
Legend, The Show o f Violence, and The Circle o f Guilt, all of which relied heavily on case-study
interviews; Dark Legend and The Circle o f Guilt each took single case studies as their central
narrative, while The Show o f Violence consisted mostly of chapters that addressed individual case
studies. In these books, the conversation with the accused criminal, usually in a jail or mental
institution where they have been confined, provides an anchor for Wertham’s assertions. Many
of these conversations were referred to, but not quoted at length. Wertham reflected on
conversations with Santana in The Circle o f Guilt: “The more we talked, the more I realized that
a certain quiet shyness was a lifetime characteristic of his” (1956, p. 25). And as that book
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progresses, the critique that Wertham has to offer of the other professions comes from how they
have not bothered to talk to him about himself.
Conversations with accused criminals play a larger role in The Show o f Violence, where,
for instance, Wertham gives his incarcerated patient Robert Irwin a significant role of his own in
the chapter where his case is considered. Wertham presents Irwin’s understanding of himself by
quoting their conversations, and a letter that Irwin wrote, at length. The content of these
conversations demonstrates Irwin’s lack of malice, potential value to society, and inability to
control himself from time to time. He even quoted Irwin’s own admiring commentary, when he
responded to one of Wertham’s queries by responding, “[y]ou know what I think of you. Apart
from the human end, you have more brains than all o f them put together” (1949a, p. 163).
While Wertham included numerous quotes from his patients, Lindner was even more
consistent in his use of quotes of his analysands. When he provided support for his arguments, it
usually came in the form o f quotations from psychoanalytic sessions. A good example o f how
Lindner would position himself in the recounting of interactions with analysands can be found in
an article he penned for McLean’s that begins with Lindner receiving a telephone call at home
one night. Lindner answers it; it is a family friend, Grace, who has a problem. Here Lindner
breaks into a direct-quoting presentation, Grace explains that she and her husband Hal are having
problems with their son, Tony. Lindner offers reassurance, and meets with the parents in his
office. In addition to providing quotations of their interactions, always using his friends’ first
names, Lindner gives back-stage information on his own state o f mind. He describes how, when
he first gets the phone call, he “found it impossible to concentrate on the work before me. My
mind kept reverting to the brief but urgent conversation I had just had with Grace” (1956c, p. 31).
Later, he remarks, “[i]n the meantime I did some thinking about Tony. I had known the boy for
all but two of his fourteen years, known him better than I did any other child of the friends we
had made in Baltimore” (1956c, p. 100). Pairing his own inner thoughts, fears, frustrations, and
suspicions with direct quotations of analytic sessions, Lindner’s authoritative stance was even
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more personal in tone than Wertham’s. He used this tone to underscore his own personal
investment in his analysand’s concerns and to establish not only direct contact with troubled
individuals, but also to communicate his sense of duty to these people.
Though Lindner’s deployment of his backstage information was only an occasional
component of his work, his recounting of his analytic sessions was the major way he supported
his arguments. Frequently, this would take the form of an abbreviated summary of cases, as
when he turned to the case of Henry in Prescription fo r Rebellion. Henry was a screen actor and
an alcoholic, who went to a sanitorium for help; his analyst recommended that he retreat from his
career. But then, Lindner “got him through a mutual friend. He is back in the theater now.
You’ve probably seen him lately. He’s a fine actor, and a success” (1953, p. 127). Later, he
presents the case of “Jack,” a doctor who suffered from addiction to drugs and turned to analysis
(including one analyst who was a disciple of Wilhelm Reich) to find help. After that failed, Jack
turned to Lindner, who used his own hypnoanalytic technique on him, resulting in a quick
success. Jack went on to develop a new kind of antibiotic, noted Lindner (1953, pp. 130-134).
Established in this context, Lindner’s assertions, mostly regarding the need for people to rebel in
a manner that their own instincts demand, were given support through repeated narratives of
success. In most of his works, if Lindner doesn’t arrive ‘too late,’ (as in the case of a murderer
whom Lindner is assigned to analyze after the deed) he presents his expertise as something that
was sufficient to work in the real world. Lindner supported his arguments regarding social
problems with these case study success stories. Plainly, he was suggesting that if these cases
worked on the individual level, his own vision could be beneficially applied to the world at large.
In this sense, Lindner’s authority rested on an implicit synecdoche that held that his experience
with his individual analysands represented a communion with the people. It was as if he
maintained a direct, one-on-one relationship with the entire culture when he dealt with his
analysands.
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Like Wertham, Lindner also located his own expertise in jail, where many of his
analysands were located, most obviously in Stone Walls and Men. In that book, the emphasis on
the author’s own location was stressed in repeated stories about what life in prison was ‘really
like.’ These were interwoven with statements of how important being in prison was to
understanding the life of a prisoner. Making this case for himself, Lindner finds that “[w]hen one
has become acquainted with criminals and their histories and has been permitted to observe them
intimately, much that would otherwise be foreign to our knowledge becomes evident” (1946, p.
101). His presence in the prison was offered as a way of lifting the veil that surrounded the
institution; through repeated descriptions of case studies and his interactions with prisoners, he
could perform this presence in his writing. As in much of his other work, he presents the
interactions in great detail, with direct quotes. Whereas in other writing he may have presented a
story of improvement through psychoanalytic treatment, the case studies in Stone Walls and Men
usually ended with a diagnosis; the lack of success in treating the prisoners, it was implied, was
due to the inability of prisons to deal with prisoners’ needs. So, each case study, by virtue of its
lack of a narrative of improvement, was a bit of evidence in support of the larger story of a prison
system in trouble.
Methodology
The support that was Wertham and Lindner provided in their writings was often framed
by claims regarding the efficacy and superiority of their own methodologies. These claims
would, in what is now a familiar pattern, establish a certain solidarity with the patients or
analysands they treated. So, Wertham described psychiatry as “the art of listening,” (1941, p. 33)
and explained a psychiatric examination as an open-ended process that was carried out in a
friendly manner. “Psychiatric listening,” he insisted, was “not the same as questioning” (1941, p.
33). At the same time, though, he maintained that “[pjsychiatry is a science” that follows “rules
of scientific method” (1941, p. 40). Wertham painted a picture of psychiatric method, then, that
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planted its feet both in ‘art’ that was sensitive to human emotional needs and a ‘science’ that was
accurate and trustworthy.
But many of Wertham’s descriptions of his own methodologies tended toward
emphasizing the scientific side of psychiatry. Frequently, this took the form of a kind of barrage
of information regarding his own methodologies, as when he described numerous kinds of
psychiatric tests, including I.Q. tests, other intelligence tests, the Machover test, and the Koch
test, all of which he gave to Santana in The Circle o f Guilt (1956, pp. 43-48). Seduction o f the
Innocent contained an even more exhaustive list of psychiatric tests, as Wertham described how
his conclusions were based on the results of questionnaires, the Rorschach test, the Thematic
Apperception Test, the Mosaic Test, the Association test, the Duess Test, group psychotherapy,
drawing exercises, and reading tests (1954a, pp. 48-81).
Lindner’s positioning of his own methodology was, in places, remarkably similar to
Wertham’s stance. Like Wertham, Lindner offered his own method as a combination of art and
science. He discusses psychoanalysis as a mode of understanding “[f]ounded upon observations
of human functioning and behavior” and “grounded in the laws of interpersonal communication,”
lending it a rather scientific air (1955, xvi). But he also called it “an art so fine that it can actually
be practiced as a legitimate occupation,” further advancing the notion that a psychoanalyst is
nothing more than an artist at understanding, the product of an intensive course of study
and training which has—if it has been successful—rendered him unusually sensitive to
his fellow men. And it is this sensitivity—in short, the analyst’s own person—which is
the single instrument, the only tool, with which he performs. Only on himself, and on
nothing else, does he depend (1955, pp. xvi-xvii).
The psychoanalytic process was figured as something profoundly dyadic, involving only a
personal bond between the analysand and a very ‘sensitive’ analyst. Like Wertham, Lindner
appealed both to ideals of a rigorous science and a humanely applied, artful, relationship with the
patient/analysand.
By placing descriptions o f his methodologies at the beginning of his writings, Wertham
made his subsequent conclusions out to be results of a uniquely thorough process. As he stated,
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[t]he only method that permits us to arrive at carefully developed, valid results is the
clinical method, which permits us to study the whole child and not just one facet.
Nothing can replace concrete clinical analyses of actual significant cases. Clinical study
means thorough examination of actual significant cases. Clinical study means thorough
examination and observation, follow-up studies over a considerable period, analysis of
early conditioning, study of physique and of social situation (1966, p. 207).
Such claims regarding the superiority of psychiatry’s methodologies were frequently juxtaposed
with critiques of methodologies found in other professions and by other psychiatrists and
psychologists. Wertham aimed much of this criticism at experimental and quantitative research
methods (e.g., 1966, pp. 205-206), and Lindner placed his own methodological doctrine alongside
critiques of quantitative studies, (e.g., 1946, pp. 4-5)
Lindner’s concern for methodology was less thoroughly alluded to in his writings, but it
did occupy some place in his work, again usually occurring early in certain texts, acting as a
guarantor of the authority of subsequent conclusions. His concern for methodology can be traced
back to Rebel Without a Cause, which was written as an exploration of Lindner’s own technique
of ‘hypnoanalysis,’ a combination of hypnosis and psychoanalysis. Later texts found Lindner
posing similar, if less rigorous, methodological stances, as when, in Fifty-Minute Hour, he
recounted how he established a “play technique,” or a “psychoanalysis through play” with a
deeply troubled analysand (1955, p. 33). A more straightforward approach to claiming
methodological rigor came when he claimed methods of statistical analysis (a method he
supported as long as it was only one of many tools), experiment, synthesis, individuation, and
conjugate samples as tools for his understanding of crime in Stone Walls and Men (1946, pp. 511). Perhaps because he was more willing than Wertham to present himself as an expert apart
from the professions, Lindner reserved less space for discussions of methodology as a way of
assuring his own expertise.
Neologism
On the linguistic level, Lindner and Wertham both differed from the more orthodox
popular psychiatric experts. One difference between them and, for instance, the Menningers, was
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their willingness to express themselves in their popular works by using words that they
themselves had invented. Edward Strecker’s use of terms such as momism and the silver cord
pointed to the potential importance of these quasi-professional terms. But whereas Strecker’s
new terms derived their novelty from the fact that they were imported from non-psychiatric
fields, (‘mom’ and ‘momism’ were borrowed from Philip Wylie, and ‘the silver cord’ was
inspired by the Sidney Howard (1927) play of the same name, which was itself probably related
to the Shirley Brooks (1862) short story, also called ‘The Silver Cord’) Lindner and Wertham
used terms that they offered as their own. The use of these neologisms in their work became
another way of asserting their ‘outsider’ stances. If, as Bourdieu suggests, a “way of speaking”
acts as a “guarantee of delegation” of a communicator, (1991, p. 107) then creating a new
vocabulary could be seen as a way of performing a kind of individualistic authority. Having
explicitly refused many of the trappings of psychiatry and other professions, they staked out new,
maverick vantage points through use of terms that they had devised themselves.
Wertham made voluminous use of neologisms. His earliest neologistic enterprises were
suffused with a clinical sensibility. In his first popular book, Dark Legend, he suggested two new
terms to diagnose what had happened to the book’s central figure, Gino. The first of these was
the “Orestes complex,” (1941, p. 222) a diagnosis that Wertham defined very carefully, and that
he arrived at by way of rejecting the more orthodox professional diagnosis of the Oedipus
complex. He subtly indicates that he has invented the idea of the Orestes complex by simply
arriving at the diagnosis, as if stumbling upon the idea that “[tjhis hostility against the mother
based on excessive attachment to her can be designated as the Orestes complex” (1941, p. 222).
Additionally, Wertham describes how Gino’s “disorder of thinking” bears similarities to what “is
called catathymic thinking, from kata—meaning according to, and thymos—meaning wish or
emotional tendency” (1941, p. 224). From this, Wertham recalls how “I decided, therefore, that
the clinical patterns like that in Gino’s case could logically be called Catathymic Crisis” (1941, p.
224). Here, Wertham makes it more clear that he has invented this new term. However, both the
230

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e co p y rig h t o w n er. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

Orestes complex and Catathymic Crisis maintained some relationship with professional
psychiatry. Wertham was certainly playing the role of the maverick here, making clear how his
terminology was stretching the boundaries of the existing profession. However, the links to the
profession were still quite clear; he was acting more as a reformer than as a revolutionary. The
neologisms of Dark Legend took measured paces away from orthodox professionalism. These
were still types o f ‘crises’ and ‘complexes,’ both of which were established parts of psychiatry’s
phraseology.
But as he continued to write popular books and articles, Wertham staked out a more
independent authoritative space for himself with his neologisms. Certainly, this was in part a
measure of his growing comfort with his role as a popularizer. His new terms were deployed to
encapsulate new or enduring problems in terms that could be readily understood by a lay
audience, making past neologisms such as ‘catathymic crisis’ seem needlessly professional. He
used one neologism, ‘the air-conditioned conscience,’ in an essay by that title that aimed at
criticizing other popular psychological works, where he arrived at the conclusion that popular
psychological books “go a long way to help you to an escape from social responsibility. One can
extract from [the psychological books] a new concept, never before so folly elaborated—the
concept of an air-conditioned conscience” (1949c, p. 27). Here Wertham even calls attention to
the fact that the term is one of his own invention. Moreover, it is significant that the term ‘airconditioned conscience’ bears no formal earmarks of psychiatric terminology, and is used in an
essay written to criticize Wertham’s professional peers. It was his own neologism.
Wertham created other neologisms in his writings on the comic books, and frequently
called attention to the fact that he had invented these terms himself, as when he recalls that he has
“found a specific reading disorder which I called linear dyslexia, characterized by a number of
special symptoms, that comes directly from comic-book reading” (1955, p. 611). And in the
same article he postulates that “American children suffer from literary avitaminosis,” a kind of
distance from reading that comes from comic book (1955, p. 612). In Seduction o f the Innocent,
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he considers children who have read too many comics and have developed “a special kind of
‘reading.’ They have become what I call ‘picture readers’” (1954a, p. 139). Other writings on
the comic book problem find Wertham repeatedly describing what he calls the “Superman
ideology” or “Superman conceit,” a term he had arrived at to describe the quasi-fascist ideology
he believed was propagated by superhero comics, with their emphasis on the rule by the strong.
And he even designated a master term with which to diagnosis comic book readers, stipulating a
“comic-book syndrome” with its own particular symptoms and causes (1954a, p. 114). Through
all of these neologisms, it was clear that Wertham himself had invented the terms. There are still
some lingering hints of clinical or medical expertise here, as if he were trying to position himself
simultaneously as a professional and a maverick within the profession.
Other neologisms that Wertham created aimed for a less professional, but more dramatic
way o f framing the issues he addressed. He suggested a new term for describing the children who
were “less well-endowed materially, intellectually, educationally and socially,” rejecting the idea
of the ‘predisposed child,’ and asserting that “[i]t is far more scientific to use the concept we
worked out at Lafargue, of the endangered child’ (1954a, p. 297, my ital.). Rooting the origin of
this rather approachable neologism in the clinic, Wertham’s preference for the term is closely tied
to his own attempt to align himself with the people. By considering children to be ‘endangered’
instead of presupposed, he distanced himself from seemingly callous experts who did not
approach the issue from the point of view of the children. A similar device can be found in The
Circle o f Guilt, where he suggests that his patient “belongs to that category which I call the
unplaced'' (1956, pp. 191-192, ital. in orig.). Again, Wertham chooses an approachable term, and
calls attention to the fact that he himself created it.
Another potential symbolic dimension o f neologisms, their ability to reframe a debate in
shocking new terms, can be found in Wertham’s discussion of violence in the mass media.
Again, he again locates himself as the font of new terms when he writes that the debate over
violence in the mass media “pertains to the social control of what I have called the new
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pornography, the glorification o f violence and sadism” (1954a, p. 329). Obviously, by dubbing
mass media violence ‘the new pornography,’ Wertham was attempting to re-frame the debate in
terms of pornography, a move calculated to elicit a certain shock from his audience. The fact that
he had devised so many neologisms in his writings on comic books is significant, for it was
during the period where he focused on the comic books (roughly, 1948-1954) that he was most
widely read. It was never more clear that he was writing for a large lay audience, and the public
spotlight seems to have brought out the most neologisms from Wertham. Neologisms appear
when it is in an expert’s interest to stake out an (at least somewhat) independent stance in an
appeal to a lay audience.
Eventually, Wertham would even devise a neologism to define his own field of study. In
A Sign fo r Cain, he proclaimed that
[sjerious concern with violence, as well as the study of prevention, is something new.
For convenience’s sake, one may speak of ‘violentology,’ meaning the study of violence
from the point of view o f its prevention. The term focuses attention on a phenomenon
which people generally do not like to face in its stark reality, and it indicates that it is a
special problem (1966, p. 363).
The neologism of ‘violentology’ allowed Wertham to stake out a novel position that could not be
wholly subsumed by psychiatry or any other profession. In a sense, it allowed him to write
himself into a new field of inquiry, one that he dominated because he had, after all, created it.
Lindner did much the same thing in his study of crime. Instead of dealing directly with ‘crime’ or
with ‘mental illness,’ two topics that were tied to his background in criminology and psychology,
he carved out a new field, the study of “criminotics,” those whose criminal behavior could be
understood through psychological inquiry (1946, p. x). In Lindner’s hands, the terms criminotics
and criminosis were deployed as a kind of hybrid of psychology and criminology. That hybrid
appeal seems to have been precisely the point; the idea of criminosis gave Lindner a way of
presenting his ideas as the outcome of a unified approach to the topic of crime, and, considering
the very medical-seeming suffixes of these terms, perhaps even allowed him to smuggle in a
soupcon of medical expertise.
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While Wertham employed virtual hailstorm of new neologisms, Lindner chose a very few
new terms to define his projects. But this small number of neologisms was used liberally
throughout his work. They acted as slogan-ready central themes for his master narrative
concerning the battle between the individual and society, and the need to resist conformity at all
times. Perhaps most central was the idea of ‘adjustment,’ which defined so much of Lindner’s
work. He defined adjustment as the alteration of the individual to suit the needs of the
collectivity, and considered it the cause o f the “scarce-enviable current condition of man” (1953,
p. 10). “The word itself,” he declared,
once the property of mechanical science, was borrowed first by biology, later taken over
by physiology, and recently appropriated by psychology, wherein it has come to be
identified most closely with a broad concept that includes a way of life and an attitude
toward existence (1953, p. 11).
Basically, adjustment was Lindner’s word for conformity, though he was not adverse to using that
word, too, as he did in the title of Must You Conform? (one wonders if he had originally
suggested the title ‘Must You Adjust’). Lindner’s other neologisms radiated out from this
concept of adjustment, such as his notion of “the Eleventh Commandment,” which stated that
“You Must Adjust” (1956c, p. 102). He also used the word ‘rebellion’ as a neologism of sorts to
explain how he believed individuals could rediscover themselves and fight conformity. It was
deemed “positive rebellion” when the individual responded to his truly creative instincts and
found new healthy ways of living, and “negative rebellion” in cases where the individual struck
out blindly in frustration, thwarting both society and his or her own creative needs (1953, p. 219).
All of this was based on Lindner’s neologism for the constraints on mankind, what he called the
“triad of limitations.” Defining this term, he explained that “One side of this triangle is the
medium in which [people] must live; the second is the equipment they have or can fashion with
which to live; the third is the fact of their mortality” (1953, p. 4).
Though the idea of a ‘triangle of limitations’ had a more scientific air about it, most of
Lindner’s neologisms were really just new uses of perfectly prosaic words. Adjustment,
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rebellion, and conformity were hardly foreign to the lexicon of his readership. It was just the fact
that he used the terms in unorthodox ways, and assigned so much explanatory power to them, that
gave them a special status. Even ‘The Eleventh Commandment’ has been used by others, usually
indicating the directive ‘thou shalt not get caught.’ The contrast with Wertham is instructive;
compared to him, Lindner was much less interested in creating truly new terms. By creating
neologisms that were already part of everyday parlance, Lindner was, on a linguistic level,
casting his lot with ‘the people’. He was more consistent in his refusal of all things professional,
stance that seems utterly appropriate for an expert who lacked the extensive credentials of many
of the other experts in the field of psychological and psychiatric experts in the 1950’s. The
“guarantee of delegation” that existed in his phraseology assured his audience of his own
identification with the people. Instead of taking the role of an expert on the side of the people, he
came off as one of the people who was on the side of the people. Certainly, this stance was
something that eventually worked itself out in his work as he steadily aimed for less professional
audiences. Emerging from the professionalese stew that he had put forward in Rebel Without a
Cause and (albeit less so) in Stone Walls and Men, he found a consistent voice for himself in
Prescription fo r Rebellion, Fifty-Minute Hour, and Must You Conform?
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Couching the Mass Man:
Erich Fromm, Robert Lindner,
And the Heterodox Perspective of Lay Analysis

As we have seen, the Menninger brothers and Edward Strecker gained their entrde to
popular through their elite authority as psychiatrists, with an emphasis on their alignment with
medicine. When Fredric Wertham took on issues relating to violence, including juvenile
delinquency, the mass media, and murder, he made himself out as a kind of professional
discontent, as someone who possessed both the requisite medical credentials and a critical
perspective on those credentials. Robert Lindner wove his psychological and criminological
credentials into his own popular writings, but his lack of psychiatric (i.e., medical) authority
prompted him to attack professional orthodoxy in a more profound manner than Wertham.
Lindner offered a relatively pure distillate of anti-professionalism that contrasted with Wertham’s
posture o f psychiatric professionalism mixed with psychiatric professionalism.
Lindner’s position, as a lay analyst, shared much with, and was at times largely inspired
by, the writings and theories of Erich Fromm. Both Fromm and Lindner presented, from their
psychological and psychoanalytic standings, diagnoses of contemporary culture and society as a
whole. They posited psychological versions of the mass culture argument, claiming that
individual spontaneity and freedom had been sacrificed in the name of progress in Western
society. Like never before, this mass culture analysis placed the world on the analyst’s couch.
Fromm’s writings in particular eschewed the kind of medical psychiatry-writ-large that was found
in earlier writing by the Menningers and Strecker. The turn toward societal factors in
psychological issues that Wertham stressed was, for Fromm, a defining motif.
Erich Fromm’s role as a popularizer cannot be understood without first reviewing some
of his biography. Bom in Frankfurt in 1900 (Hausdorff, 1972, p. 7), he excelled in school and
received his Ph.D. in sociology in 1924 (Burston, 1991, p. 15). By the time he received his
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degree, he had already become fascinated with psychoanalytic methods of inquiry and therapy.
In the late twenties and early thirties, he lectured at the Psychoanalytic Institute of Frankfurt and
the Institute for Social Research at the University o f Frankfurt (Hausdorff, 1972, p. 7). His
interest in psychoanalysis did not occlude political concerns; by 1919, he became a Socialist
(Hausdorff, 1972, p. 14). The combination of socialist and psychoanalytic ideas would be a
defining theme of much of Fromm’s work.
Fromm pursued no medical training in his psychoanalytic education, nor would he ever
do so (Hausdorff, 1972, p. 16). Psychoanalysis and medicine had much less to do with each other
in Europe than in America, where the two fields were converging, in what has been alternately
cast as psychiatry’s appropriation of psychoanalysis, (Schwartz, 1999, p. 144) or as a
psychoanalytic coup within psychiatry (Shorter, 1997, pp. 145-189). When Fromm emigrated to
the United States in 1934, after the Nazi takeover in Germany, he found that his lack of medical
credentials blocked him from psychoanalytic practice; the American Psychoanalytic Association
(which had essentially set itself up as the monopoly of legitimate psychoanalytic authority) had
made medical training a prerequisite for membership (Hausdorff, 1972, p. 17). Nor was Fromm
alone in this predicament. Other noted analysts, such as Theodor Reik, Otto Rank, and Anna
Freud, also lacked medical training.3 Fromm dismissed the medicalization of psychoanalysis,
building more bridges with the studies of religion and social science than with medicine. Karl
Menninger, who would act as a kind of rival to Fromm in the ensuing decades, plaintively
remarked on how the “problem of the lay analyst exiled from Europe has been an especially
painful one,” but nevertheless openly questioned Fromm’s abilities as an analyst on the basis of
Fromm’s lack of medical credentials (Meninger quoted in Hausdorff 1972, p. 17). In a letter to
English analyst (and Freud biographer) Ernest Jones, Menninger, almost certainly referring to
Fromm, dismissed “the psychology of the refugee analysts” as “very disappointing,” observing

3 The American Psychoanalytic Association did admit some non-medical analysts who had emigrated
from Europe, but Fromm was never allowed in.
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that “they are not here very long until they have forgotten all we have done for them here”
(Faulkner & Pruitt, 1988, p. 390). The psychiatric orthodoxy made no room for Fromm.
If his lack of medical credentials curtailed Fromm’s professional efforts, it did not stand
in the way of his writing. He was a prolific, and very popular writer. His earliest writings, such
as The Development o f the Dogma o f Christ (1931), concerned religion, and were originally
penned in German. After publishing some English-language essays mostly in professional
journals (the journal Psychiatry did not refuse submissions from lay analysts, and seems to have
been a home away from home for Fromm), Fromm’s first book written in English, Escape From
Freedom, was published in 1941. In Escape From Freedom, Fromm merged concerns with
psychoanalytic theory, politics, and the relationship between society and personality. The
language he used in the book was very approachable, touching on wide-ranging fields such as
history and religion; certainly, this was a factor when the book was picked up by publishers Holt,
Rinehart, & Winston. It was also important that the book advanced a psychological perspective
on the phenomena of fascism and Nazism. This topic, no doubt, resonated with the lay audience
at the time; in a sense, Escape From Freedom was as much of a translation of World War II into
professional psychological terms as William Menninger’s Psychiatry in a Troubled World or
Strecker’s Their Mothers’ Sons. Escape From Freedom did not sell as well as some of Fromm’s
later work, but it was picked up as a selection for the Book of the Month Club, and also prompted
widespread discussion in professional and popular journals. With his first book, Fromm had a
major hit. In a sense, he had sidestepped the rivalry between lay analysis and medical
psychoanalysis by going straight to the public.
Almost all of Fromm’s subsequent books made some kind of popular splash, and he
continued to write for popular periodicals, as well. His next book after Escape From Freedom
was Man For Himself (1947). The two texts shared a great deal in terms of topic and theme; Man
For Himselfwas a sequel to Escape From Freedom, and its title can be taken as a retort to Karl
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Menninger’s Man Against Himself* The Sane Society (1955) finished off the trilogy of Fromm’s
books that diagnosed fascism and sought to explain human liberty, happiness, responsibility, and
politics in broad psychoanalytic terms. His other popular books included The Art o f Loving
(1956a), which took love as a central existential problem understandable through the application
of psychoanalytic theory. The Forgotten Language (1951) explained myths, fairy tales, and
dreams in similar psychoanalytic terms. Sigmund Freud’s Mission (1959) found Fromm taking
on Freud’s influence in psychoanalysis, striving to remake the field in terms of science and cast
off what he found to be the restrictive constraints of orthodox Freudianism. May Man Prevail?
(1961) signified a kind of shift for Fromm; it addressed the issue of nuclear weapons proliferation
and nuclear war, with a relatively small place for analytic insights. And finally, a lesser known
text that Fromm wrote for The Call Association in 1960, Let Man Prevail, was a self-proclaimed
“socialist manifesto” that, while frequently left aside in considerations of Fromm’s writing,
illustrates how his leftist political leanings led him to write for a lay audience that he could
address as fellow socialists.
Erich Fromm’s analyses of the relationship between society and the individual
emphasized the possibility for a harmony between societal pressures and individual needs. This
dialectic was clearly inspired by Freud’s concern, as expressed in (among other writings)
Civilization and Its Discontents, for how psychoanalysis could broaden our understanding of
society, though Freud was much less optimistic regarding the possibility for harmony between
individuals and society. As we shall see, Fromm did not hide his Freudian influences, nor did he
follow Freud uncritically. Fromm’s intellectual milieu provided fertile ground for his political
and so-called ‘Neo-Freudian’ stance. He was in some contact with the Zodiac Club, a rather
forward-thinking group of analysts that included such psychoanalytic luminaries as Karen
Homey, Clara Thompson, and Harry Stack Sullivan (Burston, 1991, p. 24). And his

4 After publishing Man Against Himselfin 1938, Karl Menninger noted in the foreword to his next book,
Love Against Hate (1942a) that he had considered titling the latter book “Man For Himself.” Five years
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correspondence in the late thirties and forties found Fromm in contact with analysts such as
Wilhelm Reich, Franz Alexander, and Otto Fenichel; social scientists Paul Lazarsfeld, Ruth
Benedict, and (his friend and one-time analysand) David Riesman; as well as Conrad Aiken,
Leslie Farber and Horace Minter. And significantly, Fromm shared some friendly
correspondence with Fredric Wertham.
Fromm distilled these influences, merging his interest in religion, his left-wing political
concerns, a characterological emphasis that resembled much of the work produced by Ruth
Benedict, Geoffrey Gorer, and David Riesman (in which societies were characterized by the
psychological character that they promulgated), a critique of mass culture that lined up closely
with the work of other Frankfurt school regulars, and his boldly, plainly revisionist Freudian
approach. One of Fromm’s more enduring narratives, that of the (in Fromm’s opinion,
unnecessarily) constricting effects of society on the individual, was shared with Robert Lindner.
Because Fromm and Lindner shared a professional stance (as lay analysts) and an overarching
narrative (the mass culture critique of modem society and its effects on the individual), I will
bring Lindner back into the discussion, where relevant and not redundant, to elucidate the
sometimes-differing, sometimes-identical approaches they used.
The New Turf of Fromm’s Psychological Frontiers
Fromm made little distinction between the writing he intended for a professional
audience (as, for instance, his articles for the journal Psychiatry must be considered) and those
that were given broader distribution. Throughout his work, he positioned himself as a
‘psychologist’ or a ‘psychoanalyst’. In a sense, he invented his own field of expertise, identifying
himself with a set of approaches that invoked these professional-sounding ‘psy’ labels, while
keeping the pure (medical) professionalism of someone like Edward Strecker at an arm’s length.
Like Fredric Wertham and his ‘social psychiatry,’ Fromm identified his approach with terms that
staked out new terrain. In this sense, Fromm could be considered as a kind of homesteader on the

later, Fromm’s Man For Himselfwas published. So, Menninger may have stolen Fromm’s thunder here.
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field o f expertise, charting what he made out to be new territory, identifying his expertise on his
own terms, and generally (but not strictly) defining himself against any dominant streams of
psychological thought.
These quasi-professional labels for his own work were frequently set up as the lever of
analysis, allowing him to consider the world in ways that were explicitly offered as new and
different, and even revolutionary. He had his own definition of psychology, one that he related to
enduring modes of philosophical inquiry. “Undoubtedly,” he claimed,
the desire to know our fellow men and ourselves corresponds to a deep need in human
beings...Man is endowed with reason and imagination; his fellow man and he himself are
problems which he cannot help trying to solve. The endeavor to understand man by
thought is called psychology, ‘the knowledge of the soul’” (1957, p. 10).
Having assigned this role to psychology, he remained contrary to what he believed were the
dominant trends in psychology, finding dominant ideas overly reductive in their treatment of the
human experience. He argued that psychology was best suited to establishing what “man is
not...,” concluding that the “legitimate aim of psychology, as far as ultimate knowledge is
concerned, is the negative, the removal of distortions and illusions, not the positive, full, and
complete knowledge of a human being” (1957, p. 10 [ital. in orig.]). But this limitation did not
make psychology useless; to the contrary, he saw “[psychological knowledge” as possibly “one
condition for full knowledge in the act of love” (1957, p. 10). And, because “full ‘knowledge’
can occur only in the act of love,” psychology’s importance was hardly negligible (1957, p. 11).
Significantly, Fromm avoided attributing too much power to psychology, a field with which he
was clearly at odds. Suspicious of how psychology had been advanced by other writers as a way
of knowing everything, he claimed to be working within a psychology that retained an ultimate
respect for the ‘human’ and, especially, for ‘love.’ By so doing, he donned a basic expertise,
itself hooded in a non-professional, grass-roots symbolism. Instead of addressing his audience
only as an expert who knew what the masses did not (for, he did do this), he was also quick to
point out that he remembered what other experts had forgotten—that which makes us human.
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Fromm assigned to his psychological approach a concern with ethics, highlighting how
his own insights could be integrated into a more ethical life. Again, one is struck by his disdain
for professional routine, and desire to move into ethical territory he believed was neglected by the
rest of psychology. This division of the field into the ethical (represented by himself) and the
scientific (represented by seemingly every other psychologist) can be found in his dictum that the
progress of psychology lies not in the direction of divorcing an alleged ‘natural’ from an
alleged ‘spiritual’ realm and focusing attention on the former, but in the return to the
great tradition of humanistic ethics which looked at man in his physico-spiritual totality,
believing that man’s aim is to be him selfand that the condition for attaining this goal is
that man be fo r him self(1947, p. 7 [ital. in orig.]).
This stance yoked psychology to mankind’s innermost needs, but simultaneously installed
psychology (sometimes without calling it by name) as the approach that could correct the
mentally unhealthy patterns that result from unethical living. Fromm assured that
our knowledge of human nature [achieved through psychological inquiry] does not lead
to ethical relativism but, on the contrary,.. .the sources of norms for ethical conduct are
to be found in man’s nature itself... [M]oral norms are based upon man’s inherent
qualities, and...their violation results in mental and emotional disintegration (1947, p. 7).
Though it is probably a stretch to call this an out and out concealment of professionalism, it is no
exaggeration to say that Fromm’s expertise was sometimes played off as something that came not
from a profession, but from a synthesis of diffuse intellectual currents. Of course, this was hardly
dishonest; Fromm was an eclectic intellectual. His position outside o f the mainstream of the
psychological professions led him to take a Janus posture vis-h-vis the professions, stressing the
need to get away from what the professions have been, but nevertheless advancing psychology as
a mode of inquiry that could tell us who we are, as a lever with which to move the world.
But Fromm was not always so vague when describing his psychological approach.
Though he was not allowed into the American Psychoanalytic Association, he was direct in
asserting that psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic theory were the important contemporary thrusts
in psychology. He averred that “[o]nly a dynamic psychology, the foundations of which have
been laid by Freud, can get further than paying lip service to the human factor” in psychology
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(1941, p. 14). ‘Dynamic psychology’ was, and still is, widely used as a synonym for Freudderived psychoanalysis, and its use here is certainly consistent with that. Fromm’s deployment of
psychoanalysis (as with psychology generally) did, on occasion, step into recollections of his
interactions with analysands. Justifying this kind of support, he remarked that “I intentionally
refer to individual psychology and to observations that have been made in the minute studies of
individuals by the psychoanalytic procedure” (1941, p. 136). This statement, with its emphasis
on the author’s experience in his vocation, would seem to be a classical statement of professional
expertise. However, Fromm stopped short of investing too much in psychoanalysis, noting that
“psychoanalysis does not live up to the ideal which for many years was the ideal of academic
psychology, that is, the approximation of the experimental methods of natural sciences...” (1941,
p. 136). But this kind of perambulating, ambivalent stance ends with a defense of
psychoanalysis, which he lauded as “a thoroughly empirical method, based on the painstaking
observation of an individual’s uncensored thoughts, dreams, and phantasies,” further asserting
that “[ojnly a psychology which utilizes the concept o f unconscious forces can penetrate the
confusing rationalizations we are confronted with in analyzing either an individual or a culture”
(1941, pp. 136-137). Tellingly, he raised the flag of psychoanalysis only after first indicating its
difference from the grand professional psychological project. As a lay analyst, Fromm was a
liminal professional. He represented an established discipline, with its own terminology, theories,
and practices. But, as someone rejected from the increasingly professionalized American
psychoanalytic project, he cast his outsider status not as a lack of credentials, but as a
transcendence of a limited professional project.
With this measured endorsement of psychoanalytic theory and methodology, Fromm
went on to justify his application of data gathered in individual psychoanalytic sessions to
conclusions that concerned entire societies and cultures. He dealt with this issue directly, arguing
that “[a]ny group consists of individuals and nothing but individuals, and psychological
mechanisms which we find operating in a group can therefore only be mechanisms that operate in
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individuals” (1947, p. 137). He acknowledges here that some readers may suspect that a
psychoanalyst, who presumably deals with individuals who suffer from a variety of mental
problems, would know little about the normal, mentally healthy part of the world. Again, Fromm
assures his readers that the link between his analysands and the outside world was closer than
some might have suspected. For “neurotics,” he assured, were not so different from everyone
else (1947, p. 137). Indeed, Fromm postulated that neurosis was the norm; he saw a widespread
neurosis as the result of Western society’s disharmony with individual needs (1947, pp. 137-138).
By defining society and the individual largely in terms of each other, and by defining both as
largely neurotic, Fromm bridged the gap between his own empirical observations (when they
were given) and his conclusions regarding the world at large. The world, he insisted, could fit on
the couch.
Fromm promised that psychoanalysis was a method that stressed the human potential for
happiness and ethical behavior. “I must confess,” wrote Fromm, “that during my analytic work I
have become increasingly impressed by. ..the strength of the strivings for happiness and health,
which are part of the natural equipment for man” (1947, p. x). Psychoanalysis’s humane aspects
were further emphasized in his description o f neurosis as “a moral failure,” making “the success
of the therapeutic effort [depend] on the understanding and solution of the person’s moral
problem” (1947, p. viii). Because psychoanalysis took “the total personality” as its subject, he
assured, psychoanalysis was the only psychological approach that could claim to address ethical
issues (1947, p. 31). If psychoanalysis “is the attempt to uncover the truth about oneself,”
reasoned Fromm, it could be seen as a continuation of “the tradition o f thought which, since
Buddha and Socrates, believes in truth as the power that makes man virtuous and free, or—in
Freud’s terminology—‘healthy’” (1947, pp. 35-36). By stipulating a psychoanalysis that blurred
the boundaries between psychology, other social sciences, philosophy, and even religion, Fromm
took his lack of professional credentials as a factor that freed him from any one theoretical tack.
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This hybrid version of psychoanalysis, he argued, gave him a unique access to the ‘whole’
person, and the societies that helped to define those people.
This is not to say that Fromm let anything precede psychoanalysis. He maintained that
“[t]here is no situation which provides for a better opportunity to observe the strength and
tenacity of the forces striving for health than that of psychoanalytic therapy” (1947, p. 223). So,
while other fields were subsumed under psychoanalysis, they could not be substituted for it. By
the mid-1950’s, he had taken to referring to his own standpoint as “humanistic psychoanalysis,”
(1955, p. vii) a neologism he used to refer to his work that claimed a certain understanding of the
‘human’. Humanistic psychoanalysis differed from Freudian psychoanalysis in its stipulation that
“the basic passions of man are not rooted in his instinctive needs, but in the specific conditions of
human existence, in the need to find a new relatedness to man and nature after having lost the
primary related ness of the pre-human stage” (1955, p. viii). By taking a psychoanalytic tack, but
distancing himself from even the most basic Freudian principles, Fromm again took an
ambivalent stance vis-&-vis professionalism, accepting it only up to a certain point, and then
attempting to surpass it with his own individual approach. ‘Humanistic psychoanalysis’ was, if
nothing else, a way of individuating his expertise.
The hybrid authority that Fromm claimed for himself is also evidenced in his use of the
term ‘social psychology’ to refer to his own work. He used the term most frequently in the
1940’s, before he had arrived at his humanistic psychoanalysis. It was a term that allowed him to
turn his psychoanalytic gaze both at the individual and at society. Fromm stipulated that
[i]t is the very task of social psychology to understand [the] process of man’s creation in
history. Why do certain definite changes of man’s character take place from one
historical epoch to another?... Social psychology has to explain why new abilities and
new passions, bad or good, come into existence (1941, p. 13).
With an emphasis on the idea that “man is not only made by history—history is made by man,”
(1941, p. 13) Fromm’s social psychology provided a way of relating psychoanalytic
observations—those insights into individual personalities—to whole societies.
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Fromm’s social psychology was particularly attuned to the condition of neurosis. The
study of individual neurotics, he argued, was perfectly relevant to the world at large, for neurosis
could be considered as a symptom of how certain societies shape personalities (1941, p. 137).
The symptoms of neurosis were explained as “the expression of the fight which the healthy part
of the personality puts up against the crippling influences directed against its unfolding” (1947, p.
220). Instead of limiting his authority only to conclusions regarding where neurosis comes from,
he also offered his insights on how psychological health could be maintained, noting that he
preferred “to reverse the question and ask what the conditions are which are responsible for the
fact that so many people do not become neurotic in spite of the failure in productive and
integrated living” (1947, p. 221). As with members of the psychiatric profession, Fromm
expanded his domain by looking not only at psychological problems, but also at what he deemed
psychological health.
Some important similarities between Fromm and Robert Lindner can be noted here. Like
Fromm, Lindner erected his psychological understanding on a psychoanalytic and ‘humane’
foundation. As Fromm sought to use psychoanalytic postulates to preserve human liberty and
spontaneity, Lindner constructed what he called “a psychoanalytic point of view to complete the
case against adjustment,” using the word ‘adjustment,’ as did Fromm, as a synonym for the
conformity that obtained in the mental makeup of the mass man (1953, p 149). Lindner also
shared with Fromm an ambivalent stance toward the practice of psychology, acting as a kind of
agitator from within as he did in his statement that “if psychology is to change its orientation and
to warrant by this act of change its leading place in the hierarchy of service to man, it cannot
escape having to put itself through the cleansing flames” (1953, p. 214). Though Lindner
immediately thereafter alluded to “many other psychologists” (1953, p. 216) who agreed with
him in his desire for a reformation of psychology, his basic stance is still the same. And, most
importantly, the two lay analysts shared in their work the opposition between the individual—
who possessed certain needs for liberty and nonconformity—and a society that all too frequently
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imposed on these needs. They wrote themselves into this narrative as the defenders of liberty,
psychologizing the mass culture argument. Fromm, and Lindner along with him, invoked
‘psychology’ and particularly ‘psychoanalysis’ in their writings, accepting a certain identification
with these professions. But they did so while simultaneously pushing the professions away by
remarking on how their approaches were unique and revolutionary. Again, this could be
considered as a strategically-impelled method of taking their status as lay analysts to the people,
making their own non-professionalism seem like a guarantor of their loyalty to all that was
human and genuine.
The Two Faces of Freud
Fromm’s refusal to simply accept or reject psychoanalysis (or psychology) wholesale was
mirrored in his method of positioning himself as both aligned with and opposed to the ideas of
Sigmund Freud. As we have seen, Freud’s importance as a prime mover of authority was
widespread in the psychological professions. His perspective was crucial not only to
psychoanalysts, but also to psychiatrists, who (especially around the mid^O* century) were
increasingly appropriating psychoanalytic perspectives. Of course, Freud was also an important
figure in the popular understanding o f psychology; terms like ‘Freudian slip’ and ‘Oedipus
complex’ loomed large in the public understanding o f psychology.
It takes little imagination to realize Fromm’s great reliance on Freud’s ideas; almost
every one o f Fromm’s writings found him discussing Freud by name, and often at length. As a
rule, the ambivalence that characterized Fromm’s relationship to the professions could be found
in his own stated relationship to Freud’s ideas. His refusal to reject or adopt Freud’s viewpoint
wholesale provoked a certain consternation in Karl Menninger, who in a review of Escape From
Freedom, remarked,
[t]he name of Freud, to be sure, is invoked a dozen times or more, but each time with
some patronizing remark to the effect that while Freud had some good ideas along this or
that line, his great error, which Fromm corrects, is so and so” (1942b, p. 317).
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And, in a sense, Menninger was right. Fromm was repeatedly invoking Freud and then departing
from him. In Escape From Freedom, Fromm praises Freud, observing that “Freud went further
than anybody before him in directing attention to the observation and analysis of the irrational
and unconscious forces which determine parts of human behavior” (1941, p. 9). Fromm makes
clear that Freud laid the foundation that made much of his work possible. But, not long after, he
notes that “[c]ontraiy to Freud’s viewpoint,” he believes the “key problem of psychology is that
of the specific kind of relatedness of the individual towards the world,” and has little to do with
the “satisfaction or frustration” of certain instincts (1941, p. 12). Fromm also emphasizes that he
sees history and individuals in a mutually interactive relationship, and disagrees with Freud’s
view of history as something that is pushed along on individual’s psychological forces (1941, p.
14). Fromm also makes the case that Freud’s analysis reduces all ideal motives “as the result of
something ‘mean’,” (1941, p. 294) and that “phenomena of abundance, like love or tenderness,
actually do not play any role in [Freud’s] system” (1941, p. 295). The gist of this argument was
that Fromm had found a way out of Freud’s ostensible ignorance of pure human motives, and had
constructed a more humane philosophy, itself capable of highlighting the potential for harmony
and love in human relationships.
A similar move where Fromm pulls Freud close and then pushes him away is found at the
basis of The Forgotten Language, where he credits Freud revivifying “the old
concept...[that]...dreams are both meaningful and significant” (1951, p. 9). But he then notes
that his approach, “while based on Freud’s theory of dreams, is in sharp contrast to it in many
ways” (1951, p. 47). Fromm differed with Freud’s stance that dreams expressed our most base,
irrational desires. Higher ideals, Fromm opined, also could be found in dreams (1951, p. 47).
An affirmation of Freud’s concern for “the pathology of civilized communities” (1951, p.
20) helps launch the analysis in The Sane Society, but this is followed quickly by a turning away
from orthodox Freudianism. A summary judgment o f how Freud must be responded to was
presented in Fromm’s The Art o f Loving, where he wrote that “[i]n the further development of
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psychoanalysis it is necessaiy to correct and deepen Freud’s concept by translating Freud’s
insights from the physiological into the biological and existential dimension” (1936a, p. 38). This
sense that Freud must be extended, and not merely obeyed, pervades Fromm’s work. And this
stance was crucial. Accepting and then moving beyond Freud allowed Fromm to cast himself as
an expert fully able to understand all of what Freud had to offer, while simultaneously painting
himself as a pioneer who was not limited by the ossified tendencies of any orthodoxy, himself
motivated by a concern to make Freud more humane and more relevant to the way life is lived.
Fromm showcased his branching out from orthodox Freudianism. He published an
article in Scientific American5 that specifically took on Freud’s notion of the Oedipus Myth and
the Oedipus complex, both explaining and critiquing Freud’s approach. Of course, the Oedipus
complex was one of Freud’s most recognizable concepts; Fromm’s choice to pursue it critically
seems to have been well-suited for a lay audience (even if Scientific American was a far cry from,
say, the Saturday Evening Post). Fromm concludes that
[wjhereas Freud assumed that the conflict arising from the child’s incestuous striving is
rooted in his nature and is thus unavoidable, I believe that in a cultural situation in which
respect for the individuality and integrity of every person—hence of every child—is
realized, the Oedipus complex will belong to the past, as does the Oedipus myth (1949, p.
27).
Again, Fromm finds use for, but strays from the orthodoxy of, Freudian dictates.
Though these criticisms of Freud found Fromm making sometimes incremental,
sometimes more dramatic changes, to Freud’s body of ideas, Fromm’s criticism of the individuals
identified with the Freudian movement was quite aggressive. Again, he was quite open in
attacking the orthodoxy, this time writing an essay for The Saturday Review that blasted the
Freudian movement. From the outset, he phrased the critique as a kind of expose, remarking that
Freudian psychoanalysis is commonly understood to be a theory and therapeutic technique, but
that “[w]hat is somewhat less well known is that it is also a ‘movement,’ with an international

249

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of th e co p y rig h t o w n er. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n p rohibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

organization on strictly hierarchical lines, strict rules for belonging, and for many years guided by
a secret committee consisting o f Freud and six other members” (1958, p. 11). Fromm excoriates
this movement, opposing all who hold aloft the flag of orthodox Freudianism.
Fromm contrasts the Freudian movement with the scientific followers of Darwin, posing
the rhetorical question:

. .is there a Darwinistic ‘movement,’ determining who has the right to

call himself a Darwinist, strictly organized and fanatically fighting for the purity of Darwin’s
doctrine?” (1958, p. 11). He compares the Freudian movement to the Stalinists who “call those
who defected and rebelled ‘traitors’ and ‘spies’ of capitalism,” pointing specifically to how
former members of Freud’s inner circle, such as Sandor Ferenczi and Otto Rank, were dismissed
as “psychotic” and otherwise slandered through “psychiatric lingo” by Ernest Jones, the Freud
biographer who remained within the orthodox fold after Freud’s death (1958, p. 11). Fromm
delves into the specifics of how Ferenczi and Rank came to be ejected from the movment, and
Jones is singled out for his actions in defense of the orthodox psychoanalytic movement. Fromm
explains: “I have given such a detailed description of the fantastic constructions of Dr.
Jones.. .partly to show in a concrete example the party-line spirit to be found in certain quarters of
the psychoanalytic movement” (1958, p. 55).
Fromm’s sweeping critique of the Freudian movement continued in his book, Sigmund
Freud’s Mission: An Analysis o f His Personality and Influence (1959). He continues his
criticism of the Freudian movement’s dogma, and provides some damning analysis of how the
movement has managed to survive. He surmises that the popularity of psychoanalysis is linked
largely to the American middle class, “a middle class for whom life has lost meaning” (1959, p.
106). Lacking “political or religious ideals,” they “are in search of a meaning, of an idea to
devote themselves to, of an explanation of life which does not require faith or sacrifices, and
which satisfies this need to feel part of a movement. All these needs were fulfilled by the

s The article in the Scientific American, entitled “The Oedipus Myth,” was an abridged version of a
chapter in The Family: Its Functions and Destiny (1949), edited by Ruth Nanda Anshen, published one
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Movement” (1959, p. 106). Fromm found this reception of the Freudian movement to be
perfectly fitting; he held that the movement had always sought quasi-religious devotion from its
audience. Freud and his followers, he claimed, “repressed their ambition to conquer the world
with a messianic ideal of salvation, and thus were caught in ambiguities and dishonesties” (1959,
p. 109). Moreover, the movement possessed an “authoritarian and fanatical character,” that
hampered productive understandings of what man could be, and “led to the establishment of an
entrenched bureaucracy which inherited Freud’s mantle, without possessing his creativity, nor the
radicalism of his original conception” (1959, p. 109). Even more importantly, inveighed Fromm,
“[mjost psychoanalysts, and this holds true even for Freud, are not less blind to the realities of
human existence and to unconscious social phenomena than are the other members of their own
social class” (1959, p. 109). The claims Fromm leveled in these arguments took a kind of anti
professional stance against the Freudian movement, relying on concerns for psychoanalysis’s
unique language, its bureaucracy, and its class identification. However, throughout these
critiques, Fromm stubbornly retained some appreciation for Freud himself.
Apart from his concerns regarding the Freudian movement, Fromm’s writings on Freud
the individual were somewhat more balanced, though hardly noncommittal. He claimed a
proximity to Freud, pointing out in the Saturday Review that “[i]n many of Freud’s formulations
it becomes visible that Freud’s interest transcended that of a medical cure in itself’ (1958, pp. 5556). By emphasizing Freud’s non-medical ambitions, Fromm made his own distance from
medical authority appear to be the kind of approach that Freud himself would have approved. In
Sigmund Freud, he lauded Freud as a charismatic figure, remarking on his “courage to trust
reason” (1959, p. 8). He paints a sympathetic portrait of Freud, noting how he
resented his isolation, he suffered from it, yet he was never willing, or even included, to
make the slightest compromise which might have alleviated his isolation. This courage
was also his greatest pride; he did not think of himself as a genius, but he appreciated his
courage as the most outstanding quality in his personality (1959, p. 8).

month after the article appeared.
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Fromm was at least guardedly respectful of Freud’s goal “to found a movement for the ethical
liberation of man” (1959, p. 105). His efforts “to grasp and to be in touch with reality, and to rid
man of the illusions which veil and distort reality,” Fromm claimed, put Freud in the league of
such philosophical greats as Spinoza, Kant, Nietzche, Marx, and Darwin (1959, p. 116). Freud’s
“gifts, his honesty, his courage and the tragic-character of his life may fill one not only with
respect and admiration, but with loving compassion for a truly great man” (1959, p. 120).
Obviously, Fromm stopped well short of all-out criticism of Freud and tried to identify himself as
an analyst who remained sympathetic to Freud the man, and true to Freud’s courage and concern
for human liberation. In particular, Fromm applied this lionizing rhetoric when discussing
Freud’s animus against medicine or ambitions for a more ‘social’ psychology. Of course, Fromm
was reconstructing Freudianism as something that was healthy when it steered clear of medicine
and built bridges to the realm of the social and to politics.
But Fromm also pushed Freud away, rejecting much of what he said on the basis that
Freud himself suffered from grave limitations, both personal and intellectual. He claimed that
[wjhile Freud consciously was only a scientist and a therapist, unconsciously he was—
and wanted to be—one of the great cultural-ethical leaders of the twentieth century. He
wanted to conquer the world with his rationalistic-puritan dogma, and to lead man to the
only—and very limited—salvation he was capable of: the conquest of passion by
intellect (1958, p. 56).
In Sigmund Freud, Fromm took a similar approach, critiquing Freud through analysis itself. In
the book, Fromm presents a thorough (though not encyclopedic) perspective on Freud’s
biography, postulating that “the origins of psychoanalysis is to be sought in Freud’s personality”
(1959, p. 1). Fromm walks the reader through Freud’s relationship with his mother and his father,
describing Freud’s “dependence on men,” (1959, p. 38) examining Freud’s “religious and
political convictions,” (1959, p. 95) and even analyzing Freud’s dreams (1959, e.g., pp. 27-28)
From this analysis, Fromm concludes that “Freud was a rebel and not a revolutionary,” by which
he meant that, though Freud fought the authorities in his time, he “himself [wanted] to be an
authority (to whom others submit), and...[did] not dissolve his dependence on and respect for
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authority per se” (1959, p. 60). This kind o f ‘rebel’ personality, posited Fromm, could be found
in many radical activists who then revert to conservative means once they have acquired power.
Freud’s inability to “overcome his ambivalence toward authority,” (1959, p. 60) or what Fromm
elsewhere called his “messianic impulses,” (1959, p. 105) warped him, leading him to forge what
turned out to be a profoundly conservative movement that only reproduced the authoritative
social conditions under which it was produced.
In light of Fromm’s stated admiration for and alignment with Freud and his vision, his
criticism of Freud can be seen as an attempt not to reject the man or his ideas, but as a way of
demonstrating—without saying so directly—that he had transcended the Freudian orthodoxy.
Fromm’s descriptions of Freud’s personality problems cast Fromm as an expert who knew
exactly what tripped up Freud, and knew how to move beyond those pitfalls himself. Of course,
this partial denial of Freud made Freud’s orthodox followers (Ernest Jones, in particular) out to be
deluded hacks, taking advantage of the master’s demise in a manner that stressed Freud’s
shortcomings while ignoring his strengths. Reflected in the light of his own perspective on Freud
and the field of psychoanalysis, Fromm appeared to be a true heir to the spirit and word of
Freud’s greatness precisely because he was not associated with the inner circle.
Fromm Takes On The Professions
The highly critical stance Fromm assumed in his castigation of Freud’s inner circle was
extended to the entire professional field as well. As with Lindner and Wertham, Fromm
identified himself largely in terms of opposition, taking on almost all comers in the field of
expertise that existed in the 1940’s and 1950’s. This was consistent with Fromm’s argument
(voiced in his criticism of Freud) that what was required was not rebellion, but true revolution in
the form of a new relationship to authority. It would seem that one way of making his own stance
appear to be truly revolutionary came in the form of vigorous criticism of ‘expertise,’ the
professions, and, in particular, the psychological professions that competed with lay analysis
(especially psychiatry).
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Often, Fromm took on the professions tout court, or at least dismissing broad swaths of
the professions as feckless insiders, stoking the flames of psychological problems that already
afflicted Western culture. Experts, he opined, had turned their backs on the people. He explained
how “with regard to our psychological, economic, political, and moral problems, a great sector of
our culture has just one function—to befog the issues” (1941, p. 250). Wielding “the assertion
that the problems are too complicated for the average individual to grasp,” (1941, p. 250)
professionals had excluded the laity from the issues that really mattered. The individual, he
claimed, “waits until the specialists have found out what to do and where to go,” resulting either
in a “cynicism towards everything which is said or printed” or in a “childish belief in anything
that a person is told with authority” (1941, p. 250). In this manner, Fromm was constructing a
zero-sum-gain model of expertise, where the experts’ knowledge necessarily implied a
corresponding lack of power on the part of the laity. Fromm also found this debilitating
professionalism in instances where professionals actually did reach out to the public, claiming
that “tpjeople expect that in every field there is an expert who can tell them how things are and
how they ought to be done, and that all they ought to do is listen to him and swallow his ideas”
(1947, pp. 79-80). By willingly providing this one-way flow of information, experts supported
their audiences’ “receptive orientation,” (1947, p. 79) massaging their audiences into a placid
conformity.
Without specifically identifying any single profession as the source of the problem,
Fromm disdained the relativism he perceived in the professions. He explained:
The result of this relativism, which often presents itself by the name of empiricism or
positivism or which recommends itself by its concern for the correct usage words, is that
thinking loses its essential stimulus—the wishes and interests of the person who thinks;
instead it becomes a machine to register ‘facts’” (1941, p. 248).
Opposing these concepts of relativism, empiricism, and positivism to his own work, Fromm’s
critique o f other professions made his own ‘humanistic psychoanalysis’ out to be a willing refusal
of these professional trappings, again turning a seeming lack of something into a transcendence of

254

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e cop y rig h t o w n e r. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e rm is s io n .

professionalism. In keeping with this general thrust, he recast one professional term,
“objectivity,” in an avowedly anti-professional manner, stressing that objectivity has been
“synonymous with detachment, with absence of interest and care” (1947, p. 105). He suggested
instead that “[objectivity does not mean detachment, it means respect; that is, the ability not to
distort and to falsify things, persons, and oneself’ (1947, p. 105). This comprised a frontal
assault on professionalism, a re-claiming of the terms by which professionalism could be put
across.
Some of Fromm’s critiques of the professions were aimed at ‘psychology,’ as when he
took on new developments in the psychological professions in an article penned for the Saturday
Review. Psychology, he claimed, had deviated from its proper course, and had become
“dangerous and destructive to human spiritual development” (1957, p. 9). Fromm found that
psychology had “assumed.. .a function and a meaning quite different from those which were
implied in ‘Know Thyself,”’ a term that he reserved as the proper function of psychology (1957,
p. 9). Specifically, he pointed to “market psychology” as a professional backslide into
commercial interests, where the individual was reduced to his or her role as a consumer. And he
derided another new development in psychology, “human relations,” as a propagandizing
mistreatment of truth, concluding that “what Taylor did for the rationalization of physical work
the psychologists do for the mental and emotional aspect of the worker” (1957, p. 9). These two
new psychological vectors converge to undermine proper political functioning; Fromm notes that
“the practice of democracy becomes more and more distorted by the same methods of
manipulation which were first developed in market research and ‘human relations’” (1957, p. 9).
Again, the criticism of other parts of psychology provided a way for Fromm to individuate his
own expertise as a standout in the quite crowded psychological field.
Fromm also aimed his critical gaze at psychoanalysis, going beyond the criticisms he
made of inner circle of Freudians to take on psychoanalytic practice more generally. Suggesting
that “the psychoanalytic situation looks sometimes like that of a man [i.e. the analysand] wanting
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to learn how to swim,” Fromm observes that “if we see him going on talking, talking, talking” in
an analysis, “we become suspicious that the talking and understanding have become a substitute
for the real swim” (1957, p. 11). In this way, he posited, psychoanalysis had frequently been used
as a way of avoiding real life. Other critiques of psychoanalysis were more like his take on
professionalism generally, as when he claimed that psychoanalysis had “made the mistake of
divorcing psychology from problems of philosophy and ethics,” (1947, p. 6) insisting that man
cannot be understood “without understanding the nature of value and moral conflicts” (1947, p.
7). Again, he finds a professional formation to be lacking in what makes us human, allowing his
own expertise to bask in a relatively ‘human’ glow.
The Adjustment Argument as Anti-Psychiatry
Fromm’s criticism of psychiatry was far more sweeping than his take on psychoanalysis.
Coming from the field of lay analysis, he lacked almost any commonality with psychiatry.
Psychiatry’s considerable professional power seems only to have made it a ripe target for
Fromm’s critical focus. And as Wertham and Lindner had seen fit to critique psychiatry in a
manner that reattached the stigma that had long dogged the field, Fromm followed suit and did
the same. In fact, the main anti-psychiatric narrative that runs through Fromm’s popular writing
was a major point of convergence in the writing of Fromm and Lindner. Bringing Lindner back
to fold, I hope to show that this point of convergence lent itself particularly well to the position of
the lay analyst that both Fromm and Lindner shared.
Fromm and Lindner both lambasted what they saw as psychiatry’s endorsement of
‘adjustment’. Briefly put, they argued that psychiatry had become a powerful propagator and
enforcer of a group-oriented mentality that interpreted any manifestation of individuality as a sign
o f ‘maladjustment’ to be adjusted, or, in medical parlance, ‘cured.’ When deployed, this
argument placed both Fromm and Lindner, with their analytic perspectives, on the side o f the
people, representing their interests and needs, and painting psychiatry as a servant to the
dominant order. The adjustment argument was, in this sense, an extended way of asserting anti256
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professionalism, while drawing on contemporary arguments regarding conformity and the ‘mass
man’ (this was the era of David Riesman’s ‘Lonely Crowd’ and William Whyte’s ‘Organization
Man’). The convergence on this point was not a coincidence; it was clear that Lindner borrowed
much from Fromm, whom he admired greatly.
Fromm’s critique of psychiatry’s application of an adjustment-oriented ideology was
voiced throughout his writing. He claimed that, in psychiatry, the
patient is considered as a thing, the sum of many parts. Some of these parts are defective
and need to be ‘fixed,’ like the parts of an automobile. There is a defect here and a defect
there, called symptoms. The psychiatrists considers it his function to fix them. He does
not look at the patient as a unique totality (19S7, p. 11).
In this sense, psychiatrists were seen as denying the individual’s humanity from the outset. Their
professionalism—and this is linked to Fromm’s concerns regarding ‘positivism’ and
‘empiricism’—prevents them from perceiving what Fromm could see from the vantage point of
his humanistic psychoanalysis.
The suspicion that psychiatrists were handmaidens to an unhealthy order (a claim we
have already seen) was fit into this standpoint, as Fromm described how “[m]ost psychiatrists
take the structure of their own society so much for granted that to them the person who is not well
adapted assumes the stigma of being less value” (1941, p. 139). The efforts of the psychiatrist,
then, become focused on adjusting the individual to the needs of society, until “[a]ll genuine
individuality and spontaneity may have been lost” (1941, p. 139). The psychiatrists, Fromm
continued (and he applies this to psychoanalysts as well), applied overly constrictive definitions
of ‘normality’, arriving at a definition of mental health as someone who is “never too sad, too
angry, or too excited” (1941, p. 246). The consequences of this psychiatric power move were
made clear in his conclusion that
it becomes increasingly clear that these professions [psychology, psychiatry, and
psychoanalysis] are in the process of becoming a serious danger to die development of
man, that their practitioners are evolving into the priests of the new religion of fun,
consumption and self-lessness, into the specialists of manipulation, into the spokesmen
for the alienated personality (1955, pp. 168-169).
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Pitting ‘these professions' against ‘man,' Fromm aligned himself with ‘man' and the fight against
manipulation.
The labels of psychiatry, including terms such as ‘infantile’ or ‘neurotic’ are seen as ways
“to denounce” those who do not fit the “conventional pattern” (1955, p. 246). “This kind of
influence,” claims Fromm, “is in a way more dangerous than the older and franker forms of
name-calling. Then the individual knew at least that there was some person or some doctrine
which criticized him and he could fight back. But who can fight back at ‘science’?” (1955, p.
246). Fromm attempted to identify himself with his own audience here, suggesting that, like
them, he was not a ‘scientist,’ and was therefore on the right side in this conflict.
Fromm stated outright that contemporary society could be considered mentally
unhealthy. He made this judgment from the position of what he called “normative humanism,”
and contrasted this stance with the relativistic stance held by other social scientists (1955, p. 12).
In particular, Fromm singled out American psychiatry as a purveyor of this relativism that took
the individual’s degree of adjustment to the dominant culture to be the only index of mental
health. The new psychiatry, said Fromm
wants to make us believe that contemporary Western society and more especially, the
‘American way of life’ corresponds to the deepest needs of human nature and that
adjustment to this way of life means mental health and maturity. The concept of
‘maturity’ and ‘mental health’ in this view, corresponds to the desirable attitude of a
worker or employee in industry' or business (1955, p. 73).
Significantly, Fromm chose Edward Strecker’s definition of maturity as a specimen example of
psychiatry’s contribution to reinforcing the status quo. Fromm quotes Strecker’s definition of
maturity as
the ability to stick to a job, the capacity to give more on any job than is asked for,
reliability, persistence to carry out a plan regardless o f the difficulties, the ability to work
with other people under organization and authority, the ability to make decisions, a will
to life, flexibility, independence, and tolerance (1955, p. 74).
Then Fromm himself asserts that
[i]t is quite clear that what Strecker here describes as maturity are the virtues of a good
worker, employee or soldier in the big social organizations of our time; they are the
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qualities which are usually mentioned in advertisements for a junior executive. To him,
and many others who think like him, maturity is the same as adjustment to our society,
without ever raising the question whether this adjustment is to a healthy or a pathological
way of conducting one’s life (1955, pp. 73-74).
From this point of view, Fromm’s criticism of psychiatry’s support of adjustment stresses the
ways in which psychiatry has redefined life outside of the clinic, and made everyone subject to its
own terms. Fromm’s choice of Strecker as an example of what was wrong with psychiatry was
important. Because Strecker was thoroughly medical in his approach, resistant to the introduction
of psychoanalysis, a consulting psychiatrist to the armed forces during World War II, and a
successful popularizer, he was at the very opposite of the orthodox/heterodox pole that defined so
many dimensions of the field of psychology at the time. By taking singling out Strecker, Fromm
was classifying himself in opposition to all of the orthodox trends that Strecker represented.
But Strecker was not the only paragon of professional psychiatry to receive the business
end of Fromm’s zeal. Like Wertham and Lindner, Fromm took on psychiatrist Harry Stack
Sullivan. First he praised Sullivan as “one of the most profound and brilliant psychoanalysts of
our period” (1955, p. 193). But then he asserts that Sullivan, like many other psychological
theorists and authors, “postulate[s] security as the main aim of psychic development and consider
a sense of security more or less equivalent with mental health” (1955, p. 195). For this, Fromm
denounced Sullivan’s model as a compromise, a way of making people feel comfortable when
they should not be entitled to that comfort. “Free man,” insisted Fromm, “is by necessity
insecure” (1955, p. 196). As with Strecker’s ‘maturity,’ Sullivan’s concern for ‘security,’ in
Fromm’s eyes, ultimately made him an agent who acts to preserve the unsatisfactory status quo.
By pitting himself in opposition to Sullivan, Fromm emphasized that his rejection of psychiatry
was absolute. Though he credits Sullivan with certain advances, his ideas still fail to match up to
Fromm’s strict requirements. Rejecting ‘even’ Sullivan, Fromm made it clear he would not
compromise with psychiatry the way he asserted psychiatry had compromised with the social
order.
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Fromm also emphasized his alignment with the downtrodden, the minority who did not
agree with the status quo, noting that “[a]mong this group we sometimes find people of greater
integrity than the majority, who for this very reason are incapable of accepting the cultural
opiate” (1955, pp. 17-18). Fromm’s stance as a self-proclaimed outsider is again apparent in his
statement that “[sjince most authors have emphasized the positive influence o f modem society on
man, I shall in this book pay less attention to this aspect and more to the somewhat neglected
pathogenic function of modem society” (1955, p. 77). This opposition to ‘most authors’ and the
defense of the minority ‘of greater integrity’ is similar to the alignment with the people that
Wertham and Lindner emphasized so much. Fromm was not so reliant on this angle, but these
examples prove that it was not totally foreign to his perspective. Robert Lindner also spun a
narrative of psychiatry as a force on the side o f ‘adjustment.’ And, like Fromm, this occupied a
central place in Lindner’s anti-psychiatric rhetoric. In keeping with Lindner’s overall style, his
version of the adjustment argument was more literal and less likely than Fromm to explore the
issue somewhat more abstractly. This said, the argument was essentially the same.
Many of Lindner’s criticisms have already been reviewed in the discussion o f how
Lindner and Wertham took on professionalism, but reviewing how Lindner and Fromm shared
the ‘adjustment’ argument is nevertheless instructive. From Lindner’s point of view, the medical,
or somatic, techniques, once so proudly hailed as the harbingers of a progressive psychiatry,6
were really forms of torture configured to eliminate the rebellious instinct within the individual.
Lindner argued that these supposedly new techniques highlighted psychiatry’s links to its
coercive role in asylums before the 20th century. He remarked specifically on psychiatry’s
methods, such as the “employment of the more heroic methods like shock treatment used with the
unconscious but nevertheless omnipresent purpose of punishment for the ‘crime’ of deviant

6 It should be pointed out that, by the mid-1950’s, many problems with psychosurgery, shock therapy, and
other invasive somatic treatments had been disavowed by leading psychiatrists, and especially by the
psychiatrists who played the role of public face for their profession.
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behavior and out-of-the-ordinaiy thought” (1953, p. 202). “Something has happened to die
patient” who has been treated in a clinic, claimed Lindner,
he has been pulverized into submission, thrashed and smashed into adjustment,
granulized into cowed domesticity. If he can now meet the criteria of the ‘shocktiatrist’
who has attended him—if he can be polite, keep himself tidy, respond with heartiness to
his physician’s cheery morning greeting, refrain from annoying people with his
complaining and, above all, make no noise, everything will be well. If not—Quick,
nurse, the little black box! (1953, p. 54).
This emphasis on coercion, and the location of that coercion in the clinic, turns the ostensibly
prestigious association enjoyed by psychiatry into a stigma of inhumanity. The argument was
that the medical approach to mental problems was really a punitive form of adjustment.
Lindner identified psychiatry as the linchpin in the contemporary drive for adjustment.
Lindner described how the professional study of man had created many types of experts
expounding on the benefits o f conformity and adjustment. But psychological experts get a
special role here. In Lindner’s words,
the most to be deplored—as well as the most influential—have been, and are, the
psychologists, the physicians of the ‘soul,’ the doctors of the mind.. .By a curious logic,
aided by the desire to preserve and petrify the status quo, and especially to maintain the
stake they have acquired (or hope to acquire) in it, so-called mental specialists attribute
the presence of that mysterious additional factor in illnesses of mind and body to a failure
of domestication (1953, p. 27).
O f particular importance here is ‘the stake’ that psychiatrists ‘have acquired’ from spouting this
adjustment ideology, or as he referred to it elsewhere, “the place in the human hierarchy that they
have won” (1953, p. 210). This was an anti-professional claim that the psychiatrist’s own success
depended on ignorance or neglect of the needs of the people. Making this claim, Lindner was
able to cast himself as the de facto representative of the people true interests.
And, significantly, Lindner viewed the authority o f the psychiatrist as stretching well
beyond the confines of the mental hospital. He argued that psychiatry had been so successful in
promoting the norm of adjustment that
[t]he average man must walk in fear, must tremble in his daily life, lest somehow—by
oversight or bad lack of care to conform—he violate this most recent increment to the
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Revelation and, found guilty of un- or maladjustment, he tumble into a Pit demoninhabited, no doubt, by psychiatrists and social workers (1953 p. 13).
So, the power-mad psychiatrists are thought to have so successfully sold the concept of
adjustment in their bid for professional advancement, that even day to day existence involves
obedience to psychiatric law.
Throughout his criticisms of psychiatry, and particularly in this argument involving
adjustment, Lindner used symbols (e.g. the ‘little black box’ and the ‘Pit’7) to make his own
critique of psychiatry resonate with psychiatry’s stigma in the popular imagination. While
popular psychiatrists attempted to distance themselves from some of the more invasive somatic
techniques—like shock therapy and lobotomy—Lindner sought to reattach the stigma by
reminding his audience of psychiatry’s less popular side.
Like Fromm, Lindner was suspicious that the psychological professions exercised their
‘adjustment’-oriented power through their popular writings. Lindner found adjustment to be a
major component of this appeal of popular psychiatry, asserting that “if psychology as a science
and the arts of practice that depend on it would unequivocally renounce adjustment, take a firm
stand against it, much of its appeal for the laity would go and the greater part of its attractiveness
as a way of life would disappear” (1953, p. 196). He explains that this is because “people
everywhere are psychology conscious and look toward psychologists of every stripe and stamp
almost as messianic superbeings whose approval is required for every act and thought” (1953, p.
196). The audience for popular psychiatric and psychoanalytic works had become so inured to
being told what to do, he believed, they had come to expect instructions from the experts they
followed. Though he refers here to ‘psychologists,’ that term was probably used so Lindner could
indict psychoanalysts along with the psychiatrists, and should not be taken as somehow irrelevant
to psychiatry.

7 Lindner’s references to ‘the Pit’ alluded to the book, and the movie based on it, called “The Snake Pit”
The Snake Pit was an ‘expose’-style fictional story that portrayed psychiatry and life in a mental hospital in
a negative light
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Fromm and Lindner deployed the adjustment argument as an anti-professionalism that
dovetailed with their more over-arching narratives concerning what they perceived to be the
dawning of the new age of the mass man. Adjustment became the dividing line between the
dominant psychiatric experts and Fromm and Lindner’s own ostensibly revolutionary
perspectives, a constructed border that, like their other anti-professional assertions, made the
possession of psychiatric credentials out to be a resignation from the world of the ‘human’ and an
acceptance of the dominant trend of destruction of spontaneity and freedom. Moving beyond
bare-bones assertions that psychiatrists were perpetuating the societal trends of stultification and
de-individuation, the adjustment argument provided an exploration of psychiatry, giving the
audience what seemed to be a thorough explication o f how psychiatry worked against their
interests.
Some Basic Tools for Couching the World: W hat Is Man?
Fromm and Lindner both put the world on the couch only after postulating some basic
qualities of what mankind was and should be. And it was in the assertion of these qualities that
some crucial work in boiling the world down into psychoanalytic and psychological terms was
performed. Fromm’s approach, which he called “normative humanism,” was based on the idea
that there were identifiably “right and wrong...solutions to the problem of human existence”
(1955, p. 14). He claimed that “the concept of mental health follows from the veiy conditions of
human existence, and it is the same for man in all ages and all cultures” (1955, p. 69). He based
his criticism on such anchor terms as ‘mental health’ and ‘maturity,’ erecting a critical
perspective that found fault with whatever lacked these qualities. This very basic move is one of
the few similarities that Fromm shared with psychiatric rivals such as the Menningers and
Strecker. All of them considered the world in terms that related to mental health, more or less
implicitly locating their own expertise as the key to whatever problems they were trying to
communicate to their audience. Fromm’s position in this field of psychological experts impelled
him not to take on the veiy specific problems like comic books, juvenile delinquency, or the
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psychology of combat. Because he lacked the credentials to gain the access to the problems that,
say, Wertham (with his role in courtroom trials and his clinic in Harlem) had, Fromm made what
could be deemed an end run, addressing the universal ‘conditions of human existence’ first, and
moving down from there. This involved specifying a terminology with which to take on these
problems. ‘Mental health’ an d ‘maturity’ were just the beginning of these terms. Fromm would
propose many more terms for his analyses, and these deserve some analysis.
“The key to humanistic psychoanalysis,” Fromm proffered, is an understanding of “the
human situation” (19SS, p. 22). The human situation, he continued, could not itself be understood
without taking a dynamic approach. The problem of existence is hence submersed in a
psychoanalytic bath; Fromm makes the human situation into a psychological issue by stating up
front that “[a]ll passions and strivings of man are attempts to find an answer to his existence or, as
we may also say, they are an attempt to avoid insanity” (1955, p. 29). Locating insanity in terms
of the problem of existence, Fromm positions psychoanalysis as the natural field of choice for
taking on this problem. And because “all cultures provide for a patterned system in which certain
solutions are predominant,” (1955, p. 29) these cultures can, by extension, also be approached via
psychology. Again, the contrast with the writings of popular psychiatrists is important. Fromm
took ‘the human situation’ or ‘the problem o f existence’ as the starting point for the application of
his expertise. By formulating an entire philosophy of living, he created a psychoanalytic lever
large enough to move the world (a world consisting of individuals and of cultures) onto his
analytic couch.
One of the most important terms he set up in his writings was ‘freedom,’ which received
its most complete treatment in Escape From Freedom. Locating freedom as the starting point at
that book, Fromm notes that “freedom characterizes human existence as such,” and that the
meaning of freedom “changes according to the degree of man’s awareness and conception of
himself as an independent and separate being” (1941, p. 24). He reviews how individuals, as they
mature in life, experience “individuation,” a separateness from society that grants freedom, but
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also engenders “a feeling of powerlessness and anxiety” (1941, p. 29). If the growing sense of
freedom in the individual is not matched by that individual’s psychological growth, an over
riding anxiety results (1941, p. 31). The increasing ‘freedom from’ society, that is, must be
matched with a ‘freedom to’ fulfill his own promise of existence. Freedom, he claims, can
become “an unbearable burden” in a modem, atomized society that lacks “the economic, social
and political conditions on which the whole process of human individuation depends” (1941, p.
36). When faced with a freedom from society but no freedom to individuate oneself, “[p]owerful
tendencies arise to escape from this kind of freedom into submission or some kind of relationship
to man and the world which promises relief from uncertainty, even if it deprives the individual of
his freedom” (1941, pp. 36-37). Hence the title ‘Escape From Freedom.’ Fromm’s definition of
freedom, as we will see, provided the foundation for his psychological version of the mass culture
critique. By situating freedom in terms of dynamic psychology and in terms of social relations,
Fromm made it an expansive term for putting the world on his analyst’s couch.
Related to this concept of freedom were terms such as ‘uncertainty’ and ‘unity.’ Fromm
stipulated that “[uncertainty is the veiy condition to impel man to unfold his powers,” for “there
is no meaning to life except the meaning man gives his life by the unfolding of his powers”
(1947, p. 45). The “quest for certainty,” he insisted, “blocks the search for meaning,” leaving
uncertainty as a major component of the answer to the existential dilemma (1947, p. 45).
‘Unity’ was a more broadly-utilized term in Fromm’s work. Again, the emphasis was on
existential issues, as Fromm described how man “has to strive for the experience of unity and
oneness in all spheres of his being in order to find a new equilibrium” (1947, p. 47). Unity, that
is, was introduced as a psychological need. The striving for this unity comes in many forms.
While religion has been one of the most important ways of finding a kind of unity in life, other
secular pursuits, he explains, serve the same function. Fromm finds that this explains how “all
these secular systems of orientation [including philosophy and science] and devotion differ in
content but not in the basic need to which they attempt to offer answers” (1947, p. 48). And the
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similarity to religion, he assures, allows us to see how “neuroses and irrational strivings” come to
exist (1947, p. 48). They are, he claims, to be seen as “answers—individual answers—to man’s
question for orientation and devotion” (1947, pp. 48-49). By starting with the seemingly nonpsychological term, ‘unity,’ Fromm eventually works his way back to the more ingrained
psychological concern for such things as neuroses. Essentially, what he is claiming here is that
religion, and all other cultural systems of meaning, are parallel to the neuroses—they are all
results of the quest for unity. And so all of these things are encoded as psychological issues.
Two other concepts, tied closely together, played a somewhat more important role in
Fromm’s couching of the world. Through many of his writings, ‘productiveness’ and ‘love’
played important roles in staking out his normative humanism. Productiveness was expressed as
a way of relating to the world. “One can be productively related to the world by acting and by
comprehending,” claimed Fromm. More specifically:
Man produces things, and in the process of creation he exercises his powers over matter.
Man comprehends the world, mentally and emotionally, through love and through reason
(1947, p. 97 [ital. in orig.]).
Productiveness implied a kind o f active orientation, where man experienced himself not as an
object, to be acted upon, but as an individual free to interact with the world. This passage makes
clear that ‘love’ plays a major role here. Love is defined as a similarly active quality, as man’s
“power of love enables him to break through the wall which separates him from another person
and to comprehend him” (1947, p. 97). Love, he argued, “is primarily giving, not receiving”
(1956a, p. 22). These basic concepts would (again) serve as the objective truth of human
existence, against which he could contrast the regnant ways of living demanded by twentieth
century culture.
The normative element in much of Fromm’s terminology reviewed so far is self-evident.
‘Productiveness’ and ‘love,’ for instance, were psychologically-inflected ideals, things that
indicated desired states of being. Other concepts that Fromm defined for his own work, such as
‘personality,’ ‘temperament,’ and ‘character,’ were used to form the backbone of Fromm’s
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analyses not of how things should be, but of how things actually were. He defined personality as
“the totality of inherited and acquired psychic qualities which are characteristic of one individual
and which make the individual unique” (1947, p. 50). And temperament “refers to the mode of
reaction and is constitutional and not changeable” (1947, p. 52 [ital. in orig.]). Both of these
terms were important in establishing how Fromm’s more involved psychological insights applied
to everyone, but seem to have been included principally for the purpose of differentiating them
from the more important concept o f ‘character’.
Character occupied a crucial place in Fromm’s work. Defined as a “dynamic” (1947, p.
54) human property, Fromm’s notion of character was quite Freudian. Fromm credited Freud’s
emphasis on individual motivation, and its frequently unconscious character, as important steps in
advancing the idea of character (1947, p. 57). But Fromm distanced himself from Freud’s
emphasis on libidinal forces, preferring instead to formulate character in social terms, focusing on
how people related to the world around them. In Fromm’s hands, character had “the function of
permitting the individual to act consistently and ‘reasonably’,” and was “also the basis for his
adjustment to society” (1947, p. 60).
Drawing on the idea of productiveness, Fromm described two major types of character
orientations: nonproductive and productive. Nonproductive orientations included the receptive,
exploitative, hoarding, and marketing types of characters. A person with a perceptive orientation
“believes that the only way to get what he wants—be it something material, be it affection, love
knowledge, pleasure—is to receive it from that outside source” (1947, p. 62). The exploitative
orientation was similar, but those who had this orientation were more manipulative and motivated
to take what they wanted instead o f waiting for it to be given (1947, p. 64). Those with the
hoarding orientation “have surrounded themselves.. .by a protective wall, and their main aim is to
bring as much as possible into this fortified position and to let as little as possible out of it” (1947,
p. 65). And, finally, the marketing orientation “is rooted in the experience o f oneself as a
commodity and of one’s value as exchange value” (1947, p. 67). Opposed to all of these was the
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productive orientation, which was not considered as a set of sub-types. The productive
orientation was closely related to Fromm’s definition of ‘productiveness.’ He referred to it as
“man’s ability to use his powers and to realize the potentialities inherent in him” (1947, p. 84).
The opposition between the productive and nonproductive orientations motivated much of his
work, particularly that in his three most inter-related books: Escape From Freedom, Man For
Himself, and The Sane Society.
Each of the nonproductive orientations was expressed as a kind of problem that must be
overcome, and all o f them were asserted to be dominant character types of 20th century Western
society. In this manner, Fromm dovetailed his very basic terminology regarding such things as
love, unity, and productiveness with the kind of incipient criticism of modem society found in
these definitions of orientations. We will return to this criticism, but for now what is relevant is
how this all relates to Fromm’s basic task of considering the world in terms of orientation. This
way of looking at the world was not unique to Fromm. Other writers, including Geoffrey Gorer,
David Riesman, and Ruth Benedict used a similar perspective, frequently under the banner of
‘characterology’. Fromm communicated a specific kind of characterology that was articulated
under the umbrella of his normative humanism, blending his strong psychoanalytic tendencies
with other diverse influences.
Robert Lindner’s definition of what man consisted of occupied an important part in his
popular writings. Like Fromm, Lindner’s perspective started with these basic definitions of man;
these definitions were starting points, or hubs, for their subsequent criticism and writing about
social problems. But though Lindner was largely inspired by Fromm, he chose to use his own
terms. Lindner’s most profound starting point regarding man’s existence concerned what he
called the ‘triangle of limitations’ that defined us all. He defined the triangle of limitations in this
manner: “One side of this triangle is the medium in which [people] must live; the second is the
equipment they have or can fashion with which to live; the third is the fact of their mortality”
(1953, p. 4). On their own, these stipulations are not very descriptive. Lindner further specifies
268

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e co p y rig h t o w n e r. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

that “[i]f there is purpose to life, that purpose must be to break through the triangle that thus
imprisons humanity into a new order of existence where such a triad of limitations no longer
obtains” (1953, p. 4). The sweeping importance of this triangle o f limitations is made even more
clear when he claims that “all that man does.. .has as its design the overcoming of one or more or
all aspects of this basic triad of limitations” (1953, p. 4). This is where all of Lindner’s professed
anti-authoritarianism originates; he postulates that escaping the triangle of limitations is simply
the reason for human existence, a proposal that sets much of his popular writing into motion. It is
this notion that leads him to conclude that “[b]y nature, man is a rebel” (1953, p. 105). And it is
also the idea of a triad of limitations that allows him to interpret so many kinds of human
behavior (including juvenile delinquency, homosexuality, murder, fascism, and communism)
from a psychological standpoint. He locates the triangle of limitations, much as Fromm or Freud
might, as a way of interpreting human behavior dynamically. But because he does not use
Fromm’s or Freud’s terms so much as his own, this dynamic approach comes across as something
that is largely unique to Lindner himself.
Considering this pattern, found in Fromm and Lindner’s works, of setting up
psychological terms as the fulcrum for an analysis of the world, one notices that almost all the
terms are, to a large degree, not very psychological (in the professional sense) at all. Fromm’s
reliance on terms like ‘freedom,’ ‘individualism,’ ‘uncertainty,’ ‘unity,’ ‘productivity,’ and
‘love,’ and Lindner’s concern for rebellion and for the ‘triangle o f limitations,’ find them using
neologisms in two different ways. Fromm was mostly taking established, even mundane terms,
and charging them with his own meaning. Though his approach was dynamic in a manner that
explicitly owed a debt to Freud, his terminology was not so bluntly professional as that o f other
popular psychological writers. By putting mundane, seemingly non-psychological, terms in the
driver’s seat, he turned away from professionalism, and offered a stealthy authority that was
subtle in the way it indicated Fromm’s own possession of cultural capital. In this sense, Fromm’s
writings were consistent with his own forceful denunciations of professional jargon and
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professional routine. Claiming popular terms for himself was a way for him to seem like he did
not presume to speak down to his audience. Lindner’s ‘triangle of limitations’ was more of a
classic neologism, a new term that he was introducing to his audience. But the neologisms that
were deployed in the definitions of man offered by Fromm and Lindner were common in the way
they carved out a domain for their expertise that steered clear of (and putatively transcended) the
world o f the professional from which they both dissented.
Love and the World
Having already reviewed how Erich Fromm used ‘love’ as a term that could couch the
world, I will now turn to the specifics of Fromm’s use of love, with a particular focus on his book
The Art o f Loving (1956a). In that text, he describes how all forms of love share certain basic
dimensions, including “care, responsibility, respect, and knowledge” (1956a, p. 26). The care
dimension, he claimed was “most evident in a mother’s love for her child,” where one finds “the
active concern for the life and the growth of that which we love” (1956a, p. 26). Responsibility
was a theme in love to the extent that the “life of [one’s] brother is not his brother’s business
alone, but his own” (1956a, p. 28). Respect, Fromm explained, “implies the absence of
exploitation,” leading him to the conclusion that “love is the child of freedom, never that of
domination” (1956a, p. 28). And, finally, concerning knowledge, Fromm noted that “the
knowledge which is an aspect of love is one which does not stay at the periphery, but penetrates
to the core” (1956a, p. 29). Insisting that each of these dimensions was interdependent with the
others, Fromm offered love not as a cure-all so much as a way of life. Fromm’s normative
expectations can be more clearly detected here. He did not just describe love, he invited his
readers to love, and to do so in a manner that lived up to this four-dimensional portrait of what
love is and should be.
This normative component became more evident in his description of the objects of love,
which found Fromm formally placing huge swaths o f social behavior on the couch. He described
brotherly love as “love for all human beings,” something “characterized by its very lack of
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exclusiveness” (1956a, p. 47). This definition was consonant with his declaration that “[i]f I truly
love one person I love all persons, I love the world, I love life” (1956a, p. 46). Fromm’s point
here was that brotherly love was a necessary condition for love in general; if a “sense of
responsibility, care, respect, [and] knowledge of any other human being” did not obtain, one
could not say one had truly found love (1956a, p. 47). He described how easy it was to love
one’s family, and how this sense of loving must be extended to all people, in part so that a spirit
of equality could prevail. The normative portion of his normative humanism was in full view
here, as brotherly love was asserted as a necessity that people lacked as a result of society’s
effects on them.
Motherly love, claimed Fromm, differed from brotherly love in its assumption of
inequality, its realization that mother and child are not equals. His take on motherly love was less
relevant than brotherly love was to his grander normative scheme for social relations. However,
it found Fromm exploring the psychology of family relationships, in a move similar to Edward
Strecker’s. Fromm notes that motherly love “requires unselfishness, the ability to give everything
and to want nothing but the happiness of the loved one” (1956a, pp. 51-52). He continues, in a
manner that makes clear that these similarities to Strecker do not end at choice of topic. For, like
Strecker, Fromm stresses that “the child’s separation” from the mother is an important task,
(1956a, p. 51) and that
the narcissistic, the domineering, the possessive woman can succeed in being a ‘loving’
mother as long as the child is small. Only the really loving woman, the woman who is
happier in giving than in taking, who is firmly rooted in her own existence, can be a
loving mother when the child is in the process of separation (1956a, p. 52).
The similarities to Strecker’s ‘mom’ argument are striking. Both authors were concerned with
the process o f weaning, or individuation, and both placed the responsibility for this process on the
mother, though Strecker did eventually modify his view to include ‘pops’ as well. However, it
should be noted that Fromm arrived at these conclusions on proper child guidance from a
perspective that did not match up perfectly with that of Strecker. Unlike Strecker, he did not
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construct this problem in terms o f a need for creating soldiers for future wars or individuals
capable of keeping a job. The problem that Fromm described, to the extent that there really was
one, was that people were not ‘loving’ enough, and that mothers could increase the amount of
true love if they themselves acted less selfishly. Especially when taken in the context of Fromm’s
other writings, his concerns about proper mothering would seem to indicate that he (like Lindner)
wanted children to be raised as rebels or even revolutionaries, while Strecker was less concerned
with individual differences.
After this, Fromm moved on to consider erotic love. To a great extent, his emphasis here
was on what erotic love was not, he seethes at the idea of ‘falling in love,’ showing disdain for
such a passive, unproductive understanding of love. He found erotic love to be “the craving for
complete fusion, for union with one other person” (1956a, pp. 52-53). Turning back to what
erotic love is not, he warns that “[sjexual attraction creates, for the moment, the illusion of union,
yet without love this ‘union’ leaves strangers as far apart as they were before” (1956a, p. 54).
Indeed, Fromm turns away from strictly sexual matters almost entirely with his dictum that
“[ejrotic love is exclusive, but it loves in the other person all of mankind, all that is alive. It is
exclusive only in the sense that I can fuse myself fully and intensely with one person only”
(1956a, p. 55). It was this idea of universality that Fromm found particularly important. He
considered the idea that “We are all One” to be a major part of erotic love, and he criticized
Western society’s inability to incorporate that idea into erotic love, though he did acknowledge
that erotic love involved “highly individual elements which exist between some people but not
between all” (1956a, p. 55).
Fromm’s understanding o f erotic love functioned as a way to find psychological
problems in Western society; it was another route for his normative humanism. His decision to
pursue a staid treatment of erotic love, restraining from using the word ‘sex,’ and with almost no
mention of specific problems, tendencies, or habits, made him different from the more explicitly
sexual writings of psychological forebears as Freud and Havelock Ellis, and especially from then272
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contemporary writers such as Wilhelm Reich and Alfred C. Kinsey. Fromm’s normative
humanism guided him away from the specifics of sexual practice and moved him toward a more
theoretical consideration of what erotic love is and could be.
Fromm also addressed self-love, proclaiming it to be perfectly consonant with brotherly
love, because “the attitudes toward others and toward ourselves, far from being contradictory, are
basically conjunctive” (1956a, p. 59). “[WJe ourselves,” he claimed “are the ‘object’ of our
feelings and attitudes” (1956a, p. 59). Voiced in a normative tone, he posited that the self “must
be as much an object of my love as another person” (1956a, p. 60). As with motherly love and
erotic love, self-love is assigned a kind of evil twin. Fromm emphasized that selfishness and selflove are not synonymous; selfishness, he claimed was really a kind of revulsion with oneself, a
result of the lack of self-love (1956a, p. 58). In this sense, Fromm considered the inner life, a
person’s relationship with him or herself. The inner life is, of course, one o f the hallmarks of
psychoanalytic practice and theory. But significantly, Fromm’s couching o f the inner life was
accomplished by means of his iconoclastic, non-professional lexicon of ‘love’ and ‘productivity.’
The final form of love that Fromm considers in The Art o f Loving was the love of God.
Like the other forms of love, he saw the love of God as something springs from the “need to
overcome separateness and to achieve union” (1956a, p. 63). “To love God,” he claimed,
“.. .would mean.. .to long for the attainment of the full capacity to love, for the realization of that
which ‘God’ stands for in oneself’ (1956a, p. 71). To this he added his description of the
religious person as someone who “has faith in the principles which ‘God’ represents; he thinks
truth, lives love and justice, and considers all of his life only valuable inasmuch as it gives him
the chance to arrive at an ever fuller unfolding of his human powers” (1956a, p. 71). Fromm saw
the loving quest for unity as the factor that could lead individuals to seek out “the act of
experiencing the oneness with God” (1956a, p. 77) that, when performed in a productive manner,
“leads to the emphasis on the right way of living” (1956a, p. 78). He contrasted this ideal with
how religion is commonly experienced and performed in Western society, where God is
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commonly treated as a father figure that allows man to remain passive in orientation, or a
religious application of “Aristotelian” principles of logic has undermined religion’s potential for
tolerance or “self-transformation” (1956a, p. 79). Again, what Fromm accomplishes in this
treatment of religion is a combination of his own psychological view with a normative view of
religion. He suggested that love could not truly be performed without a productive spiritual
orientation. The right way of living seemed to depend absolutely on the loving relationship with
God. The concept of love provided a lever for psychologizing religious experience without
seeming like he was reducing religion to the merely professional terms of psychological inquiry.
The Art o f Loving concludes with a note of crisis, as Fromm’s analysis of love culminates
in a critique of Western society. This critique, of course, had been hinted at throughout his
suggestions of how motherly, erotic, and religious love had been warped by societal constraints.
But he revealed his full critique only at the end, when he concluded that “[o]ur society is run by a
managerial bureaucracy,...people are motivated by mass suggestion,...activities are subordinated
to economic goals, [and]...means have become ends,” such that “man is an automaton” (1956a, p.
83). Fromm insisted that society be reordered to make love possible, and that man “be put in his
supreme place” (1956a, p. 83). His conclusion was a call for change:
If it is true, as I have tried to show, that love is the only sane and satisfactory answer to
the problem of human existence, then any society which excludes, relatively, the
development of love, must in the long run perish of its own contradiction with the basic
necessities of human nature (1956a, p. 83).
Never one to shy away from dire predictions, Fromm located his concept of love as the only
bulwark against the onrush of the demise of Western society. This was voiced as a kind of
scientific fact, grounded in the realities of ‘human nature.’ And he describes his own ideas as a
defense of the ‘sane’ way o f life, maintaining that this was (though ‘psychology’ was not
mentioned) a psychological issue appropriate for his own expertise. This is buttressed with the
conclusion that
[t]o analyze the nature of love is to discover its general absence today and to criticize the
social conditions which are responsible for this absence. To have faith in the possibility
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of love as a social and not only exceptional-individual phenomenon, is a rational faith
based on the insight into the very nature of man (1956a, p. 83).
Again he restates his claim regarding the crisis of an absence of love. And, as before, he appeals
to ideas of ‘nature’ to back himself up.
We will return to this theme soon, as the mass culture argument (of which this is only a
small representative) played a major role in Fromm’s writing. However, for now, what is
relevant is that Fromm used the word ‘love’ as a way of putting comradeship, family
relationships, erotic love, religion, and the entirety of Western culture on his analyst’s couch.
More than ever before, Fromm’s terminology finds him charting territory outside of the proper
professional world. Love, that is, was used as a neologism that enabled a point of view that at the
very least seemed independent of the evils of professionalism, but still highlighted his own
psychoanalytic expertise.
Dreams and the Lay Analyst
Dream analysis has long been a mainstay in the popular imagery of psychoanalysis.
Perhaps it was appropriate, then, that much of Erich Fromm’s popular writing, and one of his
most successful books, The Forgotten Language (1951), inquired into the significance of dreams.
The Forgotten Language found Fromm establishing the relevance of his psychoanalytic
perspective through assertions that dreams were something common to everyone’s experience,
and that they could, because of their relation to myths, literature, and ritual, tell us something
about our culture and society.
Fromm claimed that man, “[sjelf-trapped within the obvious,...tenaciously discounts the
very clues that might lead him to a more subtle self-awareness and self-acceptance” (quoted in
Overstreet, 1952, p. 15). That our ignorance o f our own dreams prevents us from understanding
ourselves. He argued that the key to regaining this understanding was by gaining access to what
he called “symbolic language,” (1951, p. vi) a language that “has been forgotten by modem man”
(1951, p. 7). Asserting that symbolic language is “the only universal language the human race
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ever developed,” he installed his own perspective as the one true path to understanding this
universal language (1951, p. vi). He emphasized the importance of understanding this language,
noting that
such understanding is important for every person who wants to be in touch with himself,
and not only for the psychotherapist who wants to cure mental disturbances; hence I
believe that the understanding of symbolic language should be taught in our high schools
and colleges as other ‘foreign languages’ are part of their curriculum (1951, p. vi).
Here he makes clear that he is making a centrifugal move away from the therapeutic aims closely
associated with psychoanalysis, without renouncing any claims to that core expertise.
Fromm observed that an important occasion when we use this symbolic language is when
we dream. He pits his own attentiveness to dreaming against what he sees as Western
civilization’s insistence on ignoring dreams and renouncing puzzlement or imagination. That is,
he takes a stance against the assumed grain in this domain; he proclaimed to be bucking a
dominant trend simply by looking at dreams, though he did credit Freud as a forerunner in
making this same move (1951, p. 25). Fromm held that “all dreams are meaningful and
significant” (1951, p. 24). Meaningful, because they contain “a message which can be
understood if one has the key for its translation,” and significant, in that “we do not dream of
anything that is trifling” (1951, p. 24). And just as important, dreams find us at a time when we
are “freer than when awake,” (1951, p. 27) so that sleep “is taken up with the function of self
experience” (1951, p. 28). Dreams, that is, can hardly help but tell us something about ourselves.
And whatever they have to say should be listened to precisely because it has not been filtered
through the orientations Western culture forces on us. While psychologizing dreams on the
couch would hardly be a difficult job—they were already the proper domain of psychoanalysis
long before Fromm wrote about them—Fromm emphasizes how dreams tell us about the rest of
the world when we are not dreaming, effectively and tacitly pulling ‘non-dreaming’ onto the
couch as much as dreaming itself. Dreaming was cast as a negative space from which to regard
our waking lives.
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The bulk of the rest of his discussion of dreams per se involves some rudimentary
instruction on the “art of dream interpretation” (1951, p. 148). To some degree, he reserves that
art for practiced analysts such as himself by reminding the audience that it is an art “which, like
any other art, requires knowledge, talent, practice, and patient” (1951, p. 148). Naturally, he does
not stipulate that it requires a medical degree or membership in a professional organization; but
he does stop shy of saying all people have the same keys to the symbolic languages. But he holds
that “the knowledge necessary to understand dream language can be conveyed,” and follows up
on this by providing “relatively simple dream examples” and sample analyses of those dreams,
providing a sort of Berlitz course in dream interpretation (1951, p. 148).
Moving out from dreams, Fromm placed myth alongside dreams as inter-related
examples of the universal symbolic language. Following Freud, who “saw that dreams were
essentially no different from myths and fairy tales and that do understand the language of the one
was to understand the language of the others,” Fromm establishes Freudian precedent for this
centrifugal move to link psychoanalysis’s expertise regarding dreams to claims regarding myth
(1951, p. 9). And by myths, Fromm was not referring to outdated legends of primitive societies.
He considered myths to be of great importance for understanding all cultures (1951, pp. 195-196).
Citing the insights o f J. J. Bachofen as additional guideposts to be combined with his
Freudian outlook, Fromm asserted that myths contain religious, psychological, and historical
meaning (1951, p. 196). This perspective is then applied (with a clear nod to Freud) to the
Oedipus myth. Fromm takes the Oedipus myth and analyzes it, using Bachofen’s ideas regarding
the broader importance of myths, leaving him
in a better position to take up the discussion of our hypothesis that the hostility between
father and son, which is the theme running through Sophocles’s trilogy, is to be
understood as an attack against the victorious patriarchal order by the representatives of
the defeated matriarchal system (1951, p. 210).
The Oedipus myth is thus positioned as a way of analyzing not the individual with a complex so
much as the culture at large. Broadening this perspective on the wider importance of myths,
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Fromm applies the same apparatus to the Babylonian and Biblical myths of creation, again
finding social import in how these myths involved “the mechanism of distortion and censorship
that plays such a prominent role in Freud’s interpretation of dreams and myths” (1951, pp. 234235). And finally, he addresses the symbolic language of the fairy tale of “little red-cap,” finding
it to be a tale of “male-female conflict” and “triumph by man-hating women,” providing a mirrorimage of the Oedipus myth (1951, p. 240). Grounded on the assertion that myths and fairy tales
partook of the same symbolic language as (the psychoanalytic home base of) dreams, and that
myths and fairy tales tell us much about the cultures where they thrive, Fromm pried culture open
as a kind of dream to be analyzed like any other.
The discussion o f ‘symbolic language’ concluded with his consideration of rituals and art
as realms of social behavior that are subject to Fromm’s analytic perspective. He explained ritual
as a situation “where an action, and not a word or image, stands for an inner experience” (1951,
pp. 241-242). This focus on religion provided another opportunity for boiling religion down into
psycholoanalysis, and Fromm provided an interpretation of the Sabbath ritual of Judaism and
Christianity. The Sabbath, he found, “symbolizes a state of complete harmony between man and
nature and between man and man” (p. 244). Applying his symbolic perspective, Fromm asserts
that “[w]ork is a symbol o f conflict and disharmony; rest is an expression of dignity, peace and
freedom,” making the Sabbath ritual an anticipation of “the state of human freedom that will be
fulfilled eventually” (1951, p. 247). As God “is free and fully God only when he has ceased to
work,... [s]o is man fully man only when he does not work, when he is at peace with nature and
his fellow men” (1951, p. 248).
From ritual, Fromm moved on to art, and specifically took on Kafka’s The Trial,
establishing its relevance to his psychoanalytic expertise by asserting that the “novel [i.e., The
Trial], in order to be understood must be read as if we listened to a dream—a long complicated
dream in which external events happen in space and time, being representations of K” (1951, pp.
249-250). He commences on a close reading of The Trial, describing its dreamlike logic, and
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recounting how it involved, through symbolic language, both the “humanistic” and
“authoritarian” consciences (1951, p. 254). “K.’s tragic mistake,” he explained,
was that, although he heard the voice of his humanistic conscience, he mistook it for the
voice of the authoritarian conscience and defended himself against the accusing
authorities, partly by submission and partly by rebellion, when he should have fought for
himself in the name of his humanistic conscience (1951, p. 254).
This analysis of The Trial was intended as a demonstration of how the idea of symbolic language
could be used for interpreting all art, much as his discussion of the Sabbath was advanced as a
way of demonstrating that all ritual, and by extension all religion, was accessible through the
universal ‘symbolic language.’
This was by no means a traditional psychoanalytic perspective; Fromm’s analyses in The
Forgotten Language rarely draw on any psychoanalytic language. The idea o f‘symbolic
language’ as a universal that all individuals possess was certainly parallel to psychoanalytic
assumptions regarding the universality of the basic dynamic processes, but Fromm did not point
this out. Fromm did allude to Freud on many occasions in The Forgotten Language, but usually
to establish that Freud had introduced a given concern, and then offer his own elaborated
approach. As with the idea of love, symbolic language was deployed as a term that, starting with
dreams, placed the world on the couch. And—again, like love—symbolic language was a non
threatening term that Fromm could claim credit for himself, while still retaining some connection
to psychoanalysis. That is to say, his ambivalence regarding psychoanalysis was in full display
here.
Psychoanalyzing the Mass Man
A major school of cultural critique in the mid-twentieth century held that modem society
had become a corrupting influence. In this argument, technological advance, urbanization, and
the advance of modem capitalism (among other causes) were blamed for simultaneously
undermining individuality as well as traditional associative ties between individuals. The cog in
the machine of the mass society was the mass man. Intellectuals and professionals had arrived at
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many different understandings regarding the character of this mass man. Erich Fromm was one
of the most persistent commentators on the issue, writing voluminously on the subject in America
beginning in the early 1940’s. And significantly, some of his most widely read books, including
Escape From Freedom, Man For Himself, and The Sane Society, took the mass man as a major
theme.
It should be pointed out that Fromm rarely used the term ‘mass man’ in his writings.
This, in itself, is significant. His common-language neologisms showed that he often preferred to
invent his own uses for words; this gave his writing a uniqueness, a sense of being set apart. The
term ‘mass man’ was so widely bandied about that it could offer scant distinction to his prose.
Robert Lindner, whose writing closely echoed many o f Fromm’s, used the term ‘mass man’
relatively freely; this seemed to be a way for him to clearly write himself into the mass society
critique. Lindner was, in this sense, more interested in alluding to the mass society critique at
large than was Fromm.
Regardless, both Fromm and Lindner applied their analytic perspectives to the mass
society critique, resulting in two slightly different ways of analyzing the mass man. A major part
of the analytic emphasis could be found simply in the fact that both Fromm and Lindner took as
their starting point the psyche of the individual, and then moved out to explain the relationships
between society and the individual. While other mass society critiques placed greater emphasis
on economics, politics, or history, Fromm and Lindner were concerned about individual’s minds.
Of course, economics, politics, and history were incorporated into their arguments, but the mind
of the individual was always at center stage.
Many of Fromm’s descriptions of mass man-type developments were voiced in terms of
what he called the ‘character’ o f modem man. Tracing the history o f human society, he asserts
that, having been “freed from the bonds of pre-individualistic society” by the spread of
democracy and capitalism, man’s problems still are not solved (1941, p. viii). Though freedom
“has brought him independence and rationality,” it has also “made him isolated and, thereby,
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anxious and powerless” (1941, p. viii). This anxiety and powerlessness, he claimed, led man to
make a “totalitarian flight from freedom,” willingly sacrificing—escaping, if you will—
individuality and freedom (1941, p. viii). The timing of this argument, voiced in Escape From
Freedom in 1941, was important. Fromm was clearly taking the Third Reich and, to a lesser
extent, fascist Italy, as examples of what could happen in any modem society.
This sense that ‘it could happen here’ pervaded Escape From Freedom and much of
Fromm’s other work regarding the characterology of modem man. Fromm pointed to the
similarities he detected between the Third Reich and other modem societies, especially America,
in terms of what they do to the individual. This was situated as a psychological issue, as Fromm
focused not on “external restraints,” but on “internal factors blocking the full realization of the
freedom of personality” (1941, p. 104). “In studying the psychological reactions of a social
group,” Fromm was interested “not in the peculiarities” of individuals, “but in that part of their
character structure that is common to most members of the group,” called “the social character”
(1941, p. 277).
From this line o f reasoning followed many conclusions regarding the social character of
modem man. Fromm concluded that human relationships had become de-personalized, that “in
all social and personal relations the laws of the market are the rule,” resulting in a lack of “direct
and human character” (1941, p. 118). The market’s power to alienate people from their own
labor was found to turn all people into cogs in the machine of the economy, debasing laborers as
well as white-collar workers. The alienation did not stop there, either, as the act of consumption
was also turned into an alienated activity, an empty activity that brings us no true fulfillment. All
of this leaves us as “automatons who live under the illusion of being self-willing individuals”
(1941, p. 253). And most people, he believed, did not understand their own alienation, which was
covered over by the daily routine o f his activities, by the assurance and approval he finds
in his private or social relations, by success in business, by any number of distractions,’
by ‘having fun,’ ‘making contacts,’ ‘going places.’ But whisling in the dark does not
bring light. Aloneness, fear, and bewilderment remain; people cannot stand it forever
(1941, p. 134).
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The social character, profoundly changed by the new “freedom from” the pre-individualistic
forces that once gave life meaning, had not yet benefited from a “freedom to” do what our
psychological needs would require of us (1941, p. 134).
Conformity was a major part of Fromm’s arguments regarding what man had become. It
comprised a major part of the social character of Western society that he mapped out. Fromm
asserted that modem society’s impersonality and alienation made individuals crave security. “To
be different, to find himself in a minority,” he explained, “are the dangers which threaten his
sense of security; hence a craving for conformity produces in turn a continuously operating,
though hidden, sense of insecurity” (1956b, p. 44). Fromm takes the theme o f conformity as a
psychological problem, as when he describes the conforming modem man as someone who is
“dead emotionally and mentally,” and individual who is “psychologically [an] automaton” (1941,
p. 255). In The Art o f Loving, he takes a congruent, but slightly different point of view regarding
conformity, explaining conformity by virtue of “the fact that there has to be an answer to the
quest for union, and if there is no other or better way, then the union of herd conformity becomes
the predominant one” (1956a, p. 13).
The problem of conformity was also addressed as a kind of crisis of authority in modem
societies, where democracy itself is threatened by the whims of the herd. Fromm found that in
our society, an anonymous authority is in command, operating through the “mechanism” of
conformity (1955, p. 153). Eventually, the
conformity pattern develops a new morality, a new kind of super-ego. But the new
morality is not the conscience of the humanistic tradition nor is the new super-ego made
in the image of an authoritarian father. Virtue is to be adjusted and to be like the rest.
Vice, to be different (1955, p. 158).
He portrays Western society as slowly succumbing to this ‘new’ authority that lacks reason and
rationality, emphasizing the lack of content in this regnant regime of authority.
It should be noted that Fromm’s concerns about conformity closely mirrored those of
many other intellectuals o f the time. Many of these intellectuals were cited in Fromm’s work, as
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when he draws on William H. Whyte’s ideas concerning the conformity of the ‘organization man’
and the planned community in Park Forest, Illinois (e.g. Fromm, 1955, pp. 154-158). David
Riesman’s idea of the ‘other-directed’ personality, which looks to peers—instead of traditional
authority or oneself—for guidance in how to live, also seems to have played a guiding role in
Fromm’s work.
Robert Lindner offered his own analytical take on the concerns involving conformity in
the mid^O* century; the idea of conformity (or ‘adjustment’) was the most striking point of
convergence in the work of Fromm and Lindner. We have already seen some of how Lindner
applied the idea of conformity to the issue of juvenile delinquency, but Lindner did not stop
there—conformity occupied a central place in his writing. It is worth recalling Lindner’s dictum
that “ You Must Adjust has virtually become the Eleventh Commandment” in American culture
(1956b, p. 102, ital. in orig.). This idea was given a sweeping application. As Lindner put it,
“[i]n every area of our life today individuals are forced to conform. They are commanded to
distort their personalities, sacrifice personal freedoms and fit themselves into a prevailing pattern”
(1956b, p. 102). And, like Fromm, Lindner turned to notions of human nature to explain why
conformity is wrong. Conformity is “an evil,” Lindner explained, because “[mjan is by nature a
rebel” (1956b, p. 102). And if “man is forced into conformity—a condition alien to his very
biology—his instinct of rebellion will nevertheless continue to seek an outlet” (1956b, p. 102).
And if the ‘positive’ outlets are ruled out by cultural pressure, only ‘negative’ outlets remain,
resulting in “war, crime, intolerance, bigotry and brutality on the social scale, and neurosis,
psychosomatic illness, psychosis, delinquency and failure on the personal” (1956b, p. 102).
Lindner placed a particular emphasis on a term Fromm also used: adjustment. Lindner
attempted “to reveal the truth about adjustment, to show it for what it is—a mendacious idea,
biologically false, philosophically untenable, and psychologically harmful” (1953, p. 12). It is
significant that Lindner positioned his analytical expertise in terms of biology, philosophy, and
psychology. Like Fromm, who struck a similar multi-pronged stance in his writings, Lindner was
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a lay analyst. Their position, defined in terms of lack, (no M.D., no membership in the American
Psychoanalytic Association) seems to have impelled them to cloak their authority in more than
one discipline. By so doing, they transformed their lack of professional capital in a specific
discipline into a trans-professional stance. This move bears some similarity to Freud himself,
who spoke in a language that drew on an implicit biological focus (with its description of
instincts) while retaining a firm grip on philosophical and literary influences.
Lindner argued that the powerful individuals and organizations in society were “in league
to produce Mass Man, the creature whose flat features already can be recognized among the faces
o f men” (1953, p. 23). In such statements, Lindner showed that he was more ready to use the
term ‘mass man’ than was Fromm. As a less well-known expert than Fromm, Lindner was more
willing to show his influences, to draw comparisons to other intellectuals who used the term, and
to align himself with what he admitted was an established point o f view, as, by this time, the
‘mass man’ argument had become.
The issue of mental illness was also more apparent in Lindner’s narrative of conformity
than it was in Fromm’s. Fromm phrased the issue more in terms o f how a state of ‘productivity’
and ‘love’ could be achieved; he used his own terms and tended toward framing the issues he
dealt with in terms of the lack of these things, outlining how he believed a ‘sane society’ could be
achieved, or how ‘the art of loving’ could be practiced. Lindner saw mental illness lurking
beneath the fafade of all individuals, waiting to be unleashed. He claimed that when “the
dispossessed of a society become legion,.. .the collective ego of the mass discovers itself,” and
when this happens, the latent psychopathy in every human being is uncovered—if not
directly, then by a process of contamination through psychic infection.. .For now,
unrestrained by repression, the psychopathy of the proletarianized mass is loosed upon it.
Mass Man, no longer the docile, ‘adjusted,’ passive cipher his creators hoped he would
remain and though him to be, is revealed (1953, p. 180).
This understanding of psychopathy as a latent trait in all people set Lindner apart from Fromm,
who concerned himself more with the neuroses, (on the occasions when he used professional
terminology) and stressed the potential for harmony between individuals and society. It also
284

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e co p y rig h t o w n er. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

highlights Lindner’s relative willingness (when compared to Fromm, who diligently avoided
comparisons to medicine) to use simple medical terminology, such as the words ‘contamination’
and ‘infection’.
Though Fromm and Lindner shared the notion of conformity as part of the character of
mass man, Fromm’s overall characterology was much more widely considered, and demands
some more attention. For instance, Fromm’s idea that a ‘market orientation’ had pervaded the
social character of the 20th century played a major role in his writing. Rarely was Fromm’s
background in sociology more evident than in his discussion of this orientation, which he found
to be a result of the capitalistic “process of centralization and concentration of capital” (1956a, p.
84). These developments, he claimed, found man “transformed into a commodity” so that he
“experiences his life forces as an investment which much bring him the maximum profit
obtainable under existing market conditions” (1956a, p. 86). Man’s “sense of self’, when the
marketing orientation holds sway, “does not stem from his activity as a loving and thinking
individual, but from his socio-economic role” (1955, p. 142). Again, the marketing orientation
was a way of defining social and economic developments, like monopoly capitalism, in
psychological terms. This was frequently how Fromm’s social psychology worked; it allowed
Fromm to encode the world into psychology. Instead of moving out from traditional
psychological and psychiatric terms, Fromm started with the world, and then arrived at a flexible
terminology that could diagnose that world.
This increased flexibility put Fromm in a position to apply his insights, like other mass
culture theorists, to the media of mass communication. As we have seen, Fredric Wertham, who
was himself probably very much influenced by the mass culture critique, took on the mass media
with a remarkably clinical, medical point of view. The Menningers and Strecker were more
closely tied to the traditional diagnostic routine to take on the mass media. Fromm’s analysis of
the mass media as mass culture had much in common with other mass culture critiques, but again
was framed in his own phraseology. He argued that “the spread of literacy and of the media of
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mass communication has made the influence of cultural cliches as effective as it is in a small,
highly restricted tribal culture,” linking his concerns about the mass media to his assertions
regarding the widespread conformity in Western society (1951, p. 35). Elsewhere, he approaches
popular culture in more clearly psychoanalytic terms, as when he concludes that
[m]an’s happiness today consists in ‘having fun.’ Having fun lies in the satisfaction of
consuming and ‘taking in’ commodities, sights, food, drinks, cigarettes, people, lecture,
books, movies—all are consumed, swallowed. The world is one great object for our
appetite, a big apple, a big bottle, a big breast; we are the sucklers, the eternally expectant
ones, the hopeful ones—and the eternally disappointed ones” (1956a, p. 87).
Comparing American consumerism to the suckling of a baby was a Freudian way of couching
consumerism. As Freud diagnosed certain adult activities as ‘narcissistic’ and infantile, or as
corresponding to the oral, anal, or genital phases of development, so did Fromm classify
consumerism in terms of infantile desires. Of course, all of this was done in terms of Fromm’s
‘normative humanism,’ as consumerism was discussed as kind o f “palliative” that allows people
to survive in a culture that lacks the love and productivity he set up as ideals (1956a, p. 86). All
of this accorded to another one of Fromm’s neologisms: “the principle of nonfrustration” that
Fromm saw as a corrupting influence in Western culture, a principle unconsciously guiding
individuals’ actions away from any critical attention to their own pleasure (1955, p. 164). He
asserted that the result of the application of the principle of nonfrustration was “the paralysis and
eventually the destruction of the self’ (1955, p. 165). Again contrasting the reality of Western
culture with the psychological needs of the ‘self, Fromm found his own way of analyzing the
psychological meaning of mass culture.
Politics and the Mass Man
It is hardly surprising to find that Fromm and Lindner applied the idea of the mass man as
a way o f understanding the political developments and movements of the twentieth century.
After all, the use of the term ‘mass man’ was itself largely spurred on by the fascist political
developments that led to World War II. Nevertheless, Fromm and Lindner each gave the idea of
the mass man as a political force their own psychological treatments. What they arrived at were
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different ways of psychoanalyzing modem democracy, Nazism, fascism, and communism.
Diverging from mass man-type analysis, Fromm also couched other political concerns, including
the psychology of nuclear proliferation.
Basing his own analysis of political movements on his firm belief in humanistic ethics,
Fromm returned repeatedly to state his basic moral (and, ultimately, political) precepts, and
especially stressed the idea that “[vjirtue is responsibility toward [one’s] own existence,...[e]vil
constitutes the crippling of man’s powers,” and that “vice is irresponsibility toward [oneself]”
(1947, p. 20). Fromm grounded his conclusions partly in this moral thrust, and partly on the idea
that things like economic shifts and historical events operate through the “specific ways” (1947,
p. 22) humans are structured psychologically to create specific, and even predictable, results.
Though Fromm is consistently vague about what kinds of expertise he is advancing by making
such basic claims, what he is doing in such passages is stepping out of the confines of dynamic
psychology proper so that he can tacitly marshal economic, historical, and sociological
perspectives in the service o f his overarching social psychology.
Fromm rejected the way other psychological experts approached political movements
such as the Third Reich. He rejected how “[psychoanalysts and psychiatrists have often tried to
‘analyze’ nations, and religious and political movements,” specifically singling out the means by
which psychoanalysts or psychiatrists made much of “some similarity between a clinical
symptom and a cultural phenomenon” (1943, p. 10). Fromm found that such analyses of cultural
phenomena tended to ignore everything save that which was found to be analogous to “some
neurotic symptom,” so that political and social factors in and of themselves were not given their
fair due (1943, p. 10). Ultimately, he concluded, psychiatric takes on the German national
character rationalized political slogans through application o f psychiatric terminology while also
substituting this terminology for any ethical discussion (1943, p. 10). Fromm believed that, by
allowing their own terminology to get in the way, psychiatric and psychoanalytic writers had
allowed the key issues of the war to elude them. This is easily recognized as a part of Fromm’s
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broad anti-professional stance vis a vis psychiatrists and other psychoanalysts. He claimed for
himself the power to stay in touch with ethical issues, and a methodological flexibility that
allowed him to integrate insights from a wide range of fields. In this sense, he made himself out
to be an expert dealing with Nazis and other political movements in a more direct, unmediated
fashion than other experts.
O f course, Nazism and the Third Reich specifically were major concerns in Fromm’s
own writings on political movements. ‘How could this [Nazi rise to power] have happened?’ was
the unspoken question framing his analysis. Because this topic was more specific than other
‘mass man’-type terrain, Fromm was able to support his arguments with more specific data. This
he accomplished by dedicating considerable space to issues involving class, history, economics,
and ideology in pre-World War II Germany.
Regarding class, Fromm addressed the “destructiveness of the lower middle class” as “an
important factor in the rise of Nazism,” considering the social character of that subset of Germany
(1941, p. 184). He pointed to economic contributions to this destructive sensibility throughout
Germany, in particular singling out the importance of the economic decline that preceded the war
(1941, p. 213). Economic inflation had a psychological importance, for “[i]f the state could break
its promises printed on its bank notes and loans, what promises could one trust any longer?”
(1941, p. 214). The removal o f the Kaiser after World War I only contributed to this sense of
psychological unease, and the legacy of the treaty of Versailles was important, too (1941, p. 217).
And as the monarchy and state were in decline, so were parents and the older generation, who
were perceived by their children and the younger generation as a kind of failed hold-over of the
old Reich (1941, p. 215). These factors, and many more, all played a role in shaping the social
character o f pre-World War II Germany.
While Fromm succeeded in steering clear of boiling these social and economic
considerations down into traditional psychiatric diagnoses—a method that, as we have seen, he
rejected—he did spell out the psychological significance o f these considerations, occasionally
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bringing in established psychological terms. The social and economic factors were important in
and of themselves, but it was their psychological import that was given the most emphasis.
Nazism, he claimed, “resurrected the lower middle class psychologically” and “mobilized its
emotional energies to become an important force in the struggle for the economic and political
aims of German imperialism” (1941, p. 221). Essentially, Fromm attached his take on Nazism to
his over-arching description of the mass man and social character in modem societies. His main
point was that the freedom that Germans had before World War II was matched with a loss of
individuality that pushed the people, and especially the lower middle class, (who bore the brunt of
the massification) toward political movements that offered themselves as solutions to their
emotional needs.
But this summary of Fromm’s position overstates the degree to which he saw Nazism as
an organic movement that arose from the middle class. To the contrary, he was very clear that
Nazism was a plot perpetrated by a small subset of Germans who knew that the anomie of the
time would legitimate their cause. The “very principle of Nazism,” Fromm claimed, “is its
radical opportunism” (1941, p. 220). And, in pursuit of a further understanding of Nazism, he
offered an analysis of the leaders of the Third Reich, exploring what he found to be the sado
masochism that motivated people like Hitler and Joseph Goebbels. Especially in the case of
Hitler, Fromm found “the craving for power over men and the longing for submission to an
overwhelmingly strong outside power,” which he considered to be hallmarks of the authoritarian
social character (1941, p. 236). Fromm’s perspective explained how psychological issues
interacted with the social, historical, and economic considerations that he introduced at the outset,
resulting in a multi-dimensional expertise that was never fully tied down to any one professional
perspective.
As a kind of sidebar to this discussion, it is interesting to review how Fromm addressed
the psychological issues that arise when Americans consider how they themselves should regard
Hitler. After a representative of the Journal o f Home Economics requested that he write an article
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on the topic of whether it was right to hate Hitler (Hostetter, 1941), Fromm penned an article for
that journal entitled “Should We Hate Hitler?” After beginning this article with a thorough
review of the differences between what he described as “character-conditioned” hatred, which
lacks any affirmation of life, and “reactive” hatred, which is affirmative and “results in action for
the defense of life” (1942, p. 220). The Third Reich, he claimed, was characterized by characterconditioned hatred; it was borne o f frustration, alienation, and domination. Concluding that hate
was “essential for victory,” Fromm found “hatred of Fascism” to be “a legitimate and rational
hatred which does not spring from idling destructiveness but from the concern for what we love
and want to protect” (1942, p. 223). While much of this is a kind of retread of ideas from Escape
From Freedom, the difference here is that Fromm is applying his perspective to the question of
how civilians at home were to respond to the war. As the psychiatrists who placed World War II
in the center of their popular work moved out from the war to address how American citizens
responded to the war, Fromm applied his own normative humanism to the question of how the
Nazis should be regarded.
But this application o f the Nazi question to the American situation was by no means
isolated. For, if one question that guided Fromm’s studies of the psychological dimensions of the
Third Reich was ‘How did this happen?,’ then another question that lurked just behind was
‘Could this happen in America?’ By turning the question of fascism into a domestic issue,
Fromm made his own expertise vis a vis fascism, as established in his discourse on the Third
Reich, appear to be a kind of guard against future incarnations of fascism in America. The
problem of fascism in America, he assured, was real. Indeed, he found that “there is no greater
mistake and no graver danger than not to see that in our own society we are faced with the same
phenomenon that is fertile soil for the rise of Fascism eveiywhere: the insignificance and
powerlessness of the individual” (1941, p. 240). Not surprisingly, this potential for fascism was
placed in a psychological context, as “freedom from external authority is a lasting gain only if the

290

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e co p y rig h t o w n er. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

inner psychological conditions are such that we are able to establish our own individuality”
(1941, p. 241).
To demonstrate that America lacks the ideal social conditions for individuation, Fromm
turns to examples of how American culture flattens out the individual impulses, averring that
emotions are necessary for individual growth, and that “[i]n our society emotions in general are
discouraged” (1941, p. 244). This squashing of individuality was all too similar to that of
Germany before World War II to be taken lightly. While democratic capitalism might seem to be
a good system for maximizing individual development, Fromm finds that American capitalism
produces “only a small number” who “can exercise individual initiative” (1941, p. 275).
American democracy is similarly criticized for its potential to engender fascistic tendencies, for
“[j]ust as work has become alienated, the expression of the will of the voter in modem democracy
is an alienated expression” (1955, p. 184). The rationality of political argumentation, he argues,
has been displaced by public relations and propaganda that promise to deliver votes, not address
any basic political issues (1955, p. 186). And, more fundamentally, voting itself gives the illusion
o f democracy, though it is “forces beyond [the citizen’s] control and knowledge” that are decisive
in American society (1955, p. 191). Fromm observes:
“No wonder this situation gives the average citizen a deep sense of powerlessness in
political matters (though not necessarily consciously so) and hence that his political
intelligence is reduced more and more. For while it is true that one must think before one
acts, it is also true that if one has no chance to act, the thinking becomes impoverished; in
other words, if one cannot act effectively—one cannot think productively either (1955, p.
190).
So, after considering the manifestations of individual alienation and corresponding centralization
of bureaucratic forces in contemporary America, Fromm provided reason to believe that fascist
tendencies were not only a possibility in America, but were already a widespread, if nascent,
reality.
Robert Lindner assumed a similar stance regarding fascistic tendencies in America. As
has already been demonstrated, Lindner found fascistic tendencies at play in the juvenile
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delinquency of the post-World War II period. He lumped fascism and communism together as
types o f ‘negative rebellion’ that emerged as individuals responded to society’s dictate—‘the
Eleventh Commandment’—to adjust. Negative rebellion, as Lindner described it, involved a
refusal of the dominant form of adjustment, and a membership a seemingly rebellious, but (in
Lindner’s opinion) even more conformist, subgroup, such as juvenile delinquents or fascists.
Lindner’s most thorough exploration of the fascist mindset comes in Fifty-Minute Hour,
where he tells the story of one o f his analysands, ‘Anton,’ a fascist organizer whom Lindner
meets during his own tenure as a psychologist in prison. Unlike the more sweeping and
theoretical narratives that Fromm provides, Lindner’s chapter on fascism focuses tightly on one
person—Anton—and then distills broader insights from this one case. That is, Lindner makes it
obvious at all times that he is dealing directly with a fascist, talking with him in the same room,
and trying to help Anton with his own problems.
Called to help Anton, who suffered from blackouts, bad dreams, and other symptoms,
Lindner is quickly confronted with his analysand’s anti-Semitism; Anton complains that he does
not want to be treated by a “Jew psychologist” (1955, p. 180). Ultimately, Anton comes around,
unable to cope with his own symptoms, and Lindner begins to tell his story, reviewing Anton’s
case history. He describes Anton’s angry relationship with his family, the imaginary friend he
had when he was a child, and his fear of blood. During one of his stints in prison, Anton began to
follow a “bogus ‘minister’” who preached race hatred (1955, p. 191). This man gave Anton a
focus for his hatred, and Anton became a leader in his own right of a fascist group in America.
Lindner proclaimed that “[wjhat he offered [his followers] was a share of what he had found: an
outlet for pressures accumulated during thwarted years; and he indicated to them the ways in
which their latent inclinations toward violent retribution could be channeled” (1955, p. 192).
Lindner considered his followers to be like Anton himself—personally frustrated individuals
unable to find a better way of working off their aggression.
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Lindner diagnoses Anton as a psychopath, and makes clear that this diagnosis holds for
other fascists like him. Moving on to treatment, Lindner explains his own effort to practice his
hypnoanalysis on Anton, only to find him to be resistant to hypnosis. Proceeding along more
established analytic methods of psychotherapeutic conversation, Lindner gets Anton to elaborate
on his own feelings toward his father, finding that
the identification of himself with his father occurred by way of a simple, universal
psychic mechanism. Layers beneath his hatred for this really brutal person was a core of
longing, tenderness, and admiration which Anton had for the alcoholic butcher [his
father] (1955, p. 204).
This simultaneous hatred and identification with his father, which “dated far back into infancy”
(1955, p. 204) explained Anton’s psychopathy. Relating this to Anton, who wanted to be
released from prison immediately, Lindner says to him:
You have the mentality of a storm trooper. If you contniue to work with me, maybe you
can become a decent person. You haven’t been one and you’re not one now. I won’t
help you get a parole because I can’t take any responsibility for setting you free so you
can spread your poison and infect others (1955, p. 207).
This quote highlights a major difference between how Lindner and Fromm analyzed fascism.
While Fromm took an overview of fascism, explaining it as a mass movement in broad, historical
strokes, Lindner adopted his characteristic case study style. And Lindner did something more
than just provide in-depth analyses; he used direct quotes from his sessions, at all times making
clear his own personal contact with his subjects. Including quotes where he refers to Anton as
‘you’, Lindner’s approach was more personal, and found him attempting a kind of identification
with the interests of his analysands.
After this confrontation, Anton again rejects Lindner, but eventually comes around as
Lindner explains the origins of his fascistic urges. Lindner explains how these tendencies arose
from Anton’s pathological fear of death which was “at bottom a fear of castration,” which itself
came from his “forbidden sexual love for his mother” and was “intensified by his father’s
undisguised threats to his genital” (1955, p. 217). The fascist movement that Anton joined
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allowed him a way to adjust, a place to find an outlet for his destructive urges. Moving quite
subtly to apply this to all fascists, and not just Anton, Lindner explains how fascism
provided everything for which a psychopath could ask: a whole world to hate, in
extension of his primary hatred of die father; targets on which to exercise brutality and
revenge, both as expressions of identity with the father’s strength and dominance, and in
retaliation for the hurts of childhood; symbolic trappings and uniform reminiscent of
cherished infantile wishes and proclaimers, at the same time, of the homosexualism
beneath the super-masculine pose (1955, pp. 218-219).
Tying fascism into his over-arching argument concerning adjustment, Lindner classifies fascism
as a political movement custom-fit for psychopathy. Though he stops shy of saying all fascists
are necessarily psychopaths, he nevertheless describes the appeal of fascism as psychopathic in
nature. That is, the movement itself is laid out on the analyst’s couch, with Anton as the proxy
for the entire movement.
Another chapter of Fifty-Minute Hour provides a close parallel to the case of Anton and
fascism. In a chapter entitled “Come Over, Red Rover,” Lindner describes the case of his
analysand Mac as a specimen example of communism in America. As with Anton, Lindner
spends most of the chapter dealing specifically with the single case of Mac, and then distills the
insights from that analysis to communism more generally. He starts by identifying his own
political activism, remarking on how he maintains a “conviction that the psychoanalyst belongs in
the world, among men, and should participate in the life of his community” (1955, p. 69). His
own involvement in politics, he assures, signifies his identification with non-professionals, and
one can detect a distinct tinge of anti-professionalism here as he contrasts his political
involvement with “the anchorite existence most analysts live, limiting their purview to the dim
caves in which they practice their art like oracular recluses surrounded by the esoteric symbols of
a mystic craft” (1955, p. 69). More specifically, he notes his own leftist political leanings,
pointing out that he has been involved in “movements and causes” that “have been called radical”
and have at times included communists in their membership (1955, p. 69). Before he analyzes
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communism, Lindner seems to have been motivated to show his own political stripes so as to
avoid seeming like a witch-hunting McCarthyite.
Proceeding to the story of Mac, a member of the Communist Party in America, Lindner
describes Mac’s psychiatric problems, which included impotence. Like Anton the fascist, Mac
the communist was wary at first of Lindner’s analytic point of view; Lindner relates Mac’s fear
that the party would find out about his seeing an analyst. Because he was a communist, Lindner
explained, “the moment any of his cherished formulas were questioned there would be hell to
pay” (1955, p. 81). He explained that he realized from the outset that Mac’s involvement in the
party would mean a long and complicated analysis. The fact that Lindner chose to continue with
the analysis is itself related as a kind of demonstration of Lindner’s dedication to analysis and to
his analysands. But he reveled in the “chance to test once more my ideas about the breed of men
who become militant socialists!” (1955, p. 82). Obviously, Mac was intended to act as a stand in
for communism.
As with Anton, Lindner spent much time on Mac’s family history, reviewing his
relationships with his parents and his grandparents. And again, much importance was assigned to
the analysand’s experiences as an infant; also, Mac’s resentments toward certain members of his
family are reviewed. A breakthrough of sorts took place when Mac describes a dream he had that
involved him losing his tongue and being followed but unable to scream. This dream spurs
Lindner toward the insight that Mac was, in effect, castrating himself for the Communist Party.
His sexual dysfunction, that is, was diagnosed as an unconscious result of his own loyalty to the
party. Ultimately, Mac gives in to Lindner’s reasoning, admitting that “I hate every last one of
them...And what’s more, I hate the Party too, and everything it stands for” (1955, p. 106).
The conclusion to Mac’s diagnosis places the Communist Party on the couch along with
Mac, as Lindner describes how the party allowed Mac a way o f channeling his “hatred and
aggression—originally directed against ma and later the world—with almost unlimited freedom”
(1955, p. 108). This hostile way of relating to the world was not psychotic, but was instead
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diagnosed as a neurosis. “The Party,” Lindner proclaimed, “was Mac’s neurosis—a neurotic
solution he deliberately chose as a lesser evil than die madness to which his hate was leading
him” (1955, p. 109). Because the party was “nothing more than a symptom of Mac’s difficulty,”
(1955, p. 109) it could not address the causes of Mac’s neurosis; it was only an adjustment that
exacerbated his neurotic tendencies. The party’s discipline, its grip on Mac’s life, ultimately
proved destructive; this problem—made visible through the analysis o f Mac’s dreams—was most
obviously manifested in his impotence.
Lindner makes few claims generalizing Mac’s psychological issues to the rest of the
communist party in America, but the narrative of Mac’s analysis carries throughout an implied
generalizability. Throughout, Lindner predicts what Mac’s problems were and how his analysis
would turn out, frequently alluding to his past experiences with communists. More sweeping
statements regarding the psychological status of the Communist Party can be found elsewhere,
and particularly in his chapter “Political Creed and Character” in Must You Conform? In that
context, he declared that the “mystery of communism’s appeal can be solved only by
psychology,” (1956a, p. 80) and moved on to provide a quick diagnostic lesson in the problems
with communism. In many places, this lesson refers to Fromm’s work, and like Fromm, Lindner
finds religious components in communism’s appeal. More directly, Lindner finds that
“communism or, what is more to the point, the Party that institutionalizes communism, is a haven
for neurosis and a refuge for neurosis—actually, a great organized, systematized, ready-made
neurotic defense” (1956a, p. 87). Though he immediately offers the disclaimer that “this is not to
say that all Communists are necessarily neurotic, nor that all neurotics are Communists,” he
emphasizes the way in which Communist parties “offer themselves to the neurotic as the
temporary solution to his personal disturbance, as the framework wherein his conflicts seem to
him to disappear” (1956a, pp. 87-88). In this sense, then, Lindner diagnoses communism as a
whole from a characterological angle quite similar to Fromm’s analysis of fascism, with its
concern for central tendencies in the psychological makeup of political movements.
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In his analyses of fascism and of communism, Lindner continued to use his concepts of
both ‘negative’ and ‘positive rebellion,’ arguing that both fascism and communism were types of
negative rebellion wherein the individual sacrificed his uniqueness in the pursuit of an answer to
neurotic of psychotic needs. This resulted in an analyses quite similar to Fromm’s; both
addressed (if at times obliquely) the issue of whether or not these political types could exist in
America, and both deployed the same characterological angle of inquiry. However, Lindner’s
writing partook of a kind o f situatedness that Fromm rarely offered. That is, by using in-depth
case studies that involved direct quotes from analysis and foreground his own close, personal
contact with the issues at hand, Lindner placed himself in the most literal sense on the side of the
people he was diagnosing. In his writings on Nazism and communism that relied on analytic
sessions for their narrative, Lindner portrayed himself as an expert fighting for the good of his
analysands, frequently going above and beyond the analyst’s call of duty to make the
breakthrough that freed them. And, significantly, Fromm did not just diagnose, he frequently told
stories in which he solved the patient’s problems. By including the breakthroughs at the end of
the stories of Anton and Mac, for example, he demonstrated the instrumentality of his analytic
perspective, making his own expertise out to be something that could actually solve the problems
he described. He constructed his cultural authority as relying on a therapy that, first of all,
■worked.
Nuclear War
As the fifties waned, Fromm began to address a political concern that was less closely
tied to questions of fascism, communism, or Nazism. The proliferation of nuclear arms and the
threat of nuclear war provided Fromm with new grist for his psychological perspective. Crisis
oozed from the issue of nuclear annihilation. It required little rhetorical spin to communicate its
importance, and Fromm’s treatment was frank in its acknowledgment of how terrible nuclear war
could be.
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Fromm’s take on nuclear war involved no small amount of psychological insight He
insinuated psychology into the issue in part by stressing the need for “sane thinking” in
diplomacy between the United States and Soviet Union (1960, p. 21). Paranoia, he claimed, had
been rampant in speculations on the parts of both of the superpowers. “Another pathological
mechanism” that he called attention to was “projection,” whereby an individual attributes his or
her own faults to others (1961, p. 21). He summed up: “If projection is mixed with paranoid
thinking, as is the case during a war and also in the ‘cold war,’ we have, indeed, a dangerously
explosive psychological mixture, which prevents sane and anticipatory thinking” (1961, p. 23).
Additionally, he found that “fanaticism,” a term he defined at length, played a destructive role in
the overall effort to move to understand the Soviet Union’s motives. The problem of nuclear
proliferation was made out to be a psychological problem above all.
Additionally, Fromm considers the idea of nuclear war as a psychologist, speculating as
to what the psychological damage of such a war might be, and again, finds that not enough
attention had been placed on the psychological dimension of the issue. Specifically, he suggests
that “traumatic neuroses” would be a widespread result of nuclear war (1961, p. 194). Speaking
for psychology in general, Fromm avers that
[t]o a psychologist, it is much more likely that sudden destruction, and the threat of slow
death to a large part of the American population or the Russian population or large parts
of the world will create such a panic, fury and despair, as could only be compared with
the mass psychosis that resulted from the Black Death in the Middle Ages (1961, p. 194).
In an essay for Commentary, Fromm and co-author Michael Maccoby supply some more
specifics for this, delving into the particulars o f widespread traumatic neuroses. They claimed
that
Vast psychiatric experience and a huge body of literature are there to show that traumatic
neuroses are produced both in peace and war by sudden fright and by tension of an
intensity which transcends the amount our nervous system can tolerate (Fromm &
Maccoby, 1962, p. 17).
Fromm used the idea of widespread traumatic neuroses to counter the claim, made by Herman
Kahn, that nuclear shelters could play a significant role in minimizing the damage done by a
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nuclear war. Fromm used his psychological position to provide something that he claimed the
hawkish proliferationists were missing.
Fromm incorporated some of the more enduring postulates of his humanistic psychology
in his summation regarding nuclear war. Diagnosing the culture at large, he finds it troubling that
those with whom he argues rely on figures computing potential numbers killed and saved. “What
is so new and shocking about the contribution of our age,” he posited, “is the cold-blooded use of
bookkeeping methods to encompass the destruction of millions of human beings” (1961, p. 197).
Continuing, he compares the modem character with that of Adolph Eichman, finding that
Eichman’s inhumanity is perfectly in step with the times (1961, p. 198). The mentality that finds
nuclear war comprehensible and coldly computes losses, he indicates, is both out of touch with
proper human functioning and perfectly indicative of the social character of our time. Suggesting
that we have all become Adolph Eichman, he returns to his characterological social psychology
that defined Escape From Freedom, Man For Himself, and The Sane Society. Fromm had
smoothly adapted his crisis rhetoric to the new realities of nuclear war.
Fromm’s Many Dimensions of Support
As we have seen, Erich Fromm situated himself as a psychological expert, frequently
asserting analytic (or ‘dynamic’) psychology as the best approach for understanding the situation
of modem man. He argued that the “psychoanalytic interview is one of the vantage points for
studying the authoritarian conscience in the urban middle class,” and explained how analysis was
an invaluable tool in leading patients to come to terms with their own relation to parental
authority (1947, p. 152). But it was only on rare occasions that Fromm would support his
arguments with data culled from his analytic sessions. Examples of this occur in Escape From
Freedom he lingers on the case of a medical student whose dream of skyscrapers he considered to
be “a typical example of the repression of a person’s real wishes” (1941, p. 205). And a major
portion of The Forgotten Language considers similar examples of dreams that highlight major
themes in analytic work.
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However, these kinds of recollections from analytic sessions play only a supplementary
role in Fromm’s popular work. Unlike Wertham and Lindner, who piled their case studies high,
and even (in Wertham’s case) devoted whole books to single case studies, Fromm found other
forms of support for his arguments. In terms of cultural authority, Fromm’s lack of reliance on
purely psychological data can be read as a kind of hybridization of his own authoritative stance.
Fromm mixed his psychological insight with input from history and philosophy to arrive at what
was, in some ways, a rather unique point of view. This move away from the analyst’s couch was
consistent with his denunciation of psychiatry and its empirical methods. As psychiatrists
attempted to locate their own authority outside of the clinic, Fromm made a similar flight from
reliance on psychology, allowing him to approach the problems he addressed from several angles
at once. This mode of writing was, in many ways, similar to that of Freud, who considered
history and philosophy (especially in books like Totem and Taboo, Civilization and Its
Discontents, and The Future o f an Illusion) to be essential parts of psychological inquiry, and
whose own authority as a writer was similarly hybrid. Fromm’s similarity to Freud in this sense
seems significant; by mimicking Freud’s writing in some ways, Fromm was making good on his
own promise to be true to Freud’s original dictates for psychology.
Fromm’s use of historical support blanketed much of his prose. Huge swaths of Escape
From Freedom were dedicated to the history of man. He backs up to the medieval period in
Europe and considers the Renaissance in terms of how man considered himself at these times,
pausing to reflect on the significance of primary ties, medieval commerce, and the role of capital
at the dawn o f the Renaissance (1941, pp. 40-60). He places great emphasis on the Reformation,
going so far as to consider Martin Luther’s upbringing, and how Protestantism was transformed
by Calvinism. (1941, pp. 63-69) Several vectors of historical inquiry, with an emphasis on
economics and religion, are traced up to modem day, where Fromm finds the individual—so
much a product of the pre-19th century developments in history—to be endangered by the 20th
century developments. Man For Himself and The Sane Society, both of which revisited themes
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first addressed in Escape From Freedom, maintained similar historical emphases, and addressed
the same problem of how the individual relates to society in the 20th century.
A similar use of history occurs in May Man Prevail?, where Fromm begins his analysis
of the Cold War with a long view of where the “present crisis” has come from (1961, p. 8). To do
this, he considers European history from the time of the Roman Empire, demonstrating how the
Third World has been left out of many of the relatively recent trends in development, and how the
Soviet Union and United States have come to regard each other as enemies. Eventually, this
allows him to consider both sides in the Cold War from the point of view of psychology; the
historical information is continually used to determine how it is that society constrains human
thought.
A different way of placing history into his authoritative scheme can be found in The
Forgotten Language, where he considers the history of dream interpretation, showing how his
own method of dream interpretation picks up where others had left off, but differs in some
important ways. He reviews how Native American and Asian styles of dream interpretation have
existed for a long time, and finds a Biblical style of dream interpretation as well (1951, pp. 109114). He also explains how Socrates, Plato, and Roman philosophers approached dream
interpretation in their times. He winds his way through Aquinas, Hobbes, Kant, Goethe,
Emerson, and finally Henri Bergson, comparing each of these figures’ modes of dream
interpretation to the others (1951, pp. 134-145). And, of course, he devotes significant time to a
discussion how Freud and Jung supposed dream analysis should be carried out. Overall, the
practice of dream interpretation is demonstrated to be an enduring practice that has engendered,
and resulted from, many diverse perspectives. Simultaneously, Fromm shows himself to be
someone who is familiar with these traditions, making his own form of dream analysis out to be
the standout among them.
Fromm also used philosophy to support his arguments, and in so doing, used
philosophers’ names and ideas in a manner that positioned his own conclusions as inexorable
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results of the great things that had been thought before. In Man For Himself, Fromm traces a
tradition o f humanistic ethics that involves Aristotle, Spinoza, and Dewey (1947, pp. 25-28). By
so doing, Fromm placed his own ‘humanistic’ endeavors on the terra firma of some of the great
philosophical figures, with naxy a mention o f psychology. Elsewhere, Fromm reaches out from
philosophy to (mostly) praise thinkers who have offered critiques of society, such as Elton Mayo,
F. Tannenbaum, Lewis Mumford, and A. R. Heron, whom Fromm refers to as social scientists
(1955, p. 217). Again, the inclusion of these names and ideas makes Fromm’s own ideas appear
to link up with other thinkers, and with these more contemporary figures, he makes himself out to
be a part of some kind of intellectual movement. Of course, it is significant that none of these
thinkers were psychologists; the references to these men allow him to cast a wide authoritative
net that casts his own expertise as more inclusive than that of strict professionals. Not all
philosophers are cited approvingly, however, as he contrasts his own point of view with that of
(for instance) Kant, Luther, Calvin, Stimer, and Nietzche, all of whose understandings of love
and self-love Fromm finds insufficient (1947, pp. 122-123). By differing with these
philosophers, he makes his own humanistic psychology something that has teeth, and appears to
go beyond some other perspectives.
Fromm’s use o f history and philosophy as support is best understood when contrasted to
the situated case studies used so much by Lindner and Wertham. While their authority was
achieved through establishing their own direct contact with the human issues they took on,
Fromm’s authority was less professional in the sense that it was less grounded in the professional
locus of the clinic or the couch. Moving back from any proper professional stance, Fromm’s
pronouncements were less attached to any one specific case; it was as if he floated above the
issues so as to achieve a true bird’s eye view. Fromm offered himself as an expert who was
authoritative precisely because he was not lost in the details. In this sense, one can understand his
own critique of psychiatry and o f empirical science—with their ‘mere’ facts—to have been an
integral part of highlighting how his own distanced take was superior to those of competing
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experts. Instead of constructing an authoritative contact with the issues, Fromm established an
authoritative distance that implicitly cast direct contact as a failure to come to grips with the
broader issues he saw as essential. Notwithstanding his occasional descriptions of the importance
of analysis for understanding the individual, Fromm pursued an authority that went beyond the
constraints of psychology. It was as if his lack of credentials had only freed him to write more
broadly as a free-floating intellectual instead o f as a professional.
A Program for Revolution
Erich Fromm pursued a broad critique of modem Western society from the point of view
of his analytic understanding. Consequently, much of his writing argued in the negative; using
psychological reasoning, he explained why society and individuals had fallen out of harmony.
But he also offered an array of positive arguments regarding what could be done to make the
reader’s life better or to make the world a better place. This prescriptive tone was usually located
at the end of his books and essays. After explaining how the proto-fascist Mass Man may be
reaching his historical apogee, Fromm would arrive at a conclusion that suggested positive steps
to avoid the continuing destruction of the individual.
Many of Fromm’s prescriptive suggestions bore a close resemblance to the basic
humanistic terminology he defined as the necessary components of healthy creative life. For
example, Escape From Freedom concludes with a re-assertion of the goodness of these basic
terms, as Fromm reminds his readership about the importance o f how “positive freedom consists
in the spontaneous activity of the total, integrated personality” (1941, p. 258). After a brief
discussion of related goals, including the importance o f‘Work as creation” and of winning out
over self-doubt, he implores that
[w]e must recognize the difference between genuine and fictitious ideals.. .All genuine
ideals have one thing in common: they express the desire for something which is not yet
accomplished but which is desirable for the purpose of the growth and happiness of the
individual (1941, p. 266).
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The prescriptive tone here can be found in how Fromm emphasizes that ‘We must’ pursue this
goal. This is what makes this conclusion differ from his other outlines of basic terminology:
there is a prescriptive urgency here.
To some degree, Fromm used the prescriptive tone outside of his concluding perorations.
His terminology was frequently couched in terms of what should be done; this was a crucial part
of what made his normative humanism normative, after all. This subtle framing in terms of what
should be done can be found in his outline of the role that faith plays in the humanistic
conscience, as he notes that faith “is necessary” to science and rational living (1947, p. 20S).
Concluding that “[m]an cannot live without faith,” Fromm adds that the crucial issue “is whether
this faith will be an irrational faith in leaders, machines, success, or the rational faith in man
based on the experience of our own productive activity” (1947, p. 210). Here, Fromm’s
prescriptive tone is somewhat stealthy. Faith is made out to be a necessity, and Fromm’s
preference for the faith in productivity could hardly be more clear. However, he frequently
stopped shy of suggesting what ‘should’ be done, and remained within a relatively objective,
scientific style, relying on descriptions of what is ‘necessary’.
But Fromm did not always stop short o f specific advice on how to live. In The Art o f
Loving, he describes the four factors that make up that art in straight-forward rules for living,
laying them out as a kind of ‘how to’ in the ways of love. The first factor Fromm described was
discipline, and “not only that of discipline in the practice of the particular art (say practicing
every day a certain amount of hours) but it is that of discipline in one’s whole life” (1956a, p.
108). The second factor was concentration, a quality Fromm found lacking in most people, and
therefore, an impediment to the art of love. The third factor in the art of loving was patience.
Again, Fromm stressed how Western culture impeded this quality. He asserted that “[ojour
whole industrial system fosters exactly the opposite [of patience]: quickness” (1956a, p. 109).
The final factor Fromm explained was the “supreme concern with the mastery of the art” (1956a,
p. 110). “If the art is not something of supreme importance” to the individual, he explained, “the
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apprentice will never learn it. He will remain, at best, a good dilettante, but will never become a
master” (1956a, p. 110).
These four factors in the art of loving were initially explained at a certain remove from
day to day life, but Fromm also provided some very concrete tips on how to ensure one’s own
adherence to these rules. To practice discipline, he suggests that the individual “devote a regular
amount of time during the day to activities such as meditating, reading, listening to music,
walking; not to indulge, at least not beyond a certain minimum, in escapist activities like mystery
stories and movies, [and] not to overeat or overdrink” (1956a, p. 111). And to foster the skill of
concentration, he recommends that one “leam[s] to be alone with oneself without reading,
listening to the radio, smoking or drinking” (1956a, p. 112). These recommendations gave
Fromm’s idea of love a specificity, and put his authority to work in the service o f specific
behavioral recommendations. They demonstrate how he wanted people to change after reading
his work.
Robert Lindner offered similar lists of ways in which individuals should act if they
wanted to engage in the ‘positive rebellion’ he espoused. Indeed, Lindner placed much more
emphasis on this kind of advice, and his book Prescription fo r Rebellion was indeed a proper
prescription, with four chapters devoted to fleshing out what he called the “Revolutionist’s
Handbook” (1953, p. 218). People who want to follow Lindner’s advice to be rebels, he advised
must be “aware, identified, skeptical responsible, employed, and tense” (1953, p. 252). He
explained the first component, awareness, as a most difficult quality to achieve, concerned with
the extension of “the range of cortical control over our lives, of ensuring that our activities are
directed not by the contradictory, infantile, primitive compulsions that now enslave us” (1953, p.
253). He defined identity in contrast to the mode in which the mass man lived, noting that it
involved finding a unique “sense of self” (1953, p. 254). Skepticism could be achieved through
the “nurturing of the mental habit o f questioning,” making blind conformity a less appealing
option for the individual (1953, p. 256).
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Lindner explained responsibility in terms of “personal” and “social” responsibility,
vowing that we must take responsibility for the entire world around us (1953, p. 258). And he
described how the fifth component in his 6-fold path, that of being employed, was a term
“borrowed from [Jose] Ortega y Gassett as the most suitable of expressions to convey the concept
of wholesale and absolute dedication,” while remarking on the similarity between this term and
Fromm’s idea o f ‘productivity’ (1953, p. 260). Finally, the last component of the positive rebel,
that of tension, was described as the “alertness which recognizes the distance, the gap, between
what is and what should be” (1953, p. 263).
These components were described as tools with which to achieve the three tasks that
Lindner saw as most important to the countering o f the tendencies toward massification: “the
acquisition and spread of awareness[,]...the calculated inoculation of all segments of our society
against the myth of adjustment^]... and the compounding of a remedy to revitalize and make
flourish again and continuously our expiring culture” (1953, p. 276). To a great extent, he held
that the components o f positive rebellion should be instilled at an early age; frequently, the
emphasis was placed on how to raise children in accordance with these rules, as when he notes
that
[t]o rear the child toward tension in this special sense is to dispel at their source delusions
nourished by insane religions and comforting but beguiling philosophies that this is the
best of all possible worlds, that change is wrong if not impossible, that the obligation of
each of us is to conform (1953, p. 264).
The importance of focusing on children was again made clear in Lindner’s recommendation that
“we undertake to revise our total educational orientation, its methods and its aims, as an initial
step in escaping from history” (1953, p. 279). This was, to be sure, a real ‘prescription’ for
behavior, a call for action that Lindner placed at the endpoint of his critique of conformity. Even
more than Fromm, Lindner believed he had a specific technique worked out for conquering the
mass man.
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Turning back to Fromm, one can find other prescriptive pronouncements that take a more
explicitly political standpoint. Fromm concluded that economic change should be a major part of
the move toward psychological betterment, and this became part of his prescription for a better
world. He found that “the realization of positive freedom and individualism is also bound up
with economic and social changes that will permit the individual to become free in terms of the
realization of his self’ (1941, p. 271). This meant that the “irrational and planless character of
society must be replaced by a planned economy that represents the planned and concerted effort
of society as such” (1941, p. 272). It was only after conflating the concerns of the individual and
society so that psychological postulates could be applied to society that Fromm could make these
claims. A planned economy, he argued, would allow “the purposes of society and of [the
individual to] become identical,” so that everyone would take responsibility for the shape of the
society because it would be in keeping with their own self-love to do so. Elsewhere, he described
how a person can act as a “free and responsible agent only if one of the main reasons for presentday un-freedom is abolished: the economic threat of starvation which forces people to accept
working conditions which they would otherwise not accept” (1955, p. 335). He justified the cost
of this distribution of wealth by suggesting that “the cost for such a scheme would hardly be more
than what big states have spent for the maintenance of armies in the last decades, not taking into
consideration the cost of armaments,” also noting that the cost would be offset by great
improvements in worker productivity and lower rates o f crime and mental illness (1955, p. 338).
Fromm readily acknowledged the seeming contradiction in his equation o f individual
freedom with a centrally planned economy. To address this situation, he simply suggested that it
was “one of the major tasks of democracy” (1941, p. 275) to combine centralization and
decentralization, noting that while capitalism has to date nurtured the initiative of only a small
number of people, the society that he suggests would allow most people to ponder the ways in
which to address problems of individuation and centralization. This he linked to his own critique
of authoritarianism, concluding that
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[t]he victory over all kinds of authoritarian systems will be possible only if democracy
does not retreat but takes the offensive and proceeds to realize what has been its aim in
the minds of those who fought for freedom throughout the last centuries. It will triumph
over the forces of nihilism only if it can imbue people with a faith that is the strongest the
human mind is capable of, the faith in life and in truth, and in freedom as the active and
spontaneous realization of the individual self (1941, p. 276).
Starting with his own basic definitions of individuality, productivity, and mental health, Fromm
placed his authority behind a plan that, in the context of America, used an economic revolution to
supplant what he saw as individual alienation with freedom, productivity, and true happiness. He
positioned himself from the outset as an expert whose authority concerned psychology,
philosophy, religion, sociology, and economics, and used this very broad position to find a
political solution that would provide an answer to the questions raised by all of these fields. His
emphasis on psychology spilled over into politics, a position he seemed more liberated than the
psychiatrists to take because he himself was not pinned to one profession.
Fromm’s call for this economic transformation was closely related to his description of
the need for a cultural transformation. Resolving that “[n]o social or political arrangement can do
more than further or hinder the realization of certain values and ideals,” he turned his attention to
the cultural sphere, first taking on the educational system, which he, like Lindner, believed should
be revolutionized to allow for greater critical and theoretical knowledge (1955, p. 344). Fromm
moved from these concerns to a description of how art could play a much greater role in our lives.
He averred that art itself had largely been confined to the professional sphere of the artist, and
that this had limited art’s appeal. To assuage this dilemma, he suggested that we create
‘collective art,’ meaning the same as ritual; it means to respond to the world with our
senses in a meaningful, skilled, productive, active, shared way. In this description the
‘shared’ is important, and differentiates the concept of ‘collective art’ from that of art in
the modem sense (1955, p. 347).
Collective art was, for Fromm, a way of revolutionizing individuals’ relationships to the world,
enhancing the productive element in the individual and society simultaneously. It was a way of
fostering community, integrating people into their society. Fromm argued that collective art
would solve the problems of anxiety and insecurity that plagued modem man; its benefit was, in
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this sense, psychological as well as social (19SS, p. 348). Indeed, he claimed that “[i]n
considering how we can build a sane society, we must recognize that the need for the creation of
collective art and ritual on a nonclerical basis is at least as important as literacy and higher
education” (1955, p. 349). Collective art provided a way to go from “an atomistic into a
communitarian society” (1955, p. 349). This was a cultural version of Fromm’s economic
argument; as a collective, planned economy was presented as a move away from the structures
that engendered alienation, so was collective art supposed to be a way to create shared meanings
that fought alienation qua anxiety and insecurity. This was the way to a ‘sane society’. Again
starting with a diffuse expertise that maintained a slight psychological emphasis, Fromm arrived
at a prescription for the world he had placed on the couch.
A final manner in which Fromm offered prescriptive advice for how the world should be
dealt with was visible in his discussion of nuclear war. He argued that several changes were
necessary to make nuclear disarmament possible. One of these necessary steps was what he
called “psychological disarmament, the ending of the hysterical hate and suspicion among the
[United States and Soviet Union] that up to know have made realistic and objective thinking very
difficult” (1961, p. 16). Here we see (not surprisingly) that Fromm’s psychological expertise
played a role in his formulation of specific objectives to stave off nuclear war. Other steps that he
recommended were more concrete. Fromm asserted that “massive economic aid—food, capital
and technical assistance,” should be distributed to the developing world, so that those outside the
U.S. and U.S.S.R. could get their rightful voice in world politics (1961, p. 16). Also, he
suggested that the United Nations should be restructured so that it could have more power to
negotiate disarmament and distribute wealth (1961, p. 16). But the main theme he returns to is
psychological; throughout May Main Prevail, he returns to the idea that nuclear war could be
averted if a kind of psychological revolution were carried out. He entreated his readers, stating:
“We must penetrate the net of rationalizations, self-delusions, and doublethink. We must be
objective and see the world and ourselves realistically and undistorted by narcissism and
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xenophobia” (1961, p. 30). This, above all else, was the way to take on the problem of nuclear
war. In an instructive demonstration of the flexibility of cultural authority, Fromm, as a lay
analyst, found a way to insinuate his own expertise into a position from which he could make
dramatic prescriptions regarding nuclear war and world politics.
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Thomas Szasz:
Professional Against the Profession

Criticism o f psychiatry has played a major role in the unfolding of psychiatry’s public
profile. Expose-style examinations of mental hospitals—of which Albert Deutsch’s 1948 book
The Shame o f the States remains the hallmark—have presented sobering portraits of the mental
health professions, emphasizing the coercion and inhumane conditions that occur behind the
walls of the mental hospital. Mary Jane Ward’s book The Snake Pit (1946), based largely on
Ward’s own experience as a patient in a mental hospital, was turned into a movie of the same
name, released in 1949. Both the book and the movie purported to be true-to-life, and both
showed the mental hospital, and the psychiatric profession more generally, in an unflattering
light.
This antipsychiatric impulse can be best understood in the context of the
institutionalization that was occurring at mid-century. After World War II, the number of patients
committed to mental hospitals rose steadily, reaching its all-time high figure of 559,000 in 1955
(Shorter, 1997 p. 280). The criticism of psychiatry after World War II seems to have been a
reaction to these skyrocketing commitment figures. Because mental hospitals were functioning
so much as custodial institutions—housing those whose problems could not be solved
elsewhere—the medical promise of psychiatry (particularly when contrasted to the dramatic
advances in other branches of medicine) seemed to have gone unfulfilled.As we have seen,
professionals like the Menningers and Strecker had to confront psychiatry’s stigma as an overly
coercive profession that stressed confinement over any real treatment. I have argued that the
stigma of the mental hospital led these orthodox experts to emphasize how psychiatry could be
applied outside of the confines of the mental hospital, whether in emergencies like war, or
through mental hygiene applications in the school, home, or anywhere else. Other psychiatric
and psychoanalytic experts distanced themselves from professional orthodoxy by aligning
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themselves with antipsychiatric concerns, as when Fromm and especially Lindner described
psychiatry as an unduly powerful mode of social control more concerned with forcing individuals
to ‘adjust’ than it was with mental health. Antipsychiatry left a deep impression on the public
experts who identified with either the psychiatric or psychoanalytic sectors of the field.
And antipsychiatry did not just fade away after American psychiatric institutionalization
peaked in 1955. As the 1950’s waned and the 1960’s dawned, a new generation of
antipsychiatric agitation arrived on the scene. This new wave concerned itself in particular with
the practice of electroconvulsive therapy, or ECT. Critics of psychiatry held that ECT caused
brain damage, and was used not for the purposes of therapy so much as for the punishment of
patients (Shorter, 1997, p. 282). Antipsychiatric popular culture took hold of ECT, as evidenced
by Sam Fuller’s 1963 movie Shock Corridor, which revisited the expose-style writing of the
1940’s, and even more significantly by Ken Kesey’s 1962 book (adapted as a movie in 1975) One
Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest.
A t the same time, psychiatry was under fire from academic quarters. In 1959,
psychiatrist R. D. Laing published The Divided Self. Laing offered a symbolic approach to
mental disease, in particular focusing on how schizophrenic behavior was not so much a sickness
as an alternative way of expressing oneself when one’s options for self-expression have been
constrained (mostly likely by one’s family). Sociologist Erving Goffinan’s 1961 book Asylums
analyzed the asylum as an example of a ‘total institution’ where individuality and spontaneity
were eliminated under a medical veneer. Goffinan openly questioned the morality of involuntary
commitment. Also in 1961, Michel Foucault published Madness and Civilization, which
examined the history of the idea of mental illness, with a concern for how mental illness had
become a tool to partition the populace.
Into this overarching debate concerning the question of the rectitude of psychiatry
stepped Thomas Szasz. Szasz possessed the requisite M.D. of psychiatry, but took on psychiatry
with blunt polemics that he posed in his books and articles. He gained widespread recognition in
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particular for his book The Myth o f Mental Illness (1961), in which he charged that mental illness
was not an illness per se, and so psychiatry was not really a medicine. But even before The Myth
o f Mental Illness, Szasz had gained a certain notoriety within his field. In the 1950’s, other
analysts called him “the conscience of psychoanalysis,” (personal communication, 1999) as his
reservations regarding the extension of psychiatry reflected a certain consensus among the more
analytic-minded of the psychiatrists. But Szasz also challenged Freudian orthodoxy, questioning
the methods of analysts much as he scrutinized the medical psychiatrists. One colleague of
Szasz’s referred to him as a “paleo-Freudian,” (personal communication, 1999) referring to
Szasz’s own view that psychoanalysis, as a non-coercive social interaction intended to help
individuals who were experiencing problems in living, was a brilliant idea that had never been put
to a real test. Szasz has suggested that the psychoanalysis he envisioned has “never been
tried...Not even by Freud.” (personal communication, 1999).
Szasz’s first writing for an audience outside of his profession was Pain and Pleasure,
published in 1957. Though Szasz was a psychiatrist, and was credited as “Thomas Szasz, M.D.”
on the title page and book cover, Pain and Pleasure found Szasz casting a wide theoretical net.
The book incorporated psychoanalytic, philosophical, and sociological approaches to analyze
pain and pleasure as concepts and as phenomena. Szasz reviewed philosophical perspectives on
the ontology of pain and pleasure, then turned to a more psychoanalytic take on these issues.
Freud is cited repeatedly, often playing a role as a starting point for discussion of pain and
pleasure, but Freud’s answers were rarely accepted at face value; he was mentioned in the context
o f other perspectives. And Szasz moves comfortably through some of the lexicon of
psychoanalysis, using terms such as ‘ego,’ ‘psychosis,’ and ‘shizophrenia,’ but he stops well short
of endorsing most broad trends in psychiatric diagnosis and treatment, preferring instead to hold
these terms at an arm’s length. Frequently, Szasz takes on psychoanalytic orthodoxy, as when he
finds that analysts had largely ignored the ‘physical’ realm of understanding pain and pleasure
(1957, p. 53). But, like other psychoanalytic and psychiatric experts, Szasz cites his own case
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studies to explain points that he is making, though these case studies were usually reviewed with
a certain abstraction. Certainly, direct quotations of analysands were not easy to find in these
case studies.
In the final chapter of Pain and Pleasure, Szasz offered a sociological understanding of
pain and pleasure, finding that
[i]n considering the psychology of pain, pleasure, and bodily feelings, we have touched
repeatedly on the communicative aspects of these experiences. It is clear that in this
sense these phenomena have been regarded as social processes (1957, p. 247, ital. in
orig.).
The emphasis on the social dimension to pain and pleasure would define much of Szasz’s
subsequent work. The social dimension of pain and pleasure led Szasz to focus on the cultural
values associated with them, resulting in his conclusions that “pain is, among other things, a
currency with which we repay damages done unto others” (1957, p. 249) and that the “idea that
pain and suffering somehow ennoble us has far-reaching consequences for our notions of work
and play” (1957, p. 250). This was, if only implicitly, a rejection of the psychiatric understanding
of pain and pleasure. Instead of diagnosing these concepts, Szasz was, at this point, very quietly
leading them away from psychiatry, which was, of course, his own field.
Pain and Pleasure was published by Basic Books, a publishing house that specialized in
producing books that offered professional writings for a non-professional readership. Szasz’s
association with Basic Books put his ideas up for popular consumption. Before turning to his
subsequent work, it may be helpful to understand how Szasz approached the task of
communicating with those outside his profession. After Pain and Pleasure, Szasz took a more
explicitly polemical stance, taking on psychiatry by appealing to a lay audience. In his own
words, he “wanted to destroy psychiatry,” and specifically, “what [he] considered to be the two
enemies of freedom: the insanity defense, and civil commitment” (personal communication,
1999). His own opposition to psychiatry started long before he wrote about it; in an interview
with Szasz, he pointed out how when he was a student of psychiatry he simply told “the teacher
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what the teacher want[ed] to hear” and took his psychiatric board exam “at the end for my
training” (personal communication, 1999). As his polemics against psychiatry took shape in the
early 1960’s, Szasz became a prominent public professional, addressing lay audiences
consistently through a barrage of books and articles. His motivation for going public, he has
claimed, was at least partly the result of his belief that he could have made little impact within his
own profession of psychiatry. “You knew it wouldn’t work with psychiatrists, so you went with
everyone but psychiatrists,” he has claimed (personal communication, 1999). In other words, he
considered the outreach to a lay audience as a kind of necessary part of communicating his own
point of view.
Szasz’s next book, The Myth o f Mental Illness, after being rejected by Basic Books, was
published by Harper & Row, a large-scale publisher or, in Szasz’s words, a “Cadillac publisher”
(personal communication, 1999). The Myth o f Mental Illness arrived on the heels of Szasz’s
appearance as a witness in the U.S. Senate hearings regarding psychiatric commitment, which had
boosted his visibility considerably, making him a frequent subject on radio and television shows
for a time. Poised to take his message to a wider audience, Szasz submitted articles to popular
periodicals. These articles were rejected “endlessly,” but Szasz took a “shotgun approach,”
(personal communication, 1999) submitting widely and getting published wherever possible,
allowing him to maximize his public exposure.
Szasz’s concern for addressing a lay audience was clearly stated in much of his work. In
one article, published in 1960, he noted that
[wjhile my ideas on the subject [of psychiatric participation in criminal trials] have been
presented previously in several technical papers, I would now like to set them before the
general reader. The nature of the subject is such that it rightly concerns the intelligent
citizen just as much as it does the psychiatric specialist (1960, p. 556).
By addressing the audience this way, he framed his own writing as a kind of insider’s account, a
way of gaining privileged access to an ostensibly hidden story. And he frequently addressed his
readers as ‘intelligent citizens’, avoiding the appearance of talking down to them. A similar
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approach can be found in the introduction to his third book, Law, Liberty, and Psychiatry (1963),
where he wrote that
[t]he book is addressed not only to lawyers, psychiatrists, and social scientists but also to
the intelligent layman. Indeed, the last may fmd it especially useful, for organized
psychiatry poses a much graver threat to him than it does to the professionals (1963, p.
viii).
This kind of positioning allowed Szasz to cast himself as the guardian of the people, writing for a
lay audience precisely because of this guardian role he made for himself.
Szasz constructed the debate over psychiatry in terms that included those outside the
psychiatric profession. In an article fotH arper’s, he described how “thoughtful Americans can
be roughly divided between those who dismiss all forms of psychiatric practice as worthless or
harmful and those who regard it as a panacea for” all kinds of social problems (1964a, p. SO).
After establishing the debate in terms of a conflict between ‘thoughtful Americans,’ he identified
his own professional background, claiming “I do not, as a practicing psychiatrist, intend to belittle
the help which my profession can give to some troubled individuals” (1964a, p. 50). In other
words, he cast himself as a psychiatrist against psychiatry, a professional against the profession.
Myth of Mental Illness: The Basic Idea
Szasz’s place as a critic of psychiatry was largely established through the publication of
The Myth o f Mental Illness. So, before delving any further into the cultural authority at work in
Szasz’s writing, I will address some of the basic arguments from The Myth o f Mental Illness, and
then his next two books: Law, Liberty, and Psychoanalysis and Psychiatric Justice. Early in The
Myth o f Mental Illness, Szasz declared: “I submit that the traditional definition of psychiatry,
which is still in vogue, places it alongside such things as alchemy and astrology, and commits it
to the category o f pseudo science” (1961, p. 1). Psychiatry’s problem, he claimed, was that it
could not demonstrate its own scientific grounding, and that “[h]e is a psychiatrist so long as he
claims that he is oriented toward the problem of mental illness and health” (1961, p. 2). He was
very clear in stating his goal in suggesting that psychiatry relied solely upon a myth; he noted that
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“my efforts in this study are directed first at demolishing some o f the major false substantives of
contemporary psychiatric thought, and second at laying the foundations for a process-theory of
personal conduct” (1961, p. 2).
As we have seen in the work of popular psychiatric writers, psychiatry’s connection to
medicine played a major role in its professional and public profile. By attacking psychiatry’s
links to medicine, and arguing that mental illness was not really an illness, Szasz was getting to
the very foundations of psychiatry’s authority. He insisted that what had been considered to be
mental illnesses were really something else. He referred to this something else as ‘problems in
living’. In the conclusion to The Myth o f Mental Illness, he reiterated that “the notion of a person
‘having mental illness’ is scientifically crippling,” and averred that
[i]t provides professional assent to a popular rationalization, namely, that problems in
human living experienced and expressed in terms of bodily feelings or signs (or in terms
of other ‘psychiatric symptoms’) are significantly similar to diseases of the body (1961,
pp. 296-297).
In Szasz’s view, it was “powerful institutional pressures,” and not medical merits, that “lend
massive weight to the tradition of keeping psychiatric problems within the conceptual fold of
medicine” (1961, p. 297). He concluded that “[pjsychiatrists are not concerned with mental
illnesses and their treatments. In actual practice they deal with personal, social, and ethical
problems in living” (1961, p. 296). This essential idea would inform much of Szasz’s critique of
psychiatry.
Szasz’s attack on the idea of mental illness was carried out with a libertarian concern for
individual liberty and dignity. Individual liberty was at stake, claimed Szasz, because
psychiatry’s medical posture had enabled it to commit people to mental institutions against their
will. He argued that the notion of mental illness per se had become an all-too-convenient means
by which to circumvent existing protections of individual liberty, usually for the purpose of
removing those whose unusual behavior had become inconvenient or unsettling for those around
them. Involuntary commitment of those deemed mentally ill therefore played a major role in his
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writing. He wrote that u[e]ccentrics and social misfits may be a burden to their families and a
nuisance to the public—but usually they aren’t ‘mentally ill’ and hospitalizing them may do more
harm than good” (1964a, p. SO). This basic thrust underscored much of Szasz’s writing.
The Legal Meaning of Mental Illness
As we have seen, psychiatry had made significant inroads into the legal process in
America. By the mid^O* century, psychiatrists were playing a major role in the outcome of
trials, acting as expert witnesses in cases where defendants pleaded insanity or were thought to be
incompetent to stand trial. As Fredric Wertham made clear in his writings, psychiatric witnesses
were frequently called in by both the prosecution and defense, testifying on both sides of the
question of insanity. Wertham was outspoken in his criticism of how psychiatric expertise was
used in trials. Perhaps most important to him was the question of how a medical term like mental
illness was used to determine legal questions raised by the issue of ‘insanity,’ a term that was
defined legally and not medically.
Wertham’s misgivings about psychiatry’s involvement were shared by many
psychiatrists. Not surprisingly, Szasz was most vocal on this issue. Building on the arguments he
had advanced in The Myth o f Mental Illness, his next two books, Law, Liberty, and Psychiatry
and Psychiatric Justice, found Szasz aiming his criticism directly at the bridges that had been
built between psychiatry and the law. He found the psychiatric role in the court to be a clear
indication that psychiatry was leaving its medical concerns behind in favor of the power that
came with acting as an agent of social control. As he was quick to point out, much of
psychiatry’s justification for its involvement in court cases came from its own power to define
criminality in medical terms. From Szasz’s perspective, the notion that juvenile delinquency was
some sort of mental disease, asserted (albeit in different ways) by psychiatric and psychoanalytic
experts such including Fredric Wertham and Robert Lindner, had laid the ground work for what
he considered to be an erosion of due process and American Constitutional rights.
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In this sense, Szasz’s critique of psychiatry’s courtroom power cast doubt on the entire
project of considering social problems in psychiatric terms. “[A]s psychiatrists,” he claimed, “we
deal largely with problems of human conduct—that is, with moral problems—which we cannot
adequately confront, much less resolve, while they remain hidden by our medical metaphor”
(1964b, p. 100). This idea, that the application of psychiatry in the law was to apply medical
logic to non-medical problems—was a major component of Szasz’s argument against the use of
psychiatry in the courts. In Law, Liberty, and Psychiatry, he outlined what he considered to be
the differences between the law and science, making his case that if psychiatry truly were a
science, it would not lend itself so easily to use by the law. He asserted that “[njovelty is not a
positive value in law” because “the lawyer looks for precedent” (1963, p. 122). He contrasted
this with the situation in science, where “novelty is a value” and “new facts and theories are
sought, whether or not they will prove useful” (1963, p. 122). In this sense, Szasz saw
psychiatry’s role in the courts as wholly attendant upon its practitioners’ willingness to jettison
the needs and values of science.
Szasz presented an analysis of what he considered to be the game that motivated the
participants in a trial where a psychiatrist was involved. Starting from the observation that one of
the “important functions of the law is to protect people from an excessive burden of guilt,” he
deemed that the psychiatrist “is asked by the court to give it assurance that it can proceed with
punishment without feeling guilty” (1963, p. 112). By acting as a kind of guarantor that only
patients considered healthy are punished, psychiatrists allowed those involved in the trial to
believe that they were not punishing anyone unhealthy. Though this might not seem so offensive,
Szasz was suspect of these motives, concluding that “[tjhis is a callous game. The court plays by
the rule: heads-I-win, tails-you-lose. If guilty, the defendant is sent to prison; if not guilty but
insane, he is sent to a hospital for the criminally insane” (1963, p. 114). The end result, as Szasz
saw it, is that this process “provides the ‘offender-patient’ neither absolution from criminal guilt
nor treatment” making it “nothing more than an expedient method for ‘disposing’ of persons
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displaying certain kinds of antisocial comment” (1963, p. 114). And finally, Szasz finds that this
situation serves only to place the psychiatrist in close proximity to the situation of the judge of the
case, resulting in an outcome that “would be desirable only for those who wish to give the
psychiatrist even more power than he now has” (1963, p. 116). Szasz’s emphasis here, and in
almost all of his other arguments concerning psychiatry and the legal process, was on the process
of institutionalization. This stress on the process of institutionalization is what gave his writings a
sense of crisis. Other popular psychiatrists, in their attempts to apply psychiatry to new areas not
traditionally associated with their tradition, played down institutionalization. As a major source
of the stigma that, rightly or wrongly, dogged psychiatry’s image, institutionalization and the
mental hospital itself had become taboo topics in popular psychiatry. So, Szasz’s repeated return
to institutionalization was a crucial detail in the rhetoric of his writing. He spoke as if he were
revealing something that had been hidden. And while these details had not really been hidden
(exposes of life inside mental hospitals and suspicion of psychiatry’s power were, after all, not so
hard to come by), they had never been so prominently and dramatically asserted by a psychiatrist
before.
Because he argued that psychiatry was making inappropriate encroachments upon legal
terrain, many of Szasz’s arguments concerned the legal allowances for psychiatry that had
allowed the profession this access to the courts (and, conversely, allowed the courts this access to
psychiatry). In particular, he paid repeated attention to the Durham decision, a key precedent in
outlining the grounds for considering the question of a defendant’s insanity. While the Durham
decision found that it was a “ ‘matter of fact’ for the jury to decide whether the offender suffered
from a mental illness when he committed the act for which he is charged,” (1963, p. 133) Szasz
begged to differ, insisting that any such explanation for a person’s actions was a theory and not a
matter of fact at all. He proffered that “[t]o mistake one’s theories for facts is often regarded as a
symptom of schizophrenia. Yet this is what the language of the Durham decision does” (1963, p.
134). In Psychiatric Justice, he reviewed laws from around the country and in federal courts that
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pertained to the mental competence o f defendants, and again took issue with psychiatry’s
involvement with the law. He postulated that a New York State regulation concerning pre-trial
psychiatric examinations, performed in mental hospitals, was “in effect a sixty-day sentence to a
mental hospital, authorized by a criminal order, but without trial” (1965, p. 40). These and other
regulations he contrasted with the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution, with its guarantee for a
speedy and public trial. He mused that the “Constitution does not say that this right is contingent
on the ability of the accused to prove his sanity to the satisfaction of adversary psychiatrists”
(1965, p. 55). And this was by no means an uncommon reference to the Constitution; Szasz
continually returns to it, attacking psychiatry on the grounds that it is weakening its power to
ensure a limited government. In this way, Szasz expressed Barry Goldwater-esque vision of what
was wrong with psychiatry.
In the psychiatrist’s role as witness, Szasz detected evidence of an uneven playing-field
within the court, suspecting that the “psychiatrist, by virtue of his education, may formulate a
more sophisticated theory than the layman” (1963, p. 134). By making this last point, Szasz
again relied on the idea of psychiatry as a language game, arguing that the psychiatrist’s fluency
in a certain medical terminology might in fact be nothing but the emperor’s new clothes. This
insinuation bore clear marks of the kind of anti-professional suspicion of professional jargon that
characterized the work of heterodox experts like Erich Fromm and Robert Lindner. And indeed,
Szasz certainly seemed to be approaching this issue much as a psychoanalyst might, with a
skeptical eye toward the way psychiatrists (as opposed to psychoanalysts) had been able to work
their way into the legal system.
Another prong of his attack on the psychiatric involvement in court cases centered on the
insanity acquittal. While one might imagine that Szasz would look more generously on a
situation in which psychiatrists were ostensibly using their expertise to prevent individuals from
being convicted, that was not the case. Szasz quickly dismisses the idea that acquittal by reason
of insanity is anything to bring relief to the accused. From his point of view, the accused has
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simply been moved into a different kind of prison, one which he believes lacks any Constitutional
safeguards. He asserts that the blending of psychiatry and law yields little of value, and is
situated perfectly well to bewilder the subjects of this system. “Were we to plan deliberately to
harm mental patients,” he muses,
—whose crucial difficulty often springs from not understanding their position in life—we
could not devise a more effective pathogenic influence than the present legal-social
definition of their status. Psychiatrists are similarly confused. They act as wardens but
think they are doctors. Last but not least, the jurists and legislators are confused. They
have lost sight of the distinction between ‘mental illness’ and criminality (1963, p. 143).
These are the basics of Szasz’s concerns with acquittal by means of insanity. As he sees it,
acquitting individuals on grounds of mental illness, and then committing them to mental
hospitals, only hurts the people it is trying to help. He finds the crux of the problem in the
blending of psychiatry and law, what he calls an “unholy alliance of legal, moral, and medical
approaches to antisocial behavior” (1963, p. 145). If psychiatry has explained so much crime in
terms of mental illness, there may be a problem of defining what crime is not psychiatric in
nature, or, in Szasz’s words, “one must ask how the experts can maintain that the criminals dealt
with in the ordinary, legal-penological fashion are less ‘sick’ than those psychiatrically
hospitalized” (1963, p. 145). And if, on the other hand, all criminals really are sick, Szasz insists,
then the political consequences of that must be considered, as he asks: “Is anyone really prepared
to take this position seriously? What is a crime? Speeding? Cheating on one’s income-tax
return? Selling contraceptives in Massachusetts? Operating a Planned Parenthood Clinic in
Connecticut?” (1963, p. 145). Clearly, by this point, Szasz has abstracted from the specific
situation of the insanity acquittal in the courtroom. But that is a part of his point: that the
insanity defense supports a false notion of what psychiatry should and should not address.
Significantly, though he finds new ways to arrive at the exact meaning of it, he does not waver
from his concern for incarceration, stubbornly remaining at that old source of psychiatry’s stigma.
Szasz also questioned the power of a psychiatrist to determine the course of a trial.
Because insanity was considered to be a feet determined by the psychiatrist, the right to plead
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guilty or innocent, as he saw it, was removed from the defendant. Psychiatrists justified their
findings regarding the sanity of the defendant on the basis of pre-trial examination. Szasz
uncorked a neologism to express his own skepticism of this process, referring to it as “mind
tapping” (1963, p. 161). This choice of terms drew a comparison between pre-trial psychiatric
examination and wire-tapping, again for the purpose of making a point regarding Constitutional
limits to governmental power. If wiretapping could not be performed without a warrant, Szasz
asked, why could this ‘mind-tapping’ be performed so freely (1963, p. 161)? Again, he surmised
that the result of this psychiatric advance on legal terrain had been, and would be, devastating.
He remarked, sarcastically:
How different the world might be today if only a handful of people had been sent away
for psychiatric ‘treatments,’ instead of being tried and sent to jail! Gandhi, Nehru,
Sukarno, Castro, Hitler—and of course many others, for example the ‘freedom riders’ in
the South—have been sentenced to terms in prison. Surely, the social status quo could
have been better preserved by finding each of these men mentally ill and subjecting them
to enough electric shock treatments to quell their aspirations (1963, p. 168).
Here, Szasz alludes to electro-convulsive therapy much as Robert Lindner did in his own
critiques of psychiatry; this was classic anti-psychiatry. Also, Szasz’s assertion that an
authoritarian politics can be detected in the psychiatric advance closely matches Lindner and
Erich Fromm’s ideas regarding psychiatry as a tool of adjustment to protect the status quo. And,
significantly, in this argument, the debate is forced by his use of the neologism ‘mind tapping’ as
a way of foregrounding psychiatry’s potential for obstructing justice.
Because psychiatry had established itself as a service profession, attempting to help those
with needs, and in particular help those who could not help themselves, Szasz’s attack on
psychiatry was sometimes labeled as overly dispassionate. His frank distaste for the welfare state
left him somewhat vulnerable to counter-arguments that he simply did not care about the plight of
the recipients of public psychiatric care. It is likely that these concerns were what motivated him
to choose, repeatedly, examples of cases that allowed him to cast psychiatry as the enemy of the
needy. He explained the case of “Joe,” who “like most patients in public mental hospitals, is a
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victim of social injustice” (1964a p. 53). He was very clear that while a “wealthy and important
man would have a chance, and the means, to rebut the charge of mental illness,” Joe had little
chance of doing so (1964a, p. 53). Warding off concerns that he might not care about those
considered mentally ill and the needy, Szasz invoked values of professionalism as part of the
solution to these problems, noting that “medicine and law strive to treat all people equally,” then
contrasting this with the situation in psychiatry, concluding that “[i]n psychiatry, however, we not
only fail to approximate this goal in our practice; we do not even value it as an ideal” (1964a, p.
53).

He continues to refer to psychiatry as ‘we’ when he continues his attack on the profession,

stating:
We regard the rich and influential psychiatric patient as a self-governing, responsible
client—free to decide whether or not to be a patient. But we look upon the poor and the
aged patient as a ward of the state—too ignorant or too ‘mentally sick’ to know what is
best for him. The paternalistic psychiatrist, as an agent of the family or the state, assumes
‘responsibility’ for him, defines him as a ‘patient’ against his will, and subjects him to
‘treatment’ deemed best for him, with or without his consent.. .Do we really need more of
this kind of psychiatry? (1964a, p. 53).
By referring to psychiatry as a ‘we,’ Szasz reminded his audience of his own identification as a
member of the psychiatric profession, making clear that his own dissent came from inside that
world. This underscored his own critique with an assurance that he had a substantial amount of
insider experience regarding psychiatry’s role in such matters. In a sense, then, this found Szasz
claiming proximity to the psychiatric milieu. As Wertham and Lindner made their own claims
regarding their closeness to the problems (like juvenile delinquency and fascism) they described,
Szasz claimed the same kind of proximity, only for him, psychiatry itself was the problem.
Closely related to the idea that psychiatry was hardest on the poorest and most troubled
parts o f the population was Szasz’s contention that psychiatrists acted as adversaries of those they
were supposed to be helping. Again, he contrasted the situation of the psychiatrist with that of
other medical doctors, insisting that when any physician, “is employed by someone other than the
patient, his loyalty and responsibility to his employer must be frankly recognized” (1965, p. 56).
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To the extent that psychiatrists acted as agents or representatives of judges, prosecutors, and
others, Szasz believed that their loyalty to the patient had been compromised.
Szasz linked this idea of psychiatrist-as-adversary to the criteria that are used to
determine whether or not someone is considered competent to stand trial. Because the presence
of mental illness has been deemed crucial to a person’s competence to stand trial, psychiatrists
have played a major role as arbiters of this competence. Not suiprisingly, Szasz’s response to this
situation has been that purported mental illness should have nothing to do with a person’s
competence to stand trial, and therefore, a psychiatrist should have nothing to do with the process.
Simply stated, Szasz simply did not accept that a diagnosis of schizophrenia or sexual deviance or
any other psychiatric problem had anything directly to do with competence to stand trial. He
argued that this competence was “a question of task-performance” and “not of illness,”
concluding that “[w]e must recognize psychiatric determinations of competence to stand trial as
scientistic, not scientific. Accordingly, these must be replaced by practical, commonsense
determinations” (1965, p. 253). Szasz’s accusation that psychiatric involvement in court cases
was based on scientistic (and not scientific) grounds attempted to cut the legs out from under
psychiatry, once again returning to the theme that psychiatry was too poorly-defined to be a true
science or medical practice.
This concern for the issue of competence to stand trial is then brought to bear on his
argument that psychiatrists act as adversaries to defendants. Because those found unfit were
frequently sent to mental hospitals, Szasz finds that “[pjsychiatric determination of competence to
stand trial.. .serves an additional hidden reason: it legitimates the psychiatric incarceration of
those found unfit to stand trial” (1965, p. 260). In other words, while assuaging the guilt felt by
those who demand that something humane be done for those who suffer from mental illness, the
psychiatric involvement in court cases conceals the interests at work that make it act counter to
the defendant’s needs. As Szasz sees it, when psychiatrists align themselves with the prosecution
to find someone unfit to stand trial, they cease to act in the interest o f those they are supposedly
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diagnosing, violating standards of medicine. Moreover, the psychiatric power to designate
individuals as unfit to stand trial acts as a kind of justification for their power to subsequently
commit them to mental hospitals without a trial. Szasz recommends at least two changes to this
system: first, that either judges, lawyers, or lay persons be given the power to determine fitness
for trial, (1965, pp. 255-259) and second, that those deemed unfit to stand trial not get sent to a
mental hospital. The person found unfit to stand trial, he claims, should receive the same
treatment that is received by “persons unfit to drive a car, qualify for a medical license, or found
medically (not psychiatrically) unfit to stand trial: they are deprived of the right to play a
particular social role, but are not otherwise punished” (1965, p. 261). In other words, these
people should be set free.
The over-arching picture that Szasz painted was a kind of narrative of decline by way of
psychiatric ascent. He posited a zero-sum gain relationship between individual freedom and
psychiatric power: as psychiatry grew more powerful, he claimed, individual rights were
necessarily eclipsed. Throughout, he maintained the sense that the rise of psychiatry was largely
concealed from public view, allowing himself to step into the role of the one who reveals what
was previously hidden. As he put it, “[ajlthough we may not know it, we have, in our day,
witnessed the birth of the Therapeutic State. This is perhaps the major implication of psychiatry
as an institution of social control” (1963, p. 212). Under the rubric of the ‘therapeutic state’
neologism, he proceeded to fill in the picture of psychiatric advance that he found to be such a
taint on modem history.
To demonstrate the arrival of the therapeutic state, Szasz turns to laws concerning sexual
psychopaths, finding the definition of psychopathy in those laws to be overly vague, and
criticizing the system for providing inadequate opportunities for treatment of these individuals.
The result of these and other laws that presume psychiatric involvement, he claims, is an
inadequate situation in which treatment is compulsory and criminality and mental illness are
confused. Showing his libertarian-leaning political stripes, he asserts that this scenario “reflect[s]
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a paternalistic conception of the state” and illustrates, “in the field of psychiatry, the operations of
a collectivistic welfare state” (1963, p. 215). To support this assertion of collectivism, he
compares American and Soviet psychiatric law, finding many similarities, and concluding that,
while the Soviet means of enforcing the law may have less finesse, the two systems are
essentially the same (1963, pp. 218-221). “To me,” he explains,
our movement toward juristic despotism based on paternalistic therapeutism seems
anything but slow. Perhaps this is because I am a psychiatrist. For today, only
psychiatrists and mental hospital patients are familiar with the lull scope of psychiatry as
administrative law—and hence, in Lord Hewart’s words, an administrative lawlessness.
It is high time for an informed public to know it too (1963, p. 221).
By approaching the issue this way, he was again calling attention to his own place as a
psychiatrist, with access to the essential truth of the situation. And of course, he was an expert
with a difference: his professional identification was hitched to the overall purpose of
undermining his own profession. So, the other group with whom he claims allegiance is the
public, who will become ‘informed’ once he has his say.
When the state is given the ‘paternalistic’ psychiatric power described here, says Szasz,
“the state assumes the roles of parent and therapist [and] the citizens will be forced to assume the
complementary roles of child and patient” (1963, p. 222). Again, this is a zero-sum logic of
professional gain, pitting psychiatric power against the rights of the individuals. And once more,
Szasz explored the more explicitly political dimensions of these therapeutic advances within the
legal system, making rather grand contentions comparing psychiatric power to fascism. The basis
for these claims was that psychiatry was capable of going even further and claiming more ground
for itself via the mechanism of mental illness. “Because the concept of mental illness is infinitely
elastic,” Szasz claimed, “almost any moral, political, or social problem can be cast into a
psychiatric mold” (1963, p. 247). And, in terms that are quite relevant to the public psychiatry
that we have already seen, Szasz spelled out this elasticity, noting that
[i]n recent decades, outstanding psychiatrists have included among the symptoms of
mental illness such things as a dislike of Negroes and Jews, or a preference for Fascism
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over democracy. Eveiy ethical principle has thus been interpreted as a sign of either
mental health or sickness (1963, p. 247).
Of course, the psychiatric diagnosis of race hatred and fascism/Nazism was indeed well-worn
territory, and was exceptionally prominent in the popular psychiatry o f the 1950’s. By dismissing
these psychiatric forays into the consideration of political belief, Szasz was taking on some of the
most visible, ‘outstanding’ experts in psychiatry. Even psychiatrists and psychoanalysts who
were skeptical of some of psychiatry’s tendencies, such as Erich Fromm and Fredric Wertham,
put fascism and race hatred on the couch, diagnosing it as a psychosis or neurosis. In
psychiatry’s tendency to address these things, Szasz perceived an incipient fascism.
And he was willing to use the word fascism in his remarks. He posited that laws that
circumvent Constitutional rights “are the manifestations of what I call moral Fascism: certain
types of conduct are prohibited, and violations are punished not by penal but by so-called
therapeutic sanctions...” (1963, p. 249). The term ‘moral Fascism’ was a neologism that allowed
him to explore the overlap between admirable concern and over-reaching control from above. In
the conclusion to Psychiatric Justice, Szasz outlined his concerns most clearly. He observes a
crisis, finding that “[f]or some time now, but especially since the end of the second world war,
our nation (though, of course not ours alone) has retreated from the full-bodied ethic of the free
society” (1965, p. 265). And he concludes that by “placing the burden of mental illness on the
citizen suspected of antisocial conduct and in punishing him with involuntary psychiatric
confinement and treatment, our criminal law is becoming more like the legal systems of modem
totalitarian regimes” (1965, p. 265). This bodes particularly poorly for those who are already
politically disenfranchised, as “[cjombined criminal-psychiatric measures, such as the involuntary
pretrial examination, may be especially oppressive for the Negro” because “Negroes commit, or
are accused of committing, more offenses than whites” (1965, p. 267). This, he claims, makes it
possible that psychiatrically inflected “legislation is an attempt—albeit an ‘unconscious’ or covert
attempt—to impose more rigid social controls on Negroes just as they are emerging from their
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centuries-old legal and psychological bondage” (1965, p. 267). As a peroration on this theme, he
reminds the audience that the Durham decision—the major precedent that established the basis
upon which a defendant could be found unfit for trial on psychiatric grounds—was itself named
after the African-American man who was thusly deemed unfit to stand trial. Comparing Durham
with Dreyfus, Szasz muses that “Dreyfus is the classic victim of ‘political justice’; Durham of
what I would call ‘psychiatric justice”’ (1965, p. 269). Neither should be tolerated, says Szasz.
Against Psychoanalysis
Szasz’s critiques against psychiatry sometimes overlapped with the complaints that
psychoanalysts and cognitive psychologists were making at the time. We have already seen how
some of his points converged with criticisms o f psychiatry voiced by Lindner, Fromm, and
Wertham. There is no question that Szasz considered psychiatry to be the most important target.
But by no means did he let psychoanalysis off the hook. From Szasz’s point of view,
psychoanalysis benefited from some of the same kind of access to power as psychiatry, and it
suffered from some of the same faux-scientific self-legitimation. As he recalls it, “[rjight after
World War II, psychoanalysts were in a separate class, as aristocrats. Psychiatrists were the
upper-middle class. Psychologists were the proletariat” (personal communication, 1999). In this
sense, at least, Szasz took on what he considered to be the upper-middle class and the aristocracy.
Many of his criticisms of psychoanalysis were directed at its originator, Sigmund Freud.
A Newsweek article about Szasz entitled “Taking Freudianism Apart” quoted Szasz’s critique of
the Freudian view of sexuality, where he claimed that Freud’s own approach to sexuality was
largely a function of Freud’s own relationship to the culture surrounding him. “It is as if Freud
had given vent to his struggles against the Catholic mores which surrounded him,” claimed Szasz.
While “Catholicism asserted that sexuality was bad, and ought to be curbed,” he explained,
“Freud countered by asserting that it was good, and that the development o f ‘vigorous sexual
needs’ should be encouraged” (pp. 100,102). Szasz countered this with a common-sense
explanation, asserting that “Man’s sexual endowment is...no more a reason for advocating the
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vigorous development of this function...than is the existence of muscles a basis for advocating
pugnaciousness” (“Taking Freudianism Apart,” p. 102).
Other criticisms that Szasz leveled against the psychoanalytic tradition aimed more at
Freudianism than at Freud himself. In particular, he took issue with the psychoanalytic tradition
of explaining behavior through motivations. The problem with motivational explanations, he
claimed, was that motives “do not really tell us why Mr. Jones acted in a particular manner at a
certain moment. To explain specific, concrete human actions, we must know other things besides
what motivates the actor” (1961, p. 168). Szasz maintained that psychoanalysis was a kind of
“hidden-factor” theory, capable only of explaining actions in terms of pre-existing factors (1961,
p. 169). He believed that psychoanalysis and other psychological disciplines, should approach
explanations of human action via what he called “rule-following explanations,” which are
“framed in terms of (behavior-regulating) conventions” (1961, p. 169). And, not surprisingly,
Szasz detected the self-interest of the psychoanalytic orthodoxy at work in its adherence to
motivational explanations, as he surmised that a “motive-analysis of mental illness [functions] not
merely as a scientific explanation but also, or perhaps primarily, as a justification both for the
patient’s behavior and for the physician’s interest in the patient and his humane efforts to help
him” (1961,p. 171). There was a parallel here to his critique of psychiatry: in both cases, he
suggested that the methods and discourse that the two practices offered in justification of
themselves bypassed reason and served only to legitimate their own (quite successful) power
moves. And, more subtly, by referring to psychoanalysts as ‘physicians’, as he does in this last
quote, Szasz lumps them in with psychiatrists, allowing the stigma of psychiatry to be spread
even to those who might claim they had, through pure analytic work, avoided the mental hospital
and its aura.
But Szasz did not stop there; he delved more deeply into Freudianism to explain, at
length, the differences between his own model of rule-generated behavior and Freudianism’s
model of motivational explanations. He argued that Freud had “failed to deal explicitly with rule330
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following behavior, except that based on the principle that men (children) obey feared and
respected persons (adults)” (1961, p. 172). The problem, from Szasz’s point of view, was that
this left most interaction between “equal adults” mostly unexplained, instead focusing on the
“defects inherent in the ‘morality of infantilism”’ (1961, p. 172). He cast Freud’s choice of
avoiding adult interactions in part as a failure on Freud’s part to understand the degree to which
individuals could control their surroundings, and were not entirely shaped by their infantile
experiences (1961, pp. 174-175).
Continuing with this angle of criticism, Szasz attacked the Freudian idea of the neurosis,
a diagnostic term that, as we have seen, allowed psychoanalysis and psychiatry to claim
expansive new terrain for their professional projects. Szasz rejected the psychoanalytic theory
behind the notion of neurosis, finding, again, that it over-emphasized the role of childhood.
Because the association o f mental illness with childhood was nothing new, predating
psychoanalysis by a long shot, Szasz found it to be a vague recapitulation of received ideas,
mostly used to justify psychoanalytic power. This was, in many ways, a test of professionalism,
for Szasz found that “[t]o be useful, whether for scientific theory-building or psychotherapy, the
precise details” of prolonged childhood attitudes or of regression “must be elucidated” (1961, p.
184). Because he found psychoanalysis wanting in elucidation, he considered it to be less than
scientific.
Like Erich Fromm, with his contrast between what he saw as the science of Darwinism
and the quasi-religion of Freudianism, Szasz was concerned that Freudianism was not living up to
the ideals of science. Some of this criticism was aimed directly at Freud, who,
by persistently claiming—and perhaps also inviting—nonrecognition of his ideas, seemed
to orient himself to the ethics of institutional groups, such as those of organized religion
or organized medicine, rather than to the ethics o f the scientific community (1961, p.
160).
With this, Szasz holds the ideals of science above any kind o f institutional ethics, suspecting
Freud of compromising whatever value analysis had in the interest of making psychoanalysis
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more executable. This could be taken an accusation that Freud sold out to the powerful elements
in society.
And Szasz saw that as only the beginning of psychoanalysis’s long slide into trouble. For
it was “Freud’s nonscientific orientation in regard to the psychoanalytic movement” that
“undoubtedly contributed to the rapid institutionalization of psychoanalytic thought” (1961, p.
160). The result of this institutionalization, he posited, was a fully non-scientific enteiprise.
Szasz finds that “[psychoanalysis as a profession thus became a closed system, a family-type of
organization in which honesty was no longer the best policy” (1961, p. 160). And he noted that
the “honest, forthright assertion of differences from Freudian thought (for example in Jung,
Adler, Rank, Homey) were punishable by ‘expulsion’ from the group” (1961, pp. 160-161). This
analysis is, again, quite similar to that frequently offered by Fromm. Both of them approached
psychoanalysis as outsiders: Fromm because he was a lay analyst who lacked an M.D. and whose
ideas strayed too far from the Freudian orthodoxy, and Szasz because he used his own credentials
to rip out what he perceived as the encroaching lack o f professionalism in the discipline.
But despite his direct attacks on psychoanalysis, Szasz did reserve a place for the practice
of analysis. But his own take on what analysis should be set him very much apart from any
orthodoxy within the psychological professions. In a Commentary article about Szasz, Szasz
himself was quoted as saying that the “scientific significance of the psychoanalytic situation” is
that “it is a model of the human encounter regulated by the ethics of individualism and personal
autonomy” (Farber, 1965, p. 70). Szasz believed that what were considered to be psychiatric
symptoms of mental illness “entail an essential restriction of...freedom to engage in conduct
available to others similarly situated in his society” (Farber, 1965, p. 70). As the author of this
essay on Szasz, Leslie Farber, commented: “To some extent autonomous psychotherapy appears
to be a kind of training in democratic citizenship achieved through the willingness of both parties
to honor the explicit clauses in their therapeutic contract” (Farber, 1965, p. 70). In this manner
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did Szasz latch his new vision for psychoanalysis to some of the same lofty ideals espoused by
his psychiatric rivals.
Szasz’s Hope For a New Psychoanalysis
As can be detected in these last remarks by Szasz, he did maintain a certain belief in the
potential of psychoanalysis. Indeed, Szasz has consistently maintained that psychoanalysis
should not be entirely thrown out, and even in the anti-psychiatric broadside that was The Myth o f
Mental Illness, he explained (at length) what he considered to be the hope for psychoanalysis and
psychiatry. In the beginning of that book, he explained his own motives:
I should like to make clear., .that although consider the concept of mental illness to be
unserviceable, I believe that psychiatry could be a science. I also believe that
psychotherapy is an effective method of helping people—not to recover from an ‘illness,’
it is true, but rather to leam about themselves, others, and life (1961, p. xi).
In his attempts to combat psychiatry’s power, Szasz tried to wrest the idea of mental illness, with
its crucial links to medicine, away from psychiatry. A major part of this overall strategy found
Szasz proposing that those who seemed to suffer from what psychiatrists called mental illness
were in fact experiencing what he called ‘problems of living.’ This he saw as a scientific advance
within the profession, where “[ajdvances have been made in spite of the theoretical framework of
medicine into which our discipline has been cast, not because of it” (1961, p. 29).
The reformation of psychoanalysis, as Szasz saw it, would involve some recognition of
what he thought Freud had accomplished that was scientific but not medical. For example, he
praised Freud for calling attention to the difficulty that patients frequently have when they
attempt to fit their “sensations” into words (1961, p. 138). He saw a minimally coercive, dialogic
framework as the ideal for analysis, noting that proper analytic technique “rests on the tacit
assumption that we cannot know—in fact, must not even expect to know—what troubles our
patients until we have become attuned to them” (1961, p. 139). One can detect here that Szasz
was claiming a proximity to the authentic needs and desires of the patients, and using this as a
way of differentiating himself from what he thought psychoanalysis had become.
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But this concern with listening to the analysand and carrying out a dialogue cut both
ways. As Szasz lauded the psychoanalytic tradition of listening to the subject’s concerns and
beliefs, he also criticized psychoanalysis for failing this tradition with its theory regarding how
physical symptoms could result from psychic phenomena. Szasz criticized this idea of
‘conversion,’ charging that Freud “interpreted hysterical symptoms as though the translation
required were no different from, say, rendering ancient Greek into modem English” (1961, p.
122). The problem, asserted Szasz, was that physical symptoms were decidedly different from
languages, and that assuming that certain physical symptoms indicated specific psychic problems
(such as by finding that a patient’s reported pain was a symbol of their guilt) misunderstood the
nature of these symptoms.
What Szasz considered to be his own contribution to the reintroduction of science to
psychoanalytic theory revolved around his rejection of these concerns for ‘conversion’ and his
new approach to the interpretation of non-linguistic communication during the psychoanalytic
session. At issue, again, was the problem of interpreting bodily symptoms, as in those exhibited
by patients diagnosed with hysteria. Szasz presented his answer to this problem in a manner that
sketched out his own view of a non-medical, scientific psychoanalysis. He began by suggesting
that some behaviors thought to be ‘symptoms’ are, in fact, examples of protolonaguage.
Protolanguage, he explained, served purposes commonly reserved for language, and was
deployed when normal speech could not be. It could be used informatively, as when a
hysterically paralyzed arm is used to “convince the recipient (of the message) that the sufferer is
disabled” and needs help (1961, p. 127). Or, one could take advantage of the affective use of
protolanguage, which involves using bodily language “deliberately to arouse certain emotions in
the listener and so induce him to undertake certain actions” (1961, p. 129). And finally, the
“promotive” use of protolanguage involves trying to “make the listener perform certain actions”
(1961, p. 130). Szasz summed up: “whenever people feel unable—by means o f ‘normal’
mechanisms, such as ordinary speech—to prevail over the significant objects in their
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environment, they are likely to shift their pleas to the idiom of protolanguage (e.g., weeping, body
signs)” (1961, p. 130).
Retaining his characteristic tone o f demystification, Szasz argued that much of what was
called ‘mental illness’ could be understood to be a protolanguage. From his point of view,
individuals diagnosed as mentally ill were not sick, but were trying to communicate—via the only
means available—their own difficulty in coping with their problems in living. And for the
analyst to be of any help, it was important to carry out a thorough review of the individual’s life,
“including his family background, personal history, religion, occupation, and so forth,” (1961, p.
136) because “talking often helps people to cope with their problems in living” (1961, p. 137).
So, while urging psychoanalysis to shed its diagnostic approach and its efforts to formulate a
lexicon o f bodily symbols, Szasz advocated an assiduous devotion to allowing the analysand’s
own concerns to determine the course of the analysis. One can detect here a note of Szasz
aligning with the lay audience against what he casts as a very entrenched and self-interested elite.
After this survey of how the concept of protolanguage could enrich analytic work, Szasz
explained his more over-arching perspective on human behavior. He located games at the center
of this perspective. ‘Games,’ by which he referred to behavior that was carried out according to
social rules, would become the lever with which he would attempt to push mental illness out of
psychology. Doubting that the instinctual (quasi-biological) framework of the psychoanalysts or
the explicitly medical applications of the psychiatrists were capable of dealing with the non
medical issues he saw at work (as, for instance, in the protolanguage of hysteria) in what was
thought to be ‘mental illness’, he asserted that the idea of the game was more appropriate for
understanding those thought to be suffering from mental illness. As he proclaimed,
while such diseases as syphilis and tuberculosis are in the nature of events or happenings,
and hence can be described without taking cognizance of how men conduct themselves in
their social affairs, hysteria, and all other phenomena now popularly called mental
illnesses, are in the nature of actions. They are thus made to happen by sentient,
intelligent human beings and can be understood best, in my opinion, in the framework of
games (1961, p. 225).
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His goal in this was to “eschew biological considerations as explanations, and instead attempt...to
construct a consistently psychosocial explanatory scheme” (1961, p. 230).
But, much like George Herbert Mead, whose concern for social interaction and linguistic
communication shaped Szasz’s model of game theory, Szasz did not think of social interaction as
‘merely’ a game. The game perspective on human behavior, he explained, could be applied to
religion, medicine, education, and almost everything else. “Looking at problems in living from
this point of view,” he observed,
it seems apparent that much of what goes by the names of ‘growing up,’ ‘being
sophisticated,’ getting ‘treated by psychoanalysis’ (and other methods as well) are
processes having one significant feature in common: The person learns, and is taught,
that the rules of the game—and the very game itself—by which he has been playing are
not necessarily the same as those used by others around him (1961, p. 240).
Szasz presents three choices that face the individual when this realization occurs: the first is to
submit to the “other person’s coercive rules and accept the masochistic-submissive posture
offered,” the second is “renounce socially shared activities and to withdraw into certain relatively
idiosyncratic games. Such activities may be labeled scientific, artistic, religious, neurotic, or
psychotic, depending on various, generally poorly defmed criteria” (1961, p. 240). And the third
option “lies in becoming aware of one’s own games, as well as those of others, and in trying to
make compromises among them” (1961, p. 240). The choice of the second option is, of course,
what psychiatrists call ‘mental illness’. And for him, if mental illness is just a kind of game, and
one that is not well differentiated from the games of art and religion, it should not be classified as
a disease. The third option is what Szasz understood to be the goal of the responsible individual,
and the corresponding role of the analyst would then be (when it is desired by the analysand) to
assist in the undertaking of that option.
This game-centered view of life and human behavior played a major role in the
conclusion to The Myth o f Mental Illness, where Szasz again emphasized the importance of the
game. He notes how, as humans grow older, they have to leave behind the games learned in their
youth and adapt to new games. In addition to this, “[cjultural conditions are changing so rapidly
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that everyone tends to share the problem of the immigrant who must change because he has
moved from one country to another” (1961, p. 308). And when people find themselves unable to
adapt to new games,, they attempt to play the new games by the rules of the outdated game. Szasz
postulates: “[t]his fundamental game-conflict leads to various problems in living. It is these that
the modem psychotherapist is usually called on to ‘treat’” (1961, p. 308). Even an element of
crisis rhetoric is brought in to seal the case for the importance of the concept of adapting to
games, as when Szasz posits that the
momentous changes in contemporary social conditions clearly forewarn that—if man
survives—his social relations, like his genetic constitution, will undergo increasingly
rapid mutations. If this is true, it will be imperative that all people, rather than just a few,
learn how to learn (Myth, p. 309).
In this manner, Szasz made a case for the increasing, and already crucial, relevance of his own
brand of psychotherapy.
In this sense, then, Szasz put the world on the couch as much as any other expert dealt
with here. That is, he defined games, and the problems people have in understanding them, as
one of the central dimensions of human life, and then defined psychotherapy as crucially relevant
to the process of understanding them. One could argue that he projected a monopoly of
competence onto his own position within the professions, in that this concern for games was
enunciated with the goal of supplanting the medical approach to solving problems in living. As
far as he was concerned, his own approach (one that seems to have been shared by no one else,
making it that much more of a striking monopoly) was the only one consistent with
professionalism and science, while the de rigeur (and intertwined) psychiatric and psychoanalytic
approaches were but pretenders to the throne of professionalism proper.
Szasz’s Anti-Professionalism
*

Szasz’s arguments against the practice of psychiatry as medicine were not totally without
similarity to the standpoints made by other popular psychological writers of the 1950’s and
1960’s. In an interview in 1999, he expressed his discontent with popularizers of psychology,
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referring to them as “apologists” and arguing that they were “whitewashing the plantation”
(personal communication, 1999). But he also differentiated between these ‘whitewashing’
psychiatrists (including Erik Erikson and Anna Freud) and the more critical psychoanalysts, such
as Erich Fromm and Robert Lindner. Szasz praised Lindner for being a “non-whitewasher,”
someone who “saw the oppressive nature of what claimed to be a liberating force” (personal
communication, 1999).
While I have already pointed out some of the similarities that Szasz shared with Lindner
and Fromm, the full extent of their convergence is probably best understood through revealing
how Szasz shared some of their anti-professional arguments when he focused his attack on
psychiatry. Like Lindner and Fromm, Szasz’s anti-professionalism suspected that psychiatry had
accumulated too much power. Some of this power could be conceptualized in terms of prestige,
as when he described what he saw as “the public image and social role of the mid-twentieth
century psychiatrist in the United States of America”. As he saw it, the psychiatrist’s
prestige often outranks that of other physicians. He has become a kind of supertherapist.
And this is not all. He eulogizes his togetherness with his medical colleagues, and
proudly proclaims his loyalty to medicine. And how is the loyalty of the present-day
psychiatrist to medicine demonstrated? By an attitude of aggressive condescension
toward psychologists and other nonmedical psychotherapists (1963, p. 22).
Too lost in the clouds of selfish professional achievement to allow other disciplines (to say
nothing o f common people) to share in the power, Szasz’s psychiatrist was a professional gone
awry.
When Szasz made anti-professional arguments, he would frequently allude to
psychiatry’s connections to state power, alluding to the potential for psychiatry to be warped by
its own lack of contact with the people it treated. To this end, he contrasted the posture of the
psychiatrist who counsels individuals consensually with “the posture of the psychiatrist coercing
others, with police power if necessary, to submit themselves to his control” (1963, p. 4). When
he or she leaves the private practice, Szasz claimed, “the psychotherapist must give up his role as
analyzer o f the games people play and of the meanings they attribute to their actions, and must
338

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e cop y rig h t o w n e r. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e rm is s io n .

instead become a social engineer” (1963, p. 5). He posited that psychiatry had in fact become a
“social institution,” more truly concerned with the socialization of the members of society than
with the mental health of those citizens (1963, p. 85). The narrative constructed here located
psychiatry as a social climber of the professions, willing to sacrifice integrity for more power,
even if that power necessitated a coercive model of patient influence.
Another part of Szasz’s anti-professional angle regarding psychiatry pointed to
the growth of what psychiatry took as its proper domain. In particular, he objected to the
classification of moral values (how we regard human behavior) in terms of health values. Szasz
suspected that “[i]f people believe that health values justify coercion, but that moral and political
values do not, those who wish to coerce others will tend to enlarge the category of health values
at the expense of the category of moral values. We are already far along this road” (1963, pp. 56). Here he found the centrifugal extension of psychiatry outside its traditional boundaries to be
troubling, indicating that psychiatry truly had gone too far; he thought the lines between what was
and was not psychiatry had become too blurry. And psychiatry’s prominence in popular culture
also prompted Szasz’s skepticism, as he postulated a kind of crisis, finding that the
popularity of psychotherapy, and people’s alleged need for it, is rapidly increasing. At
the same time it is impossible to answer the question ‘What is psychotherapy?’ The term
‘psychotherapy encompasses nearly everything that people do in the company of one
another. Psychoanalysis, group psychotherapy, religious counseling, rehabilitation of
prisoners, and many other activities are all called ‘psychotherapy’ (1961, p. x).
Clearly, he equated the popularity o f psychotherapy (a term he used to refer to both psychiatry
and psychoanalysis, so as not to let either off the hook) with the way it had been applied to almost
everything. More specifically, Szasz was concerned about how psychiatry had broadened its
purview via new kinds of mental illness such as “hysteria, hypochondriasis, obsessivecompulsive neurosis, and depression” (1961, p. 45). By virtue of its professional links to
medicine and the government, it had grown too large, and “with increasing zeal, physicians and
especially psychiatrists began to call ‘illness (that is, of course, ‘mental illness’) anything and
everything in which they could detect any sign o f malfunctioning, based on no matter what norm”
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(1961, p. 45). The problem, as he saw it, was that the profession had simply been granted the
power to run with the kind of monopoly of competence it had been granted, resulting in a powergrab that found all kinds of human behavior classified as ‘mental illness’ by psychiatric fiat. This
recursive cycle of power and access to power constituted an anti-professional dimension at work
in Szasz’s critique; he suspected that the reward structure of psychiatry had turned it away from
what he considered to be the more proper goals of scientific inquiry and service to individuals.
One of the major points of convergence between Fromm and Lindner was their largely
shared view that the practice of psychiatry reflected the interests of the dominant classes, and
were thusly structured around reinforcing society’s status quo. This, as we have seen, was
referred to as psychiatry’s involvement in the process of conformity or ‘adjustment’. Though
Szasz was no lay analyst, his opposition to the medicalization of analysis put him in the same
camp as the lay analysts, and indeed, he had his own version of how it was that psychiatry made
people adjust to the status quo. He arrived at a new, yet still quite familiar, vocabulary of
adjustment, as when he described how “[pjsychiatrists act in the role of social tranquilizers when
they define their task as protecting the harmony of existing (chronic) institutions, such as
marriage, social class, profession (as guild), nation etc.” (I960, p. 561). When they act as this
kind of ‘tranquilizer,’ “their behavior is based on the tacit premise that the preservation of
existing interpersonal and social conditions is a desirable end. The social prestige of psychiatry
as a science is used as a means to insure this end” (1960, p. 562). As in other anti
professionalism, psychiatry’s standing as a powerful institution is used to indicate that it has
ceased to respond any authentic non-selfish interests, and is now aligning itself with a powerful
elite.
As did Fromm and Lindner, Szasz asserted that there was a connection that linked
psychiatry’s concern for adjustment with fascist political impulses. As Szasz saw it, the
“principle that the deed [for example, the criminal deed] is unimportant, that the law should
punish the doer,” that he detected in psychiatric reasoning “fitted into the political-legal schemes
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of Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, and Communist Russia” (1963, p. 94). Szasz singled out one
psychiatrist in particular as unusually “fanatical on the theme of illness-uber-Alles” (1963, p.
100). Szasz compared the psychiatric developments in America’s legal system to the systems
used in the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, and South Africa (1965, p. 266). And approaching the
situation from the patient’s point of view, Szasz made some similarly suggestive metaphors, as
when he argued that “[l]ike the Jews in Nazi Germany or, until recently, the Negroes in the South,
mental patients have been afraid to stand up and fight for their liberty” (1963, p. 253). He
suggested that the best hope for the mental patient “lies in legal action against his oppressors,” by
which he meant taking on the psychiatrists (1963, p. 253).
But aside from these assertions of incipient fascism, Szasz repeatedly stressed the more
basic idea that psychiatry’s own interests had diverged from the true interests of the general
populace, and in particular, from those considered to be mentally ill. In the introduction of Law,
Liberty, and Psychiatry, he noted that the book was intended for other professionals and also for
the “intelligent layman,” noting that he or she “may find it especially useful, for organized
psychiatry poses a much graver threat to him than it does to the professionals” (1963, p. viii). In
this aside, he cast psychiatry as a representative of the powerful, perfectly willing to do what it
could to those who lacked the kind of enhanced social standing that derived from professional
association, while assigning to himself the role of public advocate.
The question of psychiatry’s allegiance was also approached from the point of view of
the patient, as Szasz made psychiatry’s professional power out to be a bargain that was struck
with the powers that be, resulting in mental patients lacking any professional advocates. As he
put it, “the relationship between the mental hospital and its inmates is suffused with dishonesty
and deceit”; he claimed that patients were not told the reasons for their commitment, and were
kept in the dark regarding when they would be let free, if ever (1963, p. 54). He questioned the
reasons that the “public is expected to take the word of ‘responsible psychiatrists’ for what is
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proper and improper” in the realm of commitment (1963, p. 59). And he cast the standardbearing psychiatric professional organization as corrupt and power-hungry, stating that
[i]t is the official position of the American Psychiatric Association that physicians should
have unrestricted power to commit. This is an ominous sign—for patients and
psychiatrists alike—because it advocates large-scale deprivation of human liberties by
members of a scientific and professional body (1963, p. 61).
The battle between psychiatry and the people, as Szasz saw it, was totally uneven. In his words:
I submit that the psychiatric-legal match between patient-petitioner and psychiatristsuperintendent is very uneven. The odds so strongly favor the latter, that it cannot be
fairly argued that the mere availability of the writ of habeas corpus protects the patient
from the threat of imprisonment without due process of law (1963, p. 69).
Szasz interpreted psychiatrists’ imputed lack of interest in civil liberties as a suggestion “that
many psychiatrists accord greater importance to the promotion of the self-interests of psychiatry
than to the fundamental values of individualism” (1963, p. 71). This, perhaps, best captured
Szasz’s anti-professionalism. In his view, it was psychiatry’s self-interest as a profession that
made it, in a sense, too professional, or overly concerned with its own advancement, and unaware
of its inability to serve its patients and its potential danger to the general public.
One of the hallmark features of anti-professionalism, the criticism of how the language
used by those within the profession differs from the common language and serves professional
interests, was certainly evident in Szasz’s writing. He was very clear on this, and aimed for some
of the most important psychiatric terms of the time, arguing that
instead of liberty, modem psychiatric authors use words like ‘maturity’ and
‘independence’ as if they referred to notions of psychological health having nothing to do
with liberty. But this is not so. The ill-defined concepts of mental health and illness are a
hiding place for certain moral values, among them liberty (1963, p. 2).
The terms o f psychiatry, he claimed, were gerrymandered to conceal more than they illuminated,
making them weapons against freedom. More specifically, he took issue with how psychiatry had
reclassified much of the category of malingering (which did not fall squarely within the domain
of psychiatry) as a subset of hysteria (which did). This, in Szasz’s opinion, was just a power
grab; “the conversion of malingerers into hysterics was merely a device for transforming
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members of the outgroup into members of the ingroup” (1963, p. 19). Not surprisingly, he had
the same basic response to the term ‘mental illness,’ which he opined was one of many terms
used “only for their instrumental-promotive effect” (1963, p. 20). And the renaming of the insane
asylum as a ‘mental hospital,” he claimed, “has served to disguise the actual functions of the
institution behind a fafade of benevolence toward the patients” (1963, p. 55).
More broadly, but just as pointedly, Szasz suggested that “Orwell could hardly have
asked for a better example of ‘newspeak’” than he found in a proposal put out by the Group for
the Advancement o f Psychiatry. Moreover, much like Fromm and Lindner, Szasz held that
psychiatry was losing touch with any common sense in its professional lingo. Forensic
psychiatrists, he claimed, rely on defmitions that only sound professional, so that “words are
strung together so as to give the impression that each one is explained by another” (1963, p. 73).
He detected only a protective veneer of professionalism, with nothing of value inside.
To combat this veneer, many of Szasz’s arguments involved calling attention to the
stigma that was attached to mental patients and to psychiatry. After psychiatry had made great
efforts, particularly in the form of popular writing, to rid itself of the stigma that it suffered, Szasz
went back to square one, taking it back to important psychiatric innovator Charcot, whom he
compared with Guillotin by writing that while they both made it easier for people to get sick and
to die, “[njeither seemed to have made it easier for people to be well and to live!” (1961, p. 28).
In this manner, psychiatry’s stigma was made out to be an enduring, and even necessary, part of
the discipline. He contrasted the “history of Anglo-American law” and its “unremitting striving
for liberty and dignity” with psychiatry, concluding that the “treatment of mental patients in
public institutions during the past hundred years or more offers no grounds for selfcongratulation” (1963, p. 42). Psychiatry, as he saw it, was always, and would continue to be, a
plague on freedom and happiness. And to make that point, he went straight to the history of
public mental institutions.
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A separate, but related, way of using the stigma of psychiatry against it was to point out
how psychiatry was in the business of affixing to people the stigma of ‘mental illness’. “At first
glance,” observed Szasz, the idea of classifying people as sick would not seem to be harmful in
any way. He quickly magnifies the other side of this coin, concluding that “a hidden weight is
attached to this viewpoint which drags the troubled people back to the same sort of disability
from which this semantic and social switching was to rescue them” (1961, p. 28). What Szasz is
calling the reader’s attention to is the stigma of being classified as mentally ill. He argues that the
stigma undermines psychiatry’s claims that it is actually helping people by calling them sick.
And the stigma of mental illness is given a political shading, too, when Szasz claims that “[t]o be
called mentally ill is like being called a Negro in Alabama or a Jew in Nazi Germany—or to be
called a schizophrenic in a courtroom” (1965, p. 134). Again, though the word is offered to allow
an ostensibly merciful justice to be meted out, Szasz detects a subterranean (but quite real) stigma
at work, denying due process by virtue of classifying the individual as mentally ill.
The Professional Challenge
While these anti-professional elements can be detected in Szasz’s critique of psychiatry,
it must be understood that Szasz positioned himself as a professional who considered psychiatry
to be lacking in professionalism. That is, while the Menningers and Strecker used
professionalism to justify their own involvement in the issues they addressed, Szasz wielded the
same discourse of professionalism against the psychiatric project, asserting that psychiatry
stopped short of being a true profession. While this professional-minded critique was more
prominent in Szasz’s work than his anti-professionalism, there is no doubt that his
professionalism coexisted with his anti-professionalism. That these two dimensions coexisted
should not be entirely surprising, either. As Stanley Fish notes, anti-professionalism has itself
been a recurring feature within professionalism itself; it is “nothing more or less than the ideology
of professionalism taking itself seriously” (1989, p. 245). Nor should it be surprising that such a
vivid professional argument should come from Szasz; as a critic of psychiatry who was himself a
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psychiatrist with an M.D., the use of professionalism against psychiatry suited him in a way that
it did not suit Fromm and Lindner, for example. Were a lay analyst such as Fromm or Lindner to
claim, as Szasz did, that psychiatry was not up to professional standards, it would have only
called excessive attention to their own lack of credentials. In this seemingly paradoxical manner,
Szasz challenged psychiatric authority precisely because he possessed it.
Psychiatry has laid claim not just to an inchoate ideal of professionalism, but specifically
to the mantle of medical professionalism. Medicine itself, since the early 20th century, has been,
in many ways, the most successful profession. Its perceived devotion to human welfare, its
dramatic advances in treatment, and its ability to specialize have given medicine an unparalleled
authoritative voice. Szasz’s argument that psychiatry did not match up to professional standards
can largely be understood as an attempt to sever, symbolically, psychiatry’s connection to
medicine. This can be clearly detected, as when Szasz contrasted the professional demands
objectivity with what he considered to be psychiatry’s concern for values of normalcy and
stability. One major problem with psychiatry’s association with medicine, he claimed, “is that it
has sometimes led to the idea that psychiatry—like other branches of medicine—is essentially
free of moral values” (1960, p. 555). Such an understanding of psychiatry could not be tolerated,
he maintained. Because psychiatry “concerns itself with man as a social being, it deals with
many of the same problems with which religion and morality (ethics) have dealt in the past,” the
medical aura that psychiatry enjoys is totally undeserved (1960, p. 555). More bluntly, Szasz
postulated that “[pjsychiatric activity is medical in name only” because “psychiatrists are engaged
in attempts to change the behavior and values of individuals, groups, institutions, and sometimes
even of nations,” making it “a form of social engineering” (1963, p. vii). While Szasz had no
problem with the project of moral questioning in general, he believed that the medical authority
that underpinned the psychiatric project was misplaced, so that “health values have.. .tended to
replace moral and political values,” resulting in an over-extended psychiatric project (1963, p.
vii).
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And Szasz was quick to point out the huge advantages that psychiatry enjoyed because of
its successful association with medicine. Because a belief in mental illness as illness “implies—
nay, requires—therapy along medical or psychotherapeutic lines,” it was functional for psychiatry
to emphasize its medical standing (1963, p. 16). Szasz argued that, in some ways, psychiatry’s
power actually surpassed that of the rest of medicine, as when he noted that “psychiatrists may
own and operate facilities in which they may hold and treat persons against their will. They may
do the same in publicly owned psychiatric institutions. No other medical specialist has this
power” (1963, p. 79). Psychiatry, in other words, had borrowed the authority of medicine and
surpassed the limits that were observed by the true professional specialties. Szasz argued that
those who promote psychiatry’s bids to medical authority
beat the drums for large-scale mental-health programs and.. .use the prestige and the
services o f a massive psychiatric establishment as a shield of illusion, concealing some
ugly realities we would rather not face. Thus when we read in the paper that the
alcoholic, the rapist, or the vandal needs or will be given ‘psychiatric care,’ we are
reassured that the problem is being solved or, in any event, effectively dealt with, and we
dismiss it from our minds (1964a, p. SO).
The point, of course, was that psychiatry was using its alignment with medicine to its own
benefit, ultimately overstepping the proper boundaries of medical science.
Szasz’s attack on psychiatry’s claims to medical authority was focused on three major
terms: mental illness, psychiatry, and the mental hospital. He argued that mental illness was not
really an illness, psychiatry was not really a branch of medicine, and the mental hospital was not
really a hospital. The first of these arguments, that mental illness was not an illness per se, found
Szasz invoking his own knowledge of medicine to make the point. One objection he had to the
idea of mental illness was that if mental illness were construed as “a disease of the brain,
analogous to a disease of the skin or bone” it would be “a neurological defect, not a problem in
living,” and would be properly dealt with by a neurologist if it could be completely identified like
other diseases (1961, p. 12). Parallel to this, he considered that an individual’s beliefs “whether it
be Christianity, in Communism, or in the idea that his internal organs are rotting and that his body
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is already dead—cannot be explained by a defect or disease of the nervous system” (1961, p. 12).
The application of a medical framework to a person’s beliefs, he argued, was a simple category
error, a misapplication of medical logic to philosophical questions. His own theory regarding the
interpretation of mental illness, which offered the idea of hysteria and other mental diseases as
types o f protolanguages, was consonant with this non-medical approach, and he made this
relation explicit, stating that “[i]f a so-called psychopathological phenomenon is more akin to a
language problem than to illness, it follows that we cannot meaningfully talk of ‘treatment’ and
‘cure’” (1961, p. 12).
Szasz found a certain language problem among psychiatrists themselves, too. He derided
psychiatrists, finding that
[t]hey talk as though they were physicians, physiologists, biologists, or even physicists!
We hear about sick patients, instincts, and endocrine functions and of course ‘libido’ and
‘psychic energies,’ both ‘free’ and ‘bound.’ While the need for clarity in regard to
scientific method is no longer a new idea among scientists, it requires re-emphasis in our
field (1961, p. 3).
Psychiatrists, in this view, simply lacked the proper approach to deserve these medical terms.
And this problem was shared with the psychoanalytically-tinged developments within psychiatry,
as Szasz criticizes how Breuer and Freud “approached hysteria as though it were a disease,
essentially similar to (other) physicochemical disorders of the body (for example, syphilis)”
(1961, p. 81). In Szasz’s view, the idea of mental disease did not match up to the professional
demands that the word ‘disease’ required.
While making the point that mental disease was not truly disease, Szasz argued that
psychiatrists were not like other doctors. According to Szasz, doctors earned their authority in
large part because they acted as the agents of the patients they treated. And because psychiatrists
frequently worked as agents of the state, they lacked this devotion to the patient. “In curing a
disease like syphilis or pneumonia,” he opined, “the physician benefits both the patient and
society. Can the psychiatrist who ‘cures’ a ‘neurosis’ make the same claim? Often he cannot...”
(1964a, p. 50). When the interests of society and the individual conflict, “the psychiatrist can
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help one only by harming the other” (1964a, p. SO). The entire question of who is being helped,
which Szasz locates as the crux o f the doctor’s value, is called into question. Significantly, he
preserves a place for the private practitioner, who consults patients outside of an institutional
framework and at the behest of the patient. This can be seen when he notes that “the therapist’s
role is to be an agent of the patient” and finds that this “role is best illustrated by a private
psychotherapeutic relationship” (1960, p. 561). It was the psychiatrist who acted as an agent of
an institution, such as a court or a mental hospital, whom he considered to be a pretender to the
professional throne. But, because he painted a picture of a psychiatry that was irrevocably tainted
by these institutions, his critique was aimed at the bulk of psychiatric practice.
Szasz also attacked the dominant site of psychiatric work, the mental hospital. And with
obvious parallels to his other arguments that were intended to sever psychiatry’s connections to
medicine, he averred that mental hospitals were not really hospitals. This argument could be
found stated most baldly in Law, Liberty, and Psychiatry, where he offered his opinion that “the
similarities between medical and mental hospitals are institutional rather than instrumental”
(1963, p. 80). As with psychiatrists, the main problem was that the patient’s consent was not a
necessary precursor to care. He reviewed how psychiatrists justified their commitment of mental
patients against those patients’ will by arguing that mental illness was the same as physical
illness. But the problem with that defense, said Szasz, was that, if this were the case, they would
be able to allow patients to ask for help before forcing it on them. “If voluntary hospitalization
were really voluntary,” he argued,
the mental patient would be free to enter and leave the mental hospital in the same
manner as he enters and leaves a medical hospital. But this is not the case. Voluntary
admission is in fact voluntary commitment. Or, to put it another way, the voluntary
mental patient’s role is a cross between the roles of medical patient and prisoner (1963, p.
83).
Put more bluntly, Szasz considered mental hospitals to be little more than prisons, frequently
intended for jailing those whose political views placed them on the fringe of what was deemed
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sane. This made the psychiatrist in a mental hospital less of a doctor and something more like a
warden, a comparison Szasz openly invoked.
In his continuing effort to discredit psychiatry, Szasz called attention to what he
considered to be psychiatry’s similarities to religion, attempting to show how it was unlike a
science. For example, he made the point that because the diagnosis of mental illness is found in
those whose “personal conduct violates certain ethical, political, and social norms,” the term
mental illness was itself “a true heir to religious myths in general, and to the belief in witchcraft
in particular” (1963, p. 17). This argument continued in Szasz’s view of how debates within
psychiatry were structured. Because “psychiatry is characterized by a plethora o f diverse,
competing, and often mutually exclusive theories and practices,” Szasz found that “it must be
frankly acknowledged that psychiatry is more similar to religion and politics than to science”
(1961, p. 85). He contrasted this with the “little disagreement among scientists concerning
physiological, biochemical, or physical theories—even though individual scientists may profess
to different religions (or to no religion) and may be members of different national groups” (Myth,
p. 85). It was this lack of agreement that he found to be a crucial difference between psychiatry
and what he considered to be the ‘true’ professions.
In a similar vein, Szasz traced a history of scientific development that highlighted
psychiatry’s difference from the rest of science. Specifically, he remarked on how sciences have
traditionally moved from thinking “in terms of processes and activities” as has been the case in
the generation of theories concerning “elements, compounds, [and] living things,” toward “terms
of processes and activities” such as “Brownian movement, oxidation, [and] communication.” He
concluded: “[p]hysics, chemistry, and certain branches of biology have long ago supplemented
substantive conceptualizations by process-theories. Psychiatry has not” (1961, p. 1). This laid
the framework for his dramatic framing of The Myth o f Mental Illness, resulting in the claim that
“the traditional definition of psychiatry, which is still in vogue, places it alongside such things as
alchemy and astrology, and commits it to the category of pseudo science” (1961, p. 1). Unlike
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other scientists, psychiatrists “have persistently avoided disclosing fully and publicly what they
do” (1961, p. 1). These shortcomings separated psychiatry not just from medicine, but from the
entire scientific and professional endeavor. As Szasz called it, it simply was not right to grant
psychiatry a place as a bona fide profession.
History and Case Study Support
Sometimes, Szasz offered his arguments as critiques of psychiatric reasoning, and, as
such, did not rely so much on empirical support as on a concern with the internal consistency (and
potential lack thereof) of the idea of mental illness. He eschewed the use of case studies
involving his own analysands, citing in an interview that he believed such a public use of one’s
own case studies endangered the confidentiality of his treatment, and making the case that the use
of case studies was “tainted” with medical associations. The inevitable ‘cure’ at the end of such
case studies, he finds, conflicts with his own belief that “what is better can only be defined by the
patient” (personal communication, 1999). To support his own arguments, he turned to the public
record, examining the history of the idea of mental illness, and highlighting case studies that were
already publicized (and in which he played no direct role).
Szasz used historical support to demonstrate the relationship between psychiatry and the
law. To a large extent, his intent seemed to be to undermine the psychiatric project by making its
origins seem less scientific than they were legal and institutional. This could be seen at work
when he described how, “[djuring the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, psychiatry and law
were much more closely intertwined than at present. Most of the prominent pre-Freudian
psychiatrists were experts in ‘medical jurisprudence’” (1963, p. 1). The problem, as he saw it,
was that this connection to the law was often misunderstood by those who did not know
psychiatry’s past. He turned to historical support to reveal the ostensible ‘truth’ about psychiatry.
History also proved useful in Szasz’s similar attempts to show how leading figures in the
origins of psychiatry were more concerned with social control than with the cure of any kind of
disease. This approach was exemplified in his take on Charcot, “with whose contributions
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modem psychiatry can be said to begin” (1961, p. 21). In a seeming swipe at psychiatry’s claims
to medical and therapeutic origins, he noted that Charcot was, in fact, a neurologist, and because
neurology in Charcot’s time lacked “therapeutic agents with which they could appreciably help
their patients,... [t]heir function was not primarily therapeutic” (1961, p. 21). In a more directly
critical vein, Szasz reviewed how
Charcot’s (nonprivate) patients—like the involuntarily hospitalized mental patients
today—were segregated not so much because they were ‘ill’ as because they disturbed
others and were too poor and socially unimportant to be cared for in private institutions
(Myth, p. 22).
The comparison with contemporary mental patients is, of course, crucial. Clearly, Szasz was
attempting to show that psychiatry had not changed much (if at all) from the times of Charcot. In
this light, his view of Charcot’s aspiration “to the role of aristocratic autocrat” and supposition
that it “requires no great feat of the imagination to infer what sort of personal relationship must
have prevailed between him and his destitute and near-illiterate patients” (1961, p. 24). As Szasz
understood it, the relationship between Charcot and the patients in his care “was based on fear,
awe, and deception” (1961, p. 24). And Szasz is dubious of the psychiatric advance that Charcot
spearheaded when it “was decided, essentially by fiat, that in contrast to organic neurological
diseases, these people had ‘functional nervous illnesses,” a move that Szasz identifies as the
origin of the modem study of mental illness, and blames for containing “what I regard as the
major logical and procedural error in the evolution of modem psychiatry” (1961, pp. 25-26).
Again, Szasz uses history as a mode of expose, a way of turning psychiatry’s origin against its
own claims to scientific and medical authority.
But Szasz goes further back than Charcot’s nineteenth-century psychiatry in his attempts
to discredit psychiatry with history. He traces the history of psychiatry back to the Middle Ages,
where he finds beliefs in witchcraft that he portrays as an early parallel to psychiatric treatment.
His thesis was that “the notion of mental illness is used today chiefly to obscure and ‘explain
away’ problems in personal and social relationships, just as the notion of witchcraft was used for
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the same purpose from the early Middle Ages until well past the Renaissance” (1961, p. 205). He
compares psychiatrists themselves with the witch-hunters, who “were regarded as the agents of
their unfortunate clients” and notes that, like psychiatry, “executing witches was defined as
‘therapeutic’” (1961, p. 208). And like psychiatric patients, Szasz posited, witches were chosen
as scapegoats for the problems in society. He also compared the (normally low) social class of
witches and of psychiatric patients in the modem world. Of particular importance was the fact
that the labels of ‘witch,’ and of ‘mentally ill,’ were and are imposed upon the individual. He
combined the concerns for class and labeling in his argument that
the educated and the well-to-do could protect themselves from the danger of being
branded witches and being ‘treated’ for it—usually by burning at the stake—much as
well-informed and wealthy persons today have little difficulty avoiding being diagnosed
‘mentally ill’ by anyone other than themselves (1961, p. 212).
But Szasz found one important difference between the witch-hunts in the Middle Ages and the
psychiatric project in contemporary America: the witch-hunters did not confuse what they were
doing with science. As he put it, the “distinction between legal and scientific disputes was
recognized by medieval man, no less than by the ancients,” while “this important distinction was
obscured by the medical theory of hysteria” (1961, p. 214). If anything, he saw the modern-day
version of the witch-hunt as even more powerful than the hunts in the Middle Ages.
In addition to these historical data, Szasz backed up his arguments with cases of
involuntary commitment, usually marshaled to demonstrate how psychiatry functioned as social
control. These were, as a rule, culled not from Szasz’s own experience as a psychiatrist, but from
the public record. Frequently, the cases involved psychiatric involvement and control over what
Szasz considered to be political self-expression. As he described one case, he noted that his
“main emphasis” was “not on this particular case and its special implications, but rather on the
general features of the value conflict which I believe it illustrates” (1960, p. 556). This was stated
by way of introduction to the case of Isola Ware Curry, the woman who stabbed Martin Luther
King, Jr. After the stabbing incident, she was deemed insane and unfit to stand trial, then
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immediately “committed to an institution which for social purposes functions just like a jail but is
called a hospital—a hospital for the ‘criminally insane’” (1960, p. 556). Szasz argued that
Curry’s actions, though criminal, did not necessitate the involvement of psychiatry, which he
believed was used to deny her of her right to trial. The psychiatric involvement in the case, he
argued, “deprived [Curry], and by implication others of her race, of the right to commit a crime
against a prominent member of her own race,” and “enabled society—and the public mind—to
disguise and evade the moral and socio-psychological dilemmas inherent in her act” (1960, p.
560).
Szasz provided essentially the same analysis, with the same conclusions, to other cases.
It simply would not do to “dispose of problems posed by men like Fidel Castro, Earl Long, or
Adolf Hitler by labeling them ‘psychotic’” (1963, p. 200). In keeping with this, he reviewed the
case of Ezra Pound, who embraced the Italian fascist movement and denounced America in radio
broadcasts to the Italian people during World War II. As with Curry, the American government
seized Pound and committed him to a mental institution without giving him a trial. Such
treatment, Szasz argued, denies us the right to be taken seriously, to be truly responsible
individuals. “So long as more people do not ask where involuntary psychiatric hospitalization
and treatment end, and retribution and punishment begin,” Szasz concluded, “this form of
liberticide is bound to flourish” (1963, p. 200). Szasz gave the same basic treatment to the case
of Edwin A. Walker, a General in the American Armed Forces who was charged with obstructing
the racial integration effort in the South. As with Pound and Curry, Walker was at first found
unfit for trial and committed to a mental institution. But Walker eventually won a case to earn
the right to a trial, and was released (1961, pp. 178-224). Regardless, Szasz saw this as a
psychiatric over-reaching, a true demonstration of the political application of psychiatry, and
thus, a way to pit psychiatry and liberty against each other.
But Szasz found evidence for psychiatric over-reaching and social control even when the
subject’s politics were not explicitly at issue. He drew upon cases of individuals who were
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committed to mental institutions because their families found them too difficult to tolerate. For
example, he describes the case of Mrs. Abelson, a rich woman who was giving all of her money
away to other people; her children were disturbed by this behavior and had her committed to an
institution. And Szasz makes clear that this was no isolated case, for “[ljike thousands of other
involuntary mental patients, Mrs. Abelson was given psychiatric care in the hope o f changing
behavior offensive to others. ..In effect, recourse to psychiatiy provided Mrs. Abelson’s children
with a socially acceptable solution for their dilemma, not hers” (1964a, p. 51). Szasz also
explains the cases of people who are seemingly locked up just because of old age, as with “Mr.
Kelleher” whose inability to support himself and his family made him a likely candidate for
commitment to a state mental hospital, where u[h]is case will be diagnosed as a ‘senile psychosis’
or something similar” (1964a, p. 52). Szasz frequently used case studies to demonstrate
psychiatry’s potential for acting as a way of smoothing over problems caused by troublesome
family members, calling attention to the custodial dimension to psychiatric care, which was part
of the stigma of psychiatry that the profession had been trying to elude.
Another category of case study Szasz called upon was that o f the ‘person with problems.’
And if that sounds like a catch-all category, it seems to have been intended as such. By telling
the story of people who had been committed simply because of difficulties they had experienced,
Szasz made the putative psychiatric plague on liberty appear to be widespread. One such case
involved a Mrs. Tarranti, a depressed mother who was overwhelmed by her responsibilities. Her
condition was “diagnosed as a ‘post-partum depression’ and she [was] committed to the state
hospital,” demonstrating that “society has found no more decent solution to a human problem
than involuntary confinement in a mental hospital” (1964a, p. 52).
Another simple case of a person with problems was that of Louis Perroni, the owner of a
service station who had resisted the offers of a developer. One day, when representatives of the
developer showed up in an attempt to force him out, Perroni shot at them, and was then arraigned.
At his arraignment, he was found incapable of standing trial and committed to a mental hospital
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(1965, pp. 85-90). Perroni’s refusal to cooperate with psychiatric experts assigned by the court
was taken as a “ ‘lack of cooperativeness’ and ‘negativism’ which added up to ‘mental illness’”
(1965, p. 141). An even more ridiculous-sounding case of a person with problems being
committed to a mental hospital involved Frederic Lynch, who faced criminal charges because he
overdrew his checking account. He attempted to defend himself in court, but was branded
mentally ill, and (could it be a surprise by now?) was remanded to the custody of a mental
hospital (1965, pp. 227-229). After repeated attempts to protest the legality of this commitment,
Lynch took his own life (1965, p. 234).
One common thread in all of these case studies, and another (in addition to the obvious)
factor that set him aside from the other experts here under consideration, is that he played no
direct role in these cases. While psychological experts like the Menningers, Wertham, and
Lindner used case studies to show their own close contact with their patients as they worked to
improve their lot, Szasz considered the cases of people he had not met as data to show how
psychiatry cheated justice. Though he did counsel individuals as a psychiatrist, he did not locate
his own authority as a critic of psychiatry within the mental hospital. In this sense, these case
studies that he used were consistent with his own insistence that psychiatry within an institutional
framework such as a mental hospital was really a kind of punishment, and something to be
avoided at all costs. The historical support similarly placed him outside, or even above, the fray
of the day-to-day psychiatric work, allowing him to come out of nowhere to attack psychiatry
without needing to conjure up his own medical authority.
Psychiatry Responds
It did not take long for psychiatrists to respond to Szasz’s writings. Even before the
publication of The Myth o f Mental Illness, he had ruffled some feathers within psychiatry with
some boldly-voiced papers written in psychiatric journals. But after The Myth o f Mental Illness
came out, there was a real sense of outrage within psychiatry. And much of this outrage was a
result of Szasz’s choice to go public with his arguments. Dr. Henry A. Davidson regretted that
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the “impact he made on the public” can be judged “by the stream o f articles coming from his pen,
particularly those in popular periodicals; and especially the book Law, Liberty, and Psychiatry”
(1964, p. 528). The result, claimed Davidson, was that Szasz’s “views have had a considerable
effect on the less sophisticated elements of the public. Perhaps if we can allay his anxiety,”
Davidson reasoned, “we may reduce the number of people we psychiatrists seem to frighten”
(1964, p. 529). Dr. Howard P. Rome argued that Szasz’s writings “could be dismissed as no
more than the arrant nonsense of social fiction were it not that the climate of the times provides
ready tinder for all kinds of fire brands” (1964, p. 541). As these remarks demonstrate, many
psychiatrists acknowledged psychiatry’s considerable stigma, and realized that Szasz had made a
very effective bid to re-attach the stigma that the profession had tried to shed for so long. It was
Szasz’s publicity that represented the crux of the dilemma. Though psychiatry did not directly
depend on the public, it did need at least a modicum of public support to sustain itself; at least,
the psychiatrists at the time seem to have believed that their ability to effectively continue
performing psychiatry had been placed in jeopardy by Szasz’s writings. In this sense, Szasz’s
writings provoked a very clear-cut battle over professional authority.
And psychiatrists used many arguments to buttress their own claims to professional
authority. Many of them noted that Szasz relied heavily on discussions of hysteria, a diagnosis
that, by the mid-20th century, had largely fallen from professional favor. One psychiatrist
reviewer of The Myth o f Mental Illness complained that “it is not made evident what ‘mental
diseases’ ought to be thrown in one pot with ‘hysteria’” (Kahn, 1962, p. 494); this sentiment was
common throughout psychiatry. Other psychiatrists asserted that, if Szasz’s arguments were to be
accepted entirely, we would be forced to accept the kind of mind-body duality that kept science
back for so long (Reid, p. 383); mental illness and physical illness, the argument went, must
involve each other because mind and body are so closely inter-twined. To argue otherwise would
be to give in to the kind o f anti-scientific point of view that Szasz identified himself against.
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Some psychiatrists simply argued that Szasz’s portrait of psychiatric commitment was
untrue. Countering Szasz’s position that mental hospitals are driven to hold on to as many
patients as possible, Davidson insists that “[w]hen [a] patient’s depression lightens, we do release
him,” and reminding his own profession of one of the best-known defenses for holding patients:
“Every mental hospital has had the experience of hearing that an ex-patient committed suicide.
We are accused of releasing patients prematurely when this happens and scolded because we
weren’t smart enough to anticipate the suicide” (Davidson, 1964, p. 532). Re-asserting the
mental hospital’s dedication to the patients, this argument goes over some territory that Karl
Menninger covered in Man Against Himself. Dr. Ralph Slovenko (who was associated with a law
school as well as a psychiatric and neurological school) insisted that psychiatry’s “situation, while
deplorable in areas, is getting better, not worse,” (1964, p. 534) moving on to argue that
“[c]harges of railroading [patients into hospitals] are unfounded” because patients frequently
want to stay in mental hospitals and their families are unwilling to accept them if they are
released (1964, p. 536). Arguments like these were impelled to make psychiatry seem like a
profession that responded to pre-existing needs and desires on the part of the public, flying in the
face of Szasz’s contention that psychiatrists were usurpers invading individual freedom.
A less direct defense of psychiatry found Szasz to be ‘nothing new.’ Eugen Kahn, for
instance, defends psychiatry by saying that “a goodly number of points” in The Myth o f Mental
Illness “have been known for quite a while” (p. 494). And A. S. Watson asserts that the “issues
Dr. Szasz considers are ancient,” and it is precisely because these issues are so old that the
mission to deal with them “lies at the very heart of the ethical propositions of professionalism” (p.
542).
Along similar lines, many psychiatrists offered out-and-out compliments to Szasz, though
usually these compliments came alongside vituperative criticism. John Reid opines that
[w]e need more psychiatrists, like Szasz, who do not try to ‘sell’ the subject by denying
that it significantly differs, either in logical status of clinical effectiveness, from the less
subjective and more scientific parts of medicine, whose basic terms evoke more nearly
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invariant responses, whose raw data are more easily quantified, and whose hypotheses
can, therefore, be more rigorously tested (1962, p. 381).
This was, of course, a most professional statement; Reid was drawing up close to Szasz’s
professionalism so as to demonstrate that psychiatry could stand up to any critique that shared so
many core values as the profession itself. Other psychiatric compliments for Szasz credited him
with his ability to write. Eugen Kahn’s review credits The Myth o f Mental Illness for being “the
work of a doubtless brilliant mind. It is entertaining and interesting reading” (1962, p. 494). The
logic to complimenting Szasz seemed to be to show that psychiatry could stand up to his
critiques, and even benefit from them, no matter how wrong they might be.
All the more ironic, then, to find that many other psychiatric takes on Szasz associated
Szasz with unsavory political elements on the right wing; it was asserted that Szasz was himself
just a part of a politically regressive political movement, less concerned with the truth than with
the destruction of the institutions of democracy and social welfare. Alfred Auerback described
this “Anti-Mental Health Movement,” (1963, p. 105) and even diagnosed the movement, arriving
at the conclusion that psychiatrists much do a better job of portraying itself to the community, or
suffer from the stigma more than ever before (1963, p. 111). Davidson lumped Szasz into this
movement, noting “some of the weird charges by irresponsible groups who agree with Dr.
Szasz—to his embarrassment, I assume—that psychiatry threatens our liberties” (1964, p. 532).
Dr. Henry Weihofen argues that “the fears about what goes on in mental hospitals that Dr. Szasz
fosters are seized upon by the right-wing extremists with whom he has been playing footsie, to
obstruct efforts to enact [emergency commitment procedures], for fear of ‘railroading’ people
into these horrible ‘prisons’” (1964, p. 548). Dr. Howard P. Rome supports this association of
Szasz with less trustworthy ‘extreme’ politics when he notes that Szasz “allows no middle ground
when he confronts us with a dilemma and says choose ‘autonomy or heteronomy.’.. .The middle
position, which is the majority position on matters of human values and judgments, is excluded
from this situation o f a forced choice” (1964, p. 540). Psychiatrists made it seem that Szasz was,
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knowingly or not, touting a value system that was more extreme than his audience might have
imagined. By so doing, they claimed a middle ground for the profession.
And, finally, psychiatrists used a sense of proximity to the people and their true interests,
to make Szasz out to be an isolated eccentric, unclear on what really happens in a mental hospital.
Both figurative and literal proximity to mental patients was a stake in this debate. Davidson
asked, plaintively: “How can we undo the mischief provoked by these heartless words [of
Szasz’s]? How can we stand by and see this burden of guilt, confusion and anxiety piled on the
relatives who must commit their loved ones?” (1964, p. 533). Here, Davidson claims a direct
understanding of the feelings and needs of mental patients and their relatives, casting Szasz as a
callous ne’er do well, more interested in stirring up trouble than actually helping the people.
Along the same lines, Dr. A. S. Watson noted that the “question which plagues me...is what does
[Szasz’s] fiery laying-about do to patients’ confidence in the psychiatric profession?” (1964, p.
543). Again, Szasz is portrayed as feckless and callow, unfeeling toward the needs of the
mentally ill. But the classic denunciation of Szasz came (again) from Davidson, who remarks, “I
have been told that Dr. Szasz has never been on a full-time staff of a public mental hospital,”
(1964, p. 530) and notes that this distance has not made Szasz any more ‘objective’ in his stance
toward psychiatry. The claim held against Szasz is that he could not truly understand the mental
hospital without working in one, and also that his own fiery rhetoric is sorely out of place for
someone whose personal contact with mental hospitals is so limited. The criticism, that is, is
coming from someone who has not truly stood on the side of the patients.
These critiques o f Szasz show, again, that much of the debate was not so much about the
diagnostic tools of psychiatry, or the correct procedure for handling a mentally ill man in court,
but instead concerned the right to the authority to speak on such things. Professions reproduce
themselves by standardizing this authority. Szasz may have had professional credentials, but that
was just the beginning in his attempts to claim cultural authority. Because he took his arguments
to the public, and tied these arguments to an already-stigmatized profession, he stirred up a
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specific debate within his profession regarding which professionals should go public, and how
they should communicate with that public. And many familiar themes regarding professionalism,
the people’s best interests, and political identification, became important parts o f this struggle.
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Conclusion: Professed Allegiances, the Locale of Authority,
and the Professional Field

This study has described some of the relationships that obtained between professional
structures and authoritative meanings in popular psychiatric and psychoanalytic writing from the
late 1930’s through the mid- 1960’s. While the analysis has (1 think, necessarily) set aside most
other professions and even relied on a small sample of experts within psychiatry and
psychoanalysis, one can nevertheless detect some of the relationships between an expert’s
position within the professional field and that expert’s authoritative stance. Much of the variation
in authoritative stances here described can be considered in light of the psychiatric/psychoanalytic
divide. The difference in the stances asserted by representatives from these two fields illustrates
the kinds of symbolic and cultural capital available to each.
The differences between psychiatric and psychoanalytic stances can be roughly
considered in terms of whether they make a ‘single’ or ‘double’ break in their writing. Karl
Menninger and Will Menninger operated from perhaps the ultimate dominant stance within
psychiatry; though they were sometimes considered renegades of sorts within their profession,
orthodoxy flowed from them because they wielded so much power in psychiatry. And Edward
Strecker represented a related, if less flexible, orthodox point o f view. AH three o f these experts
offered themselves to a lay audience as authoritative voices who could be trusted largely because
of their professional standing. Though they did not explicitly assert that they should be granted
authority because they knew more than their audience, their authoritative stance relied upon
implicit assertions of their own difference from their readership. In this sense, they ‘broke’ from
their audience by standing fast to their own professional identification. And they had good reason
to do so; as the possessors of legitimate authority within their own field, they had much to gain by
alluding to their position in the social field, even if that did imply a kind of difference from the
audience.
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Still, these relatively orthodox psychiatrists who chose to go public were constrained by
certain factors regarding the public perception of psychiatry. Specifically, psychiatry’s perceived
distance from the rest of medicine, and the stigma that came from dealing with the mentally ill
impelled them to paint a picture of psychiatry that concealed some of the less successful parts of
existing psychiatric practice. The psychoanalytic movement within psychiatry promised a way
out of this stigma. By playing up the less forceful technique of psychotherapy, ‘the talking cure,’
and granting more diffuse definitions of mental illness that included almost everyone as a
potential neurotic, the mainstream of psychiatry shifted to dissociate itself from its most
stigmatized aspects.
And popular psychiatric writing was particularly marked by this ironic escape from the
mental hospital. Significantly, the psychiatrists who supported this move toward psychoanalysis
became some of the most significant of the popularizers. Psychoanalysis was used even before
World War II in Karl Menninger’s writing, where he used the Freudian concepts of Eros and
Thanatos to insinuate psychiatry into the most mundane aspects of life. The psychoanalytic
concern for self-destruction underwrote a centrifugal move outward from psychiatry’s traditional
concerns. If a lay audience is to be addressed, it helps to describe issues that affect the bulk of
that audience. And so, self-destruction was offered not just as an explanation not just for chronic
cases of mental illness that were diagnosed in mental hospitals, but also for widespread issues
such as crime, suicide, accidental injury and death, illness, and sex. In other words,
psychoanalytic theory simultaneously offered a way out of the mental hospital and a way to make
the concerns of the psychiatrist and the presumed concerns of the audience overlap.
Whatever differences that might have existed between medical psychiatrists and lay
analysts or even European analysts, (both of whom contested the application of a medical
framework to the practice of psychoanalysis) the pure professional outlook of the Menningers and
Strecker provided almost no sense of how their own work differed from others who claimed
psychoanalytic expertise. In this sense, they attempted to absorb psychoanalysis into their own
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professional framework, and in their popular writing, they saw no reason to describe any potential
inconsistencies between psychoanalysis and medicine. Psychoanalysis was made to seem like a
natural extension of medical psychiatry.
But an emphasis on this move in a psychoanalytic direction should not be taken as a
suggestion that the popular writing made by the Menninger brothers and Strecker cut their ties
with medicine. One of the factors that sets the textbook-style popular psychiatry apart from the
other varieties is its strict maintenance of a medical logic. Here we return to the notion that these
psychiatrists were attempting to offer themselves to their audience as pure professionals, as
people who know better and are willing to share their expertise. In Karl Menninger’s The Human
Mind, Man Against Himself, and Love Against Hate; Edward Strecker’s Basic Psychiatry; and
William Menninger’s You and Psychiatry, the authors of those respective works returned to the
properly medical procedures that they believed defined their profession. In these passages, they
claimed a medical authority, describing their own techniques in medical terminology, and always
using the notion of cures and treatment to cast their goals in a medical light. Medicine has not
always enjoyed such an enhanced authority. But the early twentieth century, when psychiatrists
first attempted to go public, was the time when medicine was beginning to organize itself into the
epitome of a respected profession. Of particular concern here is the fact that doctors are given
credit not just for their competence, but also for their presumed concern for the benefit of the
people. Clearly, for experts who possessed M.D.’s, it was most worthwhile to play up their
allegiance to medicine; it was a vast resource which could be capitalized upon in a public market.
And when the medical logic was applied to psychoanalytic therapies, their efforts to absorb
psychoanalysis were never more clear; they described these therapies much like any other
therapy, and frequently described how they could be combined with more traditional therapy.
The combination of psychoanalysis and medicine gave the orthodox popular psychiatry a
kind of hybrid appeal. By highlighting their medical and psychoanalytic standpoint, the popular
psychiatrists could benefit both from the considerable public regard for the medical profession
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and from the ticket out of the mental hospital that psychoanalysis represented. This duality of the
psychiatric appeal was offered so that psychiatrists could claim a monopoly of competence. To
be certain, they did not possess this monopoly, but they did claim it. And because psychoanalysis
was used to introduce psychiatry to such a broad spectrum of social behavior, they were claiming
a monopoly of competence for almost everything one could hope for from a profession. By
redefining mental illness so that it was not a term entirely conterminous with the mental hospital
and those inside it, the popular psychiatrists expanded their profession centrifugally, to the benefit
of its public image.
World War II provided a great occasion for showing psychiatry’s usefulness outside of
the mental hospital. Having being granted a place in the upper echelons of the military service,
psychiatrists stood to gain a great deal from their mandate to examine the draftees and active
soldiers. First of all, psychiatry’s place in the armed services allowed them to cast themselves as
partners in the war, using their own expertise to enhance the abilities and performance of the
soldiers in the field. For a profession whose alignment with the interests of the public had been
cast in doubt, this alignment with the war effort led to strengthened claims to that alignment.
William Menninger and Edward Strecker emphasized psychiatry’s willingness to understand the
soldier. And, to be certain, the fact that the war was a great victory for American forces gave
Menninger and Strecker a chance to claim that psychiatry was part of the reason for that victory.
Moreover, the screening of potential inductees for World War II was a chance for
psychiatrists to examine a large cross-section of individuals who were not previously diagnosed
as mentally ill. One of the problems that psychiatry had experienced in its efforts to expand its
application was the fact that it had mostly dealt with patients whose unusual behavior had led
them to be confined in mental institutions. To be certain, this was not an easy group from which
to generalize to the public at large. The screening project and examinations of soldiers in the
conflict gave psychiatry a vast cross-section of the American population on which to base its
pronouncements concerning the mental health of the public at large; the large numbers of
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screening subjects and neuropsychiatric casualties were routinely offered as justification for the
expansion of psychiatry’s domain. And the war itself was treated as a large psychiatric
experiment, by which the human personality could be tested for its stability. Having situated
World War II as a coming out party for their profession, psychiatrists re-invigorated their claims
to relevance to normal human life.
Along with this new cross-section of people treated by psychiatry came a new application
o f the concepts that were introduced by psychoanalysis: the neuroses. Strecker and William
Menninger did not provide very exacting definitions of the neuroses; they were left as a very
broad category including many subtle kinds of psychological problems. Because the neuroses
were so widely defined, they made for an ideal way to broaden psychiatry’s relevance. And with
the mental hygiene-derived justification for addressing the prevention of mental disease and the
maintenance o f mental health, the neuroses were considered as potential problems in any soldier.
These concerns regarding the neuroses and mental hygiene gave impetus to William Menninger’s
use of the term ‘adjustment’ to describe what was necessary for a healthy soldier (or person) and
Edward Strecker’s use of the term ‘immaturity’ to describe what had gone wrong in personalities
that experienced difficulty in war (and in life). Having used the war to get out of the mental
hospital, they then used these unpretentious terms to establish links between their war experience
and everyday life. Though Menninger’s ‘adjustment’ was defined as a state of mental health and
Strecker’s ‘immaturity’ was defined as a state o f mental disease, they both functioned as very
broad terms that could leverage entire populations into psychiatric consideration.
The unsurprising result of the use of these terms was an over-riding sense that something
was psychiatrically wrong with people in general. Menninger examined the psychiatric
importance of companionship, identification, friendship, and leadership in the war, then extended
these insights by asserting that these same factors that engendered adjustment in the soldier were
o f great importance to everyone. He compared the situation of the soldier in the Army to that of
the child in the family, showing how these factors could (and should) inform parenting practices.
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The same needs for reinforcement were thought to be germane to any individual citizen in
America; we all need these things if our country is to survive, Menninger claimed. This
constituted the bulk of William Menninger’s effort to broaden his psychiatric expertise first to the
Army, and then from the Army to the world in general.
Edward Strecker’s view of the war involved a similar kind of tacking from psychiatry to
the war, and then from the war to the world. He created a sense of crisis by describing the
immense numbers of psychiatric casualties during World War II, then pointed to ‘immaturity’ as
the explanatory factor in these casualties. This immaturity, he argued, was certainly the result of
the soldiers’ childhood experiences, when, Strecker believed, they were coddled too much and
never fully weaned from their dependence on their mothers. The military issue of psychiatric
casualties was relocated as a problem in techniques of raising children. With this new familyoriented basis for applying his psychiatric expertise in place, he extended ‘momism’, using it as a
major hub for his centrifugal extension of psychiatry. He found momism not just in cases of
mothers raising boys, but also in cases of how mothers raised their daughters, and how fathers
related to their children. But he did not stop there. He also used momism as a kind of metaphor
that could describe the function of psychoneuroses, religion, political movements, the belief in
national isolationism, fascism, Nazism, and alcoholism. And, he added, momism also caused
homosexuality. Though Strecker differed from William Menninger in many ways—most
particularly in their different relationships to psychoanalysis—both authors used World War II as
a way of establishing themselves outside of the mental hospital and then showing psychiatry’s
relevance to the world at large.
Fredric Wertham occupied a different place within psychiatry, and accordingly, the
cultural authority he claimed in his writing took a different shape. Wertham was well-known,
had an M.D., and established himself with a finely-tuned understanding of some of the more
neurological factors at work in psychiatry. However, his alignment with social psychiatry, his
concern for his patients in the inner-city, and his efforts to establish a kind of activist psychiatry
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made him somewhat of an upstart within his profession. His authority was deployed through
some of the techniques one might associate with the orthodox psychiatry of the Menningers and
Strecker. He used involved medical terminology and spoke in terms of diagnoses and ewes,
taking time to explain these concepts for the lay audience. He emphasized the professional
concern for scientific diagnostic techniques and modes of treatment. And he defended psychiatry
against other professions with which it competed.
But Wertham combined this proper professionalism with an upstart fury. He questioned
psychiatry’s flirtings with psychoanalysis. He took on other experts who wrote popular books on
psychology. He chided his own profession for turning its back on the most needy patients. He
painted an unflattering picture of psychiatrists who served on lunacy commissions. And when he
addressed the issue of comic books, he accused psychiatrists with whom he disagreed guilty of
conspiring with the comic book industry to insulate them from criticism. All this is to say that
Wertham displayed a certain relevance vis a vis his own profession. Instead of simply allowing
his own professional standpoint to justify his place as an authority, Wertham cast himself as an
expert who differed from competing experts because of his own direct contact with—and concern
for—the people.
William Menninger played up his own allegiance to the plight of the soldiers in World
War II, but Wertham’s attention to such details was placed front and center in his authoritative
appeals. His extended case studies of individual criminal cases allowed him to show his
involvement in the lives of the people he touched. His prose frequently found him describing his
own sympathy for his patients and for all the less fortunate people who slip through the cracks of
the American system. A critique of psychiatry, in Wertham’s hands, was an assertion that he was
clued in to the difficulties that people had with psychiatry, and that he was therefore better
positioned to grant a knowing opinion. He described interactions with his patients with full
quotations from treatment sessions, a technique that demonstrated his own face to face contact
with them. Frequently, this meant locating himself in conversation with parents, children, and the
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lower classes, all of whom he claimed to represent. This played out as an attempt to gain the
moral high hand in the many debates that Wertham entered; he presented a vision of the field of
expertise that contrasted other professionals' adherence to routine and alignment with vested
interests with his own grass roots involvement and intense effort to understand every single
patient he treated.
Wertham was, in this sense, very consistent to the ethic of social psychiatry, the
psychiatric school of thought that placed great importance on the relationship of social
background and psychiatric health. As an exponent of this school of thought, Wertham gained
great visibility in his crusades against school segregation and comic book violence. This latter
quest found Wertham at the apex o f his influence. Having changed the face of the debate over
comic books by introducing psychiatric concerns regarding juvenile delinquency, he found
himself in a position of seemingly great influence. After emerging as the definitive expert on
comic books, advising the Senate subcommittee, and appearing before that subcommittee to
present his perspective, he seemed to be sitting in the driver’s seat. But when the subcommittee
announced that it would back a self-censorship code endorsed by the comic book industry, it was
clear that the sum of Wertham’s authority was not enough to overcome the interests at work in
that issue. In this sense, Wertham’s position as a member of “a dominated fraction of the
dominant class” (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 145) was elucidated. His authority as an expert was enough
to shape a debate, but not enough to control policy. It was a reminder of the limits of the power
of even so authorized of an expert as Wertham. The intellectual can control authority, but this
authority is of questionable relevance outside of the field from which the intellectual has
emerged.
Wertham claimed a cultural authority that involved a negotiation between
professionalism and a dissent from the rest o f his profession. In this sense, there was a ‘double
break’ at work in his writing. He identified himself both as a professional and also as a
representative of the people. This same double-break is even more apparent in the work of the
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two lay analysts discussed here: Robert Lindner and Erich Fromm. Lindner and Fromm derived
their authority from their stance as lay analysts, and their relative lack of professional credentials,
I argue, shaped the cultural authority they projected in their writing.
Using a psychoanalytic framework, Lindner and Fromm couched social problems in a
manner that, by now, should be familiar. They introduced their own specialized form of
discourse and applied it to a set of social problems. Fromm was concerned with showing how
political problems could be explained in psychoanalytic terms. In a sense, he revealed how the
politics of fascism, Nazism, communism, and capitalism ‘really’ operated, with an emphasis on
how the subconscious shapes politics. Lindner, who was outspoken in his praise of Fromm, took
basically the same approach. As with the relatively orthodox psychiatry of William Menninger
and Edward Strecker, World War II loomed large in these analyses. The Nazi rise to power was
considered as something that could potentially happen in America, lending this writing a sense of
impending crisis, and making this expertise glow with the promise of opposing hitherto unnoticed
fascist trends.
Additionally, Fromm considered extremely broad issues such as love and dreams, and in
doing so, he offered an extremely diffuse psychoanalysis. It was the psychoanalysis of the
mundane. So, much as the Menninger brothers used psychoanalysis to apply psychiatry to
problems that were less severe than those traditionally addressed by psychiatry, Fromm’s
specialist approach to psychoanalysis did much the same thing. He put human existence itself on
the couch, and spelled out why it was that a psychoanalytic attention to existence was crucial for
an understanding of the world. Again, one can detect the same implicit claims for a monopoly of
competence that were found in more orthodox professional writing.
Lindner did not attend so closely to the issues of human existence. He was more specific
in his interests. While he shared with Fromm the psychoanalytic understanding of politics, he
also shared with Wertham the concern for crime and juvenile delinquency. Sometimes he blurred
these two approaches, arriving at a way of showing how, for instance, juvenile delinquents had a
369

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e co p y rig h t o w n e r. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

state of mind similar to that of fascists. The moral he repeatedly returned to was that people
should not conform too much, that the human instinct for creativity could be squelched only by
putting the individual and society in grave danger. His psychoanalytic expertise was held up as a
potential bulwark against creeping fascism.
Though the topics of Lindner’s writing frequently overlapped with those of Fredric
Wertham, Lindner did not position himself as a medical expert. Indeed, he offered a pointed
critique of the medical approach to the mind. Lindner’s perspective, like that of Fromm, could be
described as truly anti-professional. Both of them opposed the world of the professions to the
world of genuine value; they suggested that professionals—and psychiatrists in particular—had
become overly routinized, power-hungry means to an end that was controlled by more powerful
interests. Though Stanley Fish has considered anti-professionalism to be professionalism in its
purest form, it seems significant that the experts who relied upon it most here—Lindner and
Fromm—lacked the professional credentials that defined the dominant section of their field. It
hardly seems mysterious why they deployed this anti-professionalism: they were attempting to
match their more powerful psychiatric counterparts by denying the basis on which that power was
granted. They cast their lack of credentials—and of the psychiatric ideas that accompanied those
credentials—as a guarantee of their own allegiance to the authentic truth, and to those who lacked
the power of psychiatry. In this sense, Lindner and Fromm closed ranks with their audience,
making the lack of credentials out to be something that they shared with their audience. By
simultaneously asserting their expertise ad dissenting from the orthodox professional viewpoint,
they effected a double-break, setting themselves off from their audience (by virtue of their
expertise) and erecting a divide between themselves and the professions. They were both of the
people and not of the people.
Nowhere was this feasting on the body of psychiatry more obvious than when Fromm
and Lindner took on what they saw as psychiatry’s ideology of ‘adjustment.’ As we have seen,
many psychiatrists of the period established a sense of crisis around concerns that people were
370

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e co p y rig h t o w n e r. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

not sufficiently adjusted to society’s needs. For instance, William Menninger used the term
‘adjustment’ and Edward Strecker used the term ‘maturity’ to indicate the positive quality of
serving society’s needs. Fromm and Lindner forged a heterodox challenge to these ideas by
claiming that the ideology of adjustment was itself cause for concern. The psychiatrists’ belief in
adjustment, they claimed, demonstrated that they did not truly want to have a free society, and
that they were allowing their professional position cloud them to the needs of the people. Fromm
and Lindner cast themselves as experts who acted in the people’s defense of other experts,
showing how the belief in adjustment was really just another form of conformity (according to
Lindner) or an alienated outlook (according to Fromm) that could only move us closer to fascism.
And, because both of them had already claimed fascism as a domain of their expertise, they could
fit psychiatry alongside the raft of other political misfits who led history the wrong way.
Moreover, Lindner’s opposition to psychiatry impelled him to routinely attempt to bring
back something that, as we have seen, the popular psychiatrists made great attempts to conceal:
the stigma of the mental hospital and the lingering sense that psychiatry was a kind of brain
washing. To get that stigma back in place, Lindner salted his accusations of psychiatry’s support
of conformity with remark that reminded his audience of such unpopular psychiatric methods as
shock treatment, and lobotomy. And he frequently invoked images of the mental hospital and the
asylum of earlier times, as he contrasted psychiatry’s ostensible willingness to enchain patients
with his own pointedly anti-psychiatry perspective. Again the notion of anti-professionalism
seems relevant: by making the orthodox psychiatry out to be a parasite on the public interest, he
could make his own relative lack of orthodox credentials shine. This helps explain why Lindner
was trying to put psychiatry back in its old place—the asylum.
Thomas Szasz emerged at the end of the period of time analyzed here. When compared
with the other professionals here considered, Szasz’s position in the topology of professions
seems closest to that of Fredric Wertham. Like Wertham, he was a duly credentialed member of
the psychiatric profession who opposed himself to the strict orthodoxy of the profession.
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Wertham’s brand o f social psychiatry, and Szasz’s insistence that psychiatry was workable only
as a form of private practice that emphasized the rational conversation and eliminated the medical
aura, marked both of them as black sheep within psychiatry. Also, both Szasz and Wertham used
simultaneous appeals to professional superiority and intra-professional dissent to mark
themselves off.
From the time of his first book, Pain and Pleasure, Szasz had demonstrated a critical
perspective on the medical trappings of psychiatry. But his subsequent work made his dissent a
much more open secret as he attempted to do no less than destroy psychiatry. His blunt assertion
that mental illness is a myth attacked what could be seen as one of the most essential parts of the
cultural authority asserted by the orthodox psychiatrists. The orthodox view that mental illness
was in fact an illness, and therefore a medical issue, underwrote everything psychiatrists like the
Menningers and Strecker put forth. Their use of medical terminology and medical metaphors
found them staking claim to the considerable authority wielded by the medical professions,
especially after World War II. Szasz’s attack on this connection to medicine cut right to the heart
of how psychiatry had attempted to bill itself in its bids to shed the ‘mad doctor’ images that had
dogged the profession.
By portraying psychiatry as a form of social control, a way of denying individual liberty,
Szasz appealed to the (by then) well-established stigma of the mental hospital. Lindner and
Fromm made very similar points when they laid out what they saw as psychiatry’s plot to keep
individuals adjusted and conformist. But while they made psychiatry’s anti-individualism out to
be a component of over-professionalism that prevented psychiatrists from understanding the
plight of the mental patient, Szasz asserted that psychiatry had, in fact, failed to live up to the
standards of the professions. He found psychiatry lacking in the professionalism that could have
redeemed it. By making these claims, he essentially made himself out to be the one true
professional within psychiatry. He cast himself as the one true professional within psychiatry, the
only one capable of understanding psychiatry as an insider who also perceived the lack of
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professionalism in his peers. He played the role of a whistle-blower, whose testimony (even
though it undermined the institution within which he had worked) was saturated with the
authority of a member of the in-group. As Szasz has demonstrated, the ideal of professionalism
can be turned against a profession by someone who is a member of that target profession. Of
course, Szasz’s choice of a professional attack on psychiatry was strategic; his own credentials
impelled him to use professionalism, instead of relying on the anti-professionalism that was a
natural choice for the lay analysts who lacked credentials.
Szasz’s work re-introduced an anti-psychiatric thrust to popular culture just as psychiatry
itself was undergoing a change. Two changes in the profession seem most relevant here: the
move toward deinstitutionalization and the beginning of the age of pharmacology. A movement
that called for “community psychiatry” affected the move toward deinstitutionalization. The
community psychiatry movement had intended to create asylums that would rely on patients’ own
decisions regarding when to check in and out. The treatment at community psychiatry centers, it
was hoped, would involve creating a stable environment for its denizens. While community
psychiatry never fully took off in America, the community psychiatry movement’s concern for
elevating the social dimensions of mental illness above the biological definitions represented an
erosion of the strictly medical sense of mental illness, and a move away from the mental hospital.
But deinstitutionalization cannot be understood without taking note of the rise of
psychopharmacology in the late 1950’s and early 1960’s. Psychopharmacology enjoyed success
at this time because new drug treatments, such as chlorpromzine (an antipsychotic), had proven
relatively successful in controlling patients that had formerly been thought to require full-time
custodial care in a mental hospital (Shorter, 1997, p. 279). This development provided a
convenient way of preserving the medical psychiatry and effacing the mental hospital. Because
the mental hospital had been (and continues to be) sidestepped by drug treatments,
psychopharmacology provided some of the most significant practical impetus for
deinstitutionalization. If American psychiatiy’s attempts to absorb psychoanalysis represented a
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strategic move to distance itself from the mental hospital and find a broad set of non-stigmatized
applications, the psychopharmacological vector in psychiatry has done much the same thing,
while still retaining (and even emphasizing) the medical identification of psychiatry.
In this sense, psychoanalysis and psychopharmacology—so often considered as
diametrically-opposed rivals in the debate over the nature of the human mind—represented
parallel strategies for psychiatry. As psychiatry increasingly turned to the new generation of
psychopharmacology in the 1970’s and 1980’s, psychoanalysis was decidedly on the wane within
psychiatry. And, true to form, the psychiatric profession frequently regards this move from
psychoanalysis to psychopharmacology as a triumphant liberation of the profession—much as
earlier generations of psychiatrists regarded Phillippe Pinel’s un-chaining of the inmates at the
Salpetriere, Freud’s suggestions regarding psychotherapeutic methodology, and the psychiatric
experience during World War II (Shorter, 1997, p. 313). Psychiatry’s success in establishing the
use of such pharmacological treatments as Prozac and Ritalin has helped the profession re-invent
itself once again.
‘Lay’ Analysis as a Profession?
By treating lay psychoanalysis and psychiatry as more or less professional ways of
constructing messages, as I have done here, I have begged at least one question: In what sense
can a lay analyst be treated as a profession, if it is in fact defined (and even asserted in the
popular writing) by virtue of its lack of professional credentials? Though lay analysts did not
possess M.D.’s, and were denied membership in the American Psychoanalytic Association, I
argue that it is still worthwhile to consider the popular writing o f such lay analysts as Erich
Fromm and Robert Lindner with an understanding o f the professions kept in mind.
The sociology of professions can be brought in more explicitly in the consideration of the
professional identity of lay analysis. Everett Hughes’s work on the professions is relevant here.
His description of professions stresses their activity in providing “esoteric services” (1971, p.
374); among these services, Hughes places a particular importance on the giving of advice. But,
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more fundamentally, he says: “professionals profess,” and this “is the essence of the professional
idea and the professional claim'’. In the professing, the professional “asks that he be trusted”
(1971, p. 375, ital. in orig.). He also considers detachment and the concern for finding an
intellectual base as important factors in the maintenance of a profession. And, finally, he devotes
a certain amount of attention to the ways in which “occupations try to change themselves or their
image, or both, in the course of a movement to become ‘professionalized’” (1971, p. 377).
Hughes’s analysis did not make professional status out to be something that could be possessed;
instead, he considered the professions as modes of presentation, as claims to be made. In this
sense, Lindner and Fromm, though they were lay analysts, passed the test of professionalism in
that they claimed a kind o f power to profess, based on their own explicitly laid out formalized
knowledge of psychoanalysis.
But Lindner and Fromm did not only lay claim to a kind of professional stance; while
they did that, they also renounced professionalism. Stanley Fish claims that such anti
professionalism is in fact “professionalism itself in its purest form” (1989, p. 245). Though this is
consistent with my overall consideration of popular lay psychoanalysis as a professional appeal, it
should be noted that the orthodox professionals under consideration here did not deploy anti
professionalism in their writing, or at least they did not do so nearly to the extent that Lindner and
Fromm did. Anti-professionalism, I assert, is a strategy that, like any other strategy, relates to
one’s position in the field. Because the Menningers and Strecker had so thoroughly aligned
themselves with psychiatry, and wrote as psychiatrists, anti-professionalism would have
undermined their authoritative stances. Because they did not operate from dominant positions
within the psychological field, Lindner, Fromm, and to some extent, Fredric Wertham, stood to
benefit from a balancing o f anti-professional and professional appeals. So, in keeping with Fish’s
scheme, anti-professionalism and professionalism were deployed in tandem; there seems to be
nothing incompatible about the two strategies. However, the variance of the use of anti
professionalism is something Fish does not account for. Bourdieu’s field metaphor assists in
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doing so. As he has put it, “the denunciation of professional routine is to some extent
consubstantial with prophetic ambition, even to the point where this may amount to official proof
of one’s charismatic qualifications” (1993, p. 124). According to the logic of the field of
psychology, it made sense for Lindner, Fromm, and Wertham to denounce psychiatry; it was a
way of casting themselves as charismatic leaders.
Returning briefly to the sociology o f professions, Eliot Freidson contrasts the accepted
definitions of the term profession, and other similar terms, such as intellectual, intelligentsia,
expert, and technician. Not surprisingly, he finds that there is considerable debate regarding the
lines that are to be drawn between professionals and intellectuals. In keeping with most
definitions of professionals, lay analysts possessed and deployed a kind of formal knowledge that
was shared by a group o f like-minded practitioners—psychoanalytic methodology and theory.
And indeed, though Fromm and Lindner were at times widely divergent in the kind of analytic
work they did, they both practiced psychoanalysis and boiled down the issues they examined into
a psychoanalytic terminology. That is to say, they claimed a certain field of expertise, and used
that expertise as a way of professing to the world. But the rather broad goals addressed in the
writing of Lindner and Fromm, along with their professedly heterodox way of addressing issues
of power made them closely resemble the definition of the intellectual used by many theorists as a
counterpoint to the definition of professional (Freidson, 1986, pp. 10-13). In this sense, Lindner,
Fromm, and even Wertham (whose oppositional stances and occasional attempts at universality)
can be understood to have occupied a position somewhere in the middle of the continuum that
runs between accepted definitions professionalism and intellectualism.
Bourdieu addresses the idea that the lack of institutional power may have something to do
with the role of the intellectual. He concludes that “intellectuals.. .are a dominated fraction of the
dominant class,” ultimately “dominated in their relations with those who hold political and
economic power” (1990, p. 14S). And indeed, the experts in this study who were closest to these
definitions of the intellectual that I have considered were the very same experts who lacked the
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institutional power of the psychiatric orthodoxy (which itself wielded much political power
indeed, though it was almost certainly dominated in other ways). In this sense, oppositionality of
the kind that the lay analysts offered can be understood as an emergent strategy owing to their
social position. And indeed, this insight can be broadened to the point where we can arrive at the
conclusion that intellectualism of the oppositional, universal kind that figures such as Lewis
Coser and Russell Jacoby have defined is determined by the relationship to domination. Perhaps
the strategies of positioning that involve the universalism and oppositionality are made possible
by the domination that defines the relationships within the intellectual field.
It is important to remember, however, that these are not rules followed by everyone at all
times. I have attempted to considering the positioning at work in the rhetoric of public
professionalism as an example of strategic communication. Bourdieu explicitly contrasts the
ideas of strategies and rules as tools for understanding communication and behavior, noting how
“intellectual or artistic position-takings are also always semi-conscious strategies in a game in
which the conquest of cultural legitimacy and of the concomitant power of legitimate symbolic
violence is at stake” (1993, p. 137). Unlike rule-oriented tools for understanding the rhetoric of
such struggles, the strategic point of view is relatively content-neutral, instead focusing on how
the structure of a given field, and the power-relations of that field, relate to the position-takings,
assuming only that what emerges will involve a kind of attempt at maximizing advantage.
To return to another one of Bourdieu’s insights that framed this project from the start:
By obeying the logic of the objective competition between mutually exclusive positions
within the field, the various categories of producers tend to supply products adjusted to
the expectations of the various positions in the field of power, but without any conscious
striving for such adjustment (1993, p. 45).
This is offered to reassert the contention that the experts arrived at their authoritative stances not
because of conscious planning, nor because they randomly arrived at those positions. Instead,
their stances were strategically impelled to maximize their profit within the field of popular
consumption. In a manner similar to the maneuverings involved in Goffrnan’s sense of
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maximizing ‘face’ in an interpersonal interaction, the communicators here wrote with a sense of
anticipation that was shaped by their own professional backgrounds. An orthodox psychiatrist
such as Edward Strecker, whose background was thoroughly medical, stood to gain little by
entering into discussions of some of the graver realities of public mental hospitals or by giving
the psychoanalytic upstarts within psychiatry any credit To maximize his own authority, he set
up distinctions that played to his own strengths; these distinctions were not so much invented by
Strecker, but were instead instilled in him by his professional background. In this sense, the
authoritative discourse can be understood as a kind of precipitate of the position of the speaker.
For this reason, the discourse generated by the seven experts in this study can be taken as a
precipitate of the positions occupied by those experts within the professional and intellectual
fields.
Authority: Charismatic and Rational/Legal
To speak of charismatic authority, as I briefly did above, inevitably evokes Max Weber,
who famously proposed three kinds of authority: traditional, charismatic, and rational/legal. Two
of these, charismatic and rational/legal, seem most relevant here. For Weber, rational grounds of
legitimate domination (legal authority) involve “a belief in the legality of enacted rules and the
right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands” Charismatic grounds of
legitimate domination depend on “devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary
character o f an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by
him” (1978, p. 215). I suggest that the authority claimed by orthodox psychiatrists such as the
Menningers and Strecker asserted something similar to the legal authority. Though they did not
have the legal right to command their readers to believe them, they were trying to identify
themselves as rightfully elevated to issue some kind of commands; their power to profess was
hinged on their identification as rightful owners of lofty positions as elite psychiatrists.
Meanwhile, and in keeping with the general thrust here, the psychoanalytic experts, such as
Lindner and Fromm, asserted a kind of charismatic authority, concerned more with ethos and the
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authors’ identities as individuals who were willing to go against the grain for truth. And finally,
the authority of Wertham and Szasz involved a thorough blending of these two lands of authority;
they both foregrounded their own elevation as psychiatric agents, but they also spent much time
casting their own personal positions in their writings.
Eli Zaretsky has directly addressed this issue of charisma and rationalization in mid
twentieth century psychoanalysis and psychiatry. He asserts that psychoanalysis “had become a
charismatic institution” during and after World War II; no longer tied just to Freud (an exemplar
of the charismatic-leader type), it had a great influence over “both popular culture and lay
intellectuals” (2000, p. 331). Psychiatrists such as William Menninger, claims Zaretsky,
attempted to absorb psychoanalysis by bringing it under the aegis of psychiatry, and indeed, this
represents a familiar theme in William and Karl Menninger’s popular writing. And Zaretsky also
highlights how the process of the rationalization of psychiatry involved an exclusion of some of
the most prominent of European analysts, whose less bureaucratically-oriented vision of
psychoanalysis made them outcasts in their own field, so to speak. The point is not that
psychiatry had entirely transformed the charismatic appeals of original psychoanalysis. As
Weber himself pointed out, it is uncommon to find pure forms of any one of his types of authority
(1978, p. 262); the point here is that this necessarily incomplete process of rationalization
impelled the lay analytic dissenters such as Fromm and Lindner toward relatively more
charismatic appeals, pushing them away from the professionalism used in popular psychiatry.
Ethos and Proximity
The public professionals’ strategies for self-identification, which I have linked to the idea
of ethos, frequently involved concerns for the physical space where the expert performed his
work. By creating a sense o f proximity to their work, they claimed an authority for themselves,
positioning themselves (in a most literal fashion) as closer to the issues they addressed. Barbie
Zelizer has dealt with this pattern as it plays out in the practice of journalism. Synthesizing the
work of other journalism researchers, she concludes that the “link between authorship and
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authority emerges from some underling sense of a journalist’s proximity to the event” (1990, p.
37). In Covering the Body (1992), where she addresses how journalistic authority was asserted
through coverage and re-tellings of the assassination of John F. Kennedy, Zelizer applies a
diverse understanding of cultural authority, but again stresses the manner in which journalists
create authority for themselves by framing their versions of the story with reminders of their own
presence at the event.
Applied to the cases of the psychiatrists and psychoanalysts considered here, proximity
serves a similar purpose. By supporting their analyses of phenomena as large as war, politics,
sexuality, and juvenile delinquency with case studies, the popular psychiatrists and
psychoanalysts claimed a proximity to these issues that, at least, demonstrated their authoritative
superiority to their audience. The orthodox psychiatrists’ use of proximity sometimes, but not
always, placed them in the mental hospital. I have suggested that the stigma attached to
psychiatry—and to the mental hospital in particular—acted as a disincentive to more thoroughly
reminding the audience of the location of the expertise, or at least of the relative location of the
author and his patients or analysands. As a pioneer of popular psychiatric writing, Karl
Menninger was in a position to benefit from the fact of the Menninger Clinic. Though state-run
mental hospitals were somewhat suspect in the public eye, it seems possible that he could have
framed his own observations as coming from the Menninger Clinic, which was widely considered
to be the Mayo Clinic of psychiatry, a very positive place for the profession. Though he did not
pursue this, (perhaps out of a concern that a contrast of the Menninger Clinic and other mental
health institutions would further tarnish the image o f psychiatry) he did make frequent use of case
studies in a manner that played up his own direct contact with patients, placing in the foreground
something one of the indices of his professionalism.
World War n provided a number of settings that lent themselves to the shedding of the
constraints of the mental hospital. By writing about his experiences in hospitals in Europe during
World War II, William Menninger located himself not only outside of the mental hospital, but in
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touch with the soldiers fighting the war, at their side and responding to their needs. Strecker did
much the same thing. As an important psychiatric figure in the effort to give potential soldiers a
mental health screening, he situated many of his analyses in the screening interview. Again, the
same sense of direct contact with patients was apparent in this writing. And additionally, by
establishing that he had dealt with such a large number of people who had not been previously
diagnosed as mentally ill, Strecker underwrote psychiatry’s efforts to reach out beyond mental
illness into mental health, placing everyone under psychiatric consideration because they had the
potential for mental illness. And for both Menninger and Strecker, the sense that they were in
some way or another working directly with the soldiers during the war demonstrated their own
allegiance to the war cause. As war psychiatrists, they were more than scientists; they were
fighting on the right side.
Wertham and Fromm used very precise case studies to ground their conclusions. They
both relied on extensive exact quotations of interactions with patients and analysands to explain
the symptoms of mental illness they addressed. This was, in a sense, a truly professional move to
make; by showing their interactions up front, they played up the day-to-day practice of
counseling and psychotherapy that constituted psychoanalysis and (some) psychiatry. This was
an important way of demonstrating their authority to address the issues they claimed for
psychiatry and psychoanalysis. Through a kind of synecdoche, they transformed individual
patients into indices of broader issues such as murder and juvenile delinquency. They claimed to
have come into direct human contact with these issues. Also important here was the fact that
their direct contact with their patients and analysands functioned as a way of signaling whose side
they were one. By locating themselves with their patients physically, they attempted to
demonstrate that they were acting as agents of their patients, and were unable to forget the public
well-being if only because the public itself had talked right to them.
Heterodoxy and Orthodoxy; Organic and Traditional
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The difference between the authoritative appeals made by psychiatrists and
psychoanalysts complicates the picture of how professionals assert authority in popular discourse.
First of all, it seems clear that, no matter what claims are made regarding social problems or
psychiatric maladies, the strategies arrived at by the authors involve claims about themselves.
That is to say, ethos, in the sense of rhetoric that takes the source of the message as the central
concern, plays a major role in this genre of writing. Everett Hughes called attention to the role of
ethos in how authority is established in the field of the professions. The collective claims of a
profession, he claimed, “are dependent...upon its members constituting in some measure a group
apart with an ethos of its own” (1971, p. 376). Psychiatrists and psychoanalysts alike expended
great energies in describing themselves to their audience, while merging a vision of the world
with that self-image.
One might think that the psychoanalysts, as the dominated professionals in this story,
would, in an effort to seem professional, blur the boundaries between their lay analysis and
psychiatry, but this is not the case. Their strategy involved, instead, an anti-professional
identification with the people. Lindner and Fromm could be seen doing this with their theory
regarding ‘adjustment’ at work in psychiatric expertise. As we have seen, they accepted their
lack of psychiatric credentials, and, through an attack on those credentials, cast the psychiatrists
as fools in their own game, forfeiting the truth and turning away from the true interests of the
people. Lacking the gold standard in professional credentials, Lindner and Fromm constructed a
narrative in which those credentials, displayed so voluminously by the psychiatrists, constituted a
stigma.
As I have already mentioned, this critique of psychiatry, as carried out by Lindner,
Fromm, Szasz, and sometimes Wertham, was carried out in the name of the people. Bourdieu has
observed how the idea of “the ‘people’” acts as “ one of the things at stake in the struggle
between intellectuals” (1990, p. 150). Furthermore, he describes how “the stances adopted
towards the ‘people’ or the ‘popular’ depend in their form and content on specific interests linked
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first and foremost to belonging to a cultural field of production and, secondly, to the position
occupied within this field” (1990, p. 150). In the context of these experts, we can see how ‘the
people’ are deployed as a way of contrasting the orthodox expert’s ostensible separation from the
everyday world with the critical perspectives offered by Lindner, Fromm, Szasz, and Wertham.
As Bourdieu would have it, this use of the people does indeed seem to be related to the
position occupied with the field. In the writing of the Menningers and Strecker, the people were
invoked, but for the most part this was performed in a vague way. Psychiatric expertise, as they
wielded it, was presumed to be in the interests of the people, so that the proper, medical use of
psychiatry was positioned as something that was efficacious precisely because it came from a
well-intentioned elite who knew what they were doing. During World War II, as we have seen,
the idea of the people was invoked to show how the psychiatric involvement in the war had
helped to foster mental health, ensure an efficient fighting force, and assist in efforts to create
group cohesion and morale. By closing ranks with medicine and with the war effort, they
positioned psychiatry as something that was in the best interest of the servicemen, and therefore,
in the best interest of the world. Here, the importance of William Menninger’s writings on his
experiences in Europe during the war seem most relevant; by showing that he had actually been
there, he was doing more than just showing his hands-on expertise, he was also attesting to his
own capability of fitting his psychiatric expertise to the interests of the soldiers. As with other
orthodox psychiatric expertise, though, one finds the same basic argument that psychiatry is in the
interests of the people because it possesses the expertise that separates it from the lay person.
For Wertham and Lindner, ‘the people’ were invoked as a most corporeal entity. They
both played up their own face to face contact with the people. We have already seen how the idea
of proximity shapes the construction o f the authoritative voice. But it was not just proximity that
was at work here. The claim o f proximity also implicitly claimed an advocacy for the individuals
with whom they talked. Lindner and Wertham placed case studies so prominently in their work,
and in so doing, they provided demonstrations of their own solidarity with their patients. Their
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conclusions were presented, in a sense, through the mouths of their analysands. To some extent,
this allowed them to occlude their own authoritative voice, making it seem as if they were
following the authentic voice of the people, and not imposing anything from above.
Erich Fromm’s use of the people was somewhat more difficult to locate. His interest in
the people’s best interest was more explicitly stated. He did not spend much time establishing
proximity to the people, though he did feature a occasional references to therapy sessions;
instead, he wrote as one of the people himself. The narrative that ran through Escape From
Freedom, Man For Himself, and The Sane Society involved an explicit formulation of the
opposition of the interests of the elite (and especially the psychiatrists) and the rest of the people,
and Fromm’s analysis was formulated against this elite and for the people. In this sense, his
invocation of the authority to speak for the people involved how he located himself on the social
topology. He used his position as a lay analyst to signify a commonality with his audience,
whom he had presumed to be oppressed in the same way that he was. Fromm constructed
homologies between his own position within the field of psychology and his audience’s position
in the greater social world. As Bourdieu puts it, “there are always, in any society, conflicts
between symbolic powers that aim at imposing the vision of legitimate divisions, that is, at
constructing groups”; “[s]ymbolic power, in this sense, is a power o f‘world making’” (1990, p.
137). Fromm’s symbolic power, his authoritative voice, consisted of constructing a world that
located himself as the proper ombudsmen o f and for the dominated people. And Lindner, whose
analysis so closely paralleled that of Fromm’s, did basically the same thing, though he also
provided evidence of a great amount of direct contact with the people he claimed to speak for.
Thomas Szasz’s strategy for positioning himself as an advocate of the people was, in
some ways, similar to Fromm’s narrative of resistance. Like Fromm, Szasz was a discontent
(frequently referred to as a ‘gadfly’) who divided the world up into two groups: one group of
(psychiatric) elites and another group of dominated people, with mental patients located at the
center of this latter group. His opposition to psychiatry was performed in the name of the people,
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or more precisely, in the name of civil liberties. Unlike Fromm, Szasz’s psychiatric background
allowed him to claim a degree of proximity to the psychiatric profession. This was doubled with
support that came from case studies, albeit case studies that (usually) that he had not generated in
his own practice. These case studies, as a rule, pit an individual (and in particular, individuals of
color or of the working class) against a power-hungry psychiatry. As with other case studies
dealt with here, each of Szasz’s case studies offered a kind of synecdoche that extended to
Szasz’s overall worldview. In this worldview, the psychiatric establishment took on the
powerless in pursuit of the furtherance of its own power, and Szasz ascribed to himself the role of
the whistle-blower, acting on behalf of the powerless. And if, as he made clear, everyone was
considered potentially mentally ill and everyone had to deal with the world that the idea of mental
illness had created, he closed ranks with this ‘everyone’. The homologies projected here were set
in motion via a strict concern for civil liberties; if anyone’s liberties were abrogated, he argued,
everyone has lost.
This analysis would also seem to overlap with some of Gramsci’s concerns regarding
intellectuals. Famously, Gramsci described two types of intellectuals. The first type of
intellectual he addressed were the “ ‘traditional’ professional intellectuals.. .whose position in the
interstices of society... derives ultimately from past and present class relations and conceals an
attachment to various historical class formations”. Gramsci contrasted these traditional
intellectuals with the “ ‘organic’ intellectuals,” or “the thinking and organising element of a
particular fundamental social class” (1971, p. 3). Gramsci’s typology has shaped many
treatments of intellectual history. Viewing these categories through the “field”- and “strategy”centered work of Bourdieu, I would suggest that ‘traditional’ and ‘organic’ can be used not only
as types of intellectuals, but also as concepts that become stakes in the game between intellectuals
in a given field.
Applied to the psychiatrists and psychoanalysts, this emphasis on the strategic level of
communication helps to demonstrate that the psychoanalysts, though not necessarily ‘organic’ in
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the Gramscian sense, certainly attempted to assert themselves as organic-style intellectuals,
representing the true interests of ‘the people’ (another stake in the game) in an effort to transcend
what they did not possess, medical credentials. The difference that they tried to assert between
themselves and their psychiatric rivals involved concerns for organicity and authenticity vis a vis
the people. They cast their own lack of psychiatric expertise as proof positive of their authority to
address the people’s interests. This is not to argue that they necessarily did not represent the
people’s interests so much as to assert that this strategy of using the people arose from their
position in the field. Accepting medical logic could only have undermined them, so they played
an anti-professional card that voided medical logic altogether.
In a more subtle way, the same type of insight applies to the psychiatrists. As possessors
of legitimate authority in a field with a sullied past, they were continually foregrounding and
highlighting their own identification with medicine. They can be described as traditional
intellectuals, but it is more to the point here to assert that they positioned themselves as traditional
professional intellectuals. The rhetorical thrust of their authoritative stance was to make clear
their difference from their audience. These assertions of difference were paired with promises
that their psychiatric expertise was truly wielded in the public interest. But still, they were
primarily concerned with highlighting their professional identification. Evidencing their place
within psychiatry, and burnishing the reputation of psychiatry itself, represented the cornerstone
of psychiatric authority. Orthodox psychiatrists such as the Menningers and Strecker had little to
gain from playing the ‘people’ card; their authority rested on the idea that some differences were
important. Effacing professionalism makes little point if that is the basis of one’s claims to
authority. Again, the intellectual stance taken can be seen as owing to one’s position within the
field, here largely defined by medical credentials and ambitions.
John Michael has dealt directly with this Gramscian issue regarding the positioning of
these ‘public professionals’ I address here. Though his analysis centers on more recent examples
of public intellectuals, his conclusions retain some relevance for this study. Michael finds that
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[intellectuals as a class cannot simply disappear into populist reconstructions or
unproblematically claim authority as expert elites. Both populism and elitism are
themselves quintessentially intellectual constructions, the sorts of legitimation that
intellectuals like to hide behind (2000, p. 42).
I assert that the appeals of populism and elitism can be roughly correlated with the positions of
organic and traditional rhetoric. And, when looking at these psychiatric and psychoanalytic
experts, one can see how easily the categories of populism and elitism can be (must be?) blended
with each other. But clearly, the dominated positions in this study (occupied in particular by
Fromm and Lindner, but also Wertham and Szasz) showed a greater inclination to hold up the
idea o f the organic, while the more dominant positions (the Menningers and Strecker) leaned
more heavily on classic professionalism. Despite his seeming dismissal of those who ‘hide
behind’ legitimations of one kind or another, Michael ultimately arrives at the conclusion that the
important intellectual task of criticism cannot be performed without some distance.
“Intellectuals,” he claims “cannot effectively hide the unpopular nature of the work they do; nor
can they cover themselves in the robe of the philosopher king. There is no way out of this
dilemma” (2000, pp. 42-43). To search for pure examples of the grounded intellectuals that
Gramsci, especially among the ranks of professionals, is a doomed quest.
But if all intellectuals attain their status as intellectuals by virtue of their distance from
their public, this should not be entirely sobering. The intellectual disparity between, for instance,
Karl Menninger, Erich Fromm, and Thomas Szasz is by no means negligible. Their association
with various professional inflections of psychological inquiry did anything but force them into
one point of view. The diversity of their visions should show that the categories of ‘professional’
and ‘non-professional’ are less distinct than some who oppose intellectuals to the representatives
of the professions might have it. The lay analysts operated on the margins of the psychological
professions, but this margin gave them a viable standpoint from which to establish an
authoritative voice. To be certain, some of these voices will wield more ‘real power’ than others;
the Menningers helped engineer a massive installment of psychiatry into all kinds of institutional
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settings, while Erich Fromm’s voice marshaled far fewer professional resources. But as popular
writers, they commanded a relatively comparable amount of public attention.
Professionals and the Public
In recent years, a debate has raged over issues involving public intellectuals,
professionalism, and popular writing. Participants in this debate frequently find the professions
lacking because of their alleged failure to take the public into consideration when they go about
their professional duties. The zero-sum gain model of professionalization would have it that a
professional advance would necessarily involve a public loss. In this narrative, the ostensibly
‘private’ world of the profession seals itself off through its own specialization. Professional
jargon, valued for its incomprehensibility to the public, legitimates the profession itself by virtue
of its difference from any common tongues.
The irony of these debates over the insularity of the professions, as Bruce Robbins has
pointed out, has been that they have been held in public view. Articles and books by such
academic figures as Louis Menand, Alan Wald, Todd Gitlin, and Russell Jacoby have found
professionals lacking in their public outreach, but have successfully communicated this lack of
outreach to a wide audience. Robbins suggests that this indicates something about the
professions themselves. He claims that professionals have internalized versions of ‘the public’
which shape how they go about their professional lives. “Professions,” Robbins concludes, “are
not hermetically sealed, but porous” (1993, p. 91).
Strangely enough, many of the critics of the zero-sum-game-school who find the
professions overly exclusive point to the professions’ power to legitimate themselves to the
public as one of their most important tasks. Frequently, legitimation is thought to issue (at least
in part) from the professional jargon that acts as an index of the professional’s place in the
professions. But certainly legitimation itself requires more than just the power to demonstrate a
complex jargon. Magali Larson describes how “narrow specialization” does not instantly
transform itself into the legitimation of a profession. She doubts that “specialties whose functions
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are not really understood by any significant sector of the public.. .can sustain the full ideology of
profession” (1977, p. 231). In particular, she discusses how professional persuasion is typically
directed outside of the profession, “to the relevant elites, the potential public or publics, and the
political authorities” (Larson, p. xii, as quoted in Robbins). Eliot Freidson has addressed
something closely parallel to this, in his description of how estimations of professions’ powers
require consideration into the kind of clientele which is serviced. Public opinion plays a widely
variable role here. Freidson observes that, in America, “illness...excites the greatest amount of
public interest and concern and that therefore attracts a great deal of attention by mass media
seeking to increase their circulation” (1986, p. 219).
When the professional need for a modicum of public approval is considered, along with
the American tendency to reserve a prominent place for discussions relating to sickness, it
becomes less surprising that psychiatrists pursued such a public profile in the 1940’s. Because
psychiatrists proposed such a broad application of psychiatry to everyday life, they required some
political and public approval to actually accomplish what they set out to do. Psychiatry’s stigma
played a role here, too. Because there was a negative image to correct, psychiatry was in a
particularly tender situation. The outcome was a kind of writing that was redolent of
professionalism, but by no means incomprehensible. The jargon that the critics of
professionalism consider only in terms of its difference from everyday language had been merged
with a popular approach. Thusly, Karl Menninger’s books read much like psychiatry lectures.
He presumed no (or little) previous medical knowledge, and emphasized the psychiatric features
of problems that touched everyone. William Menninger and Edward Strecker both considered
World War II with an explicitly psychiatric terminology in tow, but their goals clearly involved
much more than a mere display of expertise could accomplish. They had to simultaneously show
themselves to be professionals and explain their own relevance to the public; this shaped their
prose to their purpose. Because they wanted to appeal to the public, they had to come up with a
way of shaping their messages that allowed the public ‘in’ on their work. Professional jargon
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certainly carried with it an exclusionary dimension, but it was couched in a narrative that invited
the public’s approval for the professional endeavor.
The lay analysts, and psychiatric upstarts like Fredric Wertham and Thomas Szasz,
pursued a tack that made professional jargon out as an exclusionary scheme. As dissenters
against the orthodox psychiatric outreach, it was in their own interest to authorize themselves to
their audience by virtue of their dissent. They programmed the idea o f jargon (and their distance
from that jargon) into their narratives as proof o f their allegiance to the audience. This seems to
be a natural precipitate of the interaction of the position of the professional dissenter and the act
of popularization. Popularization, that is, might be a natural move for professionals whose
dominated position (within the profession or within the broader society) allows them to bathe
their writing in the sense that they are closing ranks with their audience. For this reason, perhaps,
some of the most notable popular professionals are the kind of ‘iconoclastic’ figures who come
from the edges of the profession. This would certainly apply to the popular work of Erich Fromm
and Robert Lindner, and also to more recent popularizers such as Mike Davis and Camille Paglia.
These figures derive much o f their authority from the fact of their dissent, which they cast as a
guarantee of their allegiance to the people, or to truth. The popular expert, in all cases, attempts
to construct homologies between their own position in the world and their audience’s position.
The idea of the neologism, briefly addressed in this study, plays into this sense of
deploying language as an authoritative strategy. The neologism shows how professionals, when
writing for lay audiences, can create terms that retain the professional goals of claiming a
monopoly of competence for the profession while also departing from the ‘merely’ professional
mode of discourse. Strecker applied the already loaded term ‘mom’ to describe what he
considered to be a psychiatric problem in how children were being raised; Wertham suggested a
raft of neologisms to claim comic books for psychiatry; Lindner launched dozens of polemics
with his unique use of the term ‘rebellion’. While many of these terms were not wholly invented
by these experts, the experts did apply them in new ways, and framed entire debates with them.
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They were clearly intended as catch-phrases, used particularly for lay audiences. Used by both
the orthodox and heterodox parts of the psychological field, neologisms show how professionals
were indeed tailoring their messages to be comprehensible to their audiences. These were not just
professional messages distributed by large publishing houses and magazines; these were
messages constructed with the anticipation of a lay audience. While this may strike some as little
more than a condescension to the people, it must be admitted that this public professionalism, as I
call it, involved a move away from the standard intra-professional mode of address.
The Idea of Centrifugality, and the Professionalism of the Popularizer
In an effort to refute, or at least complicate this picture, Bruce Robbins has considered
how professional figures in English departments might justify their own professionalism to a
public that is often uncertain about the value of studying literature. He recalls how, when called
to justify the study of literature to an uninterested audience, he arrived at the claim that he was
interested in narrative, and because English departments specialize in studying narrative and
narrative is such a profound dimension o f everything, his academic standpoint is therefore
particularly relevant to everything. ‘Everything is narrative’ arises from his professional need to
legitimate his own work (1993, pp. 84-85).
The public professionals studied here, o f course, were not members of English
departments. But Robbins’ anecdote regarding the legitimation of professional tasks highlights
one of the most universal features o f the psychiatric and psychoanalytic writing I have reviewed.
When called to justify his own interest to the public, Robbins provided an extremely broad
definition o f the domain of his (ostensibly shared) professional enterprise. The same interaction
of the public and the professions obtained in the popular professionalism composed by the
Menningers, Strecker, Wertham, Lindner, and Fromm. Instead of representing their professions
of psychiatry and psychoanalysis in the terms that had traditionally constrained those sub-fields,
these authors reached out, expanding centrifugally from the old centers of professional practice to
show how the professional approach could apply to the audience. The psychiatrists did not
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merely describe how useful the maintenance and improvement of mental hospital was to society;
they made dramatic steps away from the mental hospital, showing how psychiatry could be used
to understand and treat issues that were less closely associated with psychiatry, such as war, the
family, sexuality, crime, suicide, and physical illness. Frequently, these narratives described how
psychiatry should be used (via a mental hygiene or social psychiatry approach) to preserve mental
health, and not just treat mental illness. The lay analysts, who dissented from so many
psychiatric moves, shared with psychiatrists the concern for a move out from the traditional
boundaries of psychoanalysis. They suggested how psychoanalytic approaches could be applied
to everyone’s life, and in particular to problems of political organization, war, and crime. Again,
centrifugality was readily apparent.
The popularization of a professional approach can be said to involve an attempt to
broaden the profession so that its relevance to a lay audience can be established. One obvious
result of this is that there were (to my knowledge) no popular books by psychiatrists that
attempted to explain psychiatry solely in terms of the mental hospital. Because that topic lacks an
immediate relevance to the lay audience’s lives (and also because it dwells on a part of the
psychiatric profession that was downplayed because of its relationship to the stigma of mental
illness), it made for a poor route to popular outreach. As with Robbins showing that ‘everything
is literature,’ the public professional psychiatrists and analysts had to show that ‘everything is
mental illness’. The quest for public legitimation is an enticement for professionals to arrive at
understandings of their professions that make the centrifugal move away from the center, the
insinuation of the profession into the ‘everything’ so that its relevance cannot be mistaken. In
this sense, ‘going public’ can be understood to be something different from merely putting the
profession up for public consumption. Instead, going public involves fashioning a version of the
profession that makes the case for the profession’s legitimacy and future inroads to power.
So, going public is not a content-neutral act, whereby certain random professionals say
totally undetermined things about themselves and their professions. In particular, we have seen
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the familiar pattern of crisis rhetoric at work in this public professionalism. The idea of the
construction of social problems has been a frequent topic of communication scholarship.
Malcolm Spector and John Kitsuse framed the approach to the constructionist approach to social
problems in part by explaining how social problems are the stock in trade of professions.
Considering social problems in terms of claims-making, they describe how “the belief that
something could be done about a condition is a prerequisite to its becoming a social problem”
(1987, p. 84). They turn to Everett Hughes to consider the professions’ special role in this
scheme. Hughes asserted that
“[i]t is in the course of interaction with one another and with the professionals that the
problems o f people are given definitions.. .Professionals do not merely serve. They
define the very wants they serve” (Hughes, as quoted in Spector and Kitsuse, p. 85)
By making themselves and their professional groupings out to be the much-needed bulwark
between society and a social problem, frequently described as a ‘crisis’, professionals underwrite
their own public outreach, making their authority out to be a needed weapon if the problems they
construct are to be improved upon. This helps explain why World War II—with its attendant
concerns regarding fascism, communism, and Nazism—loomed so large in the writing of almost
all of the experts analyzed here. It was a proximal, vivid crisis that required little embellishment
to justify its status as a crisis. And, of course, psychiatry’s prominent role in the war helped the
Menningers and Strecker to address it with an insider’s point of view.
The importance of the crisis seems to line up quite well with the professions’ tendency to
move out centrifugally when writing for a lay audience. Both crisis rhetoric and centrifugal
moves fit well with the act of popularization. An exception to this rule can be found in the
writing of Thomas Szasz. Szasz is the only expert who did not really use new broad definitions
of psychiatry to establish the relevance of what he was saying. But he certainly relied on crisis
rhetoric in his effort to destroy psychiatry. The only difference was that the crisis he referred to
was the expansion of psychiatry itself. In this sense, Szasz turned crisis rhetoric against the
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centrifugality of the profession. In so doing, he was casting himself as the truest professional
amongst the psychiatrists.
If, as I am asserting here, the drive to popularize is linked (albeit indirectly) to some of
the most basic tendencies within professionalism, then the rise o f a popular version of a
profession can be taken as an (but certainly not the only) index of that profession’s power. The
limited examples of psychiatry and psychoanalysis would bear this out; their power moves as
professional formations were very closely linked. Both were becoming popular modes of writing
immediately after World War II, as they were expanding numerically (in terms of numbers of
practitioners and patients) and qualitatively (in terms of the breadth of issues that each considered
germane to itself). In this sense, then, the public interface between a profession and an audience
is an important place to look to get an idea of how a profession can sustain itself. It is not only
‘inside’ the profession that power is manifested.
This comes as a refinement of what Stanley Fish has asserted regarding the notion of
academics who go public. Fish claims that if “ ‘public intellectual’ is anything, it is a job
description, and. ..not a job for which academics, as academics, are particularly qualified” (1995,
p. 125). As he sees it, “the academic who goes public successfully will have done so not by
extending his professional literary skills, but by learning the skills of another profession” (1995,
p. 125). Fish addresses professors within the humanities who argue for a more publicly
accessible academia, and who believe that professors should become public intellectuals even if it
flies in the face of professionalism. In his writing on academia, Fish stresses the value of
professionalism over against the concern for ‘public’-ness; good professors, he thinks, make for
bad public intellectuals. But if the examples of the psychiatrists and psychoanalysts are to be
attended to, (and my analysis to be believed, which is asking somewhat more) it would seem that
popularization and professionalism can be mutually consistent goals. The profession of
psychiatry used its popular push to legitimate itself in spite of (and to some degree because of) its
bad public image. And while there are no examples of precise victories that popularization alone
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earned for psychiatry, it cannot be said that all popularization was done despite professionalism.
It is more appropriate to say that the popularization was carried out in the name of
professionalism, so completely were the two tendencies were largely reconciled. Even the
psychoanalytic incursion was carried out with professional beliefs in mind; again professional
ideals were furthered through popular writing.
But this is not to say that any profession can find equal footing in the popular field. Fish
criticizes the would-be public intellectuals from English departments because, as he sees it, even
if English professors did write for a wide audience, it would not make a difference. He defines
the public intellectual as someone who addresses “matters of public concern” and who has the
public’s attention. As he sees it, the move toward cultural studies, with its hopes of engagement
and extra-professional reach, will remain irrelevant to the public because academics do not have
the public’s attention and have no direct means of gaining that attention (1995, p. 118).
The psychiatrists and lay analysts addressed here complicate matters somewhat. They
certainly addressed issues of public concern and they did have the public’s attention.
Furthermore, figures like the Menningers and Strecker show that a rather uncomplicated
professionalism was consistent with the expansion of the domain of psychiatry into areas of
public concern, and the act of publicizing themselves. And while the lay analysts and dissenters
like Wertham and Szasz had a more complicated relationship to professionalism—one which
involved a some kind of critique of orthodoxy that positioned them as elevated above the ‘blue
chip’ experts like the Menninger—their writings still showed the same general pattern of a
centrifugal expansion of the profession paired with popularization. One important difference
between the psychiatry during the mid-ZO111century and the academy today is that psychiatry had
a favorable position from which to speak authoritatively. Psychiatry had two factors working in
its favor: it carried with it the unparalleled authority of medicine (just at the time that medicine
itself had burnished its image with germ theory and anti-biotics), and it occupied a major place in
the institutions of power, most notably during World War II, allowing its members to speak with
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the authority of those who had truly been involved in the issues they had discussed. Few
professions can claim this place on the social topology; this may account for some of the reasons
why academics can have the kinds of difficulty getting the public’s attention that Fish says they
do.
But the lay analysts, Fromm and Lindner, explicitly disavowed any connection to
medicine, and they did not have particularly important places in the major institutions of power.
And while Lindner did not have quite the size audience that Fromm did, both of them did get the
attention of the public. I assert (above), moreover, that they both did this while nevertheless
retaining a kind of professionalism in their work. Their position, in this sense, would seem to
mirror that of the academic today, possessing a certain cultural capital unique to their professional
background, but lacking the dominant position within the dominant class that gives them direct
inroads to power. They were not the kind of ‘pure’ intellectuals that some critics have called for;
both sustained themselves with professional positions that augmented (and informed) their
stances as writers. If they can be considered professional, it might be that the much lamented
disappearance of public intellectuals cannot be laid entirely at the door of professionalism. If
public intellectuals have, in fact, disappeared, the work of professionals like Fromm and Lindner
stand as strong examples of how professionalism could be consistent with the kind of work many
ask public intellectuals to do today.
Professionals, Intellectuals, Pundits, Journalists, and the Role of Communication
These conclusions regarding the professional as public intellectual find me wrestling with
existing definitions and oppositions between such terms as intellectuals, public intellectuals, and
professionals. My suggestion of a new label, the awkward one o f ‘public professionals,’ has
almost predetermined this confusion, formulated as it was to invite comparisons between two
groups frequently thought to be opposites, intellectuals and professionals. The idea of the
professionalism’s role in the supposed decline of public intellectuals does not go away. A recent
round table discussion published in The Nation demonstrates some o f the oppositions at work
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here. Russell Jacoby, reiterating his argument in The Last Intellectuals, describes how the
generation of intellectuals that included the New York intellectuals “started off as independent
intellectuals writing for small magazines and ended up as professors,” while “the next generation
started off as professors, wrote differently and thought differently” (“The Future of the Public
Intellectual,” 2001, p. 26). This different writing, Jacoby avers, involves a more professional, and
therefore necessarily less public, mode of address, so that “the university and professionalization
does absorb and suck away too much talent, and.. .there are too few who are bucking the trends”
(“The Future of the Public Intellectual,” 2001, p. 26).
This is familiar, intuitively appealing, and probably partly correct. After all, the bulk of
professional writing is carried out for a strictly professional audience, limiting the ‘public’ nature
of such writing. However, much of the Jacoby’s analysis seems to follow simply from his own
rather flexible categories. Because he uses ‘public intellectual’ in an honorific and very limited
sense, his argument is rather brittle. In the same round table discussion, Herbert Gans points out
this very fact. Gans argues that “the public intellectual is alive and well,” noting that “[o]ne of
the reasons the number of [public intellectuals] is increasing is that public intellectuals are really
pundits.. .And the moment you say they’re pundits, then you can start comparing them to other
pundits, of which we have lots” (“The Future of the Public Intellectual,” 2001, p. 30). I agree
with Gans on this point. Public intellectuals do invite comparisons with pundits, and though we
are accustomed to thinking of public intellectuals as good and pundits as bad, it may be difficult
to arrive at any justifiable means by which the two categories can be tweezed apart. Journalists
represent another category of writers who address concerns of public importance and who
routinely get public attention. A meaningful category of ‘public intellectual’ might need to
include (or at least account for) journalists. With this conceptual stickiness in mind, I would like
to make the point that the public professionals whose writing I have examined could be
considered as public intellectuals.
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In the debate regarding the inter-relationship of professionalism and intellectuals, one
factor that is frequently overlooked or neglected is the role played by the media systems at work
in the world of public intellectuals. I suggest that a concern for the processes of mass
communication (and now, the Internet) can bring to the debate more fruitful questions regarding
how public intellectuals have established, and framed, their public stature. Without addressing
the specific rhetorical poses of the public intellectuals, and without any precise accounting of the
ways in which the popular media become involved in these issues of ‘public’-ness, it is difficult
to know exactly what a public intellectual might be. By no means am I the first to forge into this
territory. Charles Kadushin’s American Intellectual Elite (1974) took a frank approach to the
relationship between mass media and intellectuals. Though they take differing approaches,
Andrew Ross’s No Respect (1989) and Paul Gorman’s Left Intellectuals and Popular Culture
(1996) both interrogate the relationship between the intellectual and popular culture. However,
there is still much work to be done.
Why Go Public?
At least one question remains: if professionalism is (as this analysis would have it)
sometimes consistent with going public, why are we not drowning in popular professionalism?
Why do some professionals write for a lay audience, while the extant majority do not? As we
have already seen, many have asserted that professionalism simply does not lend itself to going
public. Fish argues that a profession is defined by its insularity, and that this is not necessarily a
bad thing (1995). Magali Larson charts a narrative of professionalization that in some ways
defines public and professional in opposition to each other (1977). Russell Jacoby does much the
same thing (1987). Without necessarily directly contradicting any of them, it could be helpful to
understand some of the factors that were at work in the public professionalism of psychiatry and
psychoanalysis during the mid-20th century. Though I cannot completely answer the question
‘why did they go public?’, I am choosing instead to modify the question, and ask: ‘what factors
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were at work that made these professionals’ positions more consistent with popular writing than
other professionals?’
One of the most obvious factors that seems to have played a role in popular psychiatry
was the individual’s prominence within psychiatry. Even before the Menningers were known for
their popular writing, they were recognized as standard-bearers of the psychiatric profession.
Both held important positions as organizers and leaders of psychiatric organizations. Also, the
Menninger Clinic’s position as a psychiatric version of the Mayo Clinic played an important role
in this. Because mental hospitals were, to say the least, not widely admired, the Menningers
could base their authority on their connection to the mental hospital that (at least in terms of
public face) least resembled the kind of repressive organizations that mental hospitals were
thought to be. Public mental hospitals did not lend themselves to popular writing, in part because
of those institutions’ emphasis on custodial duties (as opposed to, say, other professional
activities such as writing and devising new treatment techniques), and, I assert, also because the
public institutions bore the brunt of psychiatry’s stigma. Though psychiatrists like Fredric
Wertham and Edward Strecker both maintained ties to public mental hospitals, they found ways

writing and playing their association with that institution off as a sign of dedication to the
downtrodden. Overall, the admittedly non-earth-shattering conclusion would be that
professionals who possess a great deal of professional cultural capital are more likely to be found
in the ranks of the popularizers.
The work of these psychiatric and psychoanalytic experts also shows that a major event,
such as World War II, can be capitalized upon to grant entry into public debate. The psychiatric
experts, with William Menninger and Edward Strecker in the lead, used their positions as experts
who worked for the military to cast themselves as rightful possessors of the monopoly of
competence to pronounce on the broader import o f the war. The fact that they had either been
there, giving psychiatric service to the soldiers, or screened a large number of potential soldiers,
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made psychiatry out as something besides the study of incurables in mental hospitals. So, the war
allowed psychiatrists an opportunity to re-define the focus of their field. It also gave psychiatrists
a major issue of obviously public importance with which to install themselves into a kind of
punditocracy. With their foot in the door thanks to the war, the psychiatrists could then spread
out from the war to the innumerable contiguous areas of expertise. This was perhaps best
illustrated by Strecker’s use of the war as a way of arriving at his ‘mom’-oriented psychiatric
insights regarding raising children, and then branching out to many other issues. Major events,
like wars, can provide a popularizing impetus to the professions that claim proximity to that war.
Professionals in such a position find themselves in possession of a consecrated competence to
address an issue that is thought to affect everyone, and this can be parlayed into a move to go
public.
The war also occupied an important place in the writing of Fromm and Lindner, both of
whom applied their analytic perspectives to issues like Nazism and fascism. To some degree, this
may indicate that even the heterodoxy can benefit from the gains of the orthodoxy. In this case,
perhaps it was psychiatry’s successful claiming of the war that eased psychoanalysis’s move into
the war. However, this seems unlikely. Erich Fromm’s Escape From Freedom, his book that
most clearly addresses the issue of fascism and Nazism, was published in 1941, before most
psychiatrists had been able to claim the war for psychiatry. And it must also be remembered that
World War II was turf that was contested by a wide range of professions, even if psychiatry was
granted a special place in this. Lay analysis did not occupy the same institutional position as did
psychiatry during the war, and for this reason, its experts arrived at popular works that related to
less directly to the war. While Strecker and William Menninger talked about the experiences of
soldiers, Lindner and Fromm addressed broader political issues of fascism. So, the war gave the
lay analysts something to talk about, but gave the psychiatrists a more direct way of capitalizing
on their prominent position within the war effort.
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If possession of large amounts of professional capital and the proximity to
unambiguously important events gives professionals a nudge in the direction of popularization, I
also suggest that some kinds of professional dissent lend themselves to a certain way of going
public. The heterodox lay analysts, as we have seen, were able to play off their position outside
of the orthodoxy as evidence o f their allegiance to the public they addressed. Fredric Wertham
retained a great deal of professionalism in his writing, but also arrived at a stance that disdained
the psychiatrists who did not get down to the street level as much as he did. And Thomas Szasz
explored a kind of Mobius strip running between professionalism and heterodox opposition. So,
perhaps reassuringly, it is definitely not just those who possess the ‘blue chip’, orthodox expertise
who can successfully sculpt a public posture. Public professionals representing many types of
intra-professional difference, whose authority was written in terms of these fissures, played a
major role.
What this indicates is that, in the long-discussed terms of the opposition of
professionalization and public intellectuals, the kinds of critical intellectuals who are frequently
thought to be a necessary part of democracy, do not have to occupy a truly ‘non-professional’
stance. If the critique of professionalism relies on a justified concern for its tendency to create
monoliths of authority, I suggest that professionalism itself is not (or at least, not always) so
monolithic. Psychoanalysis, as practiced by so-called ‘lay’ analysts, was in some ways a
profession. It was a formalized body of knowledge that informed a set of specialized practices.
As such, the public professionals from that specialty, such as Fromm and Lindner, authorized
their writing with the imprimatur o f their theoretical language and with reference to their
experience as analysts. But this professional angle did not put them in the same league as figures
like the Menningers. Precisely because their own claims to authority were denied by the
psychiatric orthodoxy, their writing was impelled toward a denunciation of that orthodoxy. To a
lesser extent, the same holds true for Wertham, whose social psychiatry and activism made him
an upstart within the profession, and Szasz, whose frank disavowal of medical understandings of
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human behavior cast him as a total outcast. A profession’s hold on authority is fluid and
contestable, and at each point of institutional difference, there is a potential for a criticism that
looks to the public, asserting an organic relationship to that public. And while this is not all done
in the name of an unalloyed professionalism, it still seems that professionalism can itself be
consistent with the kind of commentary most closely associated with public intellectuals.
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